Military

The Future Antiarmor Capabilities Of The Ground Combat Element

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues

 

 

 

 

                                    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: The Future Antiarmor Capabilities Of The Ground Combat Element.

 

Author: Major William H. Callahan Jr., United States Marine Corps.

 

Thesis: The Ground Combat Element's (GCE's) Light Antitank Weapon (LAW) and Medium

 

Antitank Weapon (MAW) capabilities are sufficient to counter the current and future armor threat.

 

However, the GCE's Heavy Antitank Weapon (HAW) capability is inadequate because of a lack of

 

command and control (C2) within the organizational structure. Besides the current deficiencies in

 

organizational structure, the absence of a research and development program create a dilemma for

 

the future HAW capability in the GCE of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

 

Background: Potential adversaries may be armed with an inventory of modern, highly lethal and

 

sophisticated weapon systems including a formidable tank threat reflecting US and NATO

 

technology. Future conflict of any spectrum will still have armor as the decisive force in ground

 

combat. Free trade and open armor market competition have created a mix-and-match technology

 

main battle tank with drastic improvements in survivability. Many countries have acquired these

 

tanks in large quantities.

 

   In recent years, force reductions have caused the Marine Corps to reduce C2 structure without

 

considering the repercussions of the absence of this structure as it applies to readiness and

 

employment. The GCE's future LAW and current HAW structures provide excellent examples of

 

this situation. The cost of future technology forced the Marine Corps to take a "bare bones"

 

approach to acquire and field the GCE's future antiarmor capability. This approach created a large

 

void in the future HAW capability of the GCE. The GCE in future conflict must have the

 

capability to defeat large quantities of advance technology main battle tanks with drastic

 

improvements in survivability. Currently, the Marine Corps can not counter this threat when one

 

specifically analyses the C2, survivability and lethality of the current HAW capability within the

 

GCE.

 

Recommendation:   To overcome current command and control problems in the HAW capability

 

the Marine Corps needs to consolidate (TOW) within the GCE. The reorganization of TOW into

 

one unit will increase readiness, standardize training, and be cost effective. My proposal is to

 

reconstitute Anti-Tank (TOW) Company at the same time the Marine Corps fields the Javelin

 

weapon system. In 1997, once fielding of the Javelin is complete; there will be four platoons of

 

TOW in the division. These will be the three platoons located in the regiments and a platoon

 

located in the tank battalion (The TOW section structure located in the infantry battalion will be

 

utilized to employ Javelin). The company structure should be T/O 4235M with an additional

 

platoon (Annex A).

 

   To correct the dilemma in the future HAW capability, the Marine Corps should pursue a joint

 

acquisition with the Army to develop and field Extended Range Javelin (ER Javelin) as the

 

replacement for TOW. Joint acquisition and fielding of ER Javelin are the cost effective means to

 

ensure the lethality and survivability required on the future battlefield. Since the Marine Corps

 

fights as a MAGTF, the Marine Corps concurrently should establish a joint research and

 

development program with the Army to develop a kinetic energy missile known as Line-of-Sight

 

Antitank (LOSAT) and a 120mm mortar round known as Non Line-of-Sight Antitank (NLOS).

 

These systems overwhelming lethality counter all current and projected armor defenses ensuring a

 

technological advantage for the future MAGTF.

 

   "In the world's littorals, America's global economic interests, maritime lines of communications

 

and treaty obligations intersect with growing instability. This instability is characterized by limited

 

resources, growing population and expansionist oriented leaders."1 World supplies of modern,

 

lethal weapons systems will be more than adequate to meet the demands of ambitious regional

 

leaders. Potential adversaries may be armed with an inventory of modern, highly lethal and

 

sophisticated weapon systems including a formidable tank threat reflecting US and NATO

 

technology. Marine Expeditionary Forces must prepare to fight the full spectrum of war as part of

 

a Naval Expeditionary Force, Joint Force or Coalition Force. To accomplish this mission, the

 

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) must retain the advantage in battlefield technology

 

specifically in mobility, firepower, and information to meet the threat of the future.

 

   This paper explores the topic of firepower, specifically the antiarmor capability the Ground

 

Combat Element (GCE) of the MEF requires to destroy modern armor now and in the immediate

 

future. Immediate future is defined as 1995 to the year 2015. The GCE's Light Antitank Weapon

 

(LAW) and Medium Antitank Weapon (MAW) capabilities are sufficient to counter the current

 

and future threat.  However, the GCE's Heavy Antitank Weapon (HAW) capability is

 

inadequate because of a lack of command and control (C2) within the organizational structure.

