Military

Why Lebanon

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues

 

 

 

                              EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Why Lebanon

 

Author:   Major D. O. Comer

 

Thesis: The Reagan Administration misread the political situation in the Middle East subsequent

to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

 

Background:  Beginning in late September 1982, with the United States still engaged in the

"Cold War" with the Soviet Union, US Marines assigned to Landing Force Sixth Fleet took up

residence at Beirut International Airport. Their mission, ambiguous at best, was to assist the

Lebanese Government attain stability by keeping the peace in the wake of the Israeli invasion of

southern Lebanon known as Operation Peace for Galilee. The Reagan Administration's

misinterpretation of the existing Middle East political situation provided the impetus for the

introduction of the Marines. The primary focus of this paper is on the political situation that

existed in the Middle East from the beginning of the Reagan Administration in 1981 up until the

eve of invasion. The paper will reveal a clear US misinterpretation of the political situation and

the result of a flawed foreign policy known as "strategic consensus."

 

Recommendation:   Prior to engaging in peace keeping operations of any type, the US must

determine what its interests in the region are and whether or not those interests are survival

interest, vital interests, etc. Moreover, the US must also determine the interest of the other

parties involved, and the nature of their interests. Finally, regardless of the nature of US interest,

the US must not take sides with any of the parties involved unless we are prepared to engage in

combat operations.

 

                                 WHY LEBANON?

 

       Why did the US intervene in Lebanon in 1982? Most scholars agree that the

 

United States intervened in Lebanon for regional and international considerations, not

 

because of Lebanon's importance as claimed by the United States government.1 The US

 

responded to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon (Operation Peace for Galilee) and

 

the massacres in Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in order to contain communism in the

 

Middle East, support Israel, and promote stability in the region. The war in Vietnam and

 

the Iran hostage crisis had badly damaged US prestige. The situation in Lebanon placed

 

US prestige in further jeopardy. Israel, a US surrogate armed with US weapons and

 

firing US ammunition, had invaded an Arab country. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF)

 

had confronted the PLO, drove them into a corner in Beirut, laid siege to an Arab capital

 

in the process, and defeated the Soviet backed Syrian Armed Forces occupying the

 

Beka'a Valley.

 

       The siege of West Beirut had a central impact on the political imaginations of

 

people throughout the world. It was the first war televised on a day-by-day basis with

 

live coverage of the siege of a modern capital city as part of the nightly news.2 As news

 

media from all over the world covered the gradual destruction of the city and the

 

suffering of the citizens of West Beirut caught in the Israeli-PLO cross-fire, the

 

international community placed enormous pressure on the Reagan Administration.3 The

 

governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan blamed the US for failing to prevent the

 

Israeli invasion. Even the United States' European allies condemned the attack and

 

threatened economic sanctions against Israel. There was also the worry over Soviet

 

reaction given their friendship treaty with Syria of October 1980.4

 

       Ambassador Morris Draper, assistant to Special Presidential Emissary, Philip

 

Habib, in 1982, while speaking at a symposium on Lebanon at Quantico, Virginia on

 

May 3, 1993, provided the following comment on the Reagan Administration's decision

 

to intervene in Lebanon:

 

          We got into the Lebanon mess when Israel attacked Lebanon and

          drove up towards Beirut mainly because we had no choice. In the

          situation in the Middle East, there is always a risk that a fight will

          start out between Israel and an Arab country--in this case,

          Syria--and it will escalate from there, because as history has

          shown, the Soviet Union has Syria as a set trappie [client state]

          and would back it, and we were backing Israel, although we

          certainly didn't back its invasion of Lebanon.5

 

       In response to intense international and growing domestic political pressure,

 

President Reagan sent Habib to Beirut. Over time, Habib negotiated a plan--to evacuate

 

the PLO and Syrians from Beirut--which was acceptable to all parties. When executed, it

 

went so smoothly that the US Marines were only in Beirut for 16 days. But the

 

assassination of Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, which occurred within

 

days of the Marine's departure, led to a sense of embarrassment and guilt in the White

 

House. The administration felt compelled to do something more than merely expressing

 

moral outrage. "If we show ourselves unable to respond to this [new] situation, what can

 

the Middle East parties expect of US in the Arab-Israeli peace process."6 The Reagan

 

Administration had to act to regain US credibility among the moderate Arab states and to

 

show that the US could still influence Israeli military action. Bold action was necessary

 

to give the president's new Middle East peace plan--announced only two weeks before,

