Interservicing Of U.S. Military Air Bases

Interservicing Of U

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Manpower

Executive Summary

Interservicing of U.S. Military Air Bases

Introduction. The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Report (BRAC III) proposed the closure and realignment of 17 major military air bases

located throughout the United States. Of these 17 recommendations, neither the

Department of Defense (DoD) nor BRAC III recommended that a single air base be

intentionally structured as a joint installation.

Proposal. The proposal set forth in this document is that DoD should consider

the interservicing of military air bases by realigning them to a joint structure. The

BRAC process of downsizing forces and combining military bases gives DoD the

opportunity to permanently locate joint military forces together at the same geographic

location.

Argument. The obstacles associated with the organization of a joint air base are

all within the scope of resolution. They simply require the will and motivation to

overcome them. Downsizing, rightsizing, and budget constraints have and will dictate

that the military train and fight as a single force. If we will fight the next war as a joint

force, why not physically locate those joint forces in the same geographic location during

peacetime? The best way to learn how to operate together is to be physically located

together. DoD should, however, recognize and preserve the unique perspectives and

contributions that the individual services bring to the modern battlefield. It is in our best

interest to preserve those unique service perspectives, while at the same time, reaping the

synergy and economy that come from living, operating and training together in the same

physical location.

Recommendation. In Part 4 of this paper, the author lists 10 characteristics of

the "ideal" military air base and lists some existing bases that possess many of the 10

characteristics to one degree or another. He recommends that DoD relocate units based at

underutilized airfields to a few "super" airfields that could easily accommodate a

significant increase in the number of users. These "super" airfields would be structured

jointly with the intention of giving a joint force a permanent "joint home."

Interservicing of U.S. Military Air Bases

Major John Crook CG 12

"...we learn from history that men never learn anything from history."

-George Bernard Shaw, in the preface to Heartbreak House

Introduction

The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report (BRAC

III) proposed the closure and realignment of 17 major military air bases located

throughout the United States. (see Fig. 1) Of these 17 recommendations, neither the

Department of Defense (DoD) nor BRAC III recommended that a single air base be

structured as a joint installation. The Commission did, however, consider the basic

theory of interservicing with the following statement:

"The Department of Defense has been attempting for approximately 20

years without significant success to interservice depot maintenance

workload. In his testimony before the Commission in March, 1993, the

Secretary of Defense stated DoD did not have adequate time to address the

interservicing issue or to compile the necessary data to submit

recommendations to the 1993 Commission....Committed to streamlining

depot maintenance workload to achieve maximum efficiencies, the

Commission determined the following five commodities should be

reviewed for interservicing potential: wheeled vehicles, rotary-wing

aircraft, tactical missiles, and ground communications; the fifth,

fixed-wing aircraft, was ultimately deferred from further analysis due to a

lack of reliable or comparable cost and capacity data ....The Commission's

recommendations to consolidate depot maintenance workload through

interservicing represent only an initial attempt at achieving cost savings.

The efficiencies to be realized from interservicing dictate DoD conduct an

exhaustive review and present its recommendations/actions during the

1955 round of the base closure process."1

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Later in the BRAC process, the Commission recommended that Carswell AFB be

redesignated as NAS Ft. Worth. When DoD ultimately realigned several reserve units

from different services at NAS Ft. Worth, it marked the first time that squadrons from the

Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps had been permanently located at the same air field

during a peace time condition. However, DoD realigned the squadron solely on the

basis of economics and not with the intent to foster joint interaction.3

Part I

Critical Thinking

The argument set forth in this document is that the initial theory of interservicing

does not go far enough. Not only should DoD consider the interservicing of maintenance

activities, but should also think innovatively "out of the box" and consider the benefits

and economies of interservicing the bases themselves by realignment to a joint structure.

Shortly after the end of WWII, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said, "Separate ground,

sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will

fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."4

The allied air campaign of the Pacific from 20 August to 15 November 1942

provided a shining example of what joint employment of air power from a joint airfield

could do. It all centered around the men of the Cactus Air Force defending Henderson

Field on Guadalcanal. The Marine, Navy, and Air Force fliers beat back four powerful

enemy attempts to seize the vital airfield. They set aside service rivalry, adapted their

service doctrine, employed a single air component "commander", and overcame

overwhelming odds to beat the Japanese.5 In spite of this success of a single air

component operating from a single air field, since those 87 days in the summer and fall of

1942 the services have let selfish rivalries, competition for budget dollars and "ricebowl"

doctrines obscure a common sense approach to the structuring of U.S. military air bases.

When the threat of a common enemy is absent, service parochialism takes root and

spreads as a smothering weed planting the seeds of misguided competition, bickering and

in-house fighting over roles and missions, instead of an efficient commonality of bases,

doctrine, language, and weapons systems.

To operate effectively as a joint force, the U.S. military requires extensive joint

training that they can only conduct when the various forces are physically located

together. Fortunately for U.S. forces involved in Desert Storm, the enemy allowed them

a six month joint training hiatus to prepare for the ensuing battle. The enemy we face in

the next MRC may not be so accommodating.

