Military

JFACC: A Reattack: The Joint Force Air Component Commander And Joint

Air Operations

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

 

 

                                                            EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title: JFACC: A Reattack, The Joint Force Air Component Commander and Joint Air

Operations

 

Author: Major James J. Drew, USAF

 

Thesis: Centralized control of joint air by a single air commander, the JFACC, is

essential to ensure unity of the joint air effort and realize the full impact of theater air

power.

 

Background: The idea of a single air commander is not new but dates back to World

War II. The recent idea of a joint force air component commander (JFACC) in charge

of joint air operations got its first real test in Operation Desert Storm-and it worked.

The centralized control of joint air under a single air boss using a coordinated air

tasking order (ATO) was a major factor behind the dramatic success of the air

campaign. Although there is a general consensus on the need for a JFACC, service

views, reinforced by dissimilar service doctrine, differ considerably on how centralized

control of joint air is best achieved. Specifically, there is still considerable debate over

a number of issues which include: the JFACC as a commander and the apportionment

of joint air assets, the JFACC's role in the targeting process, his relationship with the

Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), JFACC control of deep attack assets, and

composition of the JFACC's staff. This paper examines each of these areas in light of

our recent experience in Desert Storm and proposes solutions to some past problems

which can alleviate similar difficulties in the future. It also examines the distinct

perspectives of the soldier and the airman, as well as different (and sometimes

conflicting) service doctrinal views, which contribute to the lingering controversies over

the concept of a JFACC.

 

Recommendation: Joint doctrine on the role and authority of the JFACC must be more

explicit. Service doctrines need to evolve to fully integrate the new paradigm of the

JFACC who can best employ joint air power to achieve unity of effort and maximum

effect. The air targeting and ATO processes must be streamlined to improve their

effectiveness, and the JTCB must assume a more conspicuous role in integrating the

targeting recommendations of ground commanders with those of the JFACC. The

JFACC's staff should be composed of a more equitable representation of each service

component Finally, the control of deep attack assets must be reexamined with the

JFACC's need to synchronize the theater deep attack effort in mind.

 

                                   CONTENTS

 

 

                                                           Page

 

Executive Summary                                            ii

 

Contents                                                    iii

 

List of Figures                                              iv

 

Introduction                                                  1

 

Historical Perspective                                        2

 

The JFACC Role: Command, Control, or Coordinate?              3

 

The JFACC and Apportionment                                   5

 

The JFACC and Targeting                                       7

 

The JFACC and the ATO                                        16

 

The JFACC and the JTCB                                       20

 

The JFACC and His Staff                                      24

 

The JFACC and Doctrinal Difficulties                         26

 

The JFACC and Deep Attack                                    32

 

Conclusion                                                   34

 

End Notes                                                    38

 

Bibliography                                                 44

 

                                LIST OF FIGURES

 

 

                                                               Page

 

Figure 1:  Strategic Attack and Battlefield Preparation Sorties  12

 

Figure 2:  The ATO Cycle                                         17

 

Figure 3:  JTCB Under DJFC                                       23

 

Figure 4:  JTCB Under JFACC                                      23

 

                           JFACC: A REATTACK

 

      The Joint Force Air Component Commander and Joint Air Operations

 

 

 

      Joint force operations are here to stay, and in most multi-service operations,

 

there will probably be a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to ensure

 

unity of effort among service aviation components. Yet the centralized command and

 

control of joint air operations under a JFACC still remains a controversial issue among

 

services. Different views abound on the JFACC's role as a commander or coordinator

 

that are reinforced by dissimilar service doctrines and distinct warfighting philosophies.

 

In particular, the JFACC's role in the targeting process and establishing target priorities

 

continued to be an area of ongoing debate. Service doctrines clash on how centralized

 

control of theater air assets is best accomplished. This paper's central theme is that

 

centralized control of joint air by a single air commander, the JFACC, is essential to

 

ensure the unity of the joint air effort and realize the full impact of air power. To that

 

end, lingering controversies over the JFACC as a commander, apportionment of air, the

 

JFACC's role in the targeting process and with the Joint Targeting Coordination Board

 

(JTCB), control of deep attack assets, the JFACC's staff, and conflicting service

 

doctrines must be settled. The JFACC experience in Operation Desert Storm provides

 

a rich basis for examining each of these issues as they emerged then and as they

 

stand now. These remaining issues that continue to hinder unity of the air effort under

 

a JFACC in joint operations need to be resolved. In short, it is time to put the joint" into

 

JFACC.

