Perception Or Reality: Is The V-22 Ready For Production? CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Perception Or Reality: Is The V-22 Ready For Production? Author: Major John Kevin Dodge, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The V-22 is well qualified for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP). During its first Operational Assessment (OT-IIA), the Osprey adequately displayed the potential effectiveness and suitability needed to meet the established operational requirements. Background: During the Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Cheney made a strong push to cancel the V-22 program despite its documented capabilities. Support in Congress was to strong to allow the program to be killed, but due to the extremely long delays encountered during the stalemate, a huge amount of misinformation about the Osprey's characteristics was distributed. Some of the misinformation was intentional, some was unintentional. These misperceptions have caused numerous problems in solidifying support for a very capable platform. Supporting information will be provided by an extensive amount of operational documentation and knowledge gained by the author while serving as the Marine V-22 Operational Test Director from 1990 to 1992, and the V-22 Multiservice Operational Test Director from 1992 through the Osprey's first Operational Assessment in 1994. Test Reports and Requirements Documents pertaining to the first Operational Test period will be utilized to provide background information and support the contention that the V-22 is ready for limited production. This analysis will provide an extensive program background to demonstrate the capabilities of the current aircraft, the associated costs, requirements, doctrine and tactics development and an overview of the first Operational Assessment (OT-IIA) of the Osprey. Supporting narratives will also demonstrate the capability of the V-22 to meet current Forward...From The Sea doctrine. Recommendation: The potential operational effectiveness and suitability demonstrated by the V-22 during OT-IIA qualified it for a limited production decision. During the course of the assessment, tactics development was initiated and supporting information supplied to the Pentagon. The author contends that the V-22 is well qualified for Low Rate Initial Production. PERCEPTION OR REALITY: IS THE V-22 READY FOR PRODUCTION? OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The V-22 is well qualified for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP). During its first Operational Assessment (OT-IIA), the Osprey adequately displayed the potential effectiveness and suitability needed to meet the established operational requirements. I. PERCEPTION AND REALITY A. PERCEPTION B. REALITY II. V-22 PROGRAM BACKGROUND A. HISTORY B. PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS C. ACQUISITION STATUS AND COST III. JOINT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS IV. DOCTRINE AND TACTICS DEVELOPMENT A. DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT B. TACTICS DEVELOPMENT V. V-22 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (OT-IIA) VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION PERCEPTION OR REALITY: IS THE V-22 READY FOR PRODUCTION? I. PERCEPTION AND REALITY A. PERCEPTION At the dawn of the 20th century and the birth of aviation Henry Ford said, "The airplane won't amount to a damn until it can go straight up and down, and hover." While thousands of slightly biased helicopter pilots may readily agree with Mr. Ford's observation, history has provided yet another look at a false perception. B. REALITY American fixed-wing aircraft have ruled the skies for generations and helicopters have provided the flexibility of vertical flight for almost half as long. Together these two forms of aviation have made countless contributions to the defense and prosperity of our Country. Just as the airplane and the helicopter made their contributions to the development of aviation and modern warfare, a new capability has survived drastic attempts to kill it. Tilt-rotor technology has taken the form of the V-22 "Osprey" and by filling the gap between the airplane and the helicopter will revolutionize how we fly and how we fight. Since being canceled by former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Cheney in late 1988, the V-22 program has contended with a huge amount of misinformation regarding cost, capability, effectiveness and suitability. The result has often led to false perceptions about the Osprey by the very people expected to employ it. In spite of these false perceptions and with the cards often stacked against it, the V-22 program continued to slowly move ahead. On 9 December 1994, SECDEF Perry announced a Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision in favor of the V-22.1 This article contends that the V-22 is well qualified for LRIP. The Osprey adequately displays the potential effectiveness and suitability needed to meet its operational requirements, and has successfully passed the Critical Design Review (CDR) and Milestone II Plus criteria needed to proceed into limited production.2 Supporting information will be provided by an overview of: the V-22's program background and status, joint service requirements, doctrine and tactics development, the V-22's first Operational Test (OT-IIA) period. Issues and questions