If we can only conduct joint training when the various forces are physically

together in the same geographic location, why do we continue to physically segregate the

military at service specific bases which afford little opportunity to operate, train, or even

think as a joint service? Why do we continue to physically separate the services when

they will not fight separately in the next war?

Rare is the contingency plan that calls for a military service to

operate completely independent of another service. Most situations

require interaction between two or more services. Joint Chiefs of Staff

publications reflect this reciprocity in their instructions on

base-development planning. In reality, however, the services are still

parochial. Each service department has its own "facility component

system," base-development planner's manual, and interpretation of

standards of living, standards of construction, and philosophy of

base-development planning and execution. As a result, great differences

often occur in the standards under which members of the different services

live and work, even while they are near one another in a theater of

operations. Without conscious effort, little change can be expected in the

future. This parochialism results not only in a perception problem that can

affect morale but also in serious logistical problems, since either

overbuilding to an unrealistically high standard or underbuilding can

diminish support for the mission. Service planners need to eliminate the

possibility of these undesirable occurrences in base-development

planning.6

At a recent general officer symposium7, the panel lamented the fiscal dilemma

which left many military installations far short of the funds required to meet the support

requirements of the tenant operating forces. One general noted that MCAS Cherry Point,

North Carolina was $30 million dollars short of the amount required to meet projected

expenses. He also hinted that unless the base could acquire additional funding many base

services would have to be cut or employees would have to concede to pay cuts. The

panel suggested that the solution to all this was an internal Marine Corps program called

"Total Quality Leadership." A program, which in the opinion of the author, still keeps

thinkers too much "in the box" and treats symptoms and not the problem itself. A

member of the audience asked the question; "Can the Marine Corps benefit by combining

its bases with the other services, specifically Marine Corps air stations?" The responses

ranged from, "What do you mean?" to "The reserves are doing it." Although there was

no opposition to the idea, it was obvious the panel had never seriously considered the

alternative of combining a military base with another service. An alternative that might

do much to alleviate some of the budgetary crises facing the military services.

The current inter-war lull, affords opportunity to train, think, and operate in a joint

environment. The ongoing BRAC process gives DoD the opportunity to organize

military bases within a joint structure outside parochial service boundaries. With

apologies to Eisenhower, a rephrased version of his quotation referenced earlier serves to

focus us on how we should really organize our military infrastructure: "Separate ground,

sea, and air bases are gone forever. If ever again we should organize a military base, we

will organize it in all. elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."8 It is

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not beyond the scope of reasonable thinking and feasibility to realign military bases

within the structure of a Joint Task Force. (Fig. 2) It would then be a simple matter to

deploy "Joint Air Component Cherry Point" as a member of a quick reaction Joint Task

Force. All the elements of the force would already have trained together including the

commander and his staff. The ongoing BRAC process gives DoD, the Marine Corps and

all services the opportunity to combine military forces within the same framework that

they will fight. It is an opportunity that we cannot allow to evaporate in the heat of

interservice rivalry.

The cycle of scarce military resources is upon us again much as it was just after

World War II and before the Korean War. There is a familiar deja vu developing as we

face decreasing military capabilities coupled with an increasing possibility of military

involvement on the Korean Peninsula Strategic planners must consider any action that

will contribute to joint capability while enhancing the economy and efficiency of its

military forces. A discussion of interservicing all military bases is beyond the scope of

this paper. Having said that, this paper explores the specific issue of interservicing

military air bases.

Part 2

Why Interservice an Air Base?

Air bases are unique from other military bases because of their inherent mission to

support aircraft and aircraft operations. Some of these unique characteristics include:

1. Unique support requirements. (Weather services, air traffic control, etc.)

2. Requirement for a runway.

3. Proximity to military operating areas (MOA) or military restricted areas for

aviation training.

4. Preferred isolation from heavy concentrations of human population.

These unique characteristics encompass the broad spectrum of aviation

requirements of the four services. When analyzed thoughtfully, one must conclude that

there is no real justification for service segregation of air bases. A base that possesses all

or most of the aforementioned characteristics can accommodate any tactical aviation unit

equally well regardless of service identity. Service segregation of military air bases is

therefore apparently attributable to service parochialism and not because there are any

economies realized from organizing air bases as strictly Navy or Air Force.

NAS Fort Worth, Texas. BRAC II recommendations directed the closure of

Carswell AFB, Texas which occurred on 30 September 1993. The primary mission of

Carswell AFB was to provide basing for the 7th Bomb Wing. The base also supported

the 301st AFRES Fighter Wing. The transfer and consolidation of the 7th Bomb Wing to

other Air Force bases was completed by fall 1993. BRAC III then recommended the

realignment of several DoD organizations from various bases to Carswell AFB. This

included the retention of the 301st Fighter Wing at the newly designated NAS Fort

Worth. The realignment is currently taking place and expected to be complete by the end

of CY 95 at a projected savings of $5.2 million per year for the next 100+ years.9 This

will have effectively transformed NAS Fort Worth into a joint reserve air base. A base

structure directed mainly for economic reasons forced upon DoD by congressional budget

constraints. DoD realigned NAS Fort Worth from two air bases that were operating well

below capacity to realize a substantial long term savings by spreading fixed operating

costs over a larger user base. The fact that NAS Ft. Worth turned out to be joint rather

than service specific was more by accident and necessity than design.