 

To overcome current command and control problems in the HAW capability the Marine Corps

 

needs to consolidate the Tube-Launched, Optically tracked, Wire command link (TOW) units

 

within the GCE. The reorganization of TOW into one unit will increase readiness, reduce current

 

Structure, and be cost effective.

 

   Besides the current deficiencies in organizational structure, the absence of a research and

 

development program create a dilemma for the future HAW capability in the GCE.

 

To correct this dilemma, the Marine Corps should pursue a joint acquisition with the Army to

 

develop and field Extended Range Javelin (ER Javelin) as the replacement for TOW.

 

Concurrently, the Marine Corps should establish a joint research and development program with

 

the Army to develop a kinetic energy missile known as Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) and a

 

120mm mortar round known as Non Line-of-Sight Antitank (NLOS). These systems

 

overwhelming lethality counters all current and projected armor defenses ensuring a technological

 

advantage for the future Marine Air- Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

 

   As the Cold War ended, most people thought that the massive armor threat would diminish.

 

On the contrary, the opposite has occurred. The open and competitive nature of free trade in the

 

world caused many countries to sell aggressively military hardware and technology to the highest

 

bidder. Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) such as the Russian T-80U, the French LeClerc, the German

 

Leopard II and the US M1A1/2 (without special armor) are available for purchase like any

 

commodity. Many countries have acquired these tanks that are considered the world's best.  "The

 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) recently held a competition among the T80U, M1A2 and the

 

LeClerc. As a result of this competition, UAE opted to purchase 436 LeClerc over the next five

 

years."2 "Similarly, Sweden recently held a competition among the LeClerc, the M1A2 and the

 

Leopard II which resulted in the purchase of a number of Leopard II tanks."3 This type of armor

 

acquisition will continue in the future creating a diversified and potent armor threat throughout the

 

world.

 

   Another interesting result of the open armor market competition is the ability of the purchasing

 

country to dictate design changes not considered by the selling country.  "UAE bought 425

 

Russian BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. What is specifically unique about this sale is that before

 

delivery UAE had Russia install a French designed and manufactured thermal imager which

 

significantly upgrades the night fighting capability from the Russian version."4 Another example

 

transpired in South Africa South Africa purchased a number of T-72 Ms and added an upgraded

 

weapons control system that includes thermal imager and a commander's station panoramic sight.

 

Again, these modifications significantly improve the fighting capability from the Russian version.

 

South Africa currently exports this vehicle to other countries. This mix-and-match technology

 

trend will continue because of the cost of research and development to design and field new

 

weapon systems. Reduced defense budgets have caused most countries to buy existing weapon

 

systems with modification upgrades.

 

   Another great concern is the quantities of tanks countries are buying. Saudi Arabia just bought

 

more M1A2's than the entire US military owns. Egypt is entering into co-production of the M1A1

 

tank. In theory, we are helping our allies, but in 1848 Lord Palmerston said, "We have no eternal

 

Allies and we have no perpetual enemies." In today's quickly changing political world, a US ally

 

today could be a US enemy tomorrow. US forces, especially the MEF because of its expeditionary

 

nature, needs to have an antiarmor capability that can defeat large quantities of the mix-and-match

 

technology MBTs of any potential adversary.

 

   To add to the large quantities of mix and match MBTs, Russia fielded a first generation active

 

armor system called "Drozd" in the late 1980's. "Active protection works by detecting the launch

 

or presence of an incoming Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) or rocket, tracking the ATGM and

 

then shooting the ATGM down before it can hit the tank."5  Initially, "Drozd" covered only the

 

frontal 60 degrees of the tank and offered no protection against top attack (fly-over, shoot down).

 

The Russians developed a second generation system called "Arena". "Arena" offers 360 degree

 

protection against attack including top attack ATGMs. Several countries, including the US, have

 

tried to acquire this technology but Russia remains the leader in this technology and is actively

 

marketing "Arena". Any tank or armor fighting can install active protection. Active protection is

 

substantially cheaper and more effective than any alternative upgrade in armor survivability. This

 

technology undoubtedly will proliferate world wide within this decade. If "Arena" is as good as

 

Russia claims it will defeat every antiarmor missile in our current inventory.

 

   Russia and Israel simultaneously introduced Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) in the early

 

1980's. Many experts originally thought Russia had stolen and copied Israel's technology. Further

 

investigation determined Russian ERA was completely different in design from Israel ERA.

 

Russian ERA made all western ATGMs obsolete and resulted in the development and fielding of

 

the tandem shaped charge warhead such as TOW2A.   "Recently, Russia developed a

 

second-generation ERA which the Russians claim is effective not only against tandem shape

 

charge warheads but also some kinetic energy rounds as well."6 This second-generation ERA

 

appeared on Slovak Republic T72 M1 tanks along with an upgraded thermal sight.  Malaysia

 

bought the improved T72 M1 in large quantities. To defeat this type of ERA the Marine Corps

 

requires a top attack warhead such as TOW2B and the Predator.

