Military

Countering Terrorism:  The Israeli Response To The 1972 Munich Olympic

Massacre And The Development Of Independence Covert Action Teams

 

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues

 

 

 

                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

 

Title: Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic

Massacre and the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams.

 

 

Author: Alexander B. Calahhn

 

 

Thesis: The purpose of this study is to examine the methodology of the covert action

teams authorized by Prime Minister Golda Meir to find and assassinate those individuals

responsible for the attack on the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games in

September 1972. Specifically, the study addresses whether the operational and tactical

methods utilized in this counterterrorist effort were successful relative to the original

operational objectives.

 

 

Background: In 1972, the Israeli Mossad initiated one of the most ambitious covert

counterterrorist campaigns in history. Golda Meir and the Israeli cabinet's top secret

'Committee-X' devised a campaign in retaliation for the massacre of eleven Israeli's

during the Munich Olympic games. Meir tasked the committee with devising an

appropriate response to the Munich massacre. The panel concluded that the most

effective response was to authorize the assassination of any Black September terrorists

involved in the Munich incident. The Mossad assumed the responsibility for implementing

the panel's directive. To accomplish the directive, the Mossad developed several

assassination teams, each with specific mission parameters and methods of operation. The

Mossad headquarters element developed one team utilizing staff operations officers

supported by recruited assets of regional stations and managed through standard Mossad

headquarters' procedures. A second unit recruited staff officers and highly trained

specialists and set them outside the arm and control of the government. The theory was to

support this team financially through covert mechanisms and let them operate with

complete anonymity outside the government structure. The assassination team deployed

through normal channels failed to complete their mission and publicly exposed the entire

operation. The second team which operated with full decentralized authority and freedom

of movement achieved significant success in fulfilling their operational objectives and

never compromised the operation.

 

Recommendation.:  Although there are inherent differences between Israeli and U.S.

policies, specifically those addressing the use of assassination as a political tool, important

lessons may be gleaned from this study for policy makers. Planners of sensitive covert

operations must have a firm understanding of bureaucratic processes. Government

bureaucracies inherently limit the degree of operational success by the nature of their

systems. Bureaucracies cannot move effectively beyond a predetermined operational

tempo, and impose fatal restraints regarding operational tradecraft and tactics. Successful

covert operations demand a flexible capability with full decentralized authority enabling

officers to initiate actions as circumstances dictate, enhancing the operational

success-failure ratio. When operational teams incorporate decentralized authority in

concert with good tradecraft and tactical techniques, success is virtually assured.

Government agencies are capable of conducting decentralized, sensitive operations with

reasonable operational control and an expectation of success.

 

                             COUNTERING TERRORISM:

       THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPIC MASSACRE AND THE

                DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT COVERT ACTION TEAMS

 

                                      by

 

                               Alexander B. Calahan

                                     GS-12

                                Graduate Class

 

 

 

                        Thesis submitted to the Faculty

                 of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College

         in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

                          Master of Military Studies

 

                                  April 1995

 

 

 

              The views in this paper are those of the author and

             do not reflect the official policy or position of the

                 Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

 

                                ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

 

      I would like to thank Mr. George Jonas for his candid conversation regarding Avner's

 

team, which was so vital to this study. I would also like to give special thanks to my thesis

 

advisor, Dr. James H. Anderson, my second mentor, Mr. N. Richard Kinsman, and my third

 

reader and year-long faculty advisor, Dr. Donald F. Bittner. Additionally, I would like to

 

acknowledge the military officers and civilian faculty of the U.S.M.C. University, Command and

 

Staff College for allowing me the opportunity to participate in a unique learning experience.

 

                                   CONTENTS

 

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS                                                iv

 

CHAPTER                                                        PAGE

 

      1.  INTRODUCTION                                           1

 

            The Experiment, 1

            Intelligence Activities and Plausible Deniability, 3

 

      2.  THE GAMBLE                                             8

 

            Massacre at Munich, 8

            The Black September Organization, 13

 

      3.  ISRAEL RESPONDS                                       15

 

            Golda Meir and Committee-X, 15

            Case Studies, 16

            Lillehammer,  18

            Avner, 21

 

      4.  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS                              35

 

            Organizations and the Human Condition, 35

            Tradecraft, Cover, and Trails of Evidence, 43

            Politics and the Nature of War, 45

            Meeting the Objectives, 47

 

      5.  LESSONS LEARNED                                       51

 

            Relevance to U.S. Intelligence Operations, 51

            Executive Order 12,333, 56

 

APPENDIX

 

      A. Covert Operations' Methodology                         59

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                    74

 

                        COUNTERING TERRORISM

 

        The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and the

                Development of Independent Covert Action Team.

