Aviation Manning: Why We're Stretched To The Limit CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Aviation Manning: Why We're Stretched To the Limit Author: Major J. H. Daas, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The frenetic pace of operational and personnel tempo in light of recent endstrength reductions has caused a paucity in aviation manning. Background: The Marine Corps has undergone force reductions while at the same time maintaining and even increasing operational requirements. The number of Marines provided to squadrons throughout the Marine Corps are significantly lower than a few years ago. Operational units complain that readiness and quality of life for their individual Marines are adversely affected because of personnel shortages. There are many contributing factors causing shortages that include recruiting, training, force structure allocation, and Military Occupational Skill assignment. As the Marine Corps down-sizes, and ultimately right-sizes, there is a delicate balance between the finite number of Marines and the operational and personnel tempo they are expected to maintain. Recommendation: The various agencies that impact occupational skill determination need to establish closer relations. Synchronization and oversight is required in this age of limited resources, and most importantly, limited numbers of Marines. Aviation Manning: Why We're Stretched To the Limit The Marine Corp's manpower management process currently allocates 111 Marines for an F/A-18 squadron, but the Navy requirement for the same squadron integrated onto an aircraft carrier stipulates 206. Where do the extra Marines come from? A helicopter training (HMT) squadron requests a staffing increase to 218, but the available personnel inventory will only support 172. The authorized strength for MOS 6333, EA-6 electrical systems technician, is 71. There are only 45 in the entire Marine Corps. Who gets shorted? Personnel tempo (perstempo) in VMAQ units exceeds 50%. Can we afford to let these Marines out of the squadrons to pursue other career broadening tours? These are only several of a myriad of issues facing manpower managers (as well as squadron commanders) on a daily basis. Prior to attending Command and Staff College, I served a four-year stint in the Enlisted Assignment Branch (Code MMEA) at Headquarters, Marine Corps. The tour culminated as the head, Enlisted Distribution Section, which is responsible for auditing enlisted staffing for the Marine Corps among other things. A significant part of our time was spent trying to determine where all the aviation Marines were. After a year of wrestling with this dilemma, the following conclusions were evident: - There are not enough Marines to support current operational tempo (optempo). - The training pipeline is rife with inefficiency. - In an effort to save squadrons during an era of downsizing, manning controls are stretched to the breaking point. This paper will address these issues and other factors that contribute to the paucity of aviation skill- related Marines when measured against operational requirements. While it is true the Marine Corps has traditionally done "more with less," reductions in personnel manning of Marine aviation units create significant challenges to maintaining operational readiness. A simple solution to the aviation manning challenge would be to produce more Marines with aviation skills, reduce optempo, or a combination of both. This is easier said than done. It's difficult to increase training capacity in an era of downsizing and shrinking resources. As to op tempo, most will agree that relief is nowhere in sight. How are we managing in the face of personnel shortages? Typically, Marines accomplish the mission through diligence and extra effort. After traveling to bases throughout the Marine Corps and hearing the pleas of commanders, maintenance officers, and personnel chiefs, it became obvious that Marine aviation manning is stretched to the limit. After examining the numbers and sorting through the manpower management system, MMEA identified several contributing factors and tried to provide answers to the Fleet. They weren't the answers the FMF wanted to hear, though. Work is ongoing to alleviate shortages, but problems will continue for the foreseeable future. There are no simple solutions and many moving parts to deal with. The contributing factors run the gamut from recruiting to retention. There is interconnectivity, yet no overlapping responsibility. Very few people, if any, understand the entire process. Personnel shortages are not confined to aviation units. Currently, the Marine Corps has 73 MOS's manned at less than 85% of requirement. Aviation personnel shortages are more acutely affected, however, because of their mission to fly and maintain aircraft. How did the Marine Corps get into this predicament? Structure Chances After Desert Shield, confusion reigned as to force makeup and endstrength. While awaiting results of the Force Structure