Fratricide: Avoiding The Silver Bullet CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues Fratricide: Avoiding the Silver Bullet There is little that compares to the stress, confusion, and emotion of combat. Servicemen make decisions that are irreversible and other people may die as a result. The death of a friendly soldier is always tragic, but never more so than when he/she is inadvertently killed by his own comrades. Despite efforts to prevent fratricide, it has been and will continue to be one of the inevitable costs of war. One of the most unfortunate memories of the Gulf War was that "35 of the 148 U.S. combat deaths were due to friendly fire."1 Most Americans do not realize that the quick and decisive victory against Iraq likely saved thousands of lives. But to others, this question remains: Is death by friendly fire necessary? The purpose of this paper is to explore the devastating effects of fratricide from a unit's perspective. It will also highlight the Marine Corps need to concentrate on solutions to minimize this tragic side affect of war through positive leadership and the application of modern technology. Furthermore, the Corps needs to purchase the inexpensive, on- the-shelf technology that is available now in order to begin fratricide reduction within itself and Service wide. The material studied pointed clearly to two factors which were the primary cause of most fratricide incidents: (1) direct human error and (2) the misuse of technology. In researching this paper, I compared five wars to determine the primary causes of fratricide. The table below illustrates my findings: Click here to view image As shown, rarely were incidents of fratricide due to mechanical failure of a weapon system, but more likely it was a direct result of some measurable human failure. The nervousness of inexperienced troops, a lack of control or fire discipline, or the disorientation, confusion, and carelessness of pilots were the principal causes of most incidents. Another primary contributing factor is today's improved technology. Modern technology enables large, complex, and fast moving formations to fight in rain, darkness, and low visibility, which further complicates the battlefield and greatly increases the likelihood of fratricide. Additionally, technology has greatly increased the lethality and engagement ranges of our current weapon platforms. This advancement in technology has pushed us beyond the traditional form of conventional warfare into extremely high speed engagements on the move, making it more difficult to distinguish friendly units from enemy units. The combination of the above factors (speed/mobility) coupled with today's weapons, is increasing the likelihood that all direct engagements will be fatal. As highlighted above, a more rapid paced, less structured battlefield, with a mix of increasingly lethal weaponry, is now the norm for the US military. Thus, the risks of casualties resulting from fratricide have increased dramatically. Indicative of this is the experience of front line units in the Gulf War. No unit experienced the affects of fratricide more than the light armored vehicle (LAV) units. "On 29 January 1991, an A-10 aircraft fired a maverick missile which malfunctioned in flight and struck a light armored vehicle killing seven (7) and seriously wounding two (2)."2 This incident had devastating affects not only on family members but also on the units morale. Fratricide is a perplexing problem - one that needs to be addressed and studied so potential solutions will be available prior to future conflicts. One must understand that each fratricide incident contains a unique set of circumstances which are difficult to model or simulate. Background: The realities of modern warfare demand a solution to the dilemma of fratricide. As directed by the Department of Defense (DOD), the search for technological and material solutions must be a joint effort. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) issued guidance on 26 March 1992 outlining a visionary overall Combat Identification goal, consisting of the following component objectives: "to be able to rapidly identify enemy, friend, and neutral; to manage and control the battle area; to optimally employ weapons and forces; and, as a consequence of the above, to minimize fratricide." From this vision the DoD Joint Management plan for Combat Identification was developed to provide Joint Service coordination and oversight of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine combat identification requirements, policies, procedures, development, procurement programs, and related technology efforts. The critical system characteristics that were agreed upon by all four services include: 1) "Providing positive ID regardless of target aspect and/or sensor maneuvers. 2) Operating within host platform power/space budgets. 3) Operating in same environment as host platforms/systems. 4) Correlating ID data with on board weapon sensor data. 5) Providing adequate electronic protection in order to prevent exploitation/jamming. 6) Avoiding degradation of existing avionics performance. 7) Maintaining existing systems when practicable. 