 

 

                               CHAPTER I

 

                             INTRODUCTION

 

 

 

      The Experiment

 

      In 1972, the Israeli Mossad initiated one of the most ambitious covert

 

counterterrorist campaigns in history. Golda Meir and the Israeli cabinet's top secret

 

'Committee-X' devised a campaign in retaliation for the massacre of eleven Israeli's

 

during the Munich Olympic games. Black September's (BSO) assault on the Olympic

 

Village apartments on September 5, 1972, set in motion a chain of events unparalleled

 

in the history of terrorism and antiterrorism tactics. Eleven Israeli's died in the assault

 

at Olympic village and the subsequent failed (West) German police rescue attempt at

 

Germany's Furstenfeldbruck airfield. Outraged by intensifying PLO and BSO terrorist

 

attacks on Israeli citizens, Prime Minister Golda Meir, with the support of her highest

 

ranking cabinet officials, decided to take the war to the terrorists.

 

      After the events of September 1972, Golda Meir authorized the formation of

 

Mossad directed covert action teams to find and assassinate those individuals

 

responsible for the attack on the Israeli athletes in Munich. This paper will explore the

 

methods and concepts behind this counterterrorist effort, and analyze its success

 

relative to the original operational objectives. Specifically, two case studies will

 

demonstrate how the operational methodology as directed through the primary

 

headquarters' element directly affected the level of success achieved by the teams

 

outlined in the case studies. The specific concept of using assassination as a

 

government tool is not the primary focus of the thesis. Rather, the research centers

 

on the design of the teams, the operational objectives, and the measurement of

 

success relative to those objectives. Further, the paper intends to contrast and

 

compare the effectiveness of covert action teams controlled within bureaucratic

 

organizations, with loosely controlled decentralized independent action teams.

 

      In depth examination of specific elements inherent in each team's

 

organizational structure, as well as their headquarters' guidance, provides a clear

 

perspective of the teams' methodologies. The specific elements explored include the

 

following: the type of control instituted, personnel recruited, method of deployment,

 

headquarters support, use of cover, engagement, and escape procedures. For the

 

purposes of this paper, the methodologies of the different teams present an ideal

 

platform for analysis. The research focuses on the actions of two particular units as

 

they moved through the phases of their strategy, tactical deployment, engagement, and

 

escape. Other issues of consideration include Mossad operational objectives,

 

management policy and control, and the psychological impact on unit members.

 

      For the purposes of this paper, antiterrorism reflects more passive measures

 

such as education, surveillance, liaison training and advising; counterterrorism

 

techniques refer to offensive measures to prevent and deter terrorism with active

 

interdiction such as targeting and elimination.

 

      Intelligence Activities and Plausible Deniability

 

      Investigating intelligence operations from open source material is a difficult

 

task. Covert operations, by definition, incorporate an institutional plausible

 

deniability factor. Specifically, in the unfortunate event the operation becomes

 

exposed, there are levels of deniability imposed which restrict the means to positively

 

link the operation with the primary agency. In addition, when agencies do release the

 

results of operations, the sources and methods utilized to conduct the operations

 

remain classified to protect sensitive assets. This paper assumes the validity of certain

 

events based on available corroborating evidence and analysis of the events by

 

individuals with covert operational experience. Also, the identity of those individuals

 

providing their expertise of intelligence operations and tradecraft must remain

 

confidential. Even with these sources, limited means exist to fully verify the

 

information provided.

 

      The development of the structure and methodologies regarding the teams

 

described in the case studies derived from published open sources. The paper is

 

unclassified in nature and utilizes terms extracted from open sources which closely

 

represent the actual concepts.

 

      George Jonas, author of Vengeance, (1984), provided the primary source of

 

information regarding "Avner's" unit discussed in depth in the second case study.