Planning Group, the size of the Marine Corps fluctuated between 177K and 159K, and ultimately 174K were authorized. The Marine Corps started reductions and went too fast. Commanders started discharging Marines and non- EAS attrition exceeded 30%. Force reductions are easier to implement than force buildups. The confusion surrounding endstrength fluctuations and force structure paralyzed the manpower process. Deactivating aircraft types compounded the problems. HQMC planners designed separation incentives to entice Marines with outdated skills to leave the Marine Corps. The program was a success, much to the chagrin of personnel monitors and Fleet squadrons. Planners were frustrated in their efforts to keep pace with the changing picture. Out-year planning was an educated guess at best. Was MCB Hawaii going to close? What aviation assets would remain? When would the senior leadership make a decision? Many decisions made during that turbulent time were based on inaccurate data and it will take years to recover. Force structure planners faced the dilemma of reducing organizational structure (i.e., cutting squadrons) and maintaining current manning levels, or keeping units intact while spreading manpower thinner. The overwhelming worry was once structure was lost, it was lost forever. Through a combination of re-allocation, creative accounting, and "buy now-pay later" postulating, the Marine Corps avoided significant reductions to its core units. Now, we are suffering the consequences. Table of Organization (T/O) is a wartime planning figure that should be largely transparent to the FMF. The figure they should concentrate on is the staffing goal (S/G) which is derived from the Authorized Strength Report (ASR). Authorized strength is what congress is paying for, currently 174K. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation (DC/S Aviation) receives a percentage of this authorized strength to design manning for aviation related units. In essence, DC/S Aviation controls their own destiny to a large extent. In April 1991, the ASR for the Second Marine Aircraft Wing was 100% of T/O. In October 1994, the ASR was 88% of T/O. That translates to a 12% reduction in authorized manning. As a rule, ASR should at least be 90% of T/O. In April 1991, the ASR for a VMFA squadron was 140; in December 1994 it was 111. Had the mission requirements changed? Can a squadron accomplish the same degree of proficiency with 29 less Marines? Someone decided they could. ASR is further decrimented by Marines that are training, transients, patients, and prisoners (T2P2). A T2P2 percentage is factored into the ASR, but is invariably exceeded. Additionally, special assignments, other "B" billets, and uncompensated staffing "overages" are other drains on available manpower. Some MOS's are undermanned for a variety of reasons. While our focus is usually on the resultant shortages, in 1994, 42 aviation MOS's exceeded 105% of requirement. Two examples are 6013, KC-130 mechanic, currently 122%, and 6013, EA-6 mechanic, at 143%. Naturally, there are not too many complaints concerning excess Marines. These extras, however, come at the expense of existing shortfalls. When T2P2 is subtracted from ASR to give us current available manning, the resulting figures are the staffing goals for monitors to maintain. The problem is that staffing goals are based on available population, not mission requirements. If there are not enough Marines to maintain a consistent staffing goal, the computer simply reduces it to reflect reality. The Enlisted Staffing Goal Model (ESGM) is a computerized program that projects available population six months in the future. ESGM then allocates the projected available population throughout the Marine Corps based on precedence levels categorized as excepted; 100% of grade/ MOS requirement (HMX-1), priority; 100- of aggregate numbers - some substitution allowed for grade and MOS (they could receive a sergeant to fill a staff sergeant billet), and pro-share; which gets whoever is left. Aviation units are nearly all priority commands. This does not allow much flexibility to deal with changes in the inventory. The model faces the dilemma of apportioning Marines equally among units with the same level of priority. When everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. Currently, the available personnel pool is generating staffing goals that are inadequate to meet optempo/perstempo requirements. MAG 13 did a study in 1993 and informed HQMC they needed a minimum staffing goal of 82% of T/O to safely conduct their mission requirements. Unfortunately, MMEA had to go on record informing MAG 13 that HQMC couldn't guarantee their minimum requirements. To add better perspective, one can examine the staffing procedure for infantry units to draw a corollary comparison. In 1992, the Enlisted Assignment Branch initiated the TOUR II staffing program. Briefly, TOUR II involves cyclical staffing of deploying units based on their deployment date. Marines report to a