Military

United States Marine Corps Close Air Support, Revisited

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

 

 

 

 

 

                              EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Author: Major Mark R. Cyr, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: Close Air Support (CAS) procedures and doctrine require modernization to

maximize available air power in the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Currently,

MAGTF combined arms operations in the close battle harness only a fraction of available air

power, which is oftentimes dissipated by inefficient doctrine and poor command, control, and

communication (C3) execution.

 

Background:  Marine air power is crucial to the success of the MAGTF mission. The present

CAS system is operating under self imposed doctrinal and training constraints that limit combat

capabilities in the close battle. To maximize available air power in the fluid environment of today's

battlefield, the United States Marine Corps must modernize CAS procedures and doctrine.

Proposed changes include the following:

 

     Define close and deep battle target areas to remove current restrictions on CAS

     engagements in relation to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) zone of action.

     Determine extended air asset control boundaries by technical ability rather than by

     established Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCL).

     Ensure continuity in personnel manning of key air support billets through the maintenance of

     military occupational skill (MOS) technical and tactical proficiency.

     Emphasize the interdependence and the totality of the CAS system by enhancing training

     and education of the consumers of the process.

 

Recommendations:  This paper recommends three major changes to improve MAGTF combined

arms operations as they relate to air power. First, redefine close air support procedures and

doctrine to include targets beyond the FSCL. Second, promote use of organic and airborne

assets that provide C3 of target engagements in the expanded battlespace. Third, increase training,

education, and proficiency of CAS system personnel by:

 

     Establish a permanent MOS for the forward air controller (FAC).

     Lengthen tour lengths of all aviation assignments to the ground combat element (GCE).

     Enhance division and regimental air officers (AO) formal training in existing air control

     capabilities and procedures.

     Establish continuity in the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) air direction section by

     manning the positions with enlisted controllers.

 

   Specifics regarding these recommendations are the subject of this effort. Implementing these

recommendations will significantly improve the war fighting ability of the MAGTF on the modern

battlefield.

 

   This paper explores opportunities for increasing the combat efficiency of USMC

 

airpower by redefining immediate offensive air support employment, and reassesses the

 

role and application of Close Air Support in a maneuver warfare setting. Furthermore, this

 

paper will explore the principles of the CAS process, identity its weaknesses, and propose

 

changes to rectify the problem areas.

 

   The USMC's ability to integrate and control combat power of differing origins is the crux of

 

the MAGTF's effectiveness as a warfighter. The MAGTF's uniqueness is exemplified by its ability

 

to harness all of its combined arms combat power, with the requisite organic command, control,

 

and communications (C3) systems. Before proposing changes to the process, it is essential to first

 

discuss the present status and doctrine of Marine CAS as it relates to execution of the process.

 

The following proposal offers a framework as a basis for command and control of CAS execution

 

in the USMC today.

 

 

 

CAS: A MARINE STRENGTH

 

   From World War II, to the Persian Gulf, CAS has played a vital role in the success of Marine

 

operations. Close Air Support is air action against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly

 

forces requiring detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those

 

forces.1 Air assets provide the preponderance of combat power available to the MAGTF

 

commander, and are the predominant source of influence in the close battle.

 

   Close air operations are normally employed to allow for maximum application of firepower,

 

while simultaneously ensuring the safety of friendly personnel in the area. The Marine Corps

 

prides itself as a pioneer, practitioner, and proponent of CAS as a cornerstone of Marine

 

combined arms philosophy. The success of the air/ground team in the close battle relies heavily on

 

the exploitation of the enemy in the third dimension. The factors and strengths characterizing the

 

capabilities of Marine CAS are as follows:

 

   1) The habitual relationships between air and ground components foster strength in the

 

Marine combined arms team. Common language and core training facilitate team cohesiveness

 

and combat effectiveness.

 

   2) CAS has been, and is routinely practiced and employed in all environments and situations.

 

Standing procedures, innovative techniques, and expertise are attributes of past Marine CAS

 

successes. In Korea, for example, "Marine flyers were specialists in close support. It was their

 

mission, they were trained for it, and their equipment was optimized for the role."2 Today there is

 

still no substitute for a dedicated training effort necessary for effective CAS execution.

 

   3) Marines possess their own C3 system designed to support both requester and provider of

 

CAS. The primary CAS agency, the Direct Air Support Center (DASC), is collocated with the

 

senior Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), for all training, exercises and operations.3

 

Collocation facilitates coordination by bringing air and ground representation together.

