Military

Forward...From The Sea; Can We?

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

 

 

 

                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

 

Title: Forward... From The Sea; Can We?

 

Author: Major M.G. Dunnagan, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: Although the Navy and Marine Corps espouse the forward from the sea concept,

deficiencies in mine countermeasure capabilities may hinder our ability to do so.

 

Background: The United States Navy and Marine Corps recently published a joint

strategic concept which will guide them into the next century. "Forward... From The

Sea" stresses the need for a forward deployed naval presence which can react swiftly to a

crisis which effects our national security. In order to do this, the naval force must have

the capability to rapidly introduce combat power ashore. A deficiency in Shallow Water

Mine Countermeasures (SWMCM) was higlighted during Desert Storm, which may

preclude the projection of power ashore in future scenarios. The Navy and Marine Corps

have formed a joint SWMCM program monitored by a Three-Star Steering Group and a

SWMCM Commitee. A number of programs are being studied and developed to give the

Navy/Marine Corps team a viable SWMCM capability. Some of these improved

capabilities are already fielded while others will not be fielded for 10 to 15 years.

Continued command interest as well as continued budgeting will be required to ensure

naval forces have the capability to project power ashore in support of national interests.

 

Recommendation: Operational Maneuver From The Sea and Over The Horizon are

outstanding concepts, but without a viable SWMCM capability, these concepts may not

be possible in future scenarios. The Navy and Marine Corps must continue to develop a

SWMCM capability as well as incorporate joint breaching operations into amphibious

training exercises.

 

             FORWARD...FROM THE SEA; CAN WE?

 

 

 

     The United States Navy and Marine Corps recently

 

published a joint strategic concept which will guide them

 

into the next century.  "Forward... From The Sea" stresses

 

the need for a forward deployed Naval presence to react

 

swiftly to any crisis which may effect our national

 

interests or national security.  Focusing on the littoral

 

area, Navy and Marine Corps forces can seize and defend

 

advanced bases--ports and airfields--to enable the flow of

 

lands-based air and ground forces....1  This represents a

 

major shift in focus for the Navy, from deep water

 

operations to littoral operations.

 

     In this paper I will look at one aspect of amphibious

 

warfare that has often been overlooked but which is of

 

extreme importance.  Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures

 

(SWMCM) represent a major deficiency in our amphibious

 

capabilities.  Although this deficiency was recognized by

 

the Navy it was really brought to the forefront by the Gulf

 

War.  The Iraqis heavily mined the coastline of Kuwait and

 

had we decided to conduct an amphibious assault it would

 

have been extremely costly in both equipment and lives due

 

to a SWMCM deficiency.  The Navy and Marine Corps are

 

currently involved in developing capabilities and procedures

 

to enable naval forces to assault through mined littoral

 

areas.

 

     There are two reasons why this deficiency was allowed

 

to exist.  One reason was the Navy's former focus on deep

 

water operations.  Until recently, the amphibious side of

 

the Navy was viewed by many as a necessary evil and was

 

treated with great disdain.  All counter mine warfare was in

 

the deep water Navy, which was not collocated with nor had

 

any dialogue with the amphib Navy.  This represents a

 

problem as these two communities, now heavily involved in

 

SWMCM efforts, are still not overly conversant in each

 

other's capabilities and techniques.  The good news is that

 

they are working to overcome this deficiency.

 

     SWMCM deficiencies also resulted from the previous

 

focus on Europe and NATO during the Cold War.  One aspect of

 

the NATO alliance was the reliance of member countries on

 

each other for various capabilities.  Since many of our NATO

 

allies have a SWMCM capability it was felt that it would be

 

too costly for the United States to develop a capability

 

which was considered a duplication.  For these reasons,

 

there is a very large hole in our ability to conduct

 

amphibious operations, against a determined enemy with a

 

mine capability, in a littoral area.

 

     In response to this identified shortcoming, the Navy

 

and the Marine Corps have formed a joint SWMCM program

 

monitored by a Three--Star Steering Group and a SWMCM

 

Committee.  A number of programs are being studied and

 

developed to give the Navy/ Marine Corps team a viable SWMCM

 

capability.  These programs are divided into near term (5

 

years) and far term (10 years).  The priority for the Marine

 

Corps is to develop detection and reconnaissance assets to

 

enable avoidance as well as exploitation of gaps and to aid

 

in mine warfare planning.  Amphibious warfare doctrine

 

recommends avoiding mined areas through maneuver

 

capabilities or taking overt actions to prevent the hostile

 

mining of coastal and open water areas.2

 

     The areas in the littorals that must be breached are

 

broken down into five distinct areas.  Traditionally, the

 

Navy has the responsibility of clearing mines/obstacles up

 

to the high tide mark, the Marine Corps has the

 

responsibility of clearing from the high tide mark inland.