 

      Historical Perspective

 

      The idea of a single air commander goes way back to World War II. Since then,

 

the U.S. military has experienced a history of fragmented air operations. The

 

Solomons Campaign was the first true joint air operation in U.S. history with a single

 

airman commanding all the land-based aircraft of Marines, Army Air Force, and Navy

 

components. During the course of the campaign, officers from the Marine Corps, Navy,

 

and Army Air Force each served as the air commander. Perhaps it was limited air

 

assets and a situation in which the certainty of winning was actually in question, but not

 

until the Gulf War has the same degree of unity of effort in the planning and execution

 

of joint air operations again been displayed. In Korea, coordination control was the

 

byword where service air components operated practically autonomously. The Navy

 

adamantly insisted on independent operations based on geographic deconfliction while

 

the Air Force attempted to gain operational control over naval air. In Vietnam, the

 

laissez-faire control of air power continued with essentially five separate air wars taking

 

place along with the division of airspace over North Vietnam between the Air Force and

 

Navy into a "route package' system which proved very inadequate.1 The Commander

 

in Chief of Pacific Command ran the air war over North Vietnam while the Commander,

 

U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) controlled the air war in

 

the South and Cambodia. A bitter feud between the Air Force and the Marines erupted

 

over control of Marine air. Targeting was micro-managed by Washington, and even the

 

Air Force would not place its Strategic Air Command B-52 bombers under the control of

 

its own 7th Air Force commander. All of this led to an unsuccessful attempt by

 

COMUSMACV to tighten control in 1968 under a single air manager for Vietnam.

 

      In contrast with the fragmented approach to the air war in Vietnam, the

 

Commander in Chief, Central Command (ClNCCENTCOM), General H. Norman

 

Schwarzkopf, established centralized control of theater fixed-wing air operations under

 

a JFACC, Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, from the very beginning.

 

Schwarzkopf was a firm believer in the JFACC concept and strongly supported the

 

notion that the JFACC was solely responsible for planning the air campaign. In

 

prosecuting the air campaign, Schwarzkopf gave Homer his full support saying,

 

"There's only going to be one guy in charge of the air: Horner... If you want to fight

 

your interservice battles, do it after the war."2  Operation Desert Storm was the first

 

practical test of the JFACC idea in a major military conflict. General Horner's challenge

 

involved orchestrating the air power capabilities of 14 separate national or service

 

component with those of 10 coalition forces.3 Although not without some growing

 

pains, the dramatic results of the air campaign demonstrated that the JFACC concept

 

works. Centralized control of air power contributed to the dramatic success of the 43

 

day air campaign. Operating under a single air boss and a single, coordinated air

 

tasking order (ATO) resulted in the efficient, coherent application of air power and

 

significantly lessened the possibility of fratricide among coalition aircraft.4

 

 

 

      The JFACC Role: Command, Control, or Coordinate?

 

      Despite disagreement over some specific issues, there is a general consensus

 

on the need for a JFACC in large joint air operations. Unity of effort, achieved through

 

centralized control of joint air assets through a JFACC, is the most decisive way to

 

employ theater air power. Centralized control allows the joint force commander (JFC)

 

to focus his air power on enemy targets that best support his theater strategy and use

 

air power's inherent flexibility and speed to effectively respond to changes in the

 

combat situation.5  It allows the JFC to employ air power at the time and place in which

 

it will have the greatest impact. How best to achieve this unity of effort and what

 

constitutes centralized control are key issues in the JFACC debate.

 

      Does the JFACC command, control, or coordinate? The simple answer is yes.