 

   4) USMC command emphasis on CAS execution facilitates the MAGTF subordinate chains of

 

command by responding to any application shortfall. When air support produces less than

 

expected results (qualitative or quantitative), the MAGTF commander's authority to direct

 

remedial action is inherent. MAGTF hierarchy of command also ensures priortization of resources

 

to the main effort. This also allows the commander the ability to influence close operations

 

through targeting, allocation of assets, and taskings.4 Command emphasis on CAS produces a

 

more timely response to problem areas, and a sharper focus of effort.

 

   5) Finally, Marines involved in the application of CAS, including individual pilots, controllers,

 

and requesting units, all possess a vested interest in the successful outcome of a sortie. The

 

individual Marine on the ground epitomizes this vested interest.

 

   The combination of all of these factors equates to a combined arms organization which value is

 

greater than the sum of its parts.

 

 

 

STATUS OF MARINE CAS

 

   Marine CAS, although historically very successful, has room for improvement. The major

 

weakness of Marine CAS is not in its ability to place ordnance on target. Rather, the weakness

 

lies in its inability to consistently pair limited assets with dynamic needs. The primary cause of

 

untimely and unresponsive sorties is lack of coordination. Many factors contribute to poor CAS

 

performance. The primary areas of concern are: air request/asset integration,  timing,

 

communications, training, outdated procedures and lack of confidence in the system. The

 

following discussions will attempt to impart the underpinnings of each area of concern.

 

 

 

REQUEST INTEGRATION, TIMING AND AVAILABILITY

 

   Timely response to immediate and on-call requests is one of the most difficult aspects of

 

CAS. Competing needs for limited air assets exacerbate the problem of providing sufficient

 

CAS coverage of the MAGTF area of operations. Routinely, the frequency of requests for

 

immediate air outstrip the supply of assets. This mismatch between supply and demand results in

 

unanswered CAS requests. Most CAS training scenarios are typically driven by sortie availability,

 

vice the requesters need. The high level of integration required in combining available sorties with

 

outstanding requests compounds the problem. Dedicated airborne CAS sorties occasionally fail to

 

blend with the requirement, in terms of remaining time on station (TOS) necessary to execute the

 

mission, inappropriate ordnance, or target location. Sortie availability, vice the request typically

 

drive most CAS training scenarios. There is a "quick fix" for this problem, but the solution has

 

drawbacks.

 

   Scheduling immediate sorties in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) with hard take off times

 

provides some relief. However, this practice counters the Marine credo "train as we fight".

 

Exercising available air support should not take precedence over the interactions of elements in a

 

dynamic environment. By scheduling immediate CAS sorties with fixed launch times, operator

 

training is maximized at the expense of exercising the system in a realistic and spontaneous

 

scenario. The result is that the requisite integration skills between participants in the CAS process

 

rarely mature.

 

   Timing is another crucial element for overall integration and CAS mission success. The speed

 

in which the immediate request is filled usually determines the outcome of the CAS mission.

 

Fleeting target opportunity and a small window of aircraft availability dictate that the process is

 

time sensitive and requires rapid decision-making. Typical Marine CAS aircraft average 15 to 30

 

minutes TOS. Aircraft type, ordnance carried, and base of origin are some of the factors effecting

 

TOS. Launching aircraft for a specific request rarely satisfies the initial call for support, and is

 

usually responsive only if the sortie originates from forward operating bases.

 

   with the exception of actual combat, there are very few exercise opportunities that can

 

simulate the sustained sortie rate and dynamics necessary to maximize system responsiveness. The

 

Weapons Tactics Instruction course comes close to producing those levels of air operations, but

 

they are of short duration, have minimal ground play, and are scripted.

 

LACK OF CONFIDENCE

 

   Confidence in the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) is effecting the

 

outcome of the CAS process in a negative way. Part of the problem is that the MACCS displays

 

symptoms of being cumbersome and lethargic. The system is inclusive, from the air traffic

 

controller in the tower, to the forward air controller with the lead battalion. From beginning to

 

end, there are a variety of agencies able to influence the outcome of the CAS sortie.5 Specifically,

 

there are four agencies having the greatest influence on CAS execution and outcome. They are

 

the regimental and division Air Officers (AOs), the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs), the

 

Forward Air Controller and Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (FACA/TACA), and the Direct

 

Air Support Center (DASC). When their efforts are conducted in harmony, the probabilities of

 

successful CAS are very good. On the other hand, discord causes inefficiency and fosters mistrust

 

in system dependability.

