A Comparative Analysis Of The Challenge Faced In Peacekeeping Operations By British General Thomas Gage In America And Colonel Timothy Gerahty In Beirut CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND QUANTICO, VA A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHALLENGE FACED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BY BRITISH GENERAL THOMAS GAGE IN AMERICA AND COLONEL TIMOTHY GERAHTY IN BEIRUT. BY MAJOR THOMAS M. CORBETT DR. J.B. MATHEWS (1ST MENTOR) KERRY STRONG (2ND MENTOR) LTCOL(COL SELECT) CALVERT USAF (3RD MENTOR) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: A Comparative Analysis of the Challenges Faced in Peacekeeping Operations by British General Thomas Gage in America and U.S. Marine Colonel Timothy Gerahty in Beirut. AUTHOR: Major Thomas M. Corbett PROBLEM OR RESEARCH QUESTION: To analyze the similarities and discuss differences involved in peacekeeping operations in Colonial America as faced by British General Thomas Gage and in Beirut, Lebanon as faced by U.S. Marine Colonel Timothy Gerahty in Beirut. Further, to conclude with plausible lessons learned by future peacekeepers so that potential mistakes will not be repeated. DISCUSSION: Although these two peacekeeping operations occurred nearly 200 years apart, there are many similarities. Both missions would fail miserably and ultimately end in disaster with great loss of life. In addition, both General Gage and Colonel Gerahty would witness "presence" degenerate into undeclared war. This thesis both examines, as well as analyzes the similarities and differences of the two operations in the following areas; Flawed Policy and Strategy; Escalation; Windows of Opportunity; Mission Creep and Creditable Force; Disaster; Command and Control; Intelligence; Training and Rules of Engagement. CONCLUSION: The value of this thesis is derived from the analysis of the similarities of the peacekeeping operations under study and the development of lessons learned. Clear, concise mission statements, creditable force, and unified political and military strategy are necessary for success in future peacekeeping operations. Finally, when peacekeeping deteriorates into peace enforcement or even undeclared war, governments must either pull the force out or prepare to engage in full combat operations. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION.............................................1 CHAPTER ONE: FLAWED POLICY AND STATEGY.................6 CHAPTER TWO: ESCALATION AND MISSION CREEP.............23 CHAPTER THREE: WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY..................58 CHAPTER FOUR: COMMAND AND CONTROL.....................61 CHAPTER FIVE: MISSION CREEP AND CREDITABLE FORCE......65 CHAPTER SIX: DISASTER.................................68 CHAPTER SEVEN: INTELLIGENCE............................76 CHAPTER EIGHT: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.....................80 CONCLUSIONS.............................................87 INTRODUCTION There seems to have developed a somewhat superstitious belief in the mere "UN Presence". Soldiers and their political masters seldom see eye to eye on the aims and tasks, and definitely not on the means and methods in the field, where soldiering and politics meet on more or less ill-defined and impossible missions. The political decisions easily became tantamount to self deception and the soldiers are left in the lurch even before financing the operation becomes the nightmare of the organization.1 It is my intent to present a comparative analysis of peacekeeping operations involving British General Thomas Gage and Colonel Tim Gerahty in Lebanon. I will provide pertinent historical background and in depth analysis of the following areas: Flawed Policy and Strategy; Escalation; Windows of Opportunity; Creditable Force; Command and Control; Intelligence; Disaster; and Rules of Engagement. will discuss differences and compare the many similarities that both these commanders faced during these ill-fated peacekeeping missions. As each chapter unfolds, the reader may want to compare the events and analysis with recent peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti. I will conclude with plausible lessons learned by future peacekeepers so that potential mistakes will not be repeated. In North Carolina, near the entrance to Camp Johnson, a subsidiary base of the overall Camp LeJeune complex, a Memorial Wall was erected that bears the names of all Americans who died in Lebanon. The inscription on the wall reads "They Came in Peace". Along Lejeune Boulevard, on Highway #24, from the monument to the main gate, there are 272 Bradford pear trees planted for those Marines that died in Lebanon(241) and Grenada (31).2 Only by understanding the complexities involved in Peacekeeping Operations, can we prevent tragic endings. Before reading this study, one must have a thorough understanding of several basic fundamentals related to Peacekeeping Operations. These fundamentals apply to both cases this study analyses. First, it is utopianism to think that a military force, by itself, can create or restore peace. This is especially true if that force belongs to a civilized Western nation that must abide by its constitution and keep respect for democracy. Due to the nature of civilized societies and their respect for human life, it becomes extremely difficult to enforce peace with weapons. The second fundamental to understand is that a military force can only contribute to setting up a process of peace, when, and only if, the majority of the civilian population wants peace and supports that military force and its country.3 Further, it is necessary to have a rudimentary understanding of Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Chapter VI is titled: The Pacific Settlement of Disputes and involves a solution to international peace by negotiation, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of the parties own choice. The majority of scholars and the military hierarchy refer to this chapter as "Peacekeeping". Chapter VII is titled: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. This chapter states that all members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council, armed forces, assistance, and facilities for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. This chapter is referred to as "Peace Enforcement".4 If circled rings are placed around Peacekeeping(Chapter VI) and Peacemaking (ChapterVII) and then intersect the two circles, the problems that arise during actual operations will arise at this epicenter of the intersection. It is here, where the two circled rings intersect that both British General Gage and U.S. Marines Colonel Gerahty would be located. It is also in this intersection that tragedy would occur for these two commanders and the peacekeeping missions would fail miserably. Therefore, the importance of these lessons and the value of this study cannot be understated. Before beginning this study and analysis, a synopsis of each Commander's background should be valuable to the reader. The following information presented is provided to the reader solely for insight. Thomas Gage was born in 1719 in England, the second born son of a noble family. His father, Viscount Gage, pursued an erratic career in British politics. Great wealth entered this noble family when Thomas' brother, who was the eldest, married a Jewish heiress. The usual paths opened to younger sons of nobility in 18th Century England were the church, the law, and the army. He spent eight years at Click here to view image Westminster School and was commissioned sometime between 1736 and 1740. In 1741 he purchased a commission as a lieutenant in a regiment. Gage saw service in Flanders against the French. As a Lieutenant Colonel, Gage served under Major General Edward Braddock in the French and Indian wars in America. He married Margaret Kemble, daughter of a wealthy New Jersey family. Colonel Gerahty was born in St. Louis Missouri in 1938. He attended college at The Jesuit Christian College at St. Louis Missouri. His military career includes two combat tours in Vietnam with the 1st Marine Division Staff and 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. Due to a previous tour in the Middle East, he was selected to command the 24th MAU in Beirut. Colonel Gerahty graduated from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in 1973. CHAPTER ONE FLAWED POLICY AND STRATEGY An incident occurred toward the close of 1763 which resulted from the great Indian uprising. This involved the infamous massacre of harmless Christianized Indians of Conestoga in Pennsylvania by overzealous citizens. They went so far as to break into the Lancaster jail to kill twenty of these inoffensive people. Further, they advanced on Philadelphia to attack some 140 Christianized Morovian Indians who had taken refuge there. At the request of Governor John Penn, General Gage, Commander-in-Chief of the colonies, sent regular British soldiers from New York with orders to defend the Indians. Early in 1764 when the frontiersmen finally appeared on the outskirts of the city of Philadelphia, they were confronted not only by regular British soldiers, but also bands of armed citizens, including Quakers, raised by Benjamin Franklin. They decided that there would be less pleasure in fighting the outraged Quakers and the troops than in slaughtering helpless Indians and they retreated to their homes. Benjamin Franklin praised the Army for its assistance in maintaining public order. Two years later, Franklin and the majority of Americans would not rejoice at the prospect of public tranquillity maintained by the presence of the redcoats.5 In 1763 the Treaty of Paris ended the Seven Years War between France and England. As a result, Canada was ceded to England. It can hardly be argued that by conceding ownership of Canada and Eastern Louisiana to England made the independence of the British Americans inevitable. However, it is clear that the destruction of French military power on the North American continent contributed to the colonists' perception to think that they no longer needed the strong protecting arm of the Mother Country and encouraged them to believe that they owed little to the government in London. An American habit of thinking of rights within the empire rather than duties toward the empire was enormously strengthened from the vacuum created when the French left North America.6 The English hierarchy believed that Pontiac's uprising was caused in part by encroachment of colonists upon Indian lands and that the rights of the red men should be protected, temporarily by imperial decree. Consequently, there was little objection in England to the famous Proclamation of October 1763 which forbade the occupation of lands claimed by the Indians and particularly their lands that lay west of the Allegheny Mountains. Nor was there any question to the need of maintaining a standing army of British regulars in America to garrison the new possessions of the empire and to ward off French, Spanish, and Indian aggressions. It was decided to detail approximately seven thousand regular soldiers for this service. More importantly, there was little doubt in the minds of English leaders that the colonies should contribute to the cost of maintaining this force. In order to defray the cost of garrisoning soldiers in North America, the English needed more revenue from taxes.7 A brief synopsis of the taxes are as follows: - 1764 Sugar Act - Set higher duties on imported sugar and cut the duties on molasses in half, to lesson the likelihood of smuggling. Enlarged the power of the vice admiralty courts. - 1764 Currency Act - Prohibited issuance of paper money by the colonies. - 1765 Stamp Act - Required printed documents to affix revenue-raising stamps purchased from British-appointed stamp distributors. - 1765 Quartering Act - Required colonies to furnish British troops with housing and certain provisions. - 1766 Declaratory Act - Asserted Parliament's sovereignty over the colonies after repealing the Stamp Act. - 1767 Townshend Revenue Act - Imposed duties on tea, glass, paper, paints, and other items. - 1773 Tea Act - Reduced duty on tea, but gave the East India Company the right to sell directly to Americans. - 1774 Coercive Acts Closed the port of Boston, restricted