battalion 8-10 months before deployment to train and facilitate cohesion. Marine Expeditionary Units, Special Operations Capable (MEU SOC) are completely built or "locked on" six months prior to deployment. Lock on for Unit Deployment Program (UDP) units is three months. At this point, priority shifts to the next unit in the queue. The program has worked well. For one thing, there is no shortage of infantry Marines. As added insurance, MMEA artifially deflated the staffing goal to provide a "fudge factor." In other words, battalions received fewer Marines than the ESGM allocated. Priority goes to deploying units at the expense of non-deploying units. Post deployment, these battalions attrit significantly until built for the next deployment. Do they go short? Yes, but the difference is they are not flying airplanes. In 1993, MMEA incorporated TOUR II for aviation and it has been marginally successful. There is no slack in aviation manning, so staffing goals weren't depressed because they were already too low. The significant difference from infantry TOUR II is that with aviation units, there is no downside in the cycle where priority can shift. Non-deploying units have the same manning requirements as those getting ready to go. Shortages are exacerbated by deployability status of individual Marines. Frequently, squadrons have significant numbers of non- deployable Marines for various reasons, and another deployable Marine has to replace them. Typically, that Marine just completed a previous deployment. The result is a round robin effect where Marines make one deployment after another. This dynamic is affecting retention, family stability, and any number of other factors and functions involving personal situations. The shortages became so acute that MMEA was forced to admit to the various MAGs that minimum sourcing requirements could not be met. Official notification of planned shortages (MMEA's inability to accomplish the mission) went to Wing and Group with the understanding they would have to fill shortages with internal assets or go short. Credit the branch head with the moral courage to place himself on the skyline and opening his actions to further scrutiny. This obviously alienated HQMC from the FMF, but did provide an accurate portrayal of the true magnitude of existing shortages. Due to the unique nature of aviation and the specialty. skills required to task organize squadrons and detachments, MMEA allows a large degree of autonomy by the individual Groups. Granting of latitude has advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, detachments (dets), Marine Aviation Logistic Squadron (MALS) augmentees, and short skilled MOS's are managed at the user level, a form of decentralized execution. Visibility at the HQMC level suffers somewhat in this instance and the system requires a great deal of communication and flexibility. Sometimes, abuses are inevitable. Units are naturally going to protect their own interests. Both Wing and Group are hesitant to transfer Marines until a replacement is onboard, and sometimes they simply fail to comply with directives. One example of how decentralized execution causes friction is the manning of detachments for Marine Expeditionary Units. Individual Groups and squadrons are responsible for deciding detachment makeup. The deploying squadron receives staffing goal and the dets come from the parent squadron. The problem is that higher headquarters (MARFORLANT and MARFORPAC) were insisting on full complement air crews. These "gold-plated" dets were requiring T/O crews from a squadron manned according to staffing goal. The validity of this requirement is not at issue; the simple arithmetic shows that the squadron suffers the consequences. Add to this the requirement to triple-site in certain instances and there is a serious staffing dilemma facing unit commanders. For example, some squadrons chop a det to a MEU before deployment and another det to 31st Meu upon arrival on Okinawa. The core squadron becomes a mere shell. They routinely ask HQMC for assistance, but there are no extras to give them. Group commanders are forced to make difficult decisions. The deploying units are obviously a priority. One unit suffering the consequences is the training squadrons, who are going short although many of their instructor billets are excepted (highest priority). The trainers are competing with the deployers. They have voiced their concerns, among them the potential of not meeting pilot training requirements. One training squadron requested a staffing goal increase to 218 because they felt this was the minimum requirement to accomplish their mission. The T/O calls for 214, ASR is 193, and the ESGM tells us we can only afford to give them 172. What is the answer? Unfortunately, the answer is "no." The domino effect is that training shortages eventually equate to further shortfalls in the Fleet squadrons. One of the most controversial structure adjustments was the HQMC consolidation of airframe structure and