to be addressed include: Does the V-22 program currently possess the funding and test assets needed to preclude a risk to its scheduled goals? Does the system demonstrate the potential to verify and validate the system effectiveness and suitability parameters? Is the current approach to operational testing, and tactics development in line with the Forward.. From the Sea maneuver warfare doctrine? What considerations must be employed to maximize the V-22's capabilities and tactics development prior to Fleet introduction in 2001? II. V-22 PROGRAM BACKGROUND A. HISTORY The V-22 Osprey, formally the Joint Multi-Mission Vertical Lift Aircraft (JMVX), is an outgrowth of work initiated in 1969 under the Department of the Navy's Vertical Assault Medium Transport (VMAT) requirement.3 In late 1981, the services agreed to the joint development of an advanced vertical lift aircraft to meet the current joint requirement, as well as other multi-mission applications. In April 1983, the government awarded a preliminary design contract to the Bell/Boeing team. In May 1986, the Department of Defense authorized the V-22 program to enter into Full Scale Development (FSD). Citing priorities, the Army dropped out of the program in 1990 in order to pursue Light Attack (LHX) helicopter technology. The first flight of the Osprey occurred on 14 March 1989. In April 1989, SecDef Cheney recommended against going forward with FSD of the V-22. Congress however, continued to support the tiltrotor. Throughout this period of contention, the majority of misinformation regarding V-22 characteristics surfaced. Often deemed "official" but in reality inaccurate, service planners would sometimes utilize this misleading information unknowingly. False perceptions by service members not directly associated with the program began to divide grass roots support into those who wanted tiltrotor technology and those who wanted something "now." The National elections in 1992 ended the stalemate when a change in the SecDef position removed the main obstacle of the 0sprey, Mr. Cheney. Late in 1992, the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) directed Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) of the V-22. The EMD version was designed to meet the then current requirement, Medium Lift Replacement Operational Requirements Document (MLR-ORD), but the anticipated support from the new administration failed to appear. Delays in key decision requirements and budget downsizing continued. These delays, in combination with direction from Ms. Nora Slatkin (Under-Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition), provided the needed "window of opportunity" to conduct the first Operational Assessment (OT-IIA) of the V-22. This assessment was conducted from May to July 1994 by the V-22 Multiservice Operational Test Team (MOTT). It provided an assessment of the Critical Operational Issues (COIs) related to potential operational effectiveness and suitability of the Osprey.4 This assessment is required by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) to make a LRIP decision.5 B. PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS Pursuing the Osprey as the aircraft to fulfill the multiservice specific requirements, the V-22 program management and its associates have overcome a series of significant challenges: incorporated advanced technology with an innovative manufacturing process; employed a new acquisition process aimed at maximizing affordability and aircraft effectiveness; trimmed weight and cost to meet service and congressional requirements; implemented a single-site Integrated Test Team (ITT) concept at Patuxent River, MD which consolidated Developmental Testing (DT) and removed redundancy in government and contractor test requirements; incorporated Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to enhance aircraft design, shorten lines of communication, reduce cost and manufacturing time; and endured a demanding and completely objective operational assessment. Most important of all, the program incorporated design and maintenance changes in current and EMD Osprey's from lessons learned following the loss of FSD ship O5 and the tragic loss of FSD ship O4 at Quantico, VA. These changes include: the addition of drains in the nacelle cowling; increased engine inlet strength to withstand engine surges; increased integrity of the firewall between the engine compartment and upper nacelle area; addition of a temperature sensing device in the upper nacelle area; improved fire protection of the interconnect drive system; redesign of the Warning, Caution, Advisory (WCA) system. 