provincial and town governments in Massachusetts, and sent additional troops to Boston. The fiercest and most vocal opposition to Britain's revenue laws occurred in Boston, Massachusetts. A militant group of agitators led by an ex tax collector, Samuel Adams, and a local merchant, John Hancock, conducted a campaign that skillfully combined violence with sophisticated legal and political strategy. Radicals of this rebellious "faction" sat not only in the elected Massachusetts Assembly, but on the executive council which governed the colony. To strike at the mother country and Parliament, where it was most vulnerable, embargoes were imposed on all British goods carrying import duties. The Sons of Liberty. which had formed in New York over the opposition of the Stamp Tax had now grown in numbers, tarred and feathered anyone who did not observe the ban.8 Gage was determined that this must be settled by the home government and wrote "Quash this spurt at a blow, without too much regard to the expence[sic] and it will prove olconomy in the end... If the principles of moderation and forbearance are again adopted, or that these transactions shall find favor and protection with any popular leaders amongst you there will be an end to these provinces as British colonies."9 Gage wanted a display of military power to keep the movement from growing out of control. Governor Bernard of Massachusetts asked for two regiments. One to be placed in the town and one to be placed in a barracks located on Castle Island. With news of regular soldiers arriving at Boston, Sons of Liberty members preached open rebellion. The Fourteenth and Twenty-ninth regiments, along with a ship of the line, were sent from Halifax under the command of Colonel Dalrymple to support and protect the civil magistrates and officers. When the Fourteenth and Twenty-ninth Regiments reached Boston they were put in the wharf warehouses. The British government, learning of the trouble in America, sent two regiments from England, the Sixty-fourth and the Sixty-fifth in 1769. British troops remained in Boston for seventeen months before intentionally firing a shot - a shot that came on March 5, 1770.10 The term "presence" is important when analyzing the policy and overall strategy of both Great Britain in 1763 and the United States in 1983 (discussed later in this chapter). In the rivalry between the nations of France and England, the colonies were fundamentally important. The importance of the colonies when correlated to this rivalry helped to formulate government policy that was accepted as truth. First of all, colonial interests and advantages were subordinate to the mother country. Each country had a right to restrict the trade of its colony and its subjects. As a rule, surplus commodities of a colony were sent to the mother country. Finally, trade and the resources of a colony were kept out of the hands of a competing rival colony.11 Englishmen believed that the subordination of the colonies' interests and dependence on the mother country was the true design and intention for the colonies. Only in this way could the welfare of the mother country be preserved in the matter of governmental control, trade, and revenue.12 Following the French and Indian Wars, Great Britain needed to bolster its revenue she lost in support of the conflict. In addition to this problem, was the cost of garrisoning British soldiers in the Colonies. The American colonial military policy that later developed was a direct result of the traditional British fear of a peacetime army; the demand for economy due to fiscal retrenchment; apathy on the part of most politicians concerning colonial problems; and the fear of a costly Indian war on the frontier. However, Parliament moved for an act to station a force in America and determined that the colonies must bear at least the greater share of supporting the army through taxation. The earliest explicit objection to a large peacetime garrison in America can be found in the papers of Benjamin Franklin, the writings of James Otis, and the records of the Massachusetts Assembly. Otis discussed the army in the pamphlet. THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVEN where he states: "... The danger of a standing army in remote provinces is much greater to the metropolis than at home".13 The British colonial policy of taxation in order to support the standing army was flawed. The colonies did not want the "presence" of British soldiers. The "presence" of British soldiers in Boston only exacerbated the underlying fundamental problem of the situation. Due to this flawed policy, and other associated factors, which will be discussed in later chapters, Americans eventually came to view the redcoats as the enemy. The policy and strategy of the United States would also lead to the Marines being received as the enemy in Beirut. The first time Marines entered Beirut was in 1958. Lebanon had been threatened by a civil war between Christian Maronites and Muslims. Lebanese President Camille Chamoun requested American and British assistance. United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the deployment of troops to Lebanon. At the time of the request, there were three Marine Battalion Landing Teams(BLT's) in the Mediterranean. Brigadier General Sidney S. Wades 2nd Provisional force, formed from troops of the 2d Marine Division for an exercise with British Royal Marines and the Italian navy in Sardinia. General Wade would eventually take control of all the units which would land in Lebanon. The three BLT's were BLT 1/8 commanded by LTCOL John Brickly, BLT 2/2 commanded by LTCOL Hodd, and BLT 3/6 commanded by LTCOL Jenkins. BLT 2/2 landed and immediately set up a defensive perimeter at the airport and later moved into the city and took control of the dock area, in addition to posting guards around the American Embassy. BLT 1/8 landed four miles north of Beirut. Concurrently, elements of 2/8 and the US Army 24th Airborne Brigade who were flown in from Germany commanded by Major General Paul D. Adams who eventually became Commander-in-Chief of the American land forces. The aforementioned units composed all American troops in Lebanon. The Marines stayed from July to October.14 A few shots had been fired but there were no casualties in this peacekeeping operation. In 1958 President Eisenhower believed that the U.S. security interests included avoiding Soviet encroachment into the Middle East out of concern for the control they might ultimately gain over the oil reserve in the region. "Our interests were clear, out determination and capabilities obvious, and our political backing solid.15 The Marines entered Lebanon again in 1982 destined to play a larger role than they had ever anticipated. The Israeli invasion operation code named Peace for Galilee would precipitate American intervention. Gabriel's book OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE: THE ISRAELI-PLO WAR IN LEBANON provides a detailed account of this operation. The invasion culminated with the seize of Beirut and the entrapment of the Palestine Liberation Army(PLO) in and around the city. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion there was apparently some sentiment in the U.S. administration of expanding UNIFIL's (United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon) and mandate to give it a role in Beirut that ended when Israel made clear its unwillingness to cooperate with U.N. troops. In early July, 1982, U.S. envoy Phillip Habib was in Lebanon. The Lebanese had requested that the United States station some of its troops temporarily there. Such an agreement might convince Israel to pull its troops back a short distance and allow the Palestinian forces to evacuate safely. On 7 July, it was reported that President Reagan five days earlier had secretly agreed in principle to send 800-1000 U.S. Marines to join a similar French contingent in a temporary "evacuating and peacekeeping" force subject to receipt of a formal request by the government of Lebanon. The siege of Beirut continued on into August with bombardment of the city by Israeli tanks, artillery, and gunboats. Reagan telephoned Begin to express his outrage.16 There were many political ramifications. Skepticism was expressed in both the Pentagon and Congress about the role of U.S. forces. The Soviet Union reiterated its objection to the introduction of U.S. troops in Lebanon. Arab league countries put forth proposals for the evacuation of PLO fighters and Syria maneuvered to retain a significant role in Lebanon while rearming after being bludgeoned by the Israelis during the invasion.17 On 18 August, final agreement on the terms of the evacuation and schedule was reached. The Lebanese government formally requested France, Italy, and the United States to contribute troops to a multinational force (MNF). The stated mandate: ... provide assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out their responsibilities, namely, to facilitate the withdrawal from Lebanon of Palestinian leaders and combatants in a manner which will (1) assure the safety of such deporting personnel; (2) assure the safety of the person in the area; and (3) further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of Lebanon over the Beirut area.18 The MNF agreement specifically directed that the command authority would be exercised by each contingent through existing military channels; however, a liaison and coordination committee would facilitate communication among the contingents and the Lebanese Armed forces (LAF). Further, the MNF would not engage in combat and the duration of operations was to be no more than 30 days. The French contingent arrived on 21 August, 1982 with 350 troops. The U.S. troops consisting of 850 Marines from the 32nd MAU arrived on 25 August, 1982, and the remaining 510 French and 575 Italian forces arrived on the 26th of August, 1982.19 The Marines from the MAU went ashore with unloaded individual and crew served weapons. A deliberate decision was made to demonstrate that the Americans were on a peace-keeping mission. Moreover, they had to show that they trusted the Lebanese Armed Forces to maintain security20 European Command (Eucom) peacetime rules of engagement dictated that the Marines were to carry unloaded weapons, although it does not take long to insert a magazine into a weapon and chamber a round. The Marines would take up their positions within the port area of Beirut. The highlight of the evacuation was the departure of PLO leader Yassar Arafat on the 30th of August. The evacuation of the PLO continued quietly and efficiently with Marines maintaining port security for the operation. By 3 September, Colonel Mead, the MAU Commander noted a significant change in atmosphere. In Beirut the lights were on again at night because of restoration to the city's power plant. There was increased traffic in the streets, shops were reopening and the Lebanese were seen repairing damaged buildings in addition to cleaning up the rubble.21 Over 16,000 Palestinian forces were evacuated and departed for various Arab countries. The majority of the PLO departed for Syria. The MNF began its departure on 10 September with the U.S. Marines. The evacuation was complete on 13 September 1982.22 One day after the evacuation, a bomb exploded at the headquarters of the Lebanese Christian Phalangist party, killing Bashir Gemayel, Lebanese President-elect. In the following days, a brutal massacre of several hundred Lebanese and Palestinian civilians to include women, children, and the elderly occurred at the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. Reportedly, it was executed by Christian Falangist forces.23 President Reagan agreed that getting the PLO out of Lebanon to curtail their terrorism into Israel was clearly in our national interests and had sent the Marines for that purpose. Phillip Habib; however, had guaranteed Yasser Arafat that the Marines would stay there to protect the PLO fighters' families. President Reagan, more from a sense of guilt than as a matter of clear U.S. security interests, ordered that the Marines return.24 The Multinational Forces would enter Beirut again in September 1982. The total force was nearly 3,500 troops and would eventually grow to 5,400 by the summer of 1983. The Marines came ashore with 1200 troops on 