 

Avner is a former Mossad officer, selected as the team leader of an independent

 

assassination team deployed by senior Mossad operations officer Mike Harari. After

 

operating for approximately two years in the field and conducting nine successful

 

assassinations of PLO terrorists, Avner officially left the Mossad on bitter terms in

 

1974. After two years of stressful field operations, Avner felt emotionally drained and

 

extremely disappointed with the Mossad leadership. The Mossad had agreed to

 

deposit a generous salary monthly into a Swiss bank account for Avner and each team

 

member; upon completion of the assignment they would then be able to collect their

 

funds. Avner's personal account reflected approximately $100,000 dollars when the

 

team disbanded. Avner advised Harari that he intended to resign, withdraw his money,

 

and move to New York. Harari recommended that Avner simply take a vacation, but

 

remain within the Mossad. He advised Avner that he would not be required to go

 

directly back to the field and had the option of a desk assignment. This did not appeal

 

to Avner, as he was already very disillusioned with the Mossad leadership. He felt that

 

they demanded absolute loyalty but did not return that loyalty. Mr. Jonas reported

 

that to coerce him to stay, the Mossad blocked Avner's access to the Swiss bank

 

account and threatened his family. Avner countered the threats and was recontacted

 

by Harari soon after in an attempt to reconcile their disagreement. The threats

 

stopped, and Avner's money was still denied, but a resolution was eventually

 

negotiated. Mr. Jonas commented that Avner "felt grievously betrayed at the end of

 

the mission."1  Avner was never led to believe that continued service in the Mossad

 

was a condition for him to retrieve his promised salary. Money was not the original

 

motivating factor for Avner for he had fully accepted the mission prior to the promise

 

of the Swiss account. Avner had more contacts with the Mossad, however, the details

 

of these encounters are not available.

 

      In an attempt to start a new life, Avner teamed with Jonas to publish the

 

accounts of the operations he conducted as chief of one of the most successfully

 

orchestrated covert operations in history. Obviously, the name "Avner" is a

 

pseudonym used to protect his true identity. Avner never identified Mike Harari by

 

name for he utilized the pseudonym 'Ephraim' to identity his Mossad contact in his

 

personal accounts as provided to Mr. Jonas. Harari was identified through later

 

publications and the assumption that Ephraim was Harari was drawn through collateral

 

research.

 

      George Jonas is an accomplished author and currently produces movies and

 

television shows for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in Toronto, Canada.

 

Jonas explained the circumstances in which Avner came to his attention. At the

 

conclusion of his mission and subsequent dispute with the Mossad, Avner contacted a

 

British publishing company about his story. The publishing company in turn sought

 

out the services of Jonas, well known and respected for his investigative journalistic

 

skills, primarily in the law enforcement arena. Avner and Jonas discussed the

 

possibilities of producing a book and the parameters of confidentiality. The two

 

conducted a series of interviews regarding the details of Avner's mission to assassinate

 

the top PLO terrorist leaders in Europe. Jonas related that Avner's recall of "small

 

details" was remarkable. It was his ability to provide minute details inherent in the

 

operations which enhanced Jonas' assessment of Avner's credibility. After discussing

 

the events of the operations, Jonas traveled to the assassination sites to verify the

 

accounts. Avner provided specifics of operational events which never appeared in

 

news coverage of the assassinations. Only the few involved would have known the

 

intricate operational tactics and movements described in depth by Avner. He

 

produced detailed information regarding the movements and signals of the support

 

teams, the makes and models of vehicles used, the descriptions of the assassination

 

sites, weapons, the specially designed ammunition, the types of explosive devices, and

 

their process of cultivating intelligence sources.2

 

      Jonas maintains his confidentiality pact with Avner regarding "Avner's" true

 

identity. Open source published materials have speculated as to his true identify and

 

his current location and occupation. The alleged Avner was contacted by this writer

 

for his comments regarding the accounts in Jonas' book as well as his missions as a

 

team leader with the Mossad. Avner related that the Mossad recently released an

 

official statement confirming that the events published in Jonas' book, Vengeance, are,

 

in fact, true. Contractual and confidentiality agreements prohibit him from making any

 

further statements and or publicly confirming or denying "Avner's" true identity.

 

Avner stated that the events in Jonas book are accurate and include all the detail he is

 

willing, or contractually able, to provide.3

 

      Avner and Jonas refused to divulge the identities of the other officers involved

 

in the operation. However, Avner assured Mr. Jonas that the personalities and

 

specialties relating to each team member are accurate; hence, they are not composites

 

to disguise the actual team.

 

      Mike Harari and the names of the officers involved in the Lillehammer incident

 

described in the first case study were identified and cross referenced through more

 

recently published material. David B. Tinnin's book, The Hit Team, published in

 

1976, also provides an account of a team traveling through Europe assassinating PLO

 

terrorists. Numerous discrepancies of tactical details of the operations exist between

 

Tinnin's and Avner's accounts. Tinnin's premise of an independent team was correct,

 

although his description of the team's personnel and operational tactics differed

 

significantly from Avner's account. These discrepancies are discussed at length

 

subsequent to the case studies in an effort to reconcile the differences. Also, the

 

Mossad had commissioned numerous teams with different methods of operation. It is

 

feasible that Tinnin had information regarding a third team, with a similar mission as

 

Avner's, which was mentioned by Jonas..