 

on September 1, 1982--time to work. The Marines, therefore, returned to Beirut on 29

 

September as part of the reformed Multi-National National Force (MNF).7

 

 

 

The Return of the Globalist Approach: US-Israeli Relations

 

       President Reagan, as did Johnson, Nixon and Ford before him, based his foreign

 

policy on a globalist approach (i.e., everything was considered in the context of the

 

US-USSR 'global' confrontation).8 This return to a more traditional US policy position

 

represented a move away from Mr. Carter's focus on regional issues and a renewed

 

commitment to the security and qualitative military superiority of Israel.9 George Ball,

 

in Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, contends that the reason for the US intervention in

 

Lebanon lay in a Middle East policy in lock-step with the policies of Israel:

 

          Since the Reagan Administration lacked any coherent Middle East

          policy of its own it supported, without critical sensitivity, the

          policies,  decisions  and actions  of the Israeli  government,

          apparently unaware of the fact that Israel's objectives in Lebanon

          diverged sharply from America's. By failing to assert our nation's

          rights, enforce its laws and protect its interests, the Administration

          encouraged Israel in an adventure that was ill-conceived and

          disastrous for both countries.10

 

Ball thus implies that it was Reagan's policy alone, which encouraged the Israelis to

 

invade Lebanon, without due acknowledgment of the evolution of US-Israeli relations

 

during the previous 16 years. A history of strong US-Israeli relations, coupled with the

 

election of the most pro-Israeli US president ever, had a significant impact upon the US

 

decision to intervene in Lebanon. But we must consider the decision in the context of a

 

US-Israeli bond that had evolved before the Reagan years.

 

The Early Years: 1948-1958

 

       The US supported the creation of Israel in 1948 in part because of intense

 

political action by the Israeli lobby applied vis-a-vis the Democratic Party. American

 

support for the Israel intensified to the point where, by 1958, Americans saw Israel as a

 

barrier or deterrent to Soviet expansion in the Middle East. This point of view gained

 

even greater support in the "Cold War" years, with the Israeli lobby gaining increasing

 

influence with Congress.11

 

       During this period US Middle East policy reflected neutrality as the US tried to

 

act as an impartial referee between combatants in the Middle East arena, exercising

 

political and economic persuasion to try to promote reconciliation, maintain peace, and

 

balance diverse interests in the region.12 Mr. Ball summed up US Middle East policy in

 

the context of tide Western Big Three (the United States, Britain and France) 1950

 

agreement on arms sales in the region:

 

          In 1950 the United States refused Israel's request to sell it arms;

          instead, to avoid encouraging an arms race, our government sought

          to coordinate arms sales with Britain and France through the

          Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. Thereafter, until the end

          of the Kennedy Administration, the Declaration remained a central

          tenant of American Middle Eastern policy, with our government

          earnestly seeking to maintain some degree of objectivity in

          formulating Middle East policy.  America sought, so far as

          practicable, to be even-handed on the assumption that peace could

          be best assured by maintaining a rough arms balance in the area.13

 

       After the Suez Crisis, President Eisenhower forced the Israelis--and Britain and

 

France as well--to withdraw from the Sinai, returning that area to Egypt. He enunciated,

 

and then supported, a policy stating that the US would not allow aggressors to keep lands

 

conquered by force or impose conditions on the restoration of those lands. Because

 

President Eisenhower's policy galvanized American Jewish leaders, it thereby became a

 

precursor to a fundamental policy shift.

 

 

 

The Evolulion of the US-Israeli Partnership: 1959-1976

 

       Between the Suez Crisis and the end of the Kennedy Administration in 1963, the

 

Israeli lobby grew strong enough to cause a major shift in US-Israeli relations,

 

culminating in a literal US partnership with Israel during the Johnson Administration.

 

After the 1967 Six Day War, America became Israel's primary arms supplier, economic

 

benefactor, and political supporter, as a torrent of US money and military material began

 

flowing to Israel.14 Most importantly, the US moved away from the Eisenhower policy

 

by not pressuring Israel to abide by UN Resolution 242, which stipulated the negotiated

 

return of Arab territories seized during the "Six Day War" in exchange for peace in the

 

region.15 President Reagan confirmed US departure from this policy when announcing

 

his Middle East peace initiative by stating the following:

 

          That the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories were not

          illegal [but he did suggest an immediate freeze on further

          settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank], that they were

          allowed by a provision of UN Resolution 242, and that Jerusalem

          should remain an undivided city, contrary to Arab insistence that

          eastern part of the city should be ... returned to the Palestinians.16

 

       Failure to pressure the Israelis to accept Resolution 242 provided the impetus for

 

the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In that year the Arabs attacked Israel on several fronts.