29 September. It is interesting to note that the new Lebanese President Amin Gemayel argued throughout for large numbers, even as high as 30,000.25 The two French battalions were deployed in and near the port of Beirut; two Italian Battalions in the southwest sector of the city; the U.S. Marine Amphibious Unit(MAU) at the international airport, and later, the British company east of the airport.26 The mandate of the new MNF was: ... provide multinational presence requested by the Lebanese government. More specifically, it was to provide an interposition force which would establish "an environment which will permit the Lebanese armed forces to carry out their responsibilities; assist the efforts of the Lebanese government to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring an end to violence and facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty and authority in the Beirut area."27 The Rules of Engagement restricted the armed forces to self-defense. The 32nd MAU was told if its assigned area was infiltrated, intruders were to be warned. Only if Marines and any accompanying Lebanese armed forces were fired upon could the Marines return fire to ensure their safety and that of the Lebanese. Finally, the Sixth Fleet commander was to be prepared to extract forces from Beirut if it became necessary. Reagan stated that "... our agreement with the government of Lebanon expressly rules out any combat responsibilities for the U.S. forces."28 The State Department informally targeted the withdrawal of the Marines for no later than the end of December, 1982. Ambassador Phillip Habib attempted to negotiate a plan agreeable to the governments of Lebanon, Israel, France, and Italy. From this plan evolved the 32nd MAU's mission, which was to "provide ... a presence in Beirut that would in turn help establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese government to regain control of their capital."29 This mission required the 32nd MAU to occupy positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport and to establish and maintain close continuous liaison with the French, Italian, and Lebanese forces.30 Beirut II, the second deployment was dubbed, would be considerably unlike Beirut I. Located positions at the airport, the Marines would be in the midst of an area densely populated by Shiite Muslims. The term "presence" had an even more notorious connotation with respect to Lebanon. The actual mission statement was in: general to "provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese government to establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese government to regain control of their capital".31 As was mentioned earlier, the Marines were ordered into and the MNF reentered Beirut out of guilt more than in U.S. national interests. The term "presence" was interpreted differently by each succeeding MAU Commander in Beirut.32 To Colonel Tim Gerahty it meant: "... The mission of the MAU in Lebanon here is a diplomatic mission, a mission of presence, and implies a showing of the flag, so to speak. That has been carried out here for over 1 year in the form of American flag on our bunkers, being displayed on all our uniforms...our patrolling that has been quite extensive for the last year."33 The mission directive was never clearly defined. Maintaining a non-combat presence presumed a permissive environment. For that reason, a highly restrictive set of rules of engagement, as well as force structure, was designed to maintain a balance between political and military considerations with a premium on visibility to the public.34 The presence was to be passive. The operational directive called for the troops to patrol but not police.35 The other part of the mission which led to a flawed policy was to create an environment which would allow the LAF to carry out their responsibilities. This would eventually lead to training the LAF. The notion of "presence" proved manageable in the early months of Beirut II, but it became less so when the MNF was perceived by the Moslem populace as operating in support of the Lebanese armed forces as they came into military confrontations with the opposing militias.36 CHAPTER TWO ESCALATION AND MISSION CREEP Both General Gage and Colonel Gerahty witnessed increasing escalation in dissident attitudes, physical threats, violence, and killing. Furthermore, both witnessed their missions "creep" into undeclared war. In the American colonies, the British troops were initially deployed along the frontier, essentially the Appalachian Mountains and Florida, to "protect" the Indians from encroachment and unfair practices of the colonists. This situation changed however, upon the initiation of taxation. The colonies, especially Massachusetts, became increasingly vocal over the issue of taxation. The colonies exerted enough pressure on each and every act to cause parliament to withdraw the various tax legislation. British troops were moved in ever increasing numbers to Boston and other coastal towns and cities to restore order. Quarreling between the soldiers and citizens in Boston was unavoidable. The British troops were frequently denounced by colonial organizations, newspapers, and private individuals in Boston and the Massachusetts Colony. Soldiers were often arrested for breaches of the peace and constantly abused with the most bitter and profane epithets. Furthermore, townspeople did all they could to persuade soldiers to desert. However, soldiers did not always conduct themselves with propriety either. Nevertheless, the British Commanding Officer, Colonel Dalrymple, under strict orders from Gage, tried to preserve street discipline and prevent disorder.37 Some British Officers believed that the "faction" deliberately encouraged attacks upon the troops in the hope that an incident would occur which would render the troops odious in the eyes of mankind and which might have to widen the gulf between Britain and America."38 It was a cruel situation for the British. The soldiers were under constant abuse from the populace. Officers found it exceedingly difficult to keep their own men in order. It was a frustrating situation because they were not allowed to employ military force except under instruction from civil officials. Governor Thomas Hutchinson, Bernard's successor, dared not employ them to prevent mob action.39 Gage continued to believe that he had no right to interfere in civil matters and would not officially persuade civil authorities to request the military action.40 Incidents in Boston continued to increase with accidental discharges by soldiers and the routine tar and feathering of customs' informers. The British commander of the two regiments in Boston, Dalrymple, predicted a formidable attack on the main guard by a mob. He reported to the Boston executive council that citizens still waylaid and attacked soldiers in the streets and that he was given orders not to retaliate even though incidents were escalating. The Boston councilors declared that the only way to prevent clashes was to remove the soldiers to Castle Island. At the time, Castle Island barracks needed repairs and could only garrison one regiment.41 The Boston Massacre(Illustration 1) resulted when a small mob attacked a British sentry in front of the custom house. The sentry called for help. Captain Robert Preston, officer of the Main Guard, at first did nothing because he could not use force without legal authorization anymore than the sentry could. after a second call for help, he immediately sent a sergeant and seven men from the main guard. The mob attacked the soldiers with clubs and the soldiers fired their muskets(probably without orders) Click here to view image fearing for their own safety. The soldiers reloaded and prepared to fire againbut were restrained by their commander. The mob made no attempt to retaliate. Lieutenant Colonel Carr, Commander of the Fourteenth Regiment, appeared on the scene and organized units of his regiment for an armed struggle. The Twenty-ninth Regiment, though confined to Barracks, was placed under arms. Selectmen and Justices of the Peace informed Colonel Dalrymple that they would be unable to hold popular rage in check unless the soldiers were removed from the town. Governor Hutchinson's council advised compliance (even though Dalrymple was outraged) and the Twenty-ninth and Fourteenth were moved to Castle Island. After the Fourteenth and Twenty-ninth Regiments were transferred to Castle Island, the clamor against the soldiers in Boston died down. Gage planned to move the Twenty-ninth due to insufficient garrison room and two regiments on Castle Island would not help improve the situation in Massachusetts. In the summer of 1772, the Fourteenth Regiment was relieved by the Sixty-fourth Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Leslie, who served as Commanding Officer at Castle Island until Gage himself returned to Boston as governor of Massachusetts late in the spring of 1774.42 Propaganda by the radicals in Boston could have a debilitating effect on the destinies of Preston and the soldiers during the aftermath of the Boston Massacre. The real danger lay in the possibility that a verdict of not guilty or a verdict of guilty coupled with reprieves or pardons would cause Boston radicals to take justice into their hands. Preston was acquitted thanks to John Adams and his other effective lawyers. The jury decided that four of the six soldiers fired in self-defense. The other two were found guilty of manslaughter and were lightly punished. Gage's own verdict on the cases of Preston and his men offered to Hutchinson was ... had you or I been in the situation these men were in, I do believe that we should have fired in defense of our own lives. It should be added that the responsibility for sending the troops to Boston lay with the ministry, but that the decision for keeping them in the town in the summer of 1769 came from Bernard and of course Hutchinson who insisted that the soldiers be kept in Boston.43 Faced with pressure by the "liberty" mobs, Britain reacted with astonishing tolerance. By the fall of 1773 nearly all the taxes had been dropped. Tea was the only product still carrying an import duty, and this was a minimal threepence on the pound. Still the Sons of Liberty blocked its sale by their embargo.44 The Townshend Acts, except for the tax on tea had been rescinded on March 5, 1770 the very day of the Boston Massacre. Some believe Gage felt that the British government had made the same blunder twice in repealing the Stamp Act and in repealing the major portion of the Townshend Acts. In private letters to Barrington (who twice served as the Secretary of War) he vehemently denounced his superiors in London because they continued to assert the vast powers of Parliament in high words while taking no effective steps to support those powers.45 To overcome the embargo created by the Americans the British government planned to slash the price of tea by changing the law. Parliament granted authority for the East India Company(EIC) to ignore the imperial trading rules and to bypass London wholesalers. Stripped of the middle profit, British tea, now sold direct by the EIC, would be far cheaper in America than the smuggled products from the other sources. News of this skillful move to the market by the British government on the only product still carrying British duty was greeted with outrage by radial groups in America. Throughout the coastal towns, the Sons of Liberty swore they would stop the landing of EIC tea. In New York the EIC agents were threatened and forced to say: "unless the act imposing a duty upon tea imported into the colonies is repealed. there is not the least prospect of it being sold in the province."46 The British news report of the riot of "Mohawk Indians" was no great shock, but the destruction of tea which was the property of a major British corporation, operating under royal charter was an act that went for beyond acceptable limits. In London, it was viewed as the ultimate insult to the British government.47 On Jan 27, 1774 when the official report by Governor Hutchinson reached London the implications apparent were more alarming than the destruction of the tea. To the ministers in London, the letter sounded very inadequate for the governor of a colony with troops at his command. Hutchinson reported that he could not organize the 26 man council that governed Massachusetts. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Leslie, commanding a regiment on Castle Island complained angrily that the council had forbidden him to march troops on the town. "Leniency won't do now with the people here".48 It was becoming extremely clear to the British government that there had to be a limit to tolerance with the Colonies. The raid on the tea ships had provided proof that Britains past colonial policy of appearement had been a complete failure. The British responded by ordering the blockade of the Boston port. Lord North said in Commons: "Four or five frigates will do the business without any military force".49 This would deeply hurt the Bostonians who earned their living from the port. As soon as the tea had been paid for the embargo would be lifted. It would serve as a searing example to the other colonies to curb their militants. Gage told the King "Whilst we are lambs, they'll be lions".50 Gage thought that what was needed now was resolute action. Two other acts, (altogether called the Coercive acts) were passed to bring Massachusetts under direct British control. The executive government and the courts were to come under the unfiltered direction of the King and his governor. Gage would replace Hutchinson as governor and he was ordered to arrest and try the tea party ringleaders. More regiments of troops, destined for take possession of two cannon that had just arrived and returned these munitions to Boston. There had been no resistance and no shots had been fired. However, that same night, signal bonfires were burning on the hilltops around Boston. The troops expeditions had been wildly exaggerated into something more serious: Boston had been bombarded by the warships in the harbor! Based on this false information 3000 men collected on Cambridge common and an additional 10,000 were reported to be on their way from the back country of Massachusetts. Crude plans were developing to advance on Boston "like locusts and rid the town of ever soldier".55 Selectmen calmed the crowd and hurried to Cambridge to quell the false information. But the men who had massed at Cambridge were only part of a total call to arms that was enveloping all of New England. The news of the Boston bombardment was still being rushed south, uncorrected. "The disease; Gage was soon to write Dartmouth, was believed to have been confined to Boston...but there is no knowing where to apply the remedy"56 The last remnants of Gage's civil administration were fast disappearing, if not already gone. His problems now primarily military were how best to use his 3000 soldiers. He decided on retrenchment into the city. By concentrating his forces, he stood a good chance of defending Boston until the King resolved to put a "very respectable force" in the field.57 The government and commissioners moved back into Boston proper. General Gage prepared for war in the town of Boston. Guards were placed on all ammunition dumps and guns (formerly of the Boston Militia). Cannon were placed on the narrow neck that joined Boston to the mainland. Two 24 pounders and eight 9 pounders were set up in a battery formation at this site. Military patrols toured the streets and soldiers began to erect fortifications. Naval warships were hauled in close to town where they could quickly be swung around to bring their guns to bear on the city. The governor, General Gage, dispatched a message to New York to have all regiments sent to Boston.58 Intelligence reports stated that in Connecticut some 100,000 men were reportedly to be marching on Boston. An advance party for a 500 man American Cavalry Regiment confirmed that there was no bombardment. Gradually the news spread throughout Connecticut that they had been alerted by a false alarm and they returned home. However, it had been Massachusetts, boarded transports in British ports. Unlike the soldiers at Hutchinson's disposal at Castle Island, these men would be in Boston proper itself and not kept discreetly out of sight. They would represent a constant reminder to the Boston citizens of the port that the king and Parliament meant business.51 The Committees of Correspondence which had formed among the colonies in America were promoting a campaign to combat the new British policy by 1774. A communication system of link express riders were well established and hardened into a practical working structure. The tactics that had been successful in the past should be employed once more, though this time on a much wider scale: a combined ban by all the colonies of all trade with Britain.52 On June 14, 1774 the first troop convoys from Britain sailed into the harbor. The British troops pitched their tents in lines on the Boston Common. Other troop transports were also headed for Boston. British soldiers were converging on Boston from New York, from Canada, and Britain. Gage and his commanders sincerely believed that most of the people of Massachusetts were loyal to the King but frightened of the radical element in Boston. Therefore, complaints were received with courtesy, and soldiers were punished when they seemed at fault. Despite these placatory efforts, the tension in Boston rose. Gage still had only about 3000 troops in the port. This seemed relatively few to handle any large scale troubles. Arresting the ringleaders seemed undesirable and Gage apparently tried to bribe Samuel Adams but the response was "the governor should cease insulting the feelings of an exasperated people".53 Massachusetts was in a state of anarchy. There was no effective Council and few courts as the radial faction mobs moved into courtrooms and threatened both judges and sheriffs. The situation again escalated when on August 26, 1774, the Committees of Correspondence of four Colonies resolved that a Provincial Congress should take over the government of the colony because Parliament's laws were unconstitutional.54 The confrontation came faster than Gage had anticipated. Intelligence agents reported to Gage that black powder stored in Charlestown, and owned by the people of Massachusetts, was being distributed through the country. On 1 September, 1774, Gage had British soldiers execute a quiet and efficient operation to confiscate the powder and a dress rehearsal for undeclared war. Conflict had been avoided, but nothing in New England would be the same again. Men had mobilized in the thousands against the British. The militant patriot movement had progressed beyond votes and impassioned speeches. It had created an army for a revolution. Now resistance to the British became even more aggressive. Every time the British soldiers marched away from Boston, express messengers on round the clock intelligence duty rode with the news into the country. Gage urged Lord Barrington, Secretary of War, to press the government to repeal the new acts - not because this would remove the cause of the revolt but because it would provide time to raise the big army he was convinced was necessary.59 Adams and other Boston radicals kept public emotions aroused when articles were published in the press. But by now they became concerned with more spectacular matters such as reorganizing the militia and setting up magazines to supply it. One quarter of the force, the Minutemen were to be ready to mobilize within hours to the call to arms. This was definitely the most organized challenge that Gage had yet encountered and he was impotent to meet this escalation. Gage marched troops across the neck and into the country day after day because he wanted the presence of British soldiers to be a normal sight in the villages. But every time the troops moved out of Boston, they were shadowed constantly. News of other trouble came in. The governor of New Hampshire reported that following the arrival of a messenger named Paul Revere from Boston, 400 men had assaulted Castle William and Mary, the royal fortress at Portsmouth. These rebels had seized all the ammunition, cannon. and small arms. At the same time in Boston, Admiral Grover reported to London, that the Sons of Liberty were making open plans to assault Castle William as soon as the water froze between the island and the mainland. Moreover, they would take it by sheer numbers. Gage sent a dispatch to London. If the King wanted to stop this armed revolt, then he (General Gage) needed an army of 20,000 men!60 Other variables arose such as the one in France that affected this situation. America was the territory of conflict between the English and French. This could be tempting to a France humiliated in the French and Indian Wars ten years before. Lord Dartmouth wrote Gage "Everything depends on what ministers the young King (Louis VII) will choose to put his confidence in".61 Another factor emerged that closely linked France. This was the Quebec Act which restructured the government of Canada, altered its borders and gave formal recognition to the Roman Catholic Church in Canada. Horace Walpole writes "that the court was preparing a Catholic Army to keep the colonies in as great subjection as they had been when Canada was in the hands of the French".62 This act added to an already festering stream of grievances by the colonies. All governors of all the colonies had warned the British government of universal support to Boston and Massachusetts and violent opposition to Parliament's measures. Three ships of the line and 600 Marines were dispatched so Gage would have a fighting force that, in addition to his ships, amounted to nearly 4000 men. To further heighten the crisis King George IV issued a battle cry: ... the line of battle seems chalked out...The New England governments are in a state of rebellion, blows must decide whether they are to be subject to this country or independent.63 When Gage's letter reached London, government hard liners dominated the cabinet meetings. Dartmouth wrote to Gage ordering him that now force was to be repelled by force. The long term plan was to give Gage a strength of 10,000 men - exactly half of what he had asked for, but more than double what he already had - and was ordered: ... to take a more active and determined part" than the defensive policy he had operated under so far and "the first essential step" was to arrest and imprison the principal actors...in the Provincial Congress [Adams and Hancock}.64 The King planned to support Gage by sending to Boston three Generals. William Howe, who had led the assault up the plains of Abraham when Wolfe stormed Quebec, "Gentlemen Johnny" Buegoyne, a flashy but competent cavalry commander and Sir Henry Clinton."65 We were promised, taunted Charles Fox (speaking in the House of Commons) that on the very appearance of troops all was to be tranquility at Boston, yet so far from reducing the spirit of that people, these troops were reduced... reduced to the most shameful situation...66 General Gage is fairly consistent in his assertions that the policy of the British government should be one of hardline resolve in order to effectively crush any opposition to the mother country and Parliament's Click here to view image Click here to view image legislation. However, British appeasement actions to the colonists' reactions is typical of a "soft policy." This is clearly evidenced following the Boston Massacre by their willingness to submit one of their officers, Captain Preston, to be tried by the colonials. Yet, if he had committed any offense at all, it was a military crime subject to trial by military court. Furthermore, they withdrew the troops to Castle Island in the harbor. Only when the King and Parliament became so outraged by the destruction of tea in 1774, did the government respond with appropriate force; yet, the 10,000 troops sent were only half the number requested by General Gage. The measures taken by the British Government to support and enforce the Coercive Acts with naval ships and troops came too late as the colonists had organized an army for revolution. General Gage was involved in an "undeclared war." The continual escalation of events culminated in disaster for the British on the road back from Lexington and Concord. The events in Beirut are very similar to the ones that occurred in America 200 years earlier. Lebanon is a bit more complex; however, the escalation and final tragedy