Military

A Contrast In Capabilities:  Amphibious Forces At Inchon

And SWA

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - History

 

 

                               TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

INTRODUCTION                                                   PAGE 1

 

CHAPTER I                                                      PAGE(S) 2- 9

 

             AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

             AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY (1930'S-WWII)

             AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY (DEMOBILIZATION)

             AMPHIBIOUS PLANING REQUIREMENTS

 

CHAPTER II                                                      PAGE(S) 11-25

 

             AMPHIBIOUS LEADERSHIP/MACARTHUR AT INCHON

 

CHAPTER III                                                     PAGE(S) 25-32

 

             SOUTHWEST ASIA

             SWA (DEPLOYMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES)

             SWA (ARRIVAL OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF)

             SWA (AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING)

 

CHAPTER IV                                                     PAGE(S) 35-53

 

             COMPOSITING

INITIATING DIRECTIVE/AOA

 

             AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS/OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

             COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

             COMPOSITE WARFARE

 

CONCLUSION                                                     PAGE(S) 53-54

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 

       I left the Persian Gulf in June of 1991 convinced that it was time to leave the

 

Marine Corps. The past nine months had been an odyssey of incredible frustration, anger

 

and disbelief Serving as the S-4 of an infantry battalion in the 5th Marine Expeditionary

 

Brigade had been a unique experience. I joined the Marine Corps because my uncle, a

 

Marine in World War II, participated in every major campaign from the Marshalls to

 

Okinawa. His stories of these amphibious landings made me want to be a Marine. Forty

 

five years later I served with amphibious forces in the Persian Gulf. Based on this

 

experience I feel the Marine Corps had totally lost its amphibious capability. This belief

 

was rooted in emotion, not academic, analytical assessment.

 

       As time passed I realized I needed to examine the conduct of amphibious

 

operations during the Southwest Asia (SWA) conflict in detail. At my level, planing

 

seemed disjointed, crisis oriented, and ineffective. Initially, I blamed individuals. Surely

 

the Marines of my uncle's era would have done a better job. My research of this topic has

 

proven that these perceptions were understandable, yet at the same time, inaccurate. The

 

causes of the amphibious planning problems in the Gulf were systemic. Specifically, the

 

naval component commander for Central Command lacked the expertise to conduct

 

operational level amphibious planning. As a result of this deficiency, other staffs in the

 

joint command took the initiative in scripting the role of amphibious forces in the overall

 

campaign plan. This led to diffuse planning and distorted command relationships.

 

       This paper will also discuss factors that degraded the amphibious planning effort

 

at all levels in Southwest Asia. This will be accomplished by comparing the staff action

 

process at Inchon against that conducted during SWA. The Navy-Marine team at Inchon

 

used their extensive tactical proficiency in amphibious warfare with the operational level

 

of war vision established by General MacArthur. This special relationship was not present

 

during Southwest Asia. Amphibious planners in the Persian Gulf lacked the experience

 

and training of their Korean War predecessors. This deficiency was compounded by the

 

fact that the naval component headquarters in SWA failed to provide adequate guidance

 

during the planning process. The combination of these factors degraded unity of effort

 

and confused command relationships. The efficiency, focus, and rapidity of planning

 

during Inchon were not replicated during SWA. This paper will analyze the factors that

 

led to this contrast of staff capabilities. This analysis will also include recommendations to

 

enhance the amphbibious planning effort in future conflicts.

 

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

 

 

       The purpose of the following section is to illustrate the complexity and intellectual

 

magnitude of amphibious warfare. During the Gulf War several senior officers said that

 

the amphibious landing was the "easy part" of our operation.1 The author has served as a

 

Team Embarkation Officer on every class of amphibious ship, as a Combat Cargo Officer

 

for an LPD, and as an Officer-in-Charge of the Tactical-Logistics Group (TACLOG) for

 

three major deployments. The entire process by which Marines land from naval vessels is

 

anything but "easy". Extensive coordination, detailed planning, and reactive on-the-spot

 

adjustments are required to off-load men and material in a manner that supports the

 

commanders landing plan and subsequent scheme of maneuver ashore. This process

 

requires synchronization of various ship-to-shore assets from multiple platforms. Moving

 

thousands of men, hundreds of pieces of rolling stock/end items and sustainment ashore is

 

a complex task. Those that say this process is the "easy part" have never executed such a

 

maneuver.