 

   "Besides countering the substantial improvements in the survivability of the projected armor

 

threat, the future development of the tank cannon (140mm gun) and tank ammunition will extend

 

the maximum effective range of the future tank to over 4000 meters (m). This is a great

 

improvement over the current maximum effective range of 1800-2000 m. TOW currently has a

 

maximum effective range of 3200-3400 m which gives a TOW gunner a survivability standoff

 

range of 1200-1400 m.  The 140mm cannon will eliminate the survivability standoff range of the

 

TOW weapon system"7.

 

   Proliferation of conventional weapons to included modern, technologically advanced armor

 

will continue. Armor forces will retain their status as the decisive force in ground combat. The

 

future battlefield will have a large quantity of mix-and-match technology MBTs with drastic

 

improvements in survivability. Free trade and open armor market competition give any country

 

the opportunity to buy the best tanks in the world. The GCE in future conflicts, must be capable of

 

defeating this threat.

 

   To defeat this threat, the future HAW antiarmor capability must be a system that increases

 

survivability of the crew. To increase survivability of the crew, the replacement system must have

 

a maximum range of 4-6 kilometers (k), incorporate Focal Plane Array (fire and forget technology)

 

and have a soft launch capability (reduced backblast signature). This system must incorporate the

 

latest technology in counter missile capability (duel profile attack) and have a modular design to

 

provide lethality modifications to address projected threat modification in protection. The Marine

 

Corps must acquire a combination of HAW systems to integrate into the MAGTF a capability to

 

counter the large quantities of armor expected on the future battlefield.

 

   To describe the current and future antiarmor capability of the GCE, I will classify these

 

capabilities into three categories:  Light Antitank Weapon (LAW), Medium Antitank Weapon

 

(MAW) and Heavy Antitank Weapons (HAW). Many doctrinal sources have described this three

 

tiered concept in a variety of ways. Some refer only to the weight of the weapon system others to

 

the range or lethality of the weapon system. Technology has now crossed the spectrum in the areas

 

of weight, lethality and range. I will define these categories to encompass this new technology.

 

LAW is a system that weighs less than 30 lbs. (man portable), has a range from 300 m - 1 k and

 

can destroy MBTs with upgraded protection features. MAW is a system that weighs between 30

 

and 75 lbs. (man portable with the capability to be mounted on a vehicle), has a range of 1 k to 3 k

 

and can defeat any threat armor vehicle on the battlefield. HAW is a system weighing more than

 

75 lbs. (needs two marines or more to be manportable and mounts on some type of vehicle), has a

 

range of 3 k - 10 k and defeats all current and projected armor vehicles.

 

                                    CURRENT ANTIARMOR CAPABILITIES OF THE GCE

 

   "The Marine Corps's current LAW capability, the AT-4 and SMAW High Explosive

 

Antiarmor (HEAA) are available to all infantry units in the GCE of the MEF. They provide the

 

capability of destroying infantry fighting vehicles and older generation tanks without active or

 

explosive reactive armor at a maximum range of 300 m. These systems use a simple, direct attack

 

profile and provide alternative uses such as destroying fortifications. The AT-4 and SMAW

 

(HEAA) phases out of the Marine Corps inventory between 2005 and 2015."8 The SMAW

 

(HEAA) and AT-4's limited range, signature, single attack profile and limited lethality degrades

 

their value on the current and future battlefield.

 

   "The Marine Corps's current MAW capability, Dragon II is effective to 800 meters and

 

defeats about 60% of the world's tanks. The Dragon II consists of three components: a day tracker

 

(8.6 lbs.), a night tracker (32 lbs.) and a round of ammunition (28 lbs.). The total system weighs

 

73.2 lbs. which makes it an extremely heavy and cumbersome system for Marines to carry. The

 

missile has limited countermeasure effectiveness with a 60- 70 % hit probability. Dragon II

 

phases out of the Marine Corps inventory between 1998 and 2002. Dragon II's weight, single

 

attack profile, range and limited countermeasure capability makes this weapon system ineffective

 

on the future battlefield."9

 

   "The Marine Corps's current HAW capability, TOW2A/B has a maximum range of 3,750

 

m. TOW2A is a tandem shape charge utilizing the direct attack profile and TOW2B utilizes the

 

top attack profile. TOW2B can defeat all current and projected threat armor with ERA."10 TOW

 

has been in service since the early 1970's and has gone through four major upgrades since its