was just as compelling as the events in the colonies in 1775. The Marines would spend 18 months in Lebanon in which the mission of "presence" was not changed. When 32nd MAU began its presence mission, Colonel Mead conducted a map reconnaissance at the positions he was to occupy at the airport. He readily determined that he needed the high ground approximately 5 kilometers east of the airport to guarantee the MAU's safety ashore if the situation began to deteriorate. However, Ambassador Draper and Israeli Defense Minister Aerial Sharon had mutually agreed to permit the Israeli forces to use the Old Sidon Road for resupplying their troops in the Shouf Mountains. If the Marines took the heights that Colonel Mead had wanted, it would have created a politically unacceptable perception that the United States was protecting Israeli supply routes. Thus, the Americans would be looked upon as anti-Muslim and certainly less than neutral with respect to the Israelis, an image completely opposite from that which the Marines wanted to portray. Therefore, the decision was to restrict the Marines to a location in the vicinity of and to the west of the unused railroad tracks at the southeastern portion of the airport perimeter. The military importance of the high ground to the east of the Old Sidon Road was reiterated to Ambassador Habib. While Habib may have recognized the validity of the Marines rationale to hold the high ground, he refused to permit the MAU to occupy them.67 Evident to all parties concerned was the fact that the overall effectiveness of the MNF in bolstering the Lebanese Army would depend on a diplomatic effort to withdraw Israeli and Syrian forces, and the establishment of a new political consensus in the country. Negotiations for this withdrawal started up in December but proceeded very slowly. At the same time, the U.S. contingent embarked on a new function which was to train and rebuild the Lebanese Army. Some believe that the perception of neutrality by the MNF had started to deteriorate.69 The situation in Beirut was in control through February 1983 when the Lebanese Army without incident took control of East Beirut from the Lebanese Christian militia which had ruled there since the 1975-1976 Civil War. The Headquarters of the 32nd MAU and those MAU's that succeeded it were located in a two story reinforced concrete building which had formerly house the airports firefighting school facilities. The BLT occupied a bombed out, fire damaged, four story reinforced concrete building, southwest of the MAU Headquarters. Marines manned sentry posts, dug-in bunkers, and at check points dug in regular chest high fighting holes which were also sand bagged and rigged with overhead cover.70 In an exception to the relative calm, there were several incidents from January to April involving U.S. and IDF troops. One incident involved Captain Johnson a Company Commander of LIMA Co. BLT 3-8, who forced three Israeli tanks from entering the Marines/Lebanon checkpoint position.71 At this time the U.S. was promising to do everything necessary to guarantee Israel's security after its withdrawal from Lebanon. On 16 March 1983 in the first such incident, Italian and U.S. MNF units were attacked on patrol and received non-fatal injuries. The sense of accomplishment following the apparent successes of Beirut's I and II were diminishing in the face of the increasing terrorist threat.72 On 18 April a truck drove to the U.S. embassy and its cargo of explosives detonated killing scores of Lebanese. A total of 63 people were killed. The pro-Islamic Jihad organization claimed responsibility.73 On 17 May, following direct efforts by Secretary of State George Schultz, Lebanon and Israel concluded a withdrawal which contained an assertion that the state of war between them no longer exists and gave Israel certain supervisory authority in security regions in Southern Lebanon. Muslim elements in Lebanon reacted negatively to this agreement and Syria flatly refused to pull its troops out as the accord contemplated. Clashes along political and religious lines broke out, including artillery shelling on Lebanese Army positions.74 On 30 May, Marine Colonel Timothy J. Gerahty, the 24th MAU commander, assumed responsibility as commander of the U.S. contingent of a multi-national force in Beirut. Lieutenant Colonel Gerlach commanded BLT 18. The BLT commander, upon his arrival in Beirut immediately began to improve his positions at the airport. On 22 July the airport was attacked by guns and rocket launchers fired by members of Walid Jumblatt's predominately Druze Progressive Society. Nearly a dozen 122mm rockets and 102mm shells exploded inside the Marine perimeter. Anti-American sentiment escalated at the end of the month when a group of two or three Shia Muslim supporters of Amal fired short bursts of automatic fire at Marines who were jogging in the perimeter of the airport. As a result of these attacks, the 24th MAU begin a series of lethal and non-lethal responses.75 On 28 August, the MNF engaged in combat for the first time when Marines and Lebanese soldiers were fired upon by automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades. In accordance with the rules of engagement, marines responded with carefully orchestrated return fire. The next day's fighting intensified around the airport and Druze mortar fire continued to land on Marine lines. The BLTs 81mm mortars fired six illumination rounds over one of the suspect positions in an effort to suppress its fire. Minutes later 82 mm mortar fire killed one Marine and wounded four others. The U.S. Marines suffered the MNFs first casualties of the war. All four MNF contingents were under fire by this time and on 30 August four French soldiers were killed. On 1 September President Reagan said there would be no change in the force's role and no increase in the size of the unit. However, on 1 September he ordered a carrier and two thousand Marines to sit off shore.76 On 3 and 4 September, acting at the request of Lebanon and the MNF countries, Israel withdrew its force from the Beirut area to the Awali River. This move created a void that the Lebanese Army was unprepared to fill, and the result was fierce fighting along factional lines which eventually became a battle for the city. The Muslim Druze militia occupied all territory in the hills overlooking the airport except the town of Souk-El-Garb which was later taken by the Lebanese Army. Shelling and sporadic fire continued on the MNF units, moreover, the MNF were taking fatalities. Marines positioned at the Southern end of the airport continued to receive artillery rocket and small arms fire as the Lebanese Army continued to use the area as a staging base for operations in the Shouf Mountains. A heavy rocket attack hit the Marines on 5 September killing two and wounding two others. Marines responded by firing 155mm illumination rounds. The LAF attack in the hills faltered with the result ending with the Druze owning all high ground overlooking Beirut and Marine positions at the airport. In a show of force on 7 September, France and the United States launched warplanes over the city of Beirut from offshore ships. On 8 September, during the visit of General Gray (CG 2d MarDiv) and General Miller (CG FMFLANT), three rocket rounds landed approximately two hundred meters from where they were standing. A coordinated 155 howitzer volley and a 5 inch salvo from the USS Bowen responded marking the first time a U.S. warship had fired on the mainland.77 On 12 September, the Reagan administration granted broad authority to U.S. ground commanders in Lebanon to call on naval gun fire and air strikes to defend themselves and assist the Lebanese Army and other MNF units. This was based on a determination by the U.S. National Command Authorities that the successful defense of Souk-El-Garb by the LAF was essential to the safety of the Marines. As mentioned earlier, the Israeli pullback from central Lebanon created a power vacuum that was filled by warring Lebanese factions. Druze combatants, supported by the Syrians, PLO, and Shiite militias fought against Lebanese rightists. The Druze coalition began to prevail, giving Special Envoy McFarlane ammunition to make a case for a stronger U.S. Military role. McFarlane advocated a show of force in order to coerce the Syrians to cooperate. McFarlane found a persuasive reason to employ the Marines as a result of a battle in the Shouf Mountains for the village of Souk-El-Garb. According to Tom Friedman (New York Times Bureau Chief in Lebanon), this involvement changed the local perception of Americans deployed in Lebanon from neutral peacekeepers to just another warring faction.78 Once the Marines were perceived as part of the factional strife in Lebanon, they too would become vulnerable to attack. Soon after the fighting on September 19th 1983, the Lebanese Commander-in-Chief, who belonged to the rightist group, implied that he would like to see the U.S. Marines directly involved in the fighting on the side of the Lebanese Army. The reasoning was the fact that the Syrian's were actively supporting the Druze. Despite prior opportunities to do so, the U.S. generally had declined to be drawn into the factional strife in Lebanon. This would change, however, when McFarlane misused his authority as special envoy and became the equivalent of an "artillery spotter" for the Lebanese rightists. Syrian and Palestinian backed Druze units had started an artillery and ground assault on a Lebanese Army unit that controlled a ridge overlooking Beirut. The Lebanese commander said that he was under massive attack and requested U.S. help. According to Friedman; McFarlane ordered the Marine Commander in Beirut to have the Navy ships under his authority fire in support of the Lebanese Army. To his credit, the American Marine Commander in Beirut, strenuously but unsuccessfully opposed McFarlane's order because it would make American troops party to intra-Lebanese factional fighting; moreover, that Lebanese Muslims would retaliate against American Marines ashore. Overruling this advice, McFarlane had the guided missile cruisers Virginia, John Rogers, Bowen, and the destroyer Radford fire 360 five-inch shells at the Druze, Syrian, and Palestinian forces. This gave rise to the extensive and excessive use of American force. A Defense Department official stated that this action had been approved at the highest levels.79 Soon after this incident, the U.S. battleship New Jersey arrived in Lebanese waters. Colonel Gerahty recognized that providing U.S. naval gunfire support to the LAF had changed his mission. The Marines would now be considered legitimate targets by anti-government forces.80 For the next several days the Ambassadors residence and the Minister of Defense came under heavy shelling. The U.S. Warships Bowen and Virginia responded with 30 five inch rounds. A change began to appear in the MAU's official report; "naval gunfire became the weapon of choice, if it could engage the enemy firing units, as it gave some separation from U.S. MNF and did not require them to use organic howitzers firing HE rounds in defense of the LAF or MOD (Ministry of Defense)." This marked the first time the anti-government elements were referred to as enemy in any Marine report.81 On 23 September, fighting continued around the airport. Simultaneously, both the French and Italian compounds were taken under fire. The MAU fired 81mm HE rounds into suspected AMAL positions and that evening 155mm howitzers and NGF engaged artillery positions that were firing on the airport. At this point, diplomats had managed to arrange a cease-fire to take effect on 26 September. However, sniper fire continued to harass MNF forces and sporadic fighting continued to occur in the suburbs. In October, 1983, the cease fire began to unravel as PLO members began to infiltrate back into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Snipers again began to fire on one of the Marine positions located at the Lebanese University. On 8 October, heavy fighting erupted between the Lebanese forces and the militia at Burj Al Batajinah, Ash Shuwayfat, and Khaldah. On 16 October, Company A, at the Lebanese University, came under siege. They were fired on by RPGs heavy machine guns and automatic weapons. The Marines responded by firing Dragon