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At the macro level, the purpose of a military air base is to provide essentially three

things: a runway, suitable maintenance and hangar facilities, and air traffic control. It

would also be helpful if DoD located the airfield near suitable aviation training areas and

if the operation of aircraft was unimpeded by civilian concerns such as noise abatement

and population encroachment. All other aspects deal with support. With these thoughts

in mind, DoD should direct the organization of a military air base around two basic

concepts:

1. Capabilities of the air field facilities.

2. Compatibility with tenant training requirements.

These two concepts then become the critical factors for determining the number

and type of aircraft able to occupy a given facility. If the ATC facility and surrounding

training areas can support 800 close air support (CAS) aircraft in a given training day,

then the air base should have around 800 CAS aircraft resident so that the facility can

operate at or near capacity. It is not important that the 800 CAS aircraft be all Air Force

or all Navy.

As we have argued, DoD should base the organization and tenancy of military air

bases upon capability and compatibility with number and type of aircraft. When

organized on these two basic principles, air bases will not only realize the economic

benefits of interservicing, but will also produce operational benefits as well in the form of

joint synergy.

Economy. The single largest cost of building an air base is the construction of

the runway (Fig. 3)10. This is a fixed cost regardless of the number or type of aircraft that

might utilize the runway. The subsequent operation and maintenance of the runway also

incurs a major cost to the government. It can be argued that this is also a fixed cost that

remains almost constant regardless of the number of aircraft that take off or land in a

given time period.11 Therefore, to realize the greatest economy of utilization, DoD should

operate air bases at or near the capacity of their runways and ATC facilities. This

efficiently spreads the fixed costs of air traffic operations over a large base of user

activity.

It can be argued that with rare exception, most military air bases could

significantly increase the number of tenant aircraft and still operate well within safe air

traffic control and operational limits. The only limiting factor would be the availability

of military operating areas (MOAs) and restricted areas to operate the aircraft. However,

even the availability of MOAs and restricted areas in most instances is not a prohibitive

factor because users of a single MOA often come from several surrounding military air

bases.

To realize the efficiencies of spreading fixed operating costs, DoD should direct

closure of air bases that operate below capacity and combine affected tenant users at air

bases that most closely exhibit the characteristics suitable for an effective military air

base. The question then arises, "How do we combine users and where?" Not only should

decision makers view these opportunities in terms of economy and proximity, but also as

a way to enhance our ability to fight the next war. Realignment based solely on

economic motivation may lead to an inefficient training "mix" of tenants at the realigned

base. Realignment must also consider a mix of base tenants that will enhance joint

training and interoperability. To realize all of the possible benefits of interservicing, DoD

should realign base tenants based on an intelligent combination of the following three

categories:

1. Manufacturer

2. Aircraft type and mission.

3. Composite joint force structure.

Realignment by manufacturer. McDonnell Douglas Corporation manufactures

almost half of the tactical military aircraft used by the United States. Many of the parts,

technical requirements, and skills associated with the manufacture of these aircraft, even

though produced for different services, are common. It stands to reason then, that if

aircraft of common manufacture are co-located, the technical expertise to repair and

maintain these aircraft would also be co-located. Location by common manufacture

provides economies of spare parts distribution and avoids duplication of DoD funded

contractor support activities.

Realignment by type and mission. It would be illogical to locate Air Force close

air support and air superiority aircraft at the same base if there were no CAS ranges

nearby. It however, would be completely logical to base Marine Corps and Air Force

CAS aircraft at the same facility if suitable ranges and capacity were readily available.

Realignment by joint force composition (Composite Wing). A joint force

designed to operate on the scale of a major regional conflict would be composed not only

of smaller tactical aircraft but would also include tanker, early warning, and electronic

intelligence aircraft. The Air Force has successfully implemented the concept of

organizing air bases on the composite concept at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho.

The composite wing is not a new idea. The logistics system has

shown its ability to support composite wings throughout the history of the

Air force. A number of current organizations are already composite and

are easily supported. ... Composite forces will now be stationed as

composite units within the US during peacetime, but with a designated

mission of rapid deployment anywhere in the world. ... Composite wings

will have an organizational flexibility that allows for rapid and easy

change to meet any situation. They will have the ability to plug-in and

plug-out operational units so as to put together a viable composite force to

meet any mission requirement. ... Today's composite wing has an

increased responsibility for maintaining a rapid deployment capability

from a peace time base.12

The Air Force has provided the impetus of argument for the organization of

composite air bases. However, the concept of composite air bases will only be truly

effective as a combat force when organized jointly. Only joint organization provides the