6 A major Cockpit Management System (CMS) redesign for the EMD aircraft was initiated following the loss of ship 04. Significant changes in the design philosophy, display technology and layout, software design and information management have greatly enhanced the aircraft's overall potential.7 Each EMD aircraft will be production representative, be built utilizing production tooling and incorporate the majority of changes determined to be necessary in the flight test program. These EMD aircraft (ship numbers 7-10) will then be extensively flight tested in operational environments. Particular attention will be focused on areas determined to require additional testing in previous operations. One potential "speedbump" to the V-22 program's current schedule is not necessarily a failure to meet the stated requirements, but the limited number of FSD airframes available for the required testing and training. With Research and Development (R&D) funding low and scheduled requirements high, any reduction in test articles has the potential to affect the projected Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of fiscal year (FY) 2001. Government flight testing utilizing ship O2 was suspended in November, 1994. Ship O3 is the only platform currently available to meet all government and contractor flight test and training requirements. This limited availability of flight test assets will affect the capability of the current schedule to cope with unforseen situations. Availability of test and training assets will continue to be a limiting feature of program flexibility until completion and availability of EMD aircraft 7-10 in FY-97. C. ACQUISITION STATUS AND COST The Marine Corps is now scheduled to procure 425 MV- 22's, the Navy 48 HV-22's and the Air Force 55 CV-22's. The Corps number is down from the originally desired 552. The change was attributed to a decrease in attrition rate estimates due to projected reliability, maintainability and survivability enhancements over helicopter rates. The Department of the Navy has currently imposed a $1 billion annual ceiling for procurement of the V-22, which means it will take 25 years to get the desired numbers, close to the estimated 30 year life-cycle of the aircraft.8 This $1 billion annual ceiling will restrict the production rate of MV-22's to an average of 200 aircraft per year vice the originally desired 36.9 Over the past few years, varied and often inaccurate V- 22 cost per copy estimates have been widely published. The 1994 Preliminary Design Review (PDR) established official cost estimates based on a 523 (total for all services) aircraft buy at a rate of 2 aircraft per month. In FY-94 dollars the current estimate per copy in flyaway cost is $36.4 million. The Bell/Boeing Design to Cost (DTC) objective is $29.4 million.10 While a stiff price tag, the real qualifier in the acquisition process is never cost alone. Weapon systems are purchased based on cost and operational effectiveness. The V-22 was subjected to 19 separate studies and 5 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA). In each and every one the Osprey came out on top. The bottom line on cost will always be directly proportional to the size of the production run. Should the benefits of tiltrotor technology enhance the Corps expeditionary capability to the degree suggested by past studies and testing, the "strain" of being left at the starting gate awaiting strategic lift might prove too much for the Army to bear. III. JOINT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS Having a complete understanding of the service specific requirement is essential to conducting valid operational testing. Without an in-depth and independent evaluation, the service sponsor will have no guarantee the requirement has been met. Since the first JVX Joint Services Operational Requirement (JSOR) dated 14 December 1982 was promulgated, there have been 4 additional (and often conflicting) requirements documents generated which have related to the V-22. An updated version of the original JSOR was signed into effect on 13 February 1985 and remained as the only valid requirements document of record until the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the JMVX was formally presented in December 1994. The Jmvx ORD combines the United States Marine Corps (USMC) requirement for a Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) aircraft and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) requirement for a Multi-Mission Advanced Vertical Lift aircraft. The JMVX will be required to provide its service sponsors with a multi-engine, dual-piloted, self-deployable, medium lift Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) aircraft to conduct combat assault/assault support, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Special Warfare (SpecWar). Naval logistics support and Special Operations (SpecOps) missions worldwide.11 The development goals of the JMVX include: logistic commonality; user friendly technologies; increased multi- mission effectiveness; improved aircraft reliability and maintainability; optimized shipboard compatibility, enhanced survivability and reduced vulnerability; and allow for future system growth.12 All services require a night and all-weather capability, the capability to operate in contaminated environments, reduced operations and support costs and a fully integrated self-defense avionics suite. Design allowances for the integration of service specific mission and configuration requirements will be required. The MV-22 will require a capability to transport 24 combat-loaded Marines and a crew of 3 for a 200 nautical mile radius of action. The CV-22 requirement is 18 troops and a crew of 4 for a 500 nautical mile radius of action. To date, the Navy (HV-22) requirement for CSAR requires a 480 nautical mile radius of action.13 These different radius of action requirements will necessitate the installation of wing tanks in the HV-22 and CV-22. Commensurate with an established requirement (and available funding), these tanks may be incorporated in the MV-22 at a future date. Airspeed requirements for the MV-22 call for a 240 KTAS cruise and a 270 KTAS dash capability. The