anti-tank missiles and silenced one of the machine guns. Fighting eventually tapered off by midnight.82 Beirut was quiet on the 21st and 22nd of October. On 23 October, the BLT headquarters building of the U.S. Marines was destroyed by an extremely powerful explosion in a suicide terrorist bomb attack. Casualties included 241 killed and more than 100 wounded. Almost simultaneously, a similar attack occurred at the French MNF barracks killing 58. The Free Islamic Revolution Movement claimed responsibility for both attacks.83 In the aftermath of these tragedies, the MNF tried to show resolve in the face of a situation that was all but hopeless. Both France and the United States continued air attacks on anti-government installations and the New Jersey brought its mammoth 16 inch guns into action on 14 December firing on Syrian occupied positions after reconnaissance planes had encountered gun fire. 22 MAU had replaced 24th MAU in what is termed Beirut VI and would be the last U.S. MNF which would stay in Beirut from 20 November 1983 to February 26th 1984. This time the Marines would occupy extensively dug-in sea-land containers until their pullout. On 7 February the Shiite and Druze militias took control of West Beirut from the Lebanese Army. The MNF troops would pullout the end of March, 1984. President Reagan notified Congress that he had ... decided that the U.S. would terminate its participation in the MNF. The MNF was no longer a necessary or appropriate means of achieving American goals in Lebanon. Clearly, from an analysis viewpoint, when the MNF returned to Beirut following the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the Muslim opposition thought that the MNF was there to protect civilians. Later, these factions viewed the MNF as the enemy. Perhaps these same factions also viewed the ambitious program of training and rebuilding the Lebanese Army as taking sides and not maintaining neutrality. In the view of some, the perception of a neutral MNF began to deteriorate. While the notion of presence proved manageable in the early months, it became less so when the MNF was perceived by the Moslem populace as operating in support of the Lebanese armed forces and they came into ever increasing military confrontation with the opposition militias. The "window of opportunity" closed (discussed in a later chapter) with the refusal of Israel to withdraw its troops in October of 1982. Many saw the destruction of the embassy on April 18, 1983, as retribution for America's support for the Israeli invasion. Rightly or wrongly, the U.S. was viewed as providing Israel assistance in the form of weapons, money, and diplomatic cooperation.85 The agreement of 17 May 1983, was seen by many Lebanese as ceding the south to Israeli control. This is when many clashes occurred due to the outrage of Muslim Lebanese. Marine and LAF units were consequently fired upon during patrols. U.S. Naval gunfire support provided for the LAF in the battle for Souk-EI-Garb is viewed as a "watershed" when the MNF, especially the U.S., deserted a neutral stance. More likely, the loss of neutrality occurred earlier and the shelling only represented the escalation of combat.86 Colonel Gerahty, in command ashore at this time, and his Marines responded vigorously with artillery and naval gunfire as they were shelled. In my opinion, it is at this point that the mission of peacekeeping became one of "undeclared war." The opposition increased the ante when the terrorist bombed the BLT Headquarters. Just like in the American colonies, the MNF in Beirut became the "problem" rather than the solution. Click here to view image CHAPTER THREE WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY The British government grew increasingly committed to their quest of subjugating the colonies in order to enforce the taxes levied by Parliament. As British soldiers attempted to restore order by their "presence," they became the fundamental obstacle to reconciliation and peace. Similarly, when the U.S. government grew committed to Gemayel and the Lebanese government, opposing factions identified the U.S. Marines as enemy forces. Therefore, the "presence" of the Marines became an obstacle to Lebanese conciliation and peace.87 In both of these missions, the opportunity for peace and reconciliation manifested itself. But, these "windows of opportunity" remained open for only a short period of time. In my opinion, the independence of the American colonies from Great Britain would have occurred at some point in the future. Moreover, granting the American colonies their independence would have been less costly for the British government than financing the American War of Revolution. An opportunity did present itself for the British government to acquire the necessary funds to finance a small standing army on the frontier of the colonies. Benjamin Franklin suggested that Parliament establish an American currency and obtain a revenue from that currency. Another suggestion by colonial agents called for voting the needed money in the colonial assemblies. Instead, Prime Minister Grenville was determined to impose the Sugar and Currency Acts (discussed earlier). Historians have determined that a considerable number of people in England thought the measures unwise and dangerous.88 From this point on in America, the situation continued to deteriorate and unrest escalate. Following the successful evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, and subsequent redeployment of the MNF in the wake of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, a "window of opportunity" was indeed open for peace in Lebanon. The three critical months of October, November, and December, 1982, determined the future of Lebanon. It was the failure to begin reconciliation, and, more importantly, to bring about the withdrawal of foreign forces (Israel and Syria) from Lebanon. It was failure to withdraw Israeli and Syrian forces, as well as any residual PLO elements, that lead to a deteriorating environment marked by escalating anti-MNF violence in 1983 and 1984. CHAPTER FOUR COMMAND AND CONTROL An analysis of the Command and Control aspects of the two operations under study is necessary in order to ascertain the impact on the mission. Further, command and control aspects need to be analyzed in order to determine if they had any impact on the Commanders' decisions. General Gage's chain of command was fairly unconvoluted. He reported to the Secretary of War, Lord Barrington, in England and ultimately King George III. The problem with the command structure was not the successive "filtration layers" as seen in Beirut but the time/distance factor of communications. Any correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief and government officials in London would take at least a month to complete. This type of control is certainly not conducive to the peacekeeping operations in which General Gage was involved. The situation in Boston could change rapidly between extreme violence or subdued calm in this time frame. The British reaction to the colonists action was slow or ended up with wrong policy decisions due to these rapid changes. In my opinion, it is certainly understandable that General Gage and the British troops could be and were left in many frustrating situations due to the vulnerability in the Command and Control structure. Colonel Gerahty was involved in a situation where the command structure was seemingly a complex web of "confusion" of successive filtration layers (see Chart 1). Colonel Gerahty was the Commander of the U.S. Multinational Force in Beirut as well as the MAU(Marine Amphibious Unit) Commander. He reported to a multi-layered optional chain of command in addition to an administrative chain of command at FMFLANT (Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic). Furthermore, the State Department Chain of Command had direct influence on decisions he made. Dr. Mathews in his Doctoral Dissertation likened the Command structure and operational aspects to a "slinky". It could contract so that policy and decisions came immediately from the top or contract so that policies, decisions, or requests had to filter through successive levels of authority. Even the Long Commission concluded that the command structure created a problem for physical security for the USMNF ashore. Now, there is one other problem with such a long chain of command, and it was noted by the Long Commission set up Click here to view image to investigate the destruction of the Marine Barracks. With such a large number of people in the chain, everybody assumes the other guy is going to take care of the problem, whatever the problem is.89 Both commanders faced frustrating Command and Control structures exacerbated by deteriorating situations on the ground. CHAPTER FIVE MISSION CREEP AND CREDITABLE FORCE When comparing and analyzing "mission creep" by General Gage and Colonel Gerahty, "presence" becomes the key element in both operations. For General Gage in America, the "presence" of British soldiers to restore peace and the protection of custom officials was the main reason troops were dispatched to Boston. The flawed British colonial policy, as discussed earlier, precipitated this expansion in mission. Furthermore, many would argue that the term "presence" has various meanings, one of which is visibility of some kind. John F. Lolly, Council for the Congressional Investigations' Subcommittee, in his questioning of Col. Gerahty in the hearings before the committee on Armed Services made a significant comment: ... that it is an inherent conflict for the commander to be placed in the position where he has to try and maintain visibility and try to maintain security, and it is, in my view an impossible situation.90 In Boston, the presence of troops only exacerbated the tension with the colonists and, coupled with British policy, only served to increase escalation. Attempts were made by the colonists to force the British troops out of Boston. This constant "mob pressure" resulted in the Boston Massacre in 1770. As time passed and escalation increased, the troops became viewed by the government as instruments of punishment as evidenced by the Coercive Acts, and became viewed by the colonists as the enemy. However, by this time in 1775 Boston, the mission clearly "creeped" from protection of the custom officials, to locating radical "faction" members for trial, to enforcing Parliamentary legislation, to undeclared warfare in a full scale insurrection. Gage did not initially have a creditable force in Boston. His only two regiments had a combined strength of 954 troops. His forces were strengthened following the Boston Tea Party to approximately 3000 in order to bring Boston under British control. However, this number of troops still seemed inadequate to handle the "armed" population the size of Massachusetts. Mission "creep evolved in Lebanon as the Muslim populace perceived the MNF as operating with the Lebanese armed forces to defeat the opposition. When the United States utilized naval gunfire to support the LAF during the battle of Souk-El-Garb, the concept or mission of presence became obsolete.91 This can be related to creditable force as well. The Marines were in a static defensive position at the airport. "We had Marines flapping our arms saying we are sitting ducks and I had no authority to move out of the airport."92 Just like General Gage Colonel Gerahty found himself in a situation of an "undeclared war". Rocket and mortar attacks on the Marines would be dealt with by the NGF, artillery and air strikes. Clearly, Gerahty's mission evolved into full scale combat. CHAPTER SIX DISASTER There would be tragic loss of life and ultimate disaster for the forces under Gage and Gerahty. General Gage had some experience with the tactics used by the colonists against the British forces on their ill-fated withdrawal from Concord to Boston. When General Gage was a Lieutenant Colonel, he had charge of the advance force for General Braddock that was ambushed during the French and Indian Wars. However, the sheer magnitude of the colonial forces slaughtering the British troops on their return from Concord appalled even him. Gage had received an intelligence report that if the British army went out of Boston and into the country, Minutemen would oppose them. The report stated that about 500 Minutemen and their whole magazine of powder, consisting of 90 to 100 barrels was at Concord, 18 miles from Boston. For psychological as well as practical reasons, this new crisis demanded a military gesture. So a raid on Concord was planned for the night of April 18, 1775. 