 

American support kept Israel in the war and eventually swung the tide of battle in her

 

favor.17 Then, with the Israelis preparing to launch a punishing counter-offensive against

 

the Egyptian Army, the US redirected its involvement in favor of Egypt. One can argue

 

whether the threat of Soviet intervention influenced US actions or whether the US acted

 

solely to preserve US-Arab relations.18 Regardless of the impetus for US actions, the

 

widely accepted opinion is that this event helped set the stage for the Camp David

 

Accords of the Carter Administration.19

 

 

The Carter Years: 1977-1980

 

       President Carter's foreign policy focused on regional issues vice the globalist

 

approach of previous administrations. This change provided the impetus for the Camp

 

David accords which were designed to promote peace in the Middle East by fostering

 

peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Israelis.20 The accords successfully neutralized

 

Egypt and thereby should have signaled a reduction in Israel's military requirements.

 

The strongest of the Arab states, Egypt, possessed the greatest military capability and the

 

largest population base. Removing her from the equation removed the threat of another

 

multi-front war reminiscent of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars.

 

       However, Israel viewed the new found peace with Egypt as nothing more than a

 

"cold peace."21 Moreover, from the Israeli perspective the Camp David Accords failed to

 

address the massive PLO arms buildup and the development of a virtual PLO parastate

 

within Lebanon.22 The Palestinians were adamantly against either joining the peace

 

process or recognizing explicitly Israel's right to live in peace. The Syrian military

 

presence in Lebanon and its challenge to Maronite control of Lebanon also coincided

 

with the growing Palestinian armed presence that threatened Israel's security along its

 

Lebanese border.23 Finally, with the other Arab states opposing the Camp David accords

 

and Egypt's "peace" with Israel, Israel continued to act as though she were in a perpetual

 

state of war with her Arab neighbors--hence her continued build-up of military power.24

 

       Therefore, the amount of US aid to Israel continued to increase despite the Camp

 

David Accords.25 Israel, convinced that no amount of military power could provide

 

absolute security, became an "over-armed"26 camp, superior militarily to any combination

 

of the remaining Arab states, absent Egypt, and increasingly resistant to peace efforts in

 

the region.

 

 

Reagan's Policy: 1981-1982

 

       The debacle of the Vietnam War and the events in Iran in the late 1970s badly

 

affected US prestige and morale --a phenomenon President Reagan was determined to

 

reverse. Agnes Korbani, in US Interventions in Lebanon, 1958 and 1982, described the

 

significance of his election:

 

          The election of Ronald Reagan as president of the United States

          symbolized a spirit of resurgent power and confidence and brought

          with it not so much new policies as an unprecedented reliance on

          force and the threat of force to achieve US goals. In other words,

          the 'Cold War' perspective of the 1950s was resurrected....27

 

       The Reagan Administration set out to distinguish its foreign policy from that of

 

the Carter Administration by advancing the concept of "strategic consensus." This new

 

approach moved away from the strong emphasis on regional issues of the previous

 

Administration. US foreign policy now shifted toward a globalist concept of foreign

 

policy decisionmaking, one premised on a "grand theory" or "strategic design" for

 

international relations.28 The new administration imbued their theory, or design, in the

 

trappings of the "Cold War", and predicated it upon the belief that a consensus of

 

concern with respect to Soviet threats existed among the so-called moderate Arab states.

 

Under the rubric of "strategic consensus," the US sought a network of bilateral and

 

multilateral arrangements with the Arab moderates to enhance security and to counter

 

Soviet encroachment and activities of Soviet proxies in the region.29

 

       According to Francis Boyle, Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois,

 

the framework devised for the concept of "strategic consensus" developed by Reagan's

 

Secretary of State, Alexander Haig and his mentor, Henry Kissinger, was nothing more

 

sophisticated than a somewhat refined and superficially rationalized theory of

 

"Machiavellian" power politics.30 This framework caused the Reagan Administration to

 

view the Middle East from a very narrow perspective. Professor Boyle provided the

 

following analysis of "strategic consensus":

 

          Haig quite myopically viewed the myriad of problems in the

          Middle East and the Persian gulf primarily within the context of a

          supposed struggle for control over the entire world between the

          United States and the Soviet Union. Haig erroneously concluded

          that this global confrontation required the United States to forge a

          'strategic consensus' between itself and Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and

          Saudi Arabia ... to resist anticipated Soviet aggression in the

          region.