 

       The key to success in this type of operation is having people who understand both

 

the theory and mechanics of the amphibious art/science. These personnel can de-conflict

 

the myriad of problems that arise during amphibious planning and execution. More

 

importantly, senior officers that possess these skills can craft visionary plans that maximize

 

the operational benefits offered by amphibious maneuver.

 

       Planners can draw from over sixty years of amphibious precedent in their quest for

 

effective staff action. The lack of comprehensive amphibious planning at some commands

 

during Southwest Asia would indicate that the Navy-Marine team has developed

 

institutional amnesia on matters relating to this specialized type of warfare. This deficiency

 

can be rectified by re-learning the lessons of history.

 

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY(1930'S - WWII)

 

 

 

       The methodology for the conduct of amphibious operations is based upon sixty

 

years of doctrinal development and historical application. The 1933-1945 period witnessed

 

the most dramatic growth and application of amphibious doctrine. The Commandant of

 

the Marine Corps suspended all formal instruction at the schools in Quantico in 1933 in

 

order to codify developing amphibious doctrine. The Tentative Manual for Landing

 

Operations of 1934 was the product of these efforts. This comprehensive publication

 

covered command relationships, ship-to-shore movement, naval gunfire, securing a

 

beachhead, and logistics.2

 

       These theories were first tested in peacetime exercises in the 1930's with mixed

 

results. The concept of landing from the sea was valid, yet amphibious techniques,

 

procedures, and equipment were still in the developmental stages. Work continued until

 

the outbreak of World War II, when theory was put to the ultimate test. Combat

 

procedures were written in blood as real world assaults quickly identified doctrinal

 

deficiencies. The extremely costly landing at "Bloody Tarawa" taught amphibious

 

planners valuable lessons on fire support, communications, and beach reconaissance/

 

hydrography. Even as these procedures were modified and improved it became apparent

 

that even under optimal conditions, amphibious assaults were costly endeavors. On Iwo

 

Jima the Marines suffered over 26,000 casualties; with 6,821 dead and 19,217 wounded.3

 

During the equally intense Okinawa campaign the Navy had 36 ships sunk and 368

 

damaged, with an astonishing 4,709 killed.4

 

       Amphibious warfare came of age during World War II. Planning procedures were

 

streamlined and made more effective as the war progressed After Midway and

 

Guadalcanal the Japanese were on the strategic defensive, thus allowing amphibious

 

planners to utilize a PERMA(Planning, Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement, Assault)

 

planning cycle. Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur provided unity of command in

 

their respective theaters while their staffs focused the amphibious planning effort towards

 

designated objectives. This atmosphere facilitated effective amphibious planning.

 

       The Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) received an initiating

 

directive that tasked him to conduct an amphibious operation to seize an area while

 

providing him with the assets, command/control, and authority to perform his job. Assets

 

were often scarce and in direct competition between each theater, but normally were

 

sufficient to gain a relative combat power advantage over the Japanese. The Commander

 

of the Landing Force (CLF) designed his concept of operations ashore and built an

 

organization for shipping that supported his scheme of maneuver ashore. Once the plan

 

was developed, forces were embarked in such a manner to support the landing plan. This

 

load plan was tested during the rehearsal phase to ensure the ship-to-shore movement

 

placed forces ashore in the proper sequence, at the correct time, and under the protective

 

umbrella of supporting air/naval gunfire. This practice landing was followed by movement

 

to the objective area and the actual assault.