 

More precisely:

     Mines must be detected, prepared for neutralization

     and neutralized in the deep water (over 200'),

     shallow water (200'--40') and very shallow water

     (40'--10') approaches to the beach without alerting the

     defender or in--stride with the assault. After the

     approaches are clear, the surf zone (10'--0'),

     beach and craft landing zone mine/obstacle

     barriers must be breached in--stride.3  In order to do

 

this, multi--faceted detection, breaching and lane marking

 

capabilities must be developed, tested and trained with.

 

 

 

                        THE THREAT

 

 

     The end of the Cold War has ushered in an era of world

 

instability and uncertainty.  The Navy/Marine Corps team can

 

no longer focus on only a few areas as "The Threat."  Naval

 

Expeditionary Forces may be called upon to conduct

 

amphibious operations in any number of the world's

 

littorals.  The fall of the Soviet Union has served to

 

exacerbate this problem with the widespread proliferation of

 

weapons of all kinds, to include traditional and

 

non-traditional types of mines.  Any threat country that

 

possesses a coastal navy could easily develop a credible and

 

sophisticated mine warfare capability.  As mine

 

proliferation in the past has not been given the same

 

scrutiny as armored vehicles or aircraft, and mine sales are

 

difficult to track and inventories are difficult to

 

determine, such a capability could present a tactical

 

surprise.4  Obviously, a tactical surprise to an amphibious

 

unit in the assault could result in mission failure.  The

 

high level of mine proliferation world--wide is one reason

 

why the Marine Corps' priority is to develop detection and

 

reconnaissance capabilities.

 

     Marine Corps doctrine and amphibious operations are

 

critically dependent upon mobility and maneuver.  A threat

 

country with a naval mining capability can seriously impede

 

maneuver and conceivably slow down or completely stop

 

mobility.  Given the fact that 90% of the United States

 

strategic lift is done by sealift, the magnitude of the

 

threat grows exponentially.  A viable SWMCM capability is

 

necessary to ensure success for any naval force projection.

 

     The proliferation of mines poses a serious problem to

 

United States naval forces in the near term.  Today 49

 

countries possess a [water] mining capability, of which 29

 

have some demonstrated mine production capacity and 20 are

 

attempting to export mines.5  Mining is probably the

 

simplest and the least expensive means of denying a littoral

 

area to a naval force.  The lack of a SWMCM capability in

 

our naval forces became public knowledge following Desert

 

Storm.  Our SWMCM capability is the Achilles heel of our

 

naval force projection concept espoused in "FORWARD... FROM

 

THE SEA."

 

     Many types of mines are now available for naval use on

 

the world market, ranging from the more traditional "dumb"

 

mines to a wide variety of technologically advanced mines.

 

The variety and availability of these mines make

 

countermeasures extremely difficult.  The following is a

 

brief survey of some of the new technology available today

 

or in the near future.

 

       "Stealth" Mines. With the improvement in detection

       means, means for avoiding detection are also

       improving. These are primarily for bottom mines,

       and include nonmetallic casings, non--traditional

       shapes, casings made of materials that can avoid

       sonar detection and casings that enable the mine

       to bury itself in the bottom. These methods for

       avoiding detection will be on the market within

       10 years.

       Mobile Mines. These mines are launched from a

       platform such as a small craft or a submarine and

       travel under their own power to a designated point.

       This gives the using country plausible deniability.

       Mines of this type are produced and offered for sale

       by Russia.

       Anti-invasion Mines. These mines are specifically

       designed to target landing craft and vehicles in or

       near the surf zone. Although not sophisticated, the

       dynamics of the surf zone make them difficult to

       detect and neutralize.

       "Active" Mines. This type of mine is a munitions

       launching platform in itself. The Russian MSHM mine

       is able to shoot a torpedo at its selected target.

       Further technological developments will likely enable

       the targeting of LCACs and helicopters involved in

       sweep operations. Active mines give a minefield its

       own self-protection capability.6

 

     In addition to these types of mines, technology has

 

made a new generation of fuses, combination sensors, and

 

detonators.  Using the right fuse gives the mine target

 

discrimination and counter--countermeasure capabilities.

 

The seemingly endless combinations available will continue

 

to create problems for mine countermeasure efforts.  Many of

 

these new generation fuses are available off the shelf,

 

adding one to a traditional "dumb" mine gives the threat

 

country a sophisticated weapon.