hydraulic MOS's. By combining MOS's and declaring it a dual skill capability, the force structure planners were able to further reduce manning requirements. These "savings" could then shift elsewhere. Without arguing the relative merits of this decision, it does provide a graphic illustration of the interoperability and effects on various agencies. The change was not time-phased, HQMC implemented it all at once and the FMF howled. Their manning dropped across the board. For instance, prior to consolidation, MOS 6142 and 6152 totaled 584 Marines. After consolidation into MOS 6152, helicopter airframe mechanic, the number dropped to 322, a 45% reduction. HQMC overestimated unit ability to cross- train at the squadron level and obtain the additional expertise while operating at peak optempo. The training establishment had to revamp curriculum and make other adjustments that take time. In the interim, squadrons wanted to maintain a relative mix of skills that approximated the "status quo" indefinitely. They resisted the change and asked MMEA to help. Once the MOS's changed on the unit diary and updates posted in the manpower management system (MMS), the monitors lost visibility of previous specialties, but agreed to help in the transition. Carrier Manning The agreement to deploy Marine squadrons with Navy aircraft carriers may be a joint effort, and an assist to the Navy, who is undergoing their own personnel problems, but it is difficult to pull off. As previously stated, the staffing goal for an F/A-18 squadron, less its MALS augment, is 111. Navy requirements call for a total of 206 Marines. This excess comes from internal assets. MAGs on both coasts are forced into drastic adjustments because no outside help is available. One can only imagine what this is doing to the other squadrons. To make matters worse, the Navy wants its fully complemented squadron on board for workups nine months before the scheduled deployment. MEUs aren't even built until six months prior. To illustrate how difficult this requirement is, deploying units are still fed Marines up to a week before sail date. Operationally, the requirement is legitimate, but nine months is an eternity in the manpower arena. The extra time requirement disqualifies many Marines as EAS non-deployable. This requirement is not going away and miraculously the Marine Corps has pulled off several iterations. Training Pipeline As part of the endeavor to figure out where all the aviation Marines were, MMEA tried to determine if enough of them were made in the first place. This entailed some cross-boundary exploration that incited the sensitivities of various entities, chief among them was the recruiting and training commands. While "thinking out of the box" may be a vogue concept, many Marines and institutions within the headquarters are threatened by the possible consequences. As MMEA stubbornly and deftly chipped away at the rice bowls, the discovered deficiencies were glaring. The accession, training, and skill attainment process is cumbersome, complicated, and widely divergent. The process isn't broke, but it needs fixing. The most difficult obstacle to grasping this process is the wide array of players and the bureaucracy involved. Recruiting a young man or woman to fill a particular skill, and then getting that Marine through an available training pipeline in a timely fashion is a convoluted process. The interconnectivity between various organizations and individuals is like a maze. MMEA convened a meeting in the Spring of 1994 to explore the issues, and approximately sixty action officers showed up. It took thirty minutes to figure out what everybody did. Unfortunately, some attendees were merely spies to ensure their particular area of interest wasn't highlighted. Some of the issues discussed: - The annual recruiting mission is based on contracts that can be sold, and not necessarily on the needs of the Marine Corps. Aviation contracts are popular, but not all of them. The fall back plan was to make up the difference in what recruiters could sell and what the Marine Corps actually needed with open contracts. - The sister services, who provide a significant number of training school seats, require two years advance notice to reserve slots. They obviously know the merits of long- range planning. While the Marine Corps struggled with endstrength and force makeup, they submitted at least two years of "swag" requests. If a Marine receives an overabundant skill, it equates to a four-year mistake. If requisite numbers of various skills fall short, catching up is very difficult. Our sister services are also undergoing force reductions and are limiting capacity in their schools. The reductions in training available to the Marine Corps and their ramifications were not identified in time. In cases where school seat requirements fluctuated or lessened, the Marine Corps was loathe to reduce annual requests accordingly because of the fear of not being able to recapture seats if the need arose. The Marine