 

According to Joint Pub 3-0, the JFACC derives his authority from the JFC who

 

establishes the JFACC's specific responsibilities and command authority. The JFACC's

 

four chief responsibilities are to plan, coordinate, allocate, and task in executing the air

 

portion of the JFC's campaign strategy. Typically, the JFACC exercises operational

 

control (OPCON) over assigned and attached forces as a functional component

 

commander and tactical control (TACON) over forces made available by other

 

components for tasking.6  Ultimately, the JFC defines the JFACC's command authority.

 

To effectively orchestrate the joint air operation, the JFACC must command his

 

assigned forces, control or task other air assets via TACON, and coordinate between

 

service components in setting targeting priorities and allocating actual sorties.

 

      Coordinating authority defines a consultative relationship between commanders.

 

It usually applies more to planning activities and does not involve authority to task. A

 

coordinator can only ask. The JFACC does more. Since the JFACC is normally

 

designated a supported commander for the JFC's air effort, he exercises tactical control

 

which is the authority to "direct and control designated forces," in other words, to task.7

 

The single ATO is the JFACC's key instrument for exercising centralized control of the

 

joint air effort. The point is that operational control of all joint air assets is not

 

necessarily essential for the JFACC to run the air war. The desired unity of effort can

 

be achieved through tactical control.8 Coordination alone falls short. In Desert Storm,

 

the JFACC did not actually command (exercise OPCON of) Navy or Marine air units.

 

These units reported to their respective service component commanders. However,

 

General Horner exercised tactical control through the ATO by tasking these forces to fly

 

missions based on the CINC's apportionment guidance.9

 

 

 

      The JFACC and Apportionment

 

      The JFC is ultimately responsible for running the air war and apportions joint air

 

assets by percentage or weight of effort based on his priorities.10 The JFACC makes

 

recommendations on apportionment, usually based on the anticipated sortie rates of air

 

resources available in-theater, for the JFC's apportionment decision. Based on the

 

JFC's apportionment guidance, the JFACC then allocates sorties through the ATO.

 

The focus should really be on weight of effort in expressing JFC apportionment

 

guidance. Apportionment simply by percentages is undesirable because it limits the

 

JFACC's flexibility to best allocate sorties and may not result in optimum use of the air

 

assets involved. Here is why: The actual numbers, types, and unique capabilities of

 

the aircraft available in-theater can affect the percentage figures since some aircraft

 

only perform certain roles (or they perform certain roles only so well).11 For example, if

 

there are 30 F-15Cs out of a total of 100 aircraft, this 30 percent of theater air will be

 

allocated to the air superiority (anti-air warfare) mission because that is what F-15Cs

 

do--and all they do. Another equally unsatisfactory approach is to divide air assets in

 

shares to support each ground commander; in other words, the JFACC gives each

 

corps commander a certain number of daily sorties. However, concentration of air

 

power is a central principle of air warfare.12 Concentration allows the theater

 

commander to focus aerial firepower on the most important targets at the most

 

important time. Merely dividing air assets among ground commanders dilutes the

 

effectiveness of air power. This lesson was aptly demonstrated in the early fighting in

 

the North African campaign of World War II when aircraft were parceled out to Army

 

corps. As a result, there was no unity of effort for Allied air, no concerted effort to

 

achieve air superiority, and air losses were prohibitively high as German air devastated

 

small formations of Allied aircraft trying to support their ground units.13

 

      In addition, the number of sorties flown is not what really matters. What counts

 

is the type of aircraft and ordnance mix applied against each particular target Different

 

types of targets require different aircraft and weapon combinations in varying numbers

 

to achieve an optimum probability of kill. The JFC should ideally provide his guidance

 

on relative air priorities through weights of effort and leave the actual determination of

 

how many aircraft are required to fulfill these priorities to his JFACC planning experts.

 

Weight of effort is best expressed in terms of emphasis within the mission categories of

 

strategic attack, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), offensive counter air

 

(OCA), defensive counter air (DCA), close air support (CAS), and air interdiction (INT).

 

Weight of effort will usually vary with the particular phase of the JFC's theater

 

campaign. Early in a campaign, gaining air superiority through OCA and SEAD, along

 

with attacking key strategic targets such as command and control facilities, are usually

 

top priorities. Once control of the air is assured, other missions can be flown

 

unhampered by any significant enemy counterair threat. As a campaign progresses

 

further, certain aircraft such as F-16s may shift from SEAD to CAS or INT. With major

 

ground operations underway, priorities naturally shift to direct support of engaged

 

ground forces along with interdiction of rear echelon enemy forces. Certainly the

 

requirement for CAS is directly related to the progress of the ground operation.

