Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response To The 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre And

Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response To The 1972 Munich Olympic

Massacre And The Development Of Independence Covert Action Teams

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic

Massacre and the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams.

Author: Alexander B. Calahhn

Thesis: The purpose of this study is to examine the methodology of the covert action

teams authorized by Prime Minister Golda Meir to find and assassinate those individuals

responsible for the attack on the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games in

September 1972. Specifically, the study addresses whether the operational and tactical

methods utilized in this counterterrorist effort were successful relative to the original

operational objectives.

Background: In 1972, the Israeli Mossad initiated one of the most ambitious covert

counterterrorist campaigns in history. Golda Meir and the Israeli cabinet's top secret

'Committee-X' devised a campaign in retaliation for the massacre of eleven Israeli's

during the Munich Olympic games. Meir tasked the committee with devising an

appropriate response to the Munich massacre. The panel concluded that the most

effective response was to authorize the assassination of any Black September terrorists

involved in the Munich incident. The Mossad assumed the responsibility for implementing

the panel's directive. To accomplish the directive, the Mossad developed several

assassination teams, each with specific mission parameters and methods of operation. The

Mossad headquarters element developed one team utilizing staff operations officers

supported by recruited assets of regional stations and managed through standard Mossad

headquarters' procedures. A second unit recruited staff officers and highly trained

specialists and set them outside the arm and control of the government. The theory was to

support this team financially through covert mechanisms and let them operate with

complete anonymity outside the government structure. The assassination team deployed

through normal channels failed to complete their mission and publicly exposed the entire

operation. The second team which operated with full decentralized authority and freedom

of movement achieved significant success in fulfilling their operational objectives and

never compromised the operation.

Recommendation.: Although there are inherent differences between Israeli and U.S.

policies, specifically those addressing the use of assassination as a political tool, important

lessons may be gleaned from this study for policy makers. Planners of sensitive covert

operations must have a firm understanding of bureaucratic processes. Government

bureaucracies inherently limit the degree of operational success by the nature of their

systems. Bureaucracies cannot move effectively beyond a predetermined operational

tempo, and impose fatal restraints regarding operational tradecraft and tactics. Successful

covert operations demand a flexible capability with full decentralized authority enabling

officers to initiate actions as circumstances dictate, enhancing the operational

success-failure ratio. When operational teams incorporate decentralized authority in

concert with good tradecraft and tactical techniques, success is virtually assured.

Government agencies are capable of conducting decentralized, sensitive operations with

reasonable operational control and an expectation of success.

COUNTERING TERRORISM:

THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPIC MASSACRE AND THE

DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT COVERT ACTION TEAMS

Alexander B. Calahan

GS-12

Graduate Class

Thesis submitted to the Faculty

of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Military Studies

April 1995

The views in this paper are those of the author and

do not reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Mr. George Jonas for his candid conversation regarding Avner's

team, which was so vital to this study. I would also like to give special thanks to my thesis

advisor, Dr. James H. Anderson, my second mentor, Mr. N. Richard Kinsman, and my third

reader and year-long faculty advisor, Dr. Donald F. Bittner. Additionally, I would like to

acknowledge the military officers and civilian faculty of the U.S.M.C. University, Command and

Staff College for allowing me the opportunity to participate in a unique learning experience.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv

CHAPTER PAGE

1. INTRODUCTION 1

The Experiment, 1

Intelligence Activities and Plausible Deniability, 3

2. THE GAMBLE 8

Massacre at Munich, 8

The Black September Organization, 13

3. ISRAEL RESPONDS 15

Golda Meir and Committee-X, 15

Case Studies, 16

Lillehammer, 18

Avner, 21

4. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 35

Organizations and the Human Condition, 35

Tradecraft, Cover, and Trails of Evidence, 43

Politics and the Nature of War, 45

Meeting the Objectives, 47

5. LESSONS LEARNED 51

Relevance to U.S. Intelligence Operations, 51

Executive Order 12,333, 56

APPENDIX

A. Covert Operations' Methodology 59

BIBLIOGRAPHY 74

COUNTERING TERRORISM

The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and the

Development of Independent Covert Action Team.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Experiment

In 1972, the Israeli Mossad initiated one of the most ambitious covert

counterterrorist campaigns in history. Golda Meir and the Israeli cabinet's top secret

'Committee-X' devised a campaign in retaliation for the massacre of eleven Israeli's

during the Munich Olympic games. Black September's (BSO) assault on the Olympic

Village apartments on September 5, 1972, set in motion a chain of events unparalleled

in the history of terrorism and antiterrorism tactics. Eleven Israeli's died in the assault

at Olympic village and the subsequent failed (West) German police rescue attempt at

Germany's Furstenfeldbruck airfield. Outraged by intensifying PLO and BSO terrorist

attacks on Israeli citizens, Prime Minister Golda Meir, with the support of her highest

ranking cabinet officials, decided to take the war to the terrorists.