             Haig's vision of founding a US-centered 'strategic consensus'in

          the Middle East was simply a reincarnated version of Kissinger's

          'Nixon Doctrine'...   Israel would become America's new

          'policeman' for stability in the Middle East... 31

 

The hope was that regional issues, such as the Palestinian problem and the internal

 

quarrels within Lebanon, would move to the background in favor of a stronger

 

anti-Soviet position in the Middle East.32

 

       According to Professor Boyle, the US emphasis on Soviet containment in the

 

Middle East and the idea that Israel would be America's policeman in the region provided

 

for a special US-Israeli relationship:

 

          One apparent corollary to Haig's thesis was that the United States

          must more fully support the Begin Government even during the

          pursuit of its patently illegal policies in Lebanon and in the

          territories occupied [in]  1967 ... over any Arab state of

          combination thereof, absent Egypt, which had been effectively

          neutralized by the 1979 peace treaty.

 

Furthermore, according to Ambassador Draper, the concept of "strategic consensus"

 

completely discounted the Palestinian issue as contributing to the problem in the Middle

 

East:

 

          The Reagan administration basically abandoned the idea that the

          Palestinian issue was central to the Middle East problem. General

          Haig as Secretary of State pursued other objectives, with the

          Palestinian issue relegated to the deep background. The United

          States, in contrast to previous years, was inactive in what we call

          the "general peace process," and of course, the process was rotting.

          There was no dialog to speak of. The Egyptians and Israelis, while

          they had made peace, had what the Israelis called a "cold peace,"

          and the dialog was intermittent.  Sadat had died; he had been

          assassinated in that first year. And this put a tremendous pall over

          all efforts to resuscitate the peace process.33

 

Thus in Mr. Boyle's view, the US was making serious mistakes under the spell of

 

strategic consensus," which, as it related to the moderate Arab states, was a

 

fundamentally flawed concept from the beginning:

 

          Haig totally disregarded the fundamental realities of Middle

          Eastern international politics, where traditionally all regional

          actors  have  been  far  more  exclusively  concerned  about

          relationships with their immediate neighbors than about some

          evanescent threat of Soviet aggression.34

 

The Resurrection of the Israeli, Maronite Plan

 

       One can trace the Israeli-Maronite relationship back to the beginning of the

 

Zionist movement when Zionist politicians envisaged a Jewish-Maronite alliance to

 

counterbalance Muslim regional dominance. After gaining independence in 1948, some

 

Israeli leaders advocated extending the northern border to encompass southern Lebanon

 

up to the Litani river and to assimilate the Christian population living there.35 Seven

 

years later, in 1955, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and General Moshe Dayan

 

conceived a plan to "buy a Maronite officer who would then 'invite' Israeli intervention in

 

Lebanese affairs and enable Israel to establish control over Lebanon."36 Opposition from

 

Israel's foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, and resistance from the patriarchs of Lebanon's

 

Christian community, particularly Pierre Gemayel and Camille Shamun, forestalled that

 

plan.37

 

       In 1976, with the fortunes of the Lebanese Civil War turning against them, a new

 

breed of Christian leaders turned to Israel for support, but the Maronite-Israeli

 

relationship waned after Syria intervened on behalf of the Christians. The relationship

 

changed yet again when the Syrian army turned from Christian ally to an army of

 

occupation, and fear of Syrian domination replaced the Christian fear of Muslim

 

domination. Bashir Gemayel--recognizing that Israel was the only power in the Middle

 

East with the capability and the inclination to expel Syria from Lebanon--continued to

 

cultivate the nascent Israeli connection.38

 

       Gemayel's overtures to Israel coincided with the Likud Party's rise to power in

 

1977 and growing Israeli concern over improving ties between Syria and the PLO. The

 

new Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, supported the Christians, labeling them an

 

embattled religious minority and promising to prevent their genocide. He also viewed

 

them as an ally against the PLO. In Bashir Gemayel the Israelis had found their

 

Maronite for president of Lebanon. Twenty-two years later, the Israelis resurrected their

 

1955 plan for Lebanon at the behest of the Christians.39

 

 

The Missile Crisis

 

       Between 1978 and 1980, Gemayel moved to consolidate his position with Israel

 

and within the Maronite community and to carry out his first test of Israeli resolve to