 

However, some level of strategic attack may still be necessary to prevent the enemy

 

from reconstituting previously destroyed warmaking capabilities.

 

 

 

 

      The JFACC and Targeting:

 

      The targeting process-the identification, selection, and prioritization of enemy

 

targets for attack-is a significant area of friction between components and centers on

 

how target priorities are determined. The JFACC must carry out the JFC's

 

apportionment guidance by matching available air assets against the target list The

 

issue here is the relative priority of the targets nominated by ground commanders within

 

their respective areas of operation (AO) vis-a-vis strategic or theater targets identified

 

by the JFC and how the JFACC allocates air assets to each.

 

      The disagreement on target priorities stems in part from different basic

 

perspectives of the airman and the soldier. The JFACC has a theater-wide view of the

 

battlefield-and seeks to employ air power in line with the JFC's priorities for maximum

 

overall effect. As an airman, this theater-wide view comes naturally because of the

 

range, speed, and expanse of his medium. The ground commander is concerned

 

about his AO-and rightly so. As a soldier, he naturally focuses on the immediate and

 

near-term battle within his geographic area, and he sees the enemy forces immediately

 

opposite him as the most important targets to win his battle. Surface forces typically

 

depend on geographic division of the theater for effective control, and the ground

 

commander's primary concern is to destroy the enemy within his battlespace with as

 

much firepower as he can obtain. The airman, unconstrained by geography in his

 

medium, favors direct attacks on enemy strategic targets as an expedient means to win

 

the war.

 

      These two very different perspectives often clash, and Desert Storm was

 

no exception. Both the Army's VII Corps and the Marines' I MEF commanders

 

became concerned about emphasis on the strategic air campaign at the

 

expense of battlefield preparation.14 Prior to Desert Storm, joint targeting

 

procedures for component commanders and the JFACC were not clearly

 

established. General Schwarzkopf never established a CINC-level joint

 

targeting coordination board (JTCB). Technically, a JTCB did exist, but its

 

importance or authority in the overall targeting process is questionable since it

 

was not comprised of any flag officers or even full colonels.15 The absence of a

 

true high-level JTCB meant that the Army corps and division commanders did

 

not have a forum to express their concerns and views about targeting to the

 

CINC and the JFACC. A targeting process emerged that was sponsored by the

 

JFACC who hosted a daily joint targeting meeting. However, the JFACC's

 

Guidance-Apportionment-Targeting (GAT) cell, also known as the "Black Hole",

 

assumed many functions normally performed by a JTCB. It exercised the

 

greatest influence on the targeting process since it controlled the Master Target

 

List and MAP. Although it had some planners from other services who could

 

provide some oversight of the process, the vast majority were Air Force officers.

 

This led to allegations that the JFACC-led targeting process lacked the

 

necessary balance between the Air Force's strategic view and Army and Marine

 

Corps concerns of shaping the immediate battlefield. Ground commanders felt

 

that the air effort was weighted too heavily on strategic targets instead of such

 

targets as artillery on the front lines in Kuwait.16 The CENTCOM J-3 never

 

became involved to level the playing field, and there was no effective joint

 

campaign oversight by the CENTCOM staff who primarily ran CENTCOM's

 

operations center.

 

      A major area of debate was (and still is) over who should integrate the

 

target lists of various components, the JFACC staff or a theoretically more

 

objective JFC-level JTCB. On 31 January with the ground offensive

 

approaching, Schwarzkopf told Horner:

 

      Target development and nomination during the early phases of the

      campaign were clearly led by the... [JFACC]. As we move into

      battlefield preparation, maneuver commander input into the target

      selection process becomes even more important. Therefore, the

      opportunity for corps and other subordinate commanders to plan for and

      receive air sorties to fly against targets of their choosing must increase.17

 

Because of ground commander concerns that battlefield preparation was not receiving