After the events of September 1972, Golda Meir authorized the formation of

Mossad directed covert action teams to find and assassinate those individuals

responsible for the attack on the Israeli athletes in Munich. This paper will explore the

methods and concepts behind this counterterrorist effort, and analyze its success

relative to the original operational objectives. Specifically, two case studies will

demonstrate how the operational methodology as directed through the primary

headquarters' element directly affected the level of success achieved by the teams

outlined in the case studies. The specific concept of using assassination as a

government tool is not the primary focus of the thesis. Rather, the research centers

on the design of the teams, the operational objectives, and the measurement of

success relative to those objectives. Further, the paper intends to contrast and

compare the effectiveness of covert action teams controlled within bureaucratic

organizations, with loosely controlled decentralized independent action teams.

In depth examination of specific elements inherent in each team's

organizational structure, as well as their headquarters' guidance, provides a clear

perspective of the teams' methodologies. The specific elements explored include the

following: the type of control instituted, personnel recruited, method of deployment,

headquarters support, use of cover, engagement, and escape procedures. For the

purposes of this paper, the methodologies of the different teams present an ideal

platform for analysis. The research focuses on the actions of two particular units as

they moved through the phases of their strategy, tactical deployment, engagement, and

escape. Other issues of consideration include Mossad operational objectives,

management policy and control, and the psychological impact on unit members.

For the purposes of this paper, antiterrorism reflects more passive measures

such as education, surveillance, liaison training and advising; counterterrorism

techniques refer to offensive measures to prevent and deter terrorism with active

interdiction such as targeting and elimination.

Intelligence Activities and Plausible Deniability

Investigating intelligence operations from open source material is a difficult

task. Covert operations, by definition, incorporate an institutional plausible

deniability factor. Specifically, in the unfortunate event the operation becomes

exposed, there are levels of deniability imposed which restrict the means to positively

link the operation with the primary agency. In addition, when agencies do release the

results of operations, the sources and methods utilized to conduct the operations

remain classified to protect sensitive assets. This paper assumes the validity of certain

events based on available corroborating evidence and analysis of the events by

individuals with covert operational experience. Also, the identity of those individuals

providing their expertise of intelligence operations and tradecraft must remain

confidential. Even with these sources, limited means exist to fully verify the

information provided.

The development of the structure and methodologies regarding the teams

described in the case studies derived from published open sources. The paper is

unclassified in nature and utilizes terms extracted from open sources which closely

represent the actual concepts.

George Jonas, author of Vengeance, (1984), provided the primary source of

information regarding "Avner's" unit discussed in depth in the second case study.

Avner is a former Mossad officer, selected as the team leader of an independent

assassination team deployed by senior Mossad operations officer Mike Harari. After

operating for approximately two years in the field and conducting nine successful

assassinations of PLO terrorists, Avner officially left the Mossad on bitter terms in

1974. After two years of stressful field operations, Avner felt emotionally drained and

extremely disappointed with the Mossad leadership. The Mossad had agreed to

deposit a generous salary monthly into a Swiss bank account for Avner and each team

member; upon completion of the assignment they would then be able to collect their

funds. Avner's personal account reflected approximately $100,000 dollars when the

team disbanded. Avner advised Harari that he intended to resign, withdraw his money,

and move to New York. Harari recommended that Avner simply take a vacation, but

remain within the Mossad. He advised Avner that he would not be required to go

directly back to the field and had the option of a desk assignment. This did not appeal

to Avner, as he was already very disillusioned with the Mossad leadership. He felt that

they demanded absolute loyalty but did not return that loyalty. Mr. Jonas reported

that to coerce him to stay, the Mossad blocked Avner's access to the Swiss bank

account and threatened his family. Avner countered the threats and was recontacted

by Harari soon after in an attempt to reconcile their disagreement. The threats

stopped, and Avner's money was still denied, but a resolution was eventually

negotiated. Mr. Jonas commented that Avner "felt grievously betrayed at the end of

the mission."1 Avner was never led to believe that continued service in the Mossad

was a condition for him to retrieve his promised salary. Money was not the original

motivating factor for Avner for he had fully accepted the mission prior to the promise

of the Swiss account. Avner had more contacts with the Mossad, however, the details

of these encounters are not available.

In an attempt to start a new life, Avner teamed with Jonas to publish the

accounts of the operations he conducted as chief of one of the most successfully

orchestrated covert operations in history. Obviously, the name "Avner" is a

pseudonym used to protect his true identity. Avner never identified Mike Harari by

name for he utilized the pseudonym 'Ephraim' to identity his Mossad contact in his

personal accounts as provided to Mr. Jonas. Harari was identified through later

publications and the assumption that Ephraim was Harari was drawn through collateral

research.

George Jonas is an accomplished author and currently produces movies and

television shows for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in Toronto, Canada.