8) Developing architecture which allows operations across the entire spectrum. (peace to war) 9) Utilizing common data standards and common data interfaces."4 Click here to view image In order to help define the complexity of Combat Identification, the Joint Combat ID Working Group, comprised of membership from all the services and supporting cast of laboratories and research centers, developed a picture of four mission areas. These mission areas are: air to air; surface to air; air to surface; and surface to surface. For focal efforts, the Navy has the lead for air to air and surface to air, while the Army has the lead for surface to surface and air to surface. These mission areas, combined with the threefold aspect of hostile, enemy and neutral identification requirement, comprise the pyramid picture above. These mission areas were a tremendous help in crystallizing the appropriate perspective in the development of the Joint Combat ID Mission Need Statement. In analyzing the four mission areas, two critical aspects were considered: Situational Awareness (SA) and Positive Target Identification (TI). The capability of situational awareness is to know the location of the individual host system and to maximize the use of information gathered by friendly sensors to track and identify friendly forces. The positive target identification aspects are being increased through development of systems to provide levels of identification for friend/neutral, foe, type/class, and nationality. Friendly identification is a fairly mature system (IFF/identify friend or foe) in air to air missions whereas tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are consistent throughout the other mission areas. The two predominant problem areas that exist are hostile and neutral identification. These two, coupled with friendly identification, provide a complete picture of situational awareness. During Desert Storm, the recognition of this problem caused many artificial restrictions to be placed on both air and ground operating forces in an effort to control errors. The final solution will ensure interoperability across all mission areas. With the proliferation of common equipment across the globe, the lack of commonality in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in coalition forces, compounded by the complexities of modern warfare, the combat identification problem can be greatly reduced through the application of modern technology and strong positive leadership. The Gulf War has validated the fact fratricide will not be accepted and that proper procedures/technology must be identified and in place to eliminate this terrible side affect of war. In order to facilitate the modern warfighter from artificial restrictions and to reduce fratricide, the Combat Identification Program has been addressing a multitude of capabilities that incorporate strong leadership and modern technological advances. Capabilities Required to Reduce Fratricide Battlefield Combat Identification must provide integrated situational awareness for mid/far-term systems. In the near term, information from adjunct systems such as a small lightweight GPS receiver/precision lightweight GPS receiver (SLGR/PLGR) will be used. Battlefield Combat Identification (BCI) must also provide target identification (TI) of friendly ground and airborne platforms, to include dismounted soldiers, in ground-to-ground, air-to-ground, ground-to-air, and air-to- air missions. BCIS needs to automatically integrate and correlate friend and enemy position locations (situational awareness) as reported through command and control systems (C2) with through-sight or target acquisition capabilities. Since maximum effective range would include the target acquisition process, the battlefield combat identification (BCI) must provide identification under all situations which could permit the BCI host to engage a target. BCI cannot degrade the host system performance nor unit combat effectiveness. If a transponder is used, the response should be encoded to include the identification of the interrogation signal it is responding to. Current Marine Corps efforts to improve Combat ID include Satellite-based Global Positioning Systems (GPS), new generation Night Vision Goggles (NVG's), Digitization of the Battlefield, and an increase in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV'S). These systems represent a considerable effort to provide situational awareness and target identification to all levels of the MAGTF. Some additional enhancements of situational awareness have resulted from the introduction of the SINCGARS radio which reduces the enemy's ability to interfere with communications, allowing friendly units to remain in contact. During the recent OSD-level program reviews for POM95, modernization of armored vehicles, to include a shared situational awareness capability, was addressed for Army and Marine Corps armored vehicles. This capability would be provided through an applique Inter-Vehicular Information System (IVIS). A proposal was developed to fund this capability for all Marine Corps and Army armored vehicles. Although the efforts described above significantly improve on Combat ID, each effort has been developed independently, without consideration of the Combat ID mission need statement or Marine Corps goals for Combat ID. The Corps is currently working to develop an integrated plan to determine our requirements and set forth policy, guidance, and direction for Combat ID. Because it is the one Service involved in all four mission areas, USMC efforts to direct and focus current and future acquisitions are crucial to ensure that affordable and interoperable systems are fielded. Without the Corps involvement and interaction, systems could be purchased which might be cost prohibitive and lack the necessary interoperability for joint operations. The Marine Corps is actively involved in Combat ID, but to date, our role has been limited to that of monitoring the other Services' initiatives. In the future, the Marine Corps will need the appropriate funding in order to take the lead in developing its own unique systems capable of eliminating friendly fire casualties. Until the time comes when there is adequate funding allocated for research and development, fratricide will continue to plaque the Corps. Roadmap Focus Initial efforts are being addressed as follows: 1) The near-term (fielded in less than 3 years) Battlefield Combat Identification (BCI) can be an applique (non- permanent, easily attached and removed), partially integrated system which provides positive target identification (TI) of friendly forces. Existing and programmed systems such as fire control, communications, sensors, position navigation, and heading reference will be maximized for situational awareness. As the near-term solution to combat identification the Corps is presently evaluating the DRAPA light system, which is a transponder "that receives the interrogation signal from the attack platform and transmits a friendly reply to the sender."5 The system was recently tested in exercises in both Yuma, Arizona, and the Republic of Korea, and received enthusiastic praise for its effectiveness to locate friendly units. The Darpa light system, though impressive, only covers two of the four mission areas: air to ground and ground to ground. This may seem unacceptable, but one must remember this simply covers the near-term phase. The positive aspect of this system is that no aircraft modifications are required other than the pilots being required to wear night vision goggles (NVG). With a price tag of $300 per copy, combined with its proven capabilities, I believe the Corps made the right decision in purchasing this capability. 