 

   Both air and ground CAS consumers frequently criticize C3. Many of their complaints are

 

based on a weak foundation of air control knowledge. Less than expected CAS performances

 

reinforces ill-conceived perceptions of the system. The nature of CAS employment includes a

 

degree of inefficiency not recognized by many CAS proponents and critics. A comparable

 

illustration is a firetruck responding to a call. The possible outcomes are: I) the truck never gets

 

to the fire because it is diverted, lost, or runs out of gas, 2) the truck arrives too late to save the

 

structure, or 3) the truck is unable to successfully fight the blaze (i.e., hoses are to short,

 

insufficient water pressure, etc.). Ultimately, the house damage or destruction is beyond the

 

control of the fire company or the homeowner. The lesson is, given the nature and dynamics of

 

combat scenarios, that CAS efforts sometime fail to produce desired results. Requesting units

 

must understand that some calls for air support may not be filled due to a variety of legitimate

 

reasons. Failure to recognize the realities of CAS execution help generate negative opinions which

 

perpetuate marginal confidence in the system. The key to formulating solutions is identifying the

 

difference between inefficiency and legitimate reasons for CAS failures.

 

 

 

COMMUNICATIONS

 

   Effective communication in the CAS process is another area of concern. Ground to ground

 

and ground to air communications are reliable only when exercised on a regular and continual

 

basis. Communication is the conduit for CAS processing and is mandatory between the DASC,

 

aircraft, teal controllers, and the AOs.

 

   The FAC's performance is crucial to the successful outcome of the entire CAS process. He

 

must be located in suitable geographic position that ensures effective communications for terminal

 

control. On many occasions, there have been aircraft overhead with no communication with the

 

unit that requested the support. Deficient training is the culprit, and wasted sorties are the results.

 

   Training does not emphasize the when, where, what, and how to communicate necessary

 

requirements for immediate CAS. If the AOs and TACPs fail to coordinate their efforts with the

 

DASC through effective communications, breakdowns will occur when the aircraft are on station.

 

CAS control personnel are expected to be communicators, as well as operators. Many immediate

 

air requests go unanswered because of operator error and poor understanding of techniques and

 

procedures required for effective communications. Successful CAS requires that effective

 

communication be redundant, dependable, secure, and ongoing.

 

 

 

TARGETING FIRE SUPPORT, AND OUTDATED PROCEDURES

 

   Air assets attack a large percentage of targets not in contact with ground forces.

 

Identification, prioritization, acquisition, and engagement are the elements necessary to destroy or

 

neutralize specific targets from the air. In order to accomplish these, the DASC's priority should

 

encompass real time linking of target identification information with specific sorties. In surge

 

operations with many targets identified, the DASC's role defaults to a target clearing house

 

(deciding which targets to be engaged). This function coincides simultaneously with its mission to

 

provide air resource allocation and airspace deconfliction (between a/c, and between a/c and

 

ground units). Target assessment, prioritization, and asset assignment are executed without delay,

 

using the available target intelligence. "The Commander's intent is the basis for making fire

 

support decisions during the battle, to determine when and how fires will be delivered, and to

 

determine requirements."6 Engagements will be according to the commander's guidance, and

 

coordinated with other fire support assets through the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC).

 

   New technology targeting sources are presently not incorporated in the MACCS standing

 

operating procedures. Pairing near and real time systems with the DASC would greatly increase

 

enemy engagements without increasing asset requirements. RPVs and Joint Surveillance

 

Targeting Attack Radar System (JSTARS) working with the DASC in the Kuwaiti Theater of

 

Operation (KTO) is an example. This arrangement, combined with abundant air sorties, proved to

 

be key in destroying many targets that would have gone uncontested.

 

   Integrating immediate CAS assets with other fire support means has been marginal at the

 

higher level fire support coordination centers (FSCC). Doctrinal integration of air assets into the

 

fire support scenario requires the fire support coordinator (FSC) to monitor the tactical air

 

request nets. This is done so that the air situation can be "coordinated" and prioritized by the

 

GCE. Using "silence is consent" as the criteria for air request approval is not effective nor used.