 

fielding. TOWs thermal capability and lethality were combat multipliers during the Persian Gulf

 

War. Although TOWs lethality can take us into the immediate future, survivability of this system

 

on the future battlefield is very inadequate.  TOWs backblast creates a huge signature that

 

identifies to the enemy where to bring his fires to bear.  The future development of tank

 

ammunition will extend the maximum effective range to over 4k (140mm gun) which denies

 

TOWs survivability standoff range. The age of this system and support equipment has created a

 

multitude of maintenance problems that hampers readiness.  "The TOW readiness rate on the

 

average varies between 82% - 89% Marine Corps wide."11

 

   Tow units first appeared in the FMF in the Anti-Tank (TOW) Company (AT Company) located

 

in the tank battalion. The company had 72 systems organized into three platoons with 24 systems

 

each. Each platoon had three sections with four squads (two systems per squad) for a total of eight

 

systems. This structure succeeded because of a consolidated maintenance effort, standardized

 

training and the use of habitual relationships for deployment and employment. Each platoon had a

 

habitual relationship with a regiment and each section out of that platoon had a habitual

 

relationship with a battalion within the regiment.

 

   In the early 1980's, the Marine Corps procured additional TOW systems and formed a TOW

 

platoon at each regiment. This additional fire power enhanced the GCE commander's deployment

 

and employment options threefold.  Again, habitual relationships and cross training occurred

 

between the regimental TOW platoons and the AT Company because of the expertise located in

 

the AT Company.  In 1992, force reduction caused the elimination of the AT Company

 

headquarters and a redistribution of the companies TOW systems throughout the division. Table 1

 

and 2 summarize this redistribution. Tables 1 and 2 reflect a notional division with three

 

regiments.

 

Click here to view image

 

                          TOTAL NUMBER OF SYSTEM 182

 

   Table 2 shows the total number of assets within the division increased by 26 systems. This

 

increase occurred because 3rd Tank Battalion distributed 72 systems throughout the Corps upon

 

deactivated in 1992. After 1992, the key component missing in the TOW organization is the (C2)

 

structure that was the expertise within the division, the Anti -Tank (TOW) Company

 

Headquarters. This C2 was the center of gravity for all the other TOW units within the division.

 

The absence of this structure has caused some difficulties in training , maintenance, and

 

employment options.

 

   Training a TOW unit is a difficult task because of the lack of doctrinal sources available. There

 

is sufficient doctrine on tactical employment but very little on how to train a TOW crewman. In

 

the past, the best source of material to answer the "how" was the AT Company Standard Operating

 

Procedures (SOP). In 1991, all the AT Companies located in the tank battalions developed a

 

standardized training SOP. In 1992, the infantry regiments received this SOP in the hope that all

 

TOW units would train to the standards set forth in the SOP.

 

   The training standards within this SOP encompassed a variety of doctrinal sources from the

 

army and professional articles. An example from this SOP is the TOW Crew Gunnery Skills Test

 

(TCGST). A TCGST is a series of TOW specific skills common to every TOW crewman that

 

ensures that crew's safety while firing in training and combat. An example of one of the tasks

 

within the test is misfire procedures for the TOW missile. Common sense would tell you before a

 

TOW crew can fire on the range the crew must pass a TCGST. After interviewing a variety of

 

TOW personnel from all four divisions I was shocked at the number of TOW crewman who hadn't

 

taken a TCGST or for that matter any other test before firing. This is a good example of a lack of

 

C2 that could be a fatal mistake in the future.

 

   Currently, TOW units are spread throughout the division in small units attached to headquarters

 

elements who train a multitude of Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). Currently most

 

TOW unit leaders have less then 3 years experience on the weapon system. Most of the Non

 

commission Officer's (NCO's)  have more experience than their section leaders or platoon

 

sergeants. The reason for this is after the rank of sergeant there isn't any distinction on whether an

 

individual has had TOW experience. The section leader and platoon sergeant line numbers in a

 

TOW section and platoon rate an 0369 (infantryman). This situation existed in the AT Company

 

but the inexperienced section leader could learn from the experienced section leader in the unit

 

Standardized training and expertise within the AT Company provided the foundation from which

 

all could learn. Currently this foundation exists only within the senior NCOs who were once a

 

part of the AT Company. To improve TOW unit training, the Marine Corps should consolidate

 

TOW into one unit with the old C2 structure from Table of Organization (T/O) 4235M. Another

 

solution would be to publish a TOW handbook or FMFM that all units must follow. The best

 

sources to create such a handbook would be the Army's Individual Skills TOW Crewman

 

Handbook, the MCRES standards for the TOW crewman, and the AT Company SOP published in

 

1991.