CV-22 requirement is 230 KTAS cruise and 250 KTAS dash.14 The aircraft must carry up to 12 litters or up to a 10,000 pound internal load and a 10,000 pound external load (MV-22 only, dual or single point).15 The aircraft must be capable of Air Combat Maneuvers (ACM), possess a ballistic tolerance up to 14.5 MM in select areas and have a service ceiling of 25,000 feet MSL.16 The JMVX must have a mission configurable, selectable rate of fire (air-to-ground and air-to-air) weapons system compatible with night vision devices.17 An integration of weapons system information on a helmet mounted sighting system in addition to a capability to mount a crew-served weapon in the aft cabin area (ramp) is desired. Without additional funding it will remain an option for future growth. While hard points are not in the current design of the airframe, the requirement also lists a "desire" for an air to air missile capability on the MV-22. The JMVX requirement is straight forward about the need for a self-defense capability. Space, weight and center of gravity (CG) provisions have been incorporated into the EMD design for a turreted nose gun, but the aircraft will probably enter service without a defensive weapon system. Current plans call for the weapon to be a three barrelled 50 caliber system to be incorporated as a kit, during or after production.18 The need to ensure this critical weapon system is installed during LRIP and prior to the full scale operational evaluation (OPEVAL) is significant. With the increased threat and tempo of operations worldwide, the need for ensuring the system meets the requirement for effectiveness and suitability (especially if installed as a kit) prior to tactical fielding is critical. Door guns are not a feasible option on the V-22 due to the diminished and variable fields of fire caused by the nacelles and their potential for rapid rates of movement. In addition, the design of the windows and emergency hatches incorporates an explosive charge for release vice a mechanical linkage. The crew upper and lower hatch doors are not designed to open during forward flight, and incorporate a weight on wheels (WOW) switch for safety. IV. DOCTRINE AND TACTICS DEVELOPMENT A. DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT Doctrine is the general guidance that establishes a particular way of thinking about how a military organization will fight a war or employ a concept. Doctrine is authoritative but not prescriptive. Its purpose is to provide a basis for mutual understanding among the members of the organization and serve as a foundation for harmonious action during war. Like pulling a trigger, doctrine requires judgement in application. Equally as important, doctrine development requires a fundamental understanding of the technology it is sometimes based upon. From the earliest times, innovation in technology has influenced the face of war in one way or another. Marines have often found themselves at the forefront of innovation. The helicopter, AV-8 and now V-22 provide the example. Within the framework of established and developing doctrine, technology and tactics must complement each other. Based on the changing strategic face of a multipolar world, the Navy and Marine Corps enacted a fundamental shift in America's operational focus and warfighting priorities. Defined by the September 1992 publication of ... From The Sea, and expanded two years later in Forward...From The Sea, the shift signaled a change in focus and priorities. The Naval Service has refocused from dealing with a global maritime power on the high seas to projecting strength and influence along the littorals.19 The necessity for our forces to rapidly project decisive military power cannot be over emphasized. FMFM-1 states, "we should strike our enemy where and when we can hurt him most." The strategic shift in focus adds definition to our developing doctrinal concept of Operational Maneuver From the Sea, and fits hand-in-glove within the Corps' framework of maneuver warfare. Stressing tactical maneuverability within the battlespace, and reinforcing the need to project combat power over a greater distance in less time than currently possible, the V-22 will enhance the commanders warfighting capability and provide flexibility not currently available. Envisioned to serve with the currently fielded Air Cushioned Landing Craft (LCAC) and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), the V-22 has provided the catalyst of technology that will help fill the current gap in developing doctrine. "Equipment should be designed so that its usage is consistent with established doctrine and tactics."20 This statement from FMFM-1 does not intend to preclude the use of technological advancements which will enhance our overall capability to accomplish the mission. Designed with the capability to project forces deep inland from Over The Horizon (0TH), allowing surface ships to remain outside the ever increasing (and available) range of anti-ship missiles, the V-22 has through the application of technology reinforced a change in doctrine. This shift will require additional changes in the doctrinal and tactical employment of our current assets in support of this new direction, and will require service planners to fully comprehend the employment characteristics of the V-22. Having a complete understanding of service specific doctrine is as essential to realistic