Corps continued to purchase excessive seats as an insurance policy and assigned overabundant MOS's at the expense of short skills. - The aviation training pipeline is largely at the mercy of the Navy. Marines request seats from the Navy and our gyrating requirements and constantly changing numbers frayed our credibility. The "A" and "C" school interface was disjointed. Marines attend basic MOS skill courses and then transition to follow-on schools based on particular MOS requirements. The Director of Training & Education's (T&E) crusade to reduce time awaiting training permeated the school houses. Students were vectored into the first available training seat regardless of need assessments. T&E adopted a computerized system for tracking student flow that is conceptually sound, but practically, only partially effective. The problem was with Millington Tennessee, where most aviation initial training occurs, because they only had one outdated computer terminal and weren't wired into the system. They couldn't keep the system updated and provide planners with essential data. Training requirements and availability varies as the following figures will attest. In 1992, only 3,786 candidates were sent for 3,899 "A" school seats. The Marine Corps underexecuted, especially when attrition is factored in. In typical fashion, planners tried to compensate the next year; in 1993, 3,937 students were sent to fill 3,543 seats. The Marine Corps overexecuted and overshipped in the hopes additional training opportunity would open. This doesn't endear the Corps with the Navy and frankly, is a waste of time and money. In 1994, realizing the shortages endemic to the Fleet and bowing to pressure for a quick fix, the Marine Corps obtained 4,145 seats in the hope a surge would help alleviate shortages and make up for prior transgressions. While on the surface this appears to be a positive step, in actuality it resembles a form of deficit spending. Four or six years from now, when most of these Marines ends their active service, the Marine Corps will have to surge again to replace them. It amounts to a vicious cycle. On a positive note, many of these issues are being studied and some improvement is forthcoming. Another potential problem is the planned migration of the aviation training establishment to Naval Air Station Pensacola from Millington. Preliminary planning figures reflect reduced training capacity and interruptions in the pipeline which could undermine efforts to balance short skills. This will undoubtedly affect skill attainment, and it remains to be seen how effectively the Navy and Marine Corps can execute. Reserve Structure Marine Reserve structure experienced much of the same uncertainty felt in the active force. While active duty staffing in support of 4th Marine Aircraft Wing is relatively small, some of our best and most experienced Marines support the Reserve effort. Political posturing and hesitancy to carry out Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) decisions kept some bases and facilities open though the structure had shifted or zeroed out. This dilemma shows the challenges facing monitors. The Reserve establishment requests a status quo in staffing because the actual shutdown date for a particular Reserve center is negotiable and they want to keep flying. The new Reserve center wants its people ASAP and the Fleet is critically short in many of these same skills. At one time, there were approximately 400 Marines maintained in unallocated billets at various Reserve centers. This may seem an inconsequential number, but their skills and expertise were desperately needed in the FMF. Conclusions Assuming that Optempo/Perstempo will remain constant in the near future, what can be done to facilitate manpower staffing? From a HQMC perspective, first and foremost, discipline must prevail within the manpower management process. Granted, the post Desert Shield years were an anomaly for planners, but now that endstrength appears stable, the system can work like it is programmed to. The process itself is a fairly efficient design, the problem in my opinion, is we are all too ready to deviate or abandon procedures at the first sign of trouble. Decisiveness on the part of our senior leadership would be a welcome addition and a big assist to action officers. It's bewildering to confront the amount of time it takes to get a decision at HQMC, which at times is hamstrung with leadership by committee and consensus. Time is wasted on contingency planning and lost because it is difficult to recover from late decisions. On occasion, any benefits derived from a decision are diluted because they are overcome by events. Planning in a vacuum is an art form at HQMC, but a necessary evil. Another area for improvement is inter-agency communication. There are many dedicated, well-meaning people working projects that impact on others and they need to be aware of the interconnectivity. As much as D/CS Aviation is concerned about manpower management, they