Back To The Future: A Study Of Command And Control Procedures For

Back To The Future: A Study Of Command And Control Procedures

For The Naval Expeditionary Task Force In Support Of Littoral

Maneuver Warfare

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - C4

Abstract of

Back to the Future: A Study of the Command and Control Procedures for the Naval

Expeditionary Task Force in Support of Littoral Maneuver Warfare.

With the publication of the Navy's "Forward...From the Sea" and Naval Doctrinal

Publication I "Naval Warfare" there has been an increase on naval operations in the

littoral areas of the world. Additionally these operations will place an increase emphases

on the use of maneuver warfare encompassing the concepts of operational maneuver from

the sea. This shift in operations will require the development of both a force structure and

command and control organization for the exploitation of the benefits of maneuver

warfare while maintaining the ability to successfully conduct amphibious warfare. To

successfully develop both structures the Naval services must turn to historical examples of

amphibious operations within the littorals as well as lessons from current fleet operations.

A jointly oriented Naval Expeditionary Task Force combining the benefits of both the

Amphibious Ready Group and Carrier Battle group will meet the force requirements of

Operational Maneuver from the Sea. However, the command and control organization

must combine the concepts of joint warfare with the force structure currently presented

amphibious doctrine to ensure success. By establishing a command and control structure

that will allow the naval commander to conduct operational maneuver from the sea in the

deep, near and rear areas the Naval services will become the true enabling force for all

joint operations. Only in accomplishing this paradigm shift will the Naval services meet

the requirements placed upon them in future conflicts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I INTRODUCTION 1

II MANEUVER WARFARE 4

III NAVAL DOCTRINE 12

Amphibious Warfare Doctrine 13

CWC Doctrine 18

Integration of Amphibious Warfare and the CWC Concept 20

IV NAVAL EXERCISE AND HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 24

Historical 24

The Falkland Island Campaign 25

Operation Urgent Fury 33

Operation Chromite 36

Fleetex 39

V RECOMMENDATIONS 44

Why Maneuver Warfare 45

What is NETF and How Should it be Constructed 47

Command and Control structure for the NETF 54

VI CONCLUSION 61

ANNEX A Amphibious Groups 63

ANNEX B Acronyms 65

NOTES 68

BIBLIOGRAPHY 72

BACK TO THE FUTURE:

A STUDY OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR THE NAVAL

EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE IN SUPPORT OF LITTORAL MANEUVER

WARFARE

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

-"A military, naval, Littoral War, when wisely prepared and discreetly conducted is

a terrible sort of war. Happy for the people who are Sovereigns enough of the sea to put

it into Execution! For it comes like thunder and lighting to some unprepared Part of the

World." - Thomas More Molyneux1

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the increase in world regional tensions

the Department of the Navy has had to refocus and reorient the missions of its maritime

services. The senior leadership within the Navy and Marine Corps have come to the

realization that the threat we are most likely to encounter is a third world threat in the

littorals of the world. It is in the littorals of the world that the National Command

Authority (NCA) can use naval forces to carry out national policy by influencing events

ashore from our mobile sea bases operating in international waters.2 These forces would

be facing foes that are technologically inferior, but may be numerically superior.

Additionally, our forces face the possibility of heavy casualties and loss of life predicated

by the possession of high tech weapons bought on the open market by politically unstable

parties. With the ever changing requirements of the world we must witness a fundamental

shift in force composition, tactics and training within our naval forces to meet the

challenges of the future. The publication of Naval Doctrinal Publication 1 in 1994 and

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 in 1989, as well as the recent release of the Department of

the Navy's White Paper, "Forward .... From the Sea" in 1995, has recognized that the

maritime forces must shift from open ocean confrontation to joint military operations in

the littorals3.

At the very heart of this move to support littoral warfare is the adoption of the

Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) concept by the Navy and the implementation of

maneuver warfare by the Marine Corps. The key to success in any future third world

conflict will be the ability to mold these two concepts together to develop a single concept

of Operational Maneuver from the Sea.4 In order to successfully conduct maneuver

warfare any military organization must have an operationally sound command and control

doctrine. The Composite Warfare Doctrine (CWC), due to its limitations both in

execution and principle, can not meet the needs of the NETF to conduct maneuver

warfare. The Navy must develop a warfare concept that will be compatible with the

philosophy of maneuver warfare and the primacy of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force

commander. Furthermore, the Navy must be able to easily apply this concept in the joint

arena.