operational testing as a complete understanding of the requirement, the aircraft's characteristics and the threat. When taking a totally objective view of Forward...From The Sea, planners should ask themselves this simple question, can a helicopter meet the requirements of this doctrine? B. TACTICS DEVELOPMENT Understanding new doctrine, studying the effects of new technology, and developing new tactics in line with tiltrotor capabilities is just the first phase of the education process. The student will observe that changes in tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons which reasonably is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. A.T. Mahan Tiltrotor tactics development presents a unique challenge and requires those involved to keep an open mind. As one of the primary responsibilities of the V-22 Operational Test Directors, development of the OPTEVFOR/Operational Tactics Guide (OTG) will provide the tactics for the initial operational employment of the V-22. Done in coordination with other tactical development commands (Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One) to ensure both rotary and fixed-wing perspectives are utilized, the framework for tactics development is coordinated through the V-22 Tactics Manual Working Group. Utilizing modeling and simulation to augment operational testing in the aircraft, all available assets are employed to maximize results, gain an insight into employment methods and define maneuver techniques. OT-IIA provided the first opportunity to conduct tactical flight scenarios in the V-22 utilizing employment techniques developed to date. Current assault support tactics developed for helicopters were found to be compatible when the V-22 was in the helicopter and conversion mode at lower airspeeds (0 to 120 kts). Tactical employment considerations during hover operations will require additional assessment due to proprotor downwash. During maneuvering flight utilizing nacelle authority to provide vectored thrust, V-22 design and performance characteristics provide significant benefits over conventional helicopters. The tremendous acceleration and deceleration available through nacelle authority provides enhanced maneuver capabilities and serves well as the defining characteristic of tiltrotor tactical performance. When operating in the conversion mode at higher airspeeds (120-160 kts) the currently established assault support tactics for helicopters are minimized and will completely diminish as the V-22 enters fixed-wing flight. New tactics for V-22 employment in the high speed conversion and fixed-wing configuration are required. Higher speed, range, payload, and altitude considerations in combination with developing employment doctrine will also require a change in the approach to assault support escort tactics. With formal V-22 tactics development initiated, the importance of utilizing actual V-22 tactics and performance considerations in modeling, simulations and wargames is reinforced. Inputs made based on past perceptions and dated considerations may invalidate results. The most important consideration concerning the V-22 is the fact that it is not a helicopter or a fixed-wing. Forcing it into a category other than tiltrotor will ultimately reduce its unique capabilities. V. V-22 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (OT-IIA) 47 years after another tremendous innovation in technology (the helicopter) entered its first phase of operational testing, the V-22 entered into its first formal operational phase of testing. Going "in test" on 15 May 1994, this first test period lasted 54 days, assessed hundreds of operational issues, generated 14.8 flight hours and 59 hours of V-22 simulator time and concluded on 7 July, 1994. The test phase was conducted to support a program decision point, and the Critical Design Review. The overall purpose was to assess the V-22's potential operational effectiveness and suitability. Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) is the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) Squadron for assault support helicopters and related equipment. OT&E is used to determine if the test article will perform in its intended environment. In the absence of actual combat, only realistic operational testing can be used to test an aircraft against its stated requirement. HMX-1 is the lead agency for the V-22 Multiservice Operational Test Team (MOTT) consisting of Marine, Navy and Air Force test directors, analysts, maintainers and support personnel. The operational assessment was conducted in three phases. Phase I consisted of ground assessments and selected maintenance actions. Operations took place at Bell Textron in Arlington, TX and utilized aircraft 01 and 06. These assessments included removal and replacement actions. cargo handling system assessments, emergency egress and ingress operations, and embarkation and debarkation of combat loaded troops and injured personnel. Deficiencies noted in the cargo handling system warranted early release of the OT-IIA preliminary findings. The V-22 program management initiated immediate redesign procedures and the changes will be incorporated in all future V-22 aircraft. Phase II involved flight training for the author and the Air Force Test Director, LtCol Joe Bonin. The training assessments were conducted at Patuxent River. Six training flights were completed. During this