Jonas explained the circumstances in which Avner came to his attention. At the

conclusion of his mission and subsequent dispute with the Mossad, Avner contacted a

British publishing company about his story. The publishing company in turn sought

out the services of Jonas, well known and respected for his investigative journalistic

skills, primarily in the law enforcement arena. Avner and Jonas discussed the

possibilities of producing a book and the parameters of confidentiality. The two

conducted a series of interviews regarding the details of Avner's mission to assassinate

the top PLO terrorist leaders in Europe. Jonas related that Avner's recall of "small

details" was remarkable. It was his ability to provide minute details inherent in the

operations which enhanced Jonas' assessment of Avner's credibility. After discussing

the events of the operations, Jonas traveled to the assassination sites to verify the

accounts. Avner provided specifics of operational events which never appeared in

news coverage of the assassinations. Only the few involved would have known the

intricate operational tactics and movements described in depth by Avner. He

produced detailed information regarding the movements and signals of the support

teams, the makes and models of vehicles used, the descriptions of the assassination

sites, weapons, the specially designed ammunition, the types of explosive devices, and

their process of cultivating intelligence sources.2

Jonas maintains his confidentiality pact with Avner regarding "Avner's" true

identity. Open source published materials have speculated as to his true identify and

his current location and occupation. The alleged Avner was contacted by this writer

for his comments regarding the accounts in Jonas' book as well as his missions as a

team leader with the Mossad. Avner related that the Mossad recently released an

official statement confirming that the events published in Jonas' book, Vengeance, are,

in fact, true. Contractual and confidentiality agreements prohibit him from making any

further statements and or publicly confirming or denying "Avner's" true identity.

Avner stated that the events in Jonas book are accurate and include all the detail he is

willing, or contractually able, to provide.3

Avner and Jonas refused to divulge the identities of the other officers involved

in the operation. However, Avner assured Mr. Jonas that the personalities and

specialties relating to each team member are accurate; hence, they are not composites

to disguise the actual team.

Mike Harari and the names of the officers involved in the Lillehammer incident

described in the first case study were identified and cross referenced through more

recently published material. David B. Tinnin's book, The Hit Team, published in

1976, also provides an account of a team traveling through Europe assassinating PLO

terrorists. Numerous discrepancies of tactical details of the operations exist between

Tinnin's and Avner's accounts. Tinnin's premise of an independent team was correct,

although his description of the team's personnel and operational tactics differed

significantly from Avner's account. These discrepancies are discussed at length

subsequent to the case studies in an effort to reconcile the differences. Also, the

Mossad had commissioned numerous teams with different methods of operation. It is

feasible that Tinnin had information regarding a third team, with a similar mission as

Avner's, which was mentioned by Jonas..

CHAPTER 2

THE GAMBLE

Massacre at Munich

At approximately 0400 hours on September 5, 1972, the "fedayeen"1 (men of

sacrifice) began executing their plan to scale the fences at Kusoczinskidamm, and

capture the Israeli Olympic athletes residing at the Olympic Village apartments. The

gunmen made their way to apartment one, at 31 Connollystrasse, Olympic Village

Apartments, and inserted a passkey. Yossef Gutfreund, a 275 pound wrestling referee

in apartment number one, began reacting to the sound of Arab voices behind his door.

He quickly alerted his roommates there was danger and pushed his body against the

door in an attempt to deny the Arab fedayeen entrance. Gutfreund's efforts were

effective for only a few seconds, but allowed one roommate, weightlifting coach Tuvia

Sokolovsky, time to break out a window and successfully escape.2

The Arab terrorists successfully entered apartment one, immediately taking five

Israeli team members hostage: track coach Amitzur Shapira, fencing master Andrei

Spitzer, rifle coach Kehat Shorr, weightlifting judge Yacov Springer, and Yossef

Gutfreund. The terrorists expanded their search throughout the complex, capturing

six additional athletes in apartment number three. Wrestling coach Moshe Weinberger

was away from the complex during the initial assault. He arrived back at the

apartment while the terrorists continued their search for additional Israeli game

participants. Upon entering the apartment, Weinberger struggled with two assassins,

striking one and knocking him unconscious. The second Arab terrorist shot

Weinberger in the face. Although critically wounded, Weinberger rendered another

attacker unconscious before being shot repeatedly in the chest by a third terrorist.

Despite his efforts to defend himself and his colleagues, the Arab terrorists killed

Weinberger with a point-blank gunshot to his head.3

As the attack continued, weightlifter Yossef Romanno and teammate David

Marc Berger tried to escape through an open kitchen window. Romanno, failing to

make his way through the window, located a kitchen knife and stabbed one gunman in

the forehead. A second Arab moved forward and fired from point blank range into

Romanno with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, killing him.4

By approximately 0500 hours, the Arab terrorists had killed two Israeli team

members and captured nine. Due to the unanticipated battle and chaos, the terrorists