rarely, if ever, came to MMEA for discussions. It was as if they were two time zones away instead of two decks in the same building. When MMEA made overtures to ascertain the evolving situations, it was sometimes viewed as interference. Too many people at HQMC view the world from a limited perspective; what's best for my shop rather than what is most beneficial for the Marine Corps. Many of them need to get out and visit with the field. While MMEA was certainly guilty of bureaucracy and makes its share of mistakes, the sobering visits to commands helped gain their perspective. It also helps to honestly and forthrightly explain your viewpoint because it chips away at the cloak of secrecy. The accession and skill attainment process needs further exploration. The problem again is no crossover responsibility and the fixation with individual efforts. The assignment flexibility introduced by grouping like skills into recruiting packages is a positive initiative. We have to get better at long-range planning. Computer models are great, but human analysis remains a critical factor we can't forget about. The training pipeline must be level-loaded. Recruiting is cyclical with the summer months more conducive to enlisting high school graduates. This is a fact of life that has to be reconciled with the training establishment, who operates a year round schedule that is at odds with realities of recruiting dynamics. Yearly fluctuations in requirements must be dealt with incrementally. This year's quick fix will only come back to haunt us again four years later. Planners must address shortages over a three year period of time with a gradual increase. With dwindling resources and decreased training opportunities, quick fix, reactionary approaches are hard to pull off anyway. Priorities must be set, and aviation is obviously a critical element, so MMEA weights MOS assignments accordingly. There are many non-aviation MOS's that are critically short, however, and the Corps has to maintain balance. Transfer of aviation units complicated staffing. The Hawaii indecision clobbered the manpower process for over a year. Planning for PCS squadrons going to Okinawa, consolidating training on one coast, and the NAS Miramar evolution all had detrimental effects. MMEA was forced to maintain overstaffs in the event the puzzle didn't unfold as we were told it probably would. As these migrations occur, systemic discipline can return. Many aviation related MOS's are fenced from serving on special assignments. Hopefully, this is a short-term solution. These Marines deserve a chance to serve in "B" billets and for every one of them not serving, another Marine has to take his place; another vicious cycle emerges. A few aviation MOS's returned early to the FMF from special assignments to help alleviate shortages. The Marine Corps stresses Total Quality and here is a situation ideally suited to the fundamental approach of TQL. A consolidation of divergent efforts can produce progress. At a minimum, the various action officers need to meet periodically to discuss evolutions and their cross- pollination effects. Communication and dialogue are critical. Recently, MMEA included representatives from DC/S Aviation on road trips and an MMEA representative accompanied the head of ASM on another trip. These are positive developments and need to be reinforced. Optempo remains fast and furious. Airframes are aging, especially in the helicopter community. Shortages of aviation skills are highlighted and the fire hose turned on. No clear cut, readily identifiable solutions are evident. Aviation units manage to accomplish the mission. The Marine Corps asks, expects, and demands a lot from its Marines, and will continue to do so. No aviation commanders have yet stepped forward to say they can't accomplish the mission, although several have threatened to do so. In a pinch, the Marine Corps will rely on ingenuity and hard work to persevere. This always works, but with some concerted effort and imagination, the Marine Corps can work smarter in addition to working harder. Endnote Note: All facts and figures derived from the Headquarters Master File in the Manpower Management System, accessed in Kansas City. Bibliography 1. Dean, Mike, Major, United States Marine Corps, former head of Combat Arms Monitor Section, HQMC. Personal interview about the TOUR II staffing program. February - March, 1994. 2. O'Connell, Terry, Captain, United States Marine Corps, Head Recruit Distibution Section, HQMC. Personal interview about MOS assignments. February - March, 1995. 3. Schultz, Dave, Captain, United States Marine Corps, Enlisted Plans Section, HQMC. Personal interview about enlisted manpower plans. February - March, 1995. 4. Wright, L.A., Manpower Analyst, HQMC. Personal interview about enlisted staffing procedures. February - March, 1995. 5. Various Fleet personnel managers and unit commanders. Meetings, presentations, and question and answer sessions with operational units throughout the Marine Corps. 1994.