phase, assessments were conducted involving training, mission planning, cockpit management, digital flight controls, navigation systems, normal VFR operations, basic instrument and simulated instrument flight characteristics, simulated emergencies, air-crew coordination and safety. Phase III Involved five tactical scenario flights and was conducted at Patuxent River, MD and Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA. Operational areas assessed included: low- level (300 AGL) navigation at airspeeds up to 245 kts., confined area landings, simulated Special Operations Forces (SOF) inserts and extracts, troop assault and medevac operations, Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) operations, simulated aerial refueling utilizing the KC-130, external load and downwash assessment utilizing Helicopter Support Team (HST) personnel, formation flights with KC-130, CH-53D, AH-1 and T-2 aircraft, self-deployment assessment at 13,500 MSL, Search and Rescue and scramble launch, and finished with a night flight and cockpit lighting assessment. While limited in scope, the overall result of the assessment concluded that, "within the constraints imposed by the test limitations, the V-22 is potentially operationally effective and potentially operationally suitable."21 VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION The OT-IIA Report recommended that the EMD program proceed. In addition, 34 separate recommendations were made detailing issues identified during the conduct of the assessment. These issues will require further action or continued assessment prior to OPEVAL. The V-22 is well qualified for limited production. Once fielded, the V-22 will add a tremendous capability to American Forces in the 21st century. ENDNOTES 1Bell-Boeing Team. "Osprey Fax," Vol 5, Issue no. 12. Philadelphia: (Bell-Boeing Team, December 14, 1994), 1. 2COMOPTEVFOR/AFOTEC, "Operational Assessment Report of the V-22 Osprey, OT-IIA. (Project M960-OT-IIA), August 1994, 2. 3Department of the Navy, "Operational Requirements Document for Multi-mission Vertical Lift Aircraft," Study, 384-88-94, November 1994, 1. 4COMOPTEVFOR/AFOTEC, "Operational Assessment Report of the V-22 Osprey, OT-IIA." (Project M960-OT-IIA), August 1994, 2. 5Department of Defense, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures." Instruction, 5000.2, February 1993, 3-19. 6Maj J. K. Dodge, USMC, "V-22 Status Report" Nighthawk News, January 1994, 8. 7LtCol G. Hammes, USMC, "V-22 Multiservice Operational Test Director, interview by author, 5 March 1995. 8Bell-Boeing Team, "V-22 Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft." Design to Cost Estimate, 5199-32b&w, January 1995, 32. 9United States Marine Corps, Code APP-23, "Don V-22 Procurement Profile." Point Paper, May 1993, 2. 10Bell-Boeing Team, "V-22 Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft." Design to Cost Estimate, 54199-32b&w, January 1995, 32. 11Department of the Navy, "Operational Requirements Document For Joint Multi-mission Vertical Lift Aircraft," Study, 384-88-94, November 1994, 2. 12Ibid, 4. 13Ibid. 14Ibid. 15Ibid, 6. 16Ibid, 9. 17Ibid, 10. 18LtCol Boyer, USMC, V-22 Program Code PMA-275M, interview by author, 19 February 1993. 19Department of the Navy, "Forward...From The Sea," (Washington, DC: 1994), 2. 20Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, "Warfighting," FMFM-1, November, 1989. 21COMOPTEVFOR/AFOTEC, "Operational Assessment Report of the V-22 Osprey. OT-IIA." (Project M960-OT-IIA), August 1994, 2. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bell-Boeing Team. "Osprey Fax." Vol 5, Issue no. 12. Philadelphia: Bell Boeing Team, December 14, 1994. 2. Bell-Boeing Team. "V-22 Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft." Design to Cost Estimate. 54199-32b&w, January 1995. 3. Boyer, LtCol, USMC. V-22 Program Office Code PMA-275M. Interview by author, 19 February 1993. 4. Brandstein, A. G., Dr., "The MV-22 Effectiveness Analysis Phase II." Phalanx, Vol. 27. no. 4. Quantico, VA, December 1994. 5. Brittingham, M. L., Maj, USA. "Attack Helicopter Employment Options. "Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1980. 6. Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force. "Test Plan For the V-22 Osprey, OT-IIA." (Project M960-OT-IIA." April 15, 1994. 7. Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force/ Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center. "Operational Assessment Report of the V-22 Osprey, OT-IIA." (Project M960-OT-IIA), August 17, 1994. 8. Department, of Defense. "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures." Instruction, 5000.2., February 1993. 9. Department of the Navy. "Forward...From The Sea." Washington, DC., 1994. 10. Department of the Navy. United States Marine Corps. "Warfighting." FMFM-1, November, 1989. 11. Department of the Navy. United States Marine Corps. "Operational Requirements Document For Joint Multi-mission Vertical Lift Aircraft." Study, 384-88-94, November, 1994. 12. Dodge, J. K., Maj, USMC. "V-22 Status Report." Nighthawk News, January 1994. 13. Hammes, G., LtCol, USMC. "V-22 Multiservice Operational Test Director. Interview by author 5 March 1995. 14. Naval Air Systems Command A1-V-22AA-NFM-000, "NATOPS Flight Manual, V-22 Aircraft." Preliminary Draft, April 19, 1994. 15. United States Marine Corps, Code APP-23. "Department of the Navy V-22 Procurement Profile." Point Paper, May 1993.