2) The mid-term (fielded in 3 to 7 years) Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCI) will increase integration of SA and positive TI to distinguish between friend, hostile, and neutral/noncombatants. The mid-term system, which covers the entire area of operations, will include capabilities for ground-to-air, and air-to-air engagements. Mid-term BCI will also include the dismounted soldier and associated weaponry, and accommodate application to fixed wing air platforms. To meet the mid-term requirement the Corps is researching technology that deals with radar signal modulation. This system would cover all four (4) mission areas "with an accuracy of properly identifying friendly forces more than 92% of the time."6 The system operates by installing a radar-responder on a piece of ground equipment that emits a pulse via an aircraft fire control radar. The aircraft fire control radar then relays the pulse back to another ground station identifying the object in question as friend, foe or neutral. 3) The far-term (fielded in beyond 7 years) BCI will consist of a joint, fully-integrated positive friend, hostile, and neutral/noncombatant identification, communication, position, and navigation system that will provide on- platform correlation of TI and SA. Far-term BCI will operate in all previously named engagement and platform sets. The system the Corps is presently evaluating is called the Battlefield Cellular Phone w/GPS. This innovative technology consists of phone numbers linked to grid squares. A cellular phone queries cellular nets for situational awareness and proper location of friendly forces. Individuals and small units will carry beepers in order to receive proper friendly locations. The shooter dials a grid square of the intended target, while the beepers within that grid square respond with global positioning system (GPS). An attractive feature of this system is that the cellular station can be in a airborne platform or stationary on the ground. Although this concept needs more development, it is one that is both affordable and adaptable and could greatly enhance combat identification. Shortcomings of Existing Systems. Currently, a limited number of various POS/NAV devices are being used to increase situational awareness. For example, the issue of the global positioning system (GPS) will augment map and compass land navigation techniques. Generally however, units rely on terrain association with tactical maps and voice position reporting. Positions are first overlaid on situational maps to provide positional awareness at higher headquarters. Operation and frag orders are then transmitted by voice or in writing, providing the remaining elements of METT-T to complete situational awareness. One of the shortcomings of GPS is its lack of self-encryption. This opens it up to the possible interception by those enemies with the sophistication to do so. Other than the use of visual and aided visual methods, current models of battlefield target identification (TI) focus on the ground-to-air situation. A target identification (TI) system with a ground-to-ground and air-to-ground capability does not exist. In addition, the extended ranges of modern weapon systems make it virtually impossible for the operator, even under ideal conditions, to visually identify to the maximum effective range of the weapon, which contributes to the problem of fratricide. Working Group Efforts Presently, the USMC Combat ID Working Group is developing a Marine Corps Combat ID Plan, maintaining a coordinated effort in Combat ID, and integrating developed Combat ID goals into the Marine Corps Master Plan. This plan will include identifying all current Marine Corps initiatives which assist in meeting the Combat ID requirements. Developing a Marine Corps roadmap which includes a more detailed plan for implementing actions will illustrate the route the Corps intends to take in fulfilling the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated Mission Need Statement (MNS). Additionally, the Marine Corps is actively pursuing structure and funding for participation in the All Service Combat ID Evaluation Team and their efforts. This program will operate much like the OSD directed Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). Participation will bring together new technology and operators into a structured and metered arena simulating combat, to test and improve not only the technology, but the immediate improvements that can be made to tactics, techniques, and procedures. This type of operation will allow for development of a tested, interoperable, integrated solution to combat identification both today and for the future. One must remember that in today's climate of force reduction and competing interests the upper echelons of leadership in the Marine Corps will have to heighten the priority and focus more attention on the complexity of developing a integrated solution to combat. The military, working closely with our civilian partners, will continue to tackle this enormous challenge through the application of science, technology, training, and positive leadership. While advanced technological devices