In order to develop a command and control model that will function both as an

amphibious and naval force control mechanism and meet the functional requirements of

maneuver warfare, a basic framework must be first be established. To establish a

framework this paper will initially look at maneuver warfare. This examination will

include a detailed breakdown of maneuver warfare, a study of it in practice during the

German blitzkrieg, and some application to amphibious warfare. Next, an analysis will be

conducted of amphibious doctrine to include both the CWC and amphibious warfare

concepts and how the Navy has tried to integrate the two. A detailed look will then be

taken at how the Navy is currently approaching these problems along with proposed force

structures to meet possible future conflicts. Through an historical look at amphibious

warfare these models will be applied to three past conflicts that can be used as examples in

studying future potential littoral conflicts: the conflicts which will be addressed are

Grenada, the Falkland Islands, and Inchon. Additionally, there will be an historical look at

Second and Third Fleet exercises in 1993 and 1994 where the oval forces made an

attempt to support maneuver warfare by integrating these two concepts. Finally, from

lessons generated by these examples there will be a discussion of why we need maneuver

warfare; how we should approach force structure to support maneuver warfare; and in

what manner should command and control be established to support operational maneuver

from the sea.

As a solution, this paper will propose that we take the concept of Amphibious

Warfare, as stated in Joint Publication 3.02, and make minor modifications in order to

achieve the command and control requirements to successfully fight a maneuver warfare

battle in the littoral environment. This paper will attempt to take a new look at an old

problem and apply both lessons learned in blood with those learned in exercises, and to

create a feasible and acceptable command structure which will allow us to operate in a

manner to optimize our potential to win future conflicts.

CHAPTER TWO

MANEUVER WARFARE

-"Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by

unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions"-Sun Tzu5

he concept of modern maneuver warfare is a "...warfighting philosophy that seeks to

shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions

which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope."6

Retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd put in writing the modern concept of maneuver

warfare when developing the theories of his OODA loop decision model.7 Colonel Boyd

discovered that pilots while involved in air-to-air combat would go through a decision

process of four distinct steps. These steps were observation, orientation, decision, and

action (OODA). He postulated that since every combat situation requires the

commander/pilot to conduct this process the pilot achieves victory only by completing the

OODA cycle at a faster tempo than his opponent. In completing his OODA loop at a

faster tempo, the commander would be able to get inside his opponents loop. This would

force him to react to vague events, generating confusion surrounding his environment,

resulting in a loss of cohesive control. Even though this would not likely physically

destroy the enemy, he would be incapable of continuing effective resistance.8

Colonel Boyd, as well as many of the other maneuver warfare proponents,

conducted a search through history to find relationships in battle to apply the OODA loop

concept to land armies. They determined that throughout history there were several

examples of commanders who successfully translated the OODA loop decision cycle to

ground warfare. Colonel Boyd and other military analyst determined that maneuver

warfare required three basic elements to ensure a faster tempo decision process. The

decision process of maneuver warfare requires three basic tools: the focus of main effort,

the exploitation of surfaces and gaps, and the idea of using mission type orders.9

Through the use of these tools in developing a framework for operation the commanders

were able to ensure victory by reducing the time needed to make and act upon a decision.

This ultimately resulted in their opponents facing rapidly changing and seemingly

confusing, multiple threats.

The focus of main effort, referred to by the Germans as Schwerpunkt, provides

direction for a military operation. It pulls together the efforts of all subordinate elements

of an attack and guides them to the completion of a common goal.10 It provides the

course of actions that a military operation must take. This in itself is a simplification of the

meaning of Schwerpunkt. Schwerpukkt is the focus upon an adversaries' weakness,

whether physical, morale, or organizational. This focus is not simply where the

commander centers the main attack (though it often is the main attack); it is the center of

an adversaries' cohesion and order, this very center of gravity that allows him to function

as a single, cohesive unit. It is not purely a physical focus but a conceptual one.11 A

commander must ensure that he is assessing the combat situation and continually

reevaluating his focus of effort throughout a battle. This ensures that his aim continues to

be the destruction of the adversaries' cohesion and ability to resist.12

Weaknesses within an adversaries' unit and lines are only exploitable if discovered.

Therefore, the commander must employ the second tool of maneuver warfare -- the

concept of surfaces and gaps. Typically, a surface is an area of the adversaries' strong

established defense with a gap being a hole within that defense.13 A commander will use a

reconnaissance unit to determine where the gap is within the defensive line. Additionally,

a commander can use his intelligence organization to determine where gaps exist within

the enemies' defenses. Once a commander's reconnaissance units have determined the

location and existence of a gap, he will push a portion of his reserve force forward to

exploit the gap within his adversaries' lines. A commander bases the axis of advance for

military force upon the gaps that exist within an adversaries' line of defenses. All units

operating forward must be conducting reconnaissance to determine the change in enemy

positions and the existence of new gaps within his lines.14 As reconnaissance units

determine the existence of more and more gaps, a multiple axis front will result, causing

additional confusion within the adversaries' command organization. This will cause a loss

of cohesion within the adversaries' army. Liddel Hart referred to this as his "expanding

torrent theory."15 The key to the success of this type of tactic is a comprehensive forward

reconnaissance. This is why maneuver warfare experts refer to maneuver warfare as

intelligence or reconnaissance pull tactics.16

The key to success of the first two concepts of maneuver warfare is the use of

mission type orders. Without the commander clearly establishing his vision of the mission

and his intent in the conflict, the decentralized control required for maneuver warfare can

not be established. This is basically a contract between superior and subordinate to

identify the mission goals, and what the commander wants to happen in a broad setting to

accomplish these goals.17 Different from the orders that many military commanders

typically give which delineate the smallest detail of an operation, mission orders allow

widely separated unit commanders, when faced with difficulty, to use a high level of

initiative and flexibility to carry out a commanders wishes.18 A subordinate does not wait

for permission to act; he takes action and back briefs his superior after completion of the

mission.