 

                                   CHAPTER 2

 

                                  THE GAMBLE

 

 

      Massacre at Munich

 

      At approximately 0400 hours on September 5, 1972, the "fedayeen"1 (men of

 

sacrifice) began executing their plan to scale the fences at Kusoczinskidamm, and

 

capture the Israeli Olympic athletes residing at the Olympic Village apartments. The

 

gunmen made their way to apartment one, at 31 Connollystrasse, Olympic Village

 

Apartments, and inserted a passkey. Yossef Gutfreund, a 275 pound wrestling referee

 

in apartment number one, began reacting to the sound of Arab voices behind his door.

 

He quickly alerted his roommates there was danger and pushed his body against the

 

door in an attempt to deny the Arab fedayeen entrance. Gutfreund's efforts were

 

effective for only a few seconds, but allowed one roommate, weightlifting coach Tuvia

 

Sokolovsky, time to break out a window and successfully escape.2

 

      The Arab terrorists successfully entered apartment one, immediately taking five

 

Israeli team members hostage: track coach Amitzur Shapira, fencing master Andrei

 

Spitzer, rifle coach Kehat Shorr, weightlifting judge Yacov Springer, and Yossef

 

Gutfreund. The terrorists expanded their search throughout the complex, capturing

 

six additional athletes in apartment number three. Wrestling coach Moshe Weinberger

 

was away from the complex during the initial assault. He arrived back at the

 

apartment while the terrorists continued their search for additional Israeli game

 

participants. Upon entering the apartment, Weinberger struggled with two assassins,

 

striking one and knocking him unconscious. The second Arab terrorist shot

 

Weinberger in the face. Although critically wounded, Weinberger rendered another

 

attacker unconscious before being shot repeatedly in the chest by a third terrorist.

 

Despite his efforts to defend himself and his colleagues, the Arab terrorists killed

 

Weinberger with a point-blank gunshot to his head.3

 

      As the attack continued, weightlifter Yossef Romanno and teammate David

 

Marc Berger tried to escape through an open kitchen window. Romanno, failing to

 

make his way through the window, located a kitchen knife and stabbed one gunman in

 

the forehead. A second Arab moved forward and fired from point blank range into

 

Romanno with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, killing him.4

 

      By approximately 0500 hours, the Arab terrorists had killed two Israeli team

 

members and captured nine. Due to the unanticipated battle and chaos, the terrorists

 

failed to locate eight additional team members in apartments' two, four, and five. Two

 

Israeli athletes had escaped and made their way to safety. Despite the gunfire, the

 

activity at the Village Apartments drew very little notice from the other occupants in

 

the area. The two athletes who escaped alerted the authorities to the incident. Within

 

the next hour the Arab terrorists had issued a set of demands, written in English, and

 

had thrown Moshe Weinberger's body into the street.5

 

      The Palestinian off-shoot group, the Black September Organization, claimed

 

responsibility for the actions at the Village Apartments. Their demands included the

 

release of 234 Arab and German prisoners held in Israel and West Germany. The

 

terrorists provided a typewritten list of prisoners for release; these included Ulrike

 

Meinhof and Andreas Baader, the founders and leaders of the German based

 

Baader-Meinhof Gang. The German police had arrested both individuals earlier in

 

June 1972. The terrorists also demanded that the police provide three planes for their

 

escape. Upon receiving confirmation on the release of the prisoners, the terrorists

 

would select one of the planes to transport them to a safe destination.6

 

      Frank Bolz, Jr., co-author of The Counter-Terrorism Handbook published in

 

1990, outlined the West German chain of command that coordinated the efforts to

 

rescue the hostages. Manfred Schreiber, the Munich Police Commissioner, became

 

the de-facto command authority over the hostage incident. Schreiber was also the

 

officially appointed chief of the Olympic Security Forces. His superiors in Bonn

 

established communications with Israel's Prime Minister, Golda Meir, as well as

 

coordinated the possible release of the Baader-Meinhof Organization members with

 

German authorities. The Interior Minister of Bavaria, Bruno Merk, acted as

 

Schreiber's superior officer, and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt conducted

 

discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister. Meir made it perfectly clear to Brandt that

 

the Government of Israel would never negotiate with terrorists.7

 

      The West German police negotiators successfully extended three deadlines

 

originally imposed by the terrorists. The Black September Group requested a jet to