 

     The easy availability of many of these mines and fuses

 

makes the chances of encountering them in a future conflict

 

very likely.  This paper will now turn to the initiatives

 

that are being studied or developed to enable the Naval

 

Expeditionary Force to project power ashore.

 

 

               INITIATIVES/ CAPABILITIES

 

 

     The preferred method for dealing with any mined area is

 

avoidance.  If there are other beaches in the area which

 

will accommodate an amphibious landing and the concept of

 

operations, the landing force should avoid mined areas

 

through operational maneuver from the sea.  The problem with

 

this is the lack of reconnaissance and intelligence assets

 

available to the CATF and CLF to give them this type of

 

information.  Another option is to generate rules of

 

engagement, early in the crisis, which allow pre--emptive

 

strikes prior to commencement of the operation.  These

 

strikes would be conducted against the enemy's mine

 

manufacturing or storage facilities, mine laying platforms

 

and units which lay the mines.  Unfortunately, pre--emptive

 

strikes are not always a viable option.  Therefore, the

 

landing force must have the ability to conduct countermine

 

operations from shallow water inland to craft landing

 

zones(CLZ).  This paper will take a look at some

 

capabilities that are on hand now and others that will

 

become available in the near term and far term.

 

     Presently, the principle forces available to the Navy

 

for MCM operations are ships and helicopters.  The

 

Avenger(MCM--1) is the larger ship, capable of 13.5 knots.

 

A total of 14 of these are becoming available now.  The

 

Osprey(MHC--51) will be delivered over the next 3 years and

 

will eventually total 12.  Additionally a MCM command and

 

control support ship will become available with the

 

conversion of the USS INCHON.  This ship will enhance C4I

 

for the MCM forces.  The Osprey is capable of conducting

 

mine sweep and neutralization operations in water as shallow

 

as 30 feet but prefers to operate in a minimum depth of 40

 

feet to reduce the ship's vulnerability to mines.

 

     The MH--53E Sea Dragon offers a rapid response MCM

 

capability as it can be strategically air lifted to the

 

crisis area.  The Sea Dragon can conduct sweep operations

 

faster than the Osprey but cannot identify mines, requiring

 

time consuming post--flight analysis.  This helicopter can

 

conduct sweep operations in water as shallow as 20 feet, but

 

cannot sweep at night or during periods of reduced

 

visibility.

 

     Modifications to the LCAC have created the

 

Multi--purpose Craft Air Cushion(MCAC), two of which have

 

MCM applications.  In one configuration, the MCAC conducts

 

sweep operations towing the same array used by the Sea

 

Dragon.  In another configuration the MCAC conducts

 

breaching operations firing the M58 line charges.  These

 

modifications, when they become available to the fleet, will

 

offer a platform that is capable of conducting MCM

 

operations in shallow water, very shallow water and through

 

the surf zone.  The MCAC with line charges will have the

 

capability of conducting breaching operation past the high

 

tide mark to the CLZ.  A modification to the line charge

 

will have two rockets propel a surf zone array vice a single

 

line of explosive charge.  The surf zone array will breach

 

lanes in the water with a much higher degree of probability.

 

Experiments are also being conducted on an inexpensive

 

method to stabilize the rockets and to produce a straighter,

 

truer flight.  Unlike the Sea Dragon, the MCAC will have the

 

capability of operating 24 hours a day.

 

     In addition to the already mentioned assets which are

 

already available or under development, there are numerous

 

other capabilities being considered.  The EOD MCM Detachment

 

is specifically trained and equipped to support ship and

 

helo MCM operations by diving against influence fired

 

underwater ordnance.  The basic EOD Detachment cannot dive

 

against influence fired ordnance, but can be used to augment

 

operations in the surf zone and ashore.  The Marine Mammal

 

System is used with the EOD MCM Detachment and can detect,

 

mark and neutralize both moored and bottom mines.  The

 

Marine Mammal System is the only operational system with a

 

capability to detect buried mines.  These mammals have been

 

trained to place and activate explosives on or near the

 

mine, without injury to themselves.  There are numerous

 

other systems in the fleet or which will be available in the

 

immediate future which will enable MCM forces to hunt,

 

identify, sweep and neutralize mines.

 

     The near--term concept for conducting SWMCM operations

 

is somewhat bleak.  These types of operations can only be

 

conducted deliberately, in a benign environment.  The

 

concept is threat dependent from both a helicopter

 

perspective (exposure to enemy fire/asset limitations) as

 

well as to the degree of complexity/density of the

 

mine/obstacle barriers.7

 

     The far--term concept, when realized, will give the

 

naval Expeditionary Force the capability it needs to project

 

power ashore in a hostile environment.  This concept calls