There are two elements (sometimes referred to as contracts) to mission type

orders. One element is the commanders' intent. This is a long-term vision of how he

wants to attack the enemy and the final result he wishes to achieve. The short term and

small slice of the intent is the order relating to a specific point within the accomplishment

of a wider vision or mission.19 The key to success is ensuring a particular subordinate

understands the commanders' intent two levels up, and those two levels below understand

the order. Mission type orders can be thought of in very simple terms as centralized

planning and decentralized execution.

There are Four elements of structure that must exist within an organization to

ensure the success of the three key elements of maneuver warfare: 1) a combined arms

organization; 2) a strong reserve force; 3) a decentralized command and control system;

and 4) a forward push logistics system.20 Without these elements of organization, a

commander will be unable to apply the concepts of maneuver warfare to any battle field.

Combined arms organization should not be confused with the concept of

supporting arms. Supporting arms establish the ability of a commander to destroy targets

that may stand in his way for the advancement of his forces. Combined arms, on the other

hand, use a combination of different types of fire. Actions taken by an adversary to avoid

the effects of one type of weapon will quickly expose him to a second type of fire.21 This

will result in confusion and a loss of cohesion within the enemies' forces and result in the

creation of exploitable gaps within his defenses.

A strong reserve force allows the commander to exploit gaps he discovers within

the enemies' defenses. By having a strong reserve the commander is able to expand his

area of attack and exploits all gaps found by his reconnaissance. If a commander cannot

exploit the gaps that he discovers he will lose the initiative within the conflict.

Additionally, a strong reserve will give the commander the ability to counter any attack his

opponent may throw against his forces, thus parrying a thrust into his initiative by his

enemy.22

As stated earlier, a system of centralized planning and decentralized control must

be maintained. The armed service must establish a military organization framework based

on the concept of monitoring and leadership. This requires each level within the

organization to take responsibility for their actions while using a high level of initiative and

taking calculated risks on the battlefield. It requires the senior commanders to monitor

through observation and listening and not micromanage their subordinates. Because

maneuver warfare relies on the ability of commanders to make risk management decisions

it requires the leaders to lead from the front.23 Additionally, it requires a level of trust

between subordinates and superiors resulting from a shared way of thinking and

leadership. A commander must trust his subordinates to execute his mission and intent as

he envisions it for "Maneuver warfare tactics are trust." 24

Finally, the organization must establish forward logistics to allow operational

support to be immediately available to the commander. The commander must have

available to him all logistics support required to exploit the rapid advance of his troops.

Without the ability to provide this support, a commander will lose the initiative created by

the rapid movement of his force. The key in avoiding this is to anticipate the logistical

needs of the commander and provide the support immediately required. These forward

push logistics will allow the commander to continue fighting unburdened by the

requirements to wait for the resupply of his forces.25

Once the commander understands both the tools for the conduct of maneuver and

has in place the organizational structure required, he must apply them through the concept

of operational art. We can define operational art as the "art of using tactics to strike at the

enemies' strategic center of gravity."26 It is, in essence, the ability of applying battlefield

tactics to achieve strategic and political goals.27 It is a thought process that allows the

commander to concentrate on those tactical aspects that he requires to meet his objectives

mission completion. It is his ability to look beyond the fog of war and determine at a

higher level the "big picture" actions that he must take to meet the strategic objectives.

On the battlefield it does the commander little good to make a tactical decision or engage

the enemy if he is not exploiting a weakness of the enemy at an operational level.

A careful study of history indicates that one of the best examples of this concept is

the German Blitzrieg Tactics. The Germans who developed these tactics are the only

military that successfully ingrained into their military's operation the concept of maneuver

warfare. Blitzkrieg stressed mobility and speed over the use of fire power. However,

concentrated fire power was armed at decisive points within the battlefield. It used

concentrated air power to prepare the way for the advancing forces through attacking the

command and control centers and choke points within the enemies' rear. The German

high command stressed infiltration tactics using armor and mobile infantry to infiltrate

deep into the enemies rear to disrupt enemy lines of communication.28 The Germans

executed this infiltration through the vertical movement of troops along a horizontally

organized front allowing troops to occupy "nodal points" and overrun their enemies

command centers. The Germans accomplished this type of operation by warfare aimed at

the operational defeat of the enemy. U

Military