 

       PERMA was a logical, linear, and rational planning process. This does not mean

 

that PERMA was simple to achieve or lock-step in exertion. Concurrent detailed

 

planning at all levels was required to synchronize the efforts of all participants. The

 

planning/supervisory responsibilities of the blue and green staffs were enormous. The

 

establishment of the amphibious objective area, sea echelon areas, and control of the

 

ship-to-shore movement were labor intensive. Landing plans and the associated serial

 

assignment, landing craft, and landing sequence tables were generated without the benefit

 

of computers and Xerox copy machines. The delivery of accurate, timely, and effective

 

naval gunfire/air was essential for movement against island defenses. Synchronizing and

 

concentrating this combat power required detailed coordination and extensive

 

communication. The spirit of this process was best summed up by the legendary World

 

War II amphibian, Rear Admiral R.K. Turner. He stated, "....the assembly of a large

 

amphibious attack force brings together numerous units of different arms and services

 

which may have operated together, or have had limited contact with each other. Since a

 

very high degree of coordination is required for a successful assault, the activities of each

 

of these elements must be carefully dovetailed with those of numerous other previously

 

unrelated elements...detailed supervision is required, if a smooth working team is to be

 

provided, and this supervision is exercised by a relatively small number of experienced

 

personnel."5 The PERMA process was executed by cadres of amphibious experts who

 

built an ever increasing reservoir of expertise with each landing. As the war progressed

 

the landings became larger and more complex. During the Guadalcanal campaign the

 

amphibious task force had 51 ships, a figure that was dwarfed by the 495 present for Iwo

 

Jima.6

 

       The point of this historical overview is to show that amphibious warfare came of

 

age in World War II. The mechanics and techniques of amphibious assault were hard

 

earned. None of this was easy because the lessons learned were written in blood. On

 

Tarawa the defects of our amphibious techniques became readily apparent. The

 

ship-to-shore movement was nearly ruined by poor hydrography and coral reefs. Planned

 

naval gunfire support was inadequate for the task at hand and poorly timed to maneuver

 

ashore. These problems were identified and corrected to the largest extent possible.

 

            The subsequent campaign against the Marshalls incorporated these lessons with

 

superb results. Fires, maneuver, and protection were weaved into a synchronized battle

 

plan that yielded high operational gains at low tactical cost. This campaign, code named

 

FLINTLOCK, secured a two thousand mile archipelago containing several vital airfields

 

and fleet anchorages. Outer island strong points in the Marshalls were neutralized with

 

fires and bypassed, while amphibious forces seized the relatively weaker inner atolls.

 

       General MacArthur used similar operations in the Southwest Pacific to maneuver

 

around enemy strengths while simultaneously isolating Japanese forces. MacArthur's

 

amphibious commander, Rear Admiral Barbey, masterfully deployed forces against

 

Japanese gaps and critical vulnerabilities. The highly successful New Guinea/Solomons

 

campaign epitomized the proper use of superior maneuver and concentration of forces.

 

       Firepower, not maneuver, became the focal point of later battles in the Central

 

Pacific and Okinawa. The location, size, and strategic value of these objectives dictated

 

attrition warfare methods. Subsequently, the Navy and Marine Corps became very

 

proficient at executing amphibious assaults/forcible entry operations. The result of this

 

experience was the codification of battle-tested doctrine, techniques, and procedures.

 

Attrition warfare honed our technical amphibious assault skills, while other campaigns

 

highlighted the utility of amphibious maneuver. These two concepts are not mutually

 

exclusive. Successful application of operational maneuver from the sea requires an

 

in-depth appreciation of both concepts. One must thoroughly understand the basic tenets

 

of amphibious warfare, its capabilities and limitations, before it is applied at the

 

operational level of war. MacArthur and the planners of Inchon recognized and respected

 

this special relationship. This paper will contend that the naval component commander for

 

Central Command did not fully appreciate this concept in Southwest Asia..

 

       Amphibious doctrine was forged into operational/tactical reality in World War II.

 

This process emphasized the criticality of focused, detailed, and comprehensive planning.

 

Amphibious warfare was a multi-faceted instrument that had proven itself in a spectrum

 

ranging from high intensity assault to maneuver driven by economy of force. This legacy

 

served us well at Inchon, but not during SWA. Why? The answer to this question begins

 

with an analysis of the Inchon campaign.