700 troops slipped quietly across the Boston common to the water and ferried to a farm located on the other side. Troops were issued thirty-six rounds of ammo per man. Colonel Smith, commanded this outfit which was headed by six light infantry companies under Major Pitcairn of the Royal Marines. Their movement would take them toward Lexington and the next town beyond which was Concord. A group of British officers on a forward recce captured Paul Revere on the road to Concord. Revere said "There'll be five hundred Americans here in a short time" for I've alarmed the country all the way up. Several more express riders were stopped and all spoke confidently of 1000 men massing on the village green in Lexington.93 An officer had been sent to Colonel Smith, located with the grenadiers farther back down the road, warning that impending opposition was likely. Smith upon hearing the American signaling guns sent an urgent message back to Boston requesting reinforcements. Major Pitcairn reformed the column in case of ambush and the British column moved into Lexington where they could see ranks of men waiting on the green for them. Pitcairn was on the scene close enough to assess the situation, and decided upon a course of action. He could hardly continue marching on to Concord leaving men formed up for conflict in his rear at Lexington. He shouted for the rebels to lay down their arms. The first shot of the American Revolution was fired (probably from the direction of Buckman Tavern by an American from across the green). The British soldiers reacted fiercely. For months they had to endure insults and harassment from the provincials in Boston. Without order, they raised their muskets and fired, then charged. Pitcairn tried to stop them but none obeyed. The troops were seemingly intent on slaughter. Colonel Smith arrived on the scene and was horrified at the sight. He immediately had a drummer sound orders. Only then did the angry troops obey their officers and reform ranks. By then there was not an American in sight except for eight dead men lying awkwardly on the grass.94 The British soldiers continued then to march for Concord, the elite corps of grenadiers following the light infantry. The road was deserted. The British observed a column of several hundred men moving toward them from Concord. They stopped and then moved back into the town. The sight of this column of Americans was enough to warn the British that there was organized opposition in Concord just as in Lexington only of a larger size. When the column halted in Concord, Colonel Smith ordered contingents to hold the bridges north and south to hold off any Americans who might converge on Concord from the neighboring countryside. A crisis occurred at the north bridge. Captain Parsons had command of seven companies to hold the bridge and had orders to conduct a raid on a farm owned by Militia Colonel James Barrett. Ostensibly, this farm had harbored a large arms dump. As soon as the British reached the bridge they saw a militia of 400 men approaching. Parsons posted two companies to his right to cover the road, left one at the bridge and marched off to Barrett farm with the rest. At the bridge Captain Laurie decided that despite his orders to hold the bridge, his little force was too small to challenge a large number of men. He formed his troops in ranks hoping the Americans would halt. They did not, and firing erupted. Two soldiers died. When Parsons returned he only saw the two dead soldiers one of which had been scalped.95 At the time Lord Percy was marching with his Brigade from Boston in response to Colonel Smith's request for reinforcements. Colonel Smith gave the orders to start the 18 mile march home. Flankers were put out. On the Lexington road the hill sloped down to a small bridge over a stream. As the British column approached the stream, the flankers moved back onto the highway in order to cross. The Americans were waiting in ambush for them on the right of the hill. Lieutenant Sutherland said "I dare say near a thousand were approaching through the trees. Then a much larger body drawn up to my left".96 The Americans fired and slaughtered men in the forward companies. The troops fired back only to find their targets had taken cover behind stone walls and trees. The officers urged their men on. But the incident at the bridge would not be an isolated one. All along the road Americans were taking up covered positions. Every clump of trees, or boulders, or houses, shots rang out. This was infuriating to the British troops who thought this was "dirty fighting". These were methods of men afraid to stand and fight, who thought nothing of shooting a man in the back! The flankers did their best, but the numbers of Americans were in the thousands. As the soldiers reached Lexington they were ragged and tired. They had no sleep the night before and had marched 20 miles since the previous morning. As the British troops continued to move down the route, firing continued and more soldiers died. The British troops were at the breaking point and did at one time panic and began to run but the officers were able to gain order. When they arrived at Lexington village, they could see three ranks of British soldiers formed from Lord Percy's First Brigade. Percy allowed half an hour recovery time and then ordered the 1800 British soldiers to begin their march to Boston. But as the column advanced a mile "they were fired at by all quarters".97 The "Indian style" fighting techniques appalled the British and as a result, angry soldiers rushed house after house, killing everyone they could find. The number of British killed and wounded grew, and as they approached Cambridge the firing became more intense. The Americans who had been streaming into Cambridge all day, were assembling ahead in greater numbers than the British had yet encountered. Percy realized that he had to choose the alternate route to Charlestown in order to get back. By the time they approached the narrow neck that connected the mainland to the Charlestown peninsula it was dusk, and for the first time since they had left Lexington, they were no longer under fire.98 Percy did not know what to expect from the inhabitants of Charlestown, so he gave the orders for the column to proceed onto Bunker Hill and prepare to defend the high position. Gage sent additional troops to assist in manning the defensive positions that Percy's hard pressed force had set up on the northern slopes of Bunker Hill facing the mainland. Slowly the British were evacuated across the waters to Boston.99 It has been a disastrous day, 237 casualties, many wounded, but as always many of them would soon die. It was an appalling total, considering the quality of the soldiers (i.e. the grenadiers) - many of them from the best fighting units in the British Army - and the nature of the attackers: farm men, largely ungeneraled and uncoordinated.100 Like General Gage, Colonel Gerahty had prior experience with the tactics used by the warring opposition in Lebanon. This was due to the car bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Gerahty stated: "...in the case of the embassy I think they were talking about the bomb around(2500) or (2800) pounds of explosive force."101 However, Gerahty's experience was not on the same scale when related to the BLT Headquarters bombing. "Massive, massive .... The blast focus - when you are talking 12,000 and 15,000 lbs. of explosives...." "This is the car bomb capital of the world, but we had not thought of a truck bomb."102 Perhaps the retaliatory efforts during peacekeeping/ peace-enforcing missions should be studied closely, because the ultimate aim of the escalation is to enduce the military occupiers to leave the country. Such was the case in the colonies and in Beirut. Furthermore, both efforts succeeded! CHAPTER SEVEN INTELLIGENCE The intelligence aspect of these two peacekeeping operations is significant from the standpoint of possibly averting disaster and mission failure. In that context, a determination can be made on whether the slaughter on the road back from Concord and the BLT Headquarters building bombing might have been avoided. Clearly, records indicate that General Gage had a considerable intelligence network. Furthermore, he had lived in America for 12 years, served as a Lieutenant Colonel under General Braddock in the French and Indian War, and had married a woman born in the colonies. Of any man in the official British hierarchy, he should have had a clear understanding of the makeup, character, and intentions of the colonists. In early 1775, General Gage attempted to find out the plan of action of the rebels as well as learn the nature of the country around Boston. In this way, his troops could operate at maximum efficiency. Troops and loyalists reported to a Stephen Kimble whom Gage placed in charge of his intelligence operations. Even more valuable to Gage was a source of information with direct access to rebel headquarters in Concord. Historians believe that this man was Dr. Benjamin Church, a fiery orator and a trusted man in the colonies. Apparently Gage had more than two spies at Concord for records indicate he had a clear picture of rebel equipment and stores located there.103 It is my opinion that General Gage did have an extremely clear picture of rebel activities in and around Boston and Concord. (But what is puzzling, is why he ordered the guns and powder of Concord seized with a force of only 700 troops is still in debate. This is a significant point because in September 1774. after the seizure of powder at Charlestowne, the rebels had set bonfires on the hilltops around Boston signaling that the British had bombarded: the city. As discussed earlier, the aftermath saw the rebels massing by the thousands in response. It had been a dress rehearsal. (The answer probably can be arrived at by the fact that Gage had approximately 3000 troops in Boston and thought the seizure could be carried out swiftly and quite efficiently.) It should be mentioned here that some historians believe Mrs. Gage furnished information to the colonial leaders for the raid on Concord. However, no conclusive evidence can be found.104 In contrast to General Gage, who possessed an intimate knowledge of the colonies, Colonel Gerahty was thrust into a situation with limited knowledge of Lebanon and a scenario with limited human intelligence in relation to the dissident groups in the area.105 Even the Long Commission concluded that Colonel Gerahty was not provided timely intelligence tailored to his specific needs which would have enabled him to defend against the threat that he faced. Furthermore, that the failure of adequate intelligence and assets severely limited his ability to perceive the threat. However, could the American Embassy bombing in May have been a "dress rehearsal" for the BLT Headquarters bombing? And could it have alerted" the MNF forces to take appropriate defensive steps? Colonel Gerahty provided insight: I think I have counted over 100 car bomb threats for instance...as a game for a threat, we were talking about car bombs, or, in the case of the Embassy, I think they were talking about the bomb around 2500 or 2800 pounds of explosive force. Security against bomb damage that could be caused of the magnitude that hit the BLT building on the 23rd of October is just of a magnitude as to completely remove any security...on the basis of the terrorist truck bomb, is that they could, with the killing power they have with that kind of explosive power, could park in the main airport road without ever getting inside the compound and blow my headquarters, my MSSG and half of us away without ever getting inside the compound.106 The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelly, stated that there was no shred of intelligence which would have alerted a reasonable and prudent commander to the new and unique security threat of kamikaze truck bombs.107 Perhaps Gerahty and all other MNF officials could not fathom a threat of this magnitude