 

Historically, receipt of a request by the DASC implies approval. In thirteen years of air support

 

experience, this author cannot recall an occasion when the FSCC canceled or re-prioritized a

 

request with this method. All real fire support coordination takes place at the company level. The

 

forward observer (FO) and Forward air controller (FAC), prior to transmitting the request, decide

 

the appropriate means for engagement. If the request cannot be filled within 15 minutes, the

 

DASC will revalidate the request with the unit and attempt to source from other assets.

 

    Finally, the blurred distinction between the close and deep battle causes many lost target

 

opportunities. This, combined with a fluid battlespace and rapid maneuver, questions the validity

 

of current doctrinal air control procedures and fire control measures. Outdated procedures

 

produce ineffective results by not capitalizing on the increasing ability to engage targets in the

 

MAGTF area of operations. In an expanded battlespace, the present ability of the MAGTF to

 

identify and engage real time targets is deficient. This complicates the CAS process and requires

 

additional flexibility in solving inefficiencies.7

 

    These symptoms present opportunities to improve the CAS process in MAGTF air utilization.

 

Consumers' lack of C3 awareness, combined with poor coordination, marginal communications

 

and training, and outdated procedures, all add up to a less than effective CAS system. If

 

unanswered, the situation will contribute to forming rifts in the air/ground team, and will be a

 

continual problem for the MAGTF.

 

 

 

THE IDEAL SCENARIO

 

   Ideally, as the DASC receives requests from real-time target identifiers, they are prioritized

 

and filled with available assets that are: 1) inbound to the control area, 2) airborne at the CAS

 

holding point, 3) diverted from another lower priority mission, or 4) launched from forward

 

operating bases/airfields in the rear. The pilots are briefed the following: updated friendly and

 

threat situation, friendly artillery status, routing, target, and final controller, and working

 

frequencies. Once communication is established with the terminal controller (if required), the pilot

 

verifies the CAS brief and is given instructions prior to running the initial attack heading to the

 

target. The FAC or FACA marks the target with artillery, mortars, or rockets to provide the pilot

 

visual acquisition prior to ordnance release. If precision munitions are used, appropriate

 

designation of the target is executed. Re-attacks are directed if required and feasible. Bomb

 

damage assessments (BDA) are collected upon returning to base, and forwarded from all

 

participants in the mission (TACP, pilot, FACA). The intent is to put bombs on prioritized targets

 

within fifteen minutes of the initial target identification or request by maximizing the efficiency of

 

the sorties available. If more sorties are needed, the DASC will continue to push them to the

 

target area.

 

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE/MEASURES

 

   The primary coordinating measure for CAS is the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). It

 

is established by the appropriate ground commander to ensure coordination of fire not under his

 

direct control, but which may effect current tactical operations.8 The effect a target has on

 

current tactical operations is a key factor to the applicability of immediate air support in the

 

MAGTF. Tactical targets located in a position to effect current operations infers that they could

 

engage the GCE in the near future. Doctrinally, the FSCL divides the close battle from the deep.

 

It is supposed to maximize employment of weapons where they are most efficient.9 The DASC's

 

responsibility to control and direct air operations coincides with the definition of CAS, which

 

normally is employed in close proximity to friendly forces. Reasons to establish an FSCL are

 

two-fold; 1) to allow the maximum unbridled freedom of the MAGTF fires (permissive), and 2) to

 

ensure the safety of friendly forces (restrictive).

 

   The degree of restrictive coordination between agency and aircraft diminishes as distance from

 

the close battle area to the target increases. For targets in close proximity of friendlies, maximum

 

coordination and control of aircraft is required. For preplanned deep targets, 50 miles from the

 

friendlies, very little is necessary. The amount of time consumed coordinating is proportionate to

 

the degree of control required. Efficient coordination produces efficient immediate air support.

 

The entire MACCS, including the pilot, is involved in this effort. There is an extended chain of

 

events that occurs prior to dropping ordnance which has a significant impact on the outcome.

 

   The area between close and deep, beyond the FSCL, contains targets that can effect the

 

current battle. For this discussion, these targets will be identified as near deep targets. The

 

engagement of near deep targets can be facilitated by CAS assets and controlling agencies. Near

 

deep targets located beyond the FSCL should be classified in the close battle area because they

 

can effect current operations. They also possess the engagement characteristic of immediacy

 

present in all CAS targeting. The ability to target and control resources in a near/real time basis

 

should be the determinant for deciding whether a target is in the close battle area. The F/A-18D in

 

the FACA role, RPVs working directly with the DASC, and the employment of the airborne

 

DASC are the principle means for establishing and maintaining air control for the extended close