 

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY(DEMOBILIZATION)

 

 

 

       The success at Inchon would have been difficult to predict in the five years

 

preceding the Korean war. After World War II demobilization fever hit the country and

 

the Navy/Marine team suffered accordingly. Senior Army and Air Force officers were

 

sounding the death bell for Marines and amphibious warfare. The infamous Secretary of

 

Defense, Louis Johnson, stated in 1949, "....the Navy is on its way out...There's no reason

 

for having a Navy and Marine Corps. General Bradley tells me that amphibious

 

operations are a thing of the past. We'll never have any more amphibious operations. That

 

does away with the Marine Corps."7 True to his word, Mr. Johnson inflicted axe like

 

blows on the Department of the Navy. The amphibious fleet of World War II had been

 

able to lift eleven Marine Expeditionary Force equivalents on 610 vessels. That vast

 

armada had been cut to 91 ships by the spring of 1950. The 400,000 plus Marine Corps

 

that marched across the Pacific had been shrunk to 35,086 in 1948. The number of landing

 

craft that carried Marines to the beach was reduced by 510 that same year. 90% of the

 

nations amphibious capability had been cut by 1950, yet in that same year American forces

 

landed and delivered a crushing blow to the North Korean Army at Inchon.8

 

       How did this occur in view of the limited assets available? Part of this answer lies

 

in the amphibious expertise the leadership, staffs, and landing forces of Inchon carried

 

over from World War II. The other factors present at Inchon were unity of command,

 

focus of effort, and assignment of a main effort. These three principles guided Inchon

 

planners down a tumultuous, yet straightforward path. That experience contrasted with

 

that of the planners of Southwest Asia, who planned operations across a spectrum of

 

never-to-be realized possibilities. During Inchon this focused mind set was driven from

 

the top, specifically by General MacArthur. No such commander, or staff replicated this

 

role during SWA.

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

 

 

       The requirement for unity of command, focus of effort, and assignment of a main

 

effort are often heard themes in today's discussions of maneuver warfare or Air-Land

 

Battle. Unity of command is one of the timeless principles of war. This concept vests

 

directive authority in one commander to ensure unity of effort is achieved. Unity of

 

command ensures that the combat capabilities/potential of multiple units are consolidated

 

into one synergistic effort. The commander and his staff must generate top-down

 

planning. Leaders must be able to articulate a vision of success and desired end state

 

through their intent. The commander's staff implements this vision by coordinating the

 

activities of the force toward this common goal. Asset allocation and priority of effort

 

emanate from one source. This is the genesis of unity of command.

 

       The next related element in the triumvirate of effective planning/warfighting is

 

focus of effort. FM 100-5 says focus (unity of effort) "is an effective system of command

 

which relies upon leadership to provide purpose, direction, and motivations; emphasizes

 

well-understood common doctrine, tactics, and techniques  and takes effective measures

 

to limit the effects of friction. Leaders set the example, communicate their intent clearly,

 

build teamwork...accept responsibility, delegate authority, anticipate developments, take

 

decisive actions, and accept risks."9 This paragraph illustrates those points that made

 

Inchon so successful. General MacArthur provided unity of command and focus of effort

 

from the top. These same principles were not evident at the requisite locations during

 

amphibious planning during SWA, specifically at Central Command's naval component

 

headquarters, NAVCENT.

 

       Our last principle, designation of main effort; is a logical extension of unity of

 

command and focus of effort. The commander assigns a main effort to accomplish the

 

most vital tasks during each phase of the battle. The actions of the main effort are

 

designed to create decisive results in accordance with the commanders intent. FM 100-5

 

states the main effort "is assigned to the element with the most important task to

 

accomplish within the commanders concept...this provides a focus of effort that each

 

subordinate commander uses to link his actions to the actions of those around him."10  The

 

main effort receives the priority of fires, combat support, and combat service support. The

 

activities of the entire organization are focused towards supporting this main effort. This

 

prioritization of effort facilitates decision making in issues concerning asset allocation

 

within the force.

 

       The linkage between unity of command, focus of effort, and assignment of main

 

effort streamlines planning and increases operational tempo. These three conditions foster

 

the synchronization of force capabilities into one cohesive operational plan. Harmony was

 

achieved between these three functions in the Southwest Pacific and the Marshalls in

 

World War II. General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz displayed a keen appreciation for

 

the power of top down planning by articulating an operational vision of success for their

 

respective operations. Each possessed a staff that had the experience and technical

 

expertise to turn the commander's operational blueprint into amphibious reality.