as all evidence suggests. CHAPTER EIGHT TRAINING AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT General Gage initially commanded what can be termed a "rough lot" of men in the colonies up until the time of the Coercive Acts. Many of the soldiers were pressed into service. Discipline was-harsh and rigidly enforced. However, as events escalated in Boston, crack regiments were shipped to The New World. Those included grenadiers and Marines who were elite British soldiers especially trained for the high spectrum of war. When introduced in the army in 1677, the function of the grenadiers had been to hurl hand grenades among the enemy's ranks at close quarters. The size and weight of these missiles demanded that the throwers should be tall of stature and muscular in build. By 1775, the grenades had disappeared, but the grenadiers still remained, representing in. height-and strength the flower of each regiment.108 The American Marines who entered Lebanon were also highly trained in the high spectrum of warfare. The difference between the British soldiers of colonial times and the 1980's American Marines is that the Marines were all volunteers, professional, and possessed a high degree of self-discipline. Colonel Gerahty provided insight on the Marines he commanded: Discipline has not been a problem, in fact, on the contrary, the discipline and the morale of the force since the time we first got together last January till this afternoon testifying before the Armed Services Investigation Committee in Washington, D.C. is as high and as positive of any unit I have been in and I have been 20-plus years at this and I say that with all honesty.109 If both commanders were in charge of highly disciplined and well trained troops, how could both missions end in disaster? An examination of the rules of engagement may provide a clue. Certainly the rules of engagement were not the cause of disaster in either case. However, they may have been a contributing factor. During the occupation of Boston by British troops up until Lexington and Concord, General Gage tried to preserve strict discipline and order. As Commander-in-chief, Gage was the authority for determining rules of engagement. However, he refused to authorize use of military force except under instruction from civil officials until he became governor of Massachusetts in 1775, at the time of the Coercive Acts. As for the civilian leadership: "Neither Governor Bernard nor his successor, Governor Thomas Hutchinson, who took office on July 31, 1769, nor any other qualified officer dare to employ them to prevent mob action."110 British troops in Boston were to be a stabilizing presence for order. They could not initiate force by arms and because of these constraints, the colonists perceived their weaknesses which contributed to an ever increasing escalation of violence leading to open rebellion. Even the Journal of the Times in 1769 ran articles of attack on the British in Boston and stated that their presence was illegal.111 The situation that occurred in Lebanon is strikingly similar. The Marines performed their mission under normal peacetime rules of engagement. The force was not to engage in combat and force was to be used only as required for self-defense against a hostile threat, or act, or in defense of Lebanese Army elements operating with the U.S. troops112 The opposition Moslem militiamen were aware of these constraints and capitalized on the Marines perceived weakness of not being able to initiate force thereby gaining the initiative.113 As Hammel notes: ... once it was realized that the Marines would not raise the ante, the United States ceased to be a serious player in Lebanese internal affairs and the objective became the neutralization of the MAU and the manipulation of the organs of American democracy.114 There were also additional rules of engagement in Beirut. Following the bombing of the American Embassy, the ROE was outlined on a "blue"card" for external posts. for internal posts, the ROE was outlined on a "white card". The difference is that for a "blue card" ROE, magazines are loaded in the weapons and for the "white card" ROE, margazines are kept in the pouches. Post 6 and 7 at the BLT Headquarters were operating under the "white card" ROE and magazines were kept in the pouches of Marine sentries at the time of the bombing. It only took approximately six seconds for the explosive-laden truck to be driven into the lobby of the BLT Headquarters and then detonate reducing the building to rubble in a matter of seconds (see Illustration 5 and 6). The Long Commission concluded that the Marine mission statement and the implementation of the "blue card" - "white card" rules of engagement had contributed to a mindset which detracted from the Marines readiness to respond to the terrorist attack on the BLT Headquarters.115 Both General Gage and Colonel Gerahty operated in an environment that changed into undeclared war. Their operating rules of engagement failed to meet the requirements necessary to authorize a commander to respond with necessary force to meet a hostile threat. Click here to view image Click here to view image CONCLUSIONS There are valuable lessons to be learned from the comparative analysis of the challenges faced by General Thomas Gage and Colonel Tim Gerahty. First, the issue of creditable force and related rules of engagement. Commanders must have a large enough force to accomplish the mission and the rules of engagement must not be detrimental in ensuring that the mission is carried out. If not, the credibility of the force will be severely weakened. Governmental policy must take into account the geopolitical ramifications of the peacekeeping mission. This will ensure that the force conducting the mission remains or is perceived as remaining neutral. The British soldiers in the colonies were viewed as the enemy because of the colonials' perception that they were the enforcers of a flawed British policy. Similarly, in Beirut, the Marines were perceived as the enemy due to support of the LAF. By governmental policy addressing the social forces at work, conflicts will be avoided decreasing future escalation. Therefore, a political mission such as peacekeeping should have a coherent and unified political and military strategy. Further, policymakers should attempt to act on "windows of opportunity" to make the correct political policy decisions. A flawed governmental policy is directly related to the mission or in better terms, "mission creep." Peacekeeping missions are executed initially to meet short term objectives. However, as evidenced from this study, the British stayed in Boston for years and the Americans in Beirut 18 months. Their very presence coupled with flawed political policies forced "mission creep" in order to accomplish ever increasing political schemes. Neither the British government nor the American government realized that their commanders on the ground were attempting to fulfill a passive neutral presence in an undeclared war zone. If the situation deteriorates to the point of undeclared war, it must be recognized that the force is the target. Every attempt will be made to discredit the force and rally public opinion to force them to disengage. All concerned must understand that to leave the force in place will only invite disaster as seen at Lexington, Concord, and Beirut on a scale that can only be considered inconceivable at the hands of a hostile citizenry. If the level of violence has reached a state of undeclared war, the force must be pulled out. In the case of General Gage and Colonel Gerahty, the prudent decision would have been to put the troops back on the ships, await the decision to either reinforce to prepare for full combat operations ashore or withdraw. However, neither commander had the authority to withdraw to the ships. Command structures must be responsive to instability in the area and requests by the commander on the ground. For both General Gage and Colonel Gerahty, the command structure helped to facilitate confusion. In this study, I have addressed the geo-political framework setting the stage on which General Gage and Colonel Gerahty would operate. Furthermore, I provided analysis of the similarities of challenges that these commanders faced. Finally, I offered several important conclusions that can be gleaned for use by future operations of this kind. ... presence became a show of force, and the audience was not impressed; rather than facilitating peace, it proved to be a catalyst for the outbreak of war. Peacekeeping is a concept still in its infancy. It can only work when it is allowed to work. What makes that frightening is what it suggests about peace itself; we only keep it when we want it.116 1 Major General Carl Van Horn, SOLDIERING FOR PEACE (New York:McKay Company Inc, 1967), vii. 2 Dr. J.B. Mathews. Doctoral Thesis LEARNING THE LESSONS OF BEIRUT (DIC 1989), 213 3 Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsback, THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT 1982-1984 (Florida: International University Press, 1991), 155. Herinafter cited as McDermott. 4 United Nations Charter 5 Peckham, Howard H., THE COLONIAL WARS 1689-1762, (The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 103. 6 Alden, John Richard, GENERAL GAGE IN AMERICA, A HISTORY OF HIS ROLE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (State University Press, 1948), 105. Herinafter cited as Alden. 7 Alden, 106 8 Alden, 146 9 Alden, 160 10 Alden, 163 11 Andrews, Charles M., THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY IV; ENGLAND'S COMMERCIAL AND COLONIAL POLICY (Yale University Press, 1965), 7 12 Andrews, 396. Herinafter cited as Andrews. 13 Shy, John, TOWARD LEXINGTON: THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Princeton University Press, 1965), 14 14 Frank, Benis M., U.S. MARINES IN LEBANON 1982-1984 (Washington DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987), 6. Herinafter cited as Frank. 15 McFarlane, Robert C., LESSONS OF THE BEIRUT BOMBING, 2. Herinafter cited as McFarlane. 16 McDermott, 9 17 McDermott, 9 18 McDermott, 9 19 McDermott, 11 20 Frank, 17 21 Frank, 19 22 McDermott 11 23 McFarlane, 3 24 McFarlane, 3 25 McDermott, 13. 26 McDermott, 13 27 McDermott, 13 28 McDermott, 13 29 McDermott, 13 30 McDermott, 13 31 Frank, 23 32 Frank, 23 33 98th Congress, 284 34 Frank, 23 35 McDermott, 44 36 McDermott, 45 37 Alden, 165 38 Alden, 167 39 Alden, 117 40 Alden, 122 41 Alden, 169 42 Alden, 179 43 Alden, 184 44 Pearson, Michael, THOSE DAMNED REBELS, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS SEEN THROUGH BRITISH EYES (New York: G.P. Putnams & Sons, 1972), 18. Herinafter cited as Pearson. 45 Alden, 180 46 Pearson, 16 47 Pearson, 20 48 Pearson, 31 49 Pearson, 31 50 Pearson, 31 51 Pearson, 36 52 Pearson, 41 53 Pearson, 41 54 Pearson, 43 55 Pearson, 43 56 Pearson, 43 57 Pearson, 43 58 Pearson, 45 59 Pearson, 46 60 Pearson, 49 61 Pearson, 49 62 Pearson, 52 63 Pearson, 55 64 Pearson, 55 65 Pearson, 55 66 Pearson, 56 67 Frank, 30 68 McDermott, 13. 69 McDermott, 14 70 Frank, 30 71 Frank, 45 72 Frank, 60 73 McDermott, 14. 74 McDermott, 14 75 Frank, 74 76 McDermott, 15 77 Frank, 86 78 Tanter, Raymond, WHO'S AT THE HELM? LESSONS OF LEBANON (Westview Press, Inc, 1990), 224. Herinafter cited as Tanter. 79 Tanter, 224 80 Frank, 89 81 Frank, 89 82 Frank, 90 83 McDermott, 16 84 McDermott, 20 85 McDermott, 21 86 McDermott, 20 87 McDermott, 18 88 Alden, 108 89 98th Congress, 268 90 98th Congress, 284 91 98th Congress, 258 92 Gerlach, LtCol, Brief to Peacekeeping Class, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, March 1995. 93 Pearson, 68 94 Pearson, 74 95 Pearson, 75 96 Pearson, 79 97 Pearson, 80 98 Pearson, 81 99 Pearson, 83 100 Pearson, 84 101 Pearson, 89 102 98th Congress, 285 103 Alden, 63 104 Alden, 65 105 98th Congress, 265 106 98th Congress, 285 107 98th Congress, 285 108 Curtis, Edward E., THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, (Yale University Press, 1926), 31. 109 98th Congress, 263 110 Alden, 167 111 Alden, 165 112 McDermott, 60 113 McDermott, 61 114 Hammel, Eric, THE ROOT. THE MARINES IN BEIRUT, AUGUST 1982 - FEBRUARY 1984, (Pacifica Press, 1993), 33. 115 Frank, 52 116 McDermott, 33 Bibliography Van Horn, Major General Carl. 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