may certainly be of significant value in reducing the complexity of combat identification through situational awareness (SA) and positive target identification (TI), they cannot provide a comprehensive solution to what is a problem of human imperfection that results in fratricide. Combat is defined as, "active fighting between enemy forces."7 That each side will suffer casualties in the process is taken for granted; they are the inevitable, if regrettable, consequence of such a deadly proposition. However, it is not generally taken for granted that each side is almost certain to suffer casualties inflicted by its own forces. Yet, in each conflict which America has participated, especially those of the twentieth century, a significant number of Marines have been killed or wounded as the result of friendly fire. That the percentage of casualties resulting from friendly fire from World War I through the Gulf War has been extremely low does not make the accidental killing or wounding of one's own troops any less tragic or disastrous. Nor does it offer much consolation to the commander responsible for the lives of his troops or to the Marine who runs the risk of falling victim to the fire of his own forces. It may well be that in the "fog of war"8 friendly fire casualties are inevitable, but this solemn observation does not absolve the armed forces from doing everything in their power to eliminate the problem. As a future commander, the safety and well-being of the troops is priority number one; therefore, the disastrous effects of fratricide must not be overlooked. The area to be hit hardest from an incident of fratricide would be morale - one of the most vital components of a successful unit. No service member is excluded from the feelings of guilt and shame, which ultimately has an adverse effect on performance. Not only does it effect the morale of the unit, but also of the country. For every service member who loses his life during wartime, there is a family who must deal with their loss. To learn that their loved one was killed by friendly fire makes that loss even harder. As a result, the armed forces may lose the confidence and support of the American people, a crucial element of any successful campaign. With these thoughts in mind, the Corps is committed to finding the appropriate solution: one that is affordable, interoperable, and yet retains the edge technology has given us in combat. But most importantly, the Corp is dedicated to a solution that removes fratricide from our military terminology. ENDNOTES 1. Joint Requirements Oversight Brief, June 1992. 2. Stephanie Kang, Army Times, copyright 1994, Army Times Publishing Company. 3. Mr. Kirk Nicholas, Integration and Assessment Branch Brief, MCCDC 1993, p 3. 4. Joint Requirements Oversight Council Brief, June 1992. 5. Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS) (draft). Program Executive Office Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Office of the Project Manager Combat Identification, Fort Monmouth, NJ. p I-8. 6. Mr. Kirk Nicholas, Integration and Assessment Branch Brief, MCCDC 1993. 7. The Random House College Dictionary, (revised edition), copyright 1982, p 267. 8. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1976 BIBLIOGRAPHY Beebe, Gilbert Wheeler, and DeBakey, Michael E. Battle Casualties: Incidence. Mortality, and Logistic Considerations. Springfield, Il: Charles C Thomas, 1952. Bryan, Courtlandt Dixion Barnes. Friendly Fire. New York: Bantam Books, 1977. Childers, C.D., conducted by HQMC, MCRDAC/AWT. Blue-on-Blue Incidents. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS #42936-56439). Commanding General 5th MEB. Mode IV Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) Operability. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS #03072-59524), February 15, 1988. Interview with Mr. Kirk Nicholas, Assistant Director Accessment Branch, NCCDC on 17, 26 and 27 January 1995 at Marine Corps Combat and Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. Joint Requirements overnight Council Brief, June 1992. Lloyd, A.M., conducted by 2nd Marine Division. Air: Fear of Fratricide: Air Support. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLL8 #32269-81178) March 22, 1991. Operation Desert Storm, conducted by MARCENT. Fratricide - Lessons Learned (Part 1). Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS# 51350-31339). Operation SWA - 0061, conducted by OASD. Fratricide - OASD Public Affairs News Release On Friendly Fire. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS# 21131-30017). August 13, 1991. Operation SWA - 0061, conducted by Marine Corps Combat and Development Command. Fratricide, Friendly Fire. Public Affairs- USA (US ARMY). Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS #01433-25474), October 15, 1992. Operation SWA-0061, conducted by Marine Corps Combat and Development Command. Fratricide - Media Articles. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS #20454-67563), December 4, 1992. Operation SWA - 0063, conducted by 1 MEF. Fratricide - Investigation of the HARM Attack on an AN/TPO-36 Radar. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS# 31746-48322) February 23, 1991. Shrader, Lt Col Charles R., Amicicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, December 1982. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACJ343). Vietnam Lessons Learned No.70: Friendly Casualties From Friendly Fires. October 17, 1968. Executive Summary This report examines the tragic loss of life from incidents of fratricide and the implications it has on morale. In addition, the report evaluates the Corps need to focus more attention on effective joint training, positive leadership, and incorporating the technology that is available today in order to eradicate this gruesome side effect of war. Finally, I will discuss the efforts the Corps is undertaking in regards to the near-term (less than 3 years), mid-term (3 to 7 years), and far-term (beyond 7 years) to abolish fratricide from our terminology.