 

transport them to Cairo where the prisoners demanded for release by Israel would

 

meet them. However, the government of Egypt refused to provide assistance in

 

support of any West German police action during the crisis. This development, in

 

combination with Golda Meir's absolute refusal to negotiate, forced Schreiber to

 

conclude that a rescue attempt was his only option. Schreiber determined that in order

 

to conduct a successful hostage rescue, he must confine the terrorists to Germany. To

 

initiate a rescue, he decided the best option was to isolate the terrorists at Germany's

 

Furstenfeldbruck Airport. Once at the airfield, West German sharpshooters would

 

attempt a hostage rescue operation.8

 

      It is important to note that Mossad Chief Zwi Zamir had traveled directly to

 

Munich, on orders from Golda Meir, to discuss the ongoing incident with the West

 

German authorities. Golda Meir had directed him to negotiate permission for specially

 

trained Israeli commandos, the 'sayeret,' to conduct the hostage rescue. The sayeret

 

are elite trained reconnaissance forces drawn from the ranks of the Israeli Special

 

Forces and experienced in hostage rescue techniques. Although Chancellor Brandt

 

might have acquiesced, the local state officials refused. According to the German

 

federal constitution, the decision was in the hands of the state officials. Unfortunately

 

the German police lacked the expertise and experience of the Israeli sayeret.9 It was

 

only after the arrival at the airport that the West German Police realized there were

 

eight terrorist members, not the five originally estimated. Considering the early

 

estimate of five terrorists, the police deployed only five German snipers at

 

Furstenfeldbruck airport to initiate the rescue. This was far short of the sniper

 

requirements for this type of ambush scenario. The German police also placed a

 

dummy Lufthansa Boeing 727 at Furstenfeldbruck airport, located approximately

 

fifteen miles from the center of Munich. Eight police officers deployed around the jet

 

dressed as flight attendants and crew members. Unfortunately these police officers

 

were without radio contact with the command post or other police units.

 

      As the terrorists moved a 'safe' distance from the hostages, Schreiber ordered

 

the police snipers to open fire. Their initial rounds went off-target and a full gun battle

 

ensued. The Israeli captives were still sitting bound in the helicopters which had

 

transported them to the airfield. The initial firefight between the fedayeen and police

 

lasted approximately an hour and fifteen minutes. The German Police decided to

 

initiate an 'infantry' attack to move the terrorists from the vicinity of the helicopters.

 

As the attack began, one fedayeen tossed a grenade into one of the helicopters holding

 

five of the Israeli athletes. The helicopter exploded, killing all five athletes. Shortly

 

thereafter, another fedayeen member entered the second helicopter, shot, and killed the

 

last four hostages. The police captured three terrorists during the ensuing firefight.

 

At approximately 0130 hours, the police killed the last of the Arab terrorists.11 The

 

German police investigation indicated that a few of the hostages may have

 

inadvertently been shot by the German police during the fierce gun battle. However, a

 

definitive conclusion was not possible due to the severely burned condition of the

 

bodies.12

 

      Although it is clearly evident that many things went wrong in the hostage

 

rescue attempt, it is not the purpose of this paper to explore those factors. However,

 

there are a number of important issues for consideration which became apparent after

 

the failed rescue effort. According to 1972 Facts on File, the West German police

 

identified Yossef Gutfreund and Yacov Springer as Israeli security agents posing as

 

Olympic team members. The three captured Arab terrorists confessed that they were

 

students who had recently lived in Jordan. They also disclosed that there were

 

possibly fifteen Arab guerrillas plotting additional terrorist attacks. What is paramount

 

is the reaction of the Israeli Government to this incident. The West German Police

 

were very critical of Golda Meir's absolute resistance to cooperate in any negotiations

 

with the terrorists to effect the release of the hostages. Israel's history contains

 

countless incidents of terrorist tactics employed by her enemies. Golda Meir, in an

 

official statement, warned that "Israel will persevere in her struggle against the

 

terrorist organizations and will not absolve their accomplices from responsibility for

 

terrorist actions."13 Unnamed Israeli sources later identified those countries as Egypt,

 

Syria, and Lebanon. The Egyptian official reaction accused the West German police

 

of making false charges against Egypt regarding a lack of cooperation. Egyptian

 

officials also placed responsibility of the deaths of the hostages on the West German

 

police, claiming that it was their bullets that killed the hostages.

 

 

 

      The Black September Organization

 

      A Palestinian guerrilla group, The Black September Organization (BSO),

 

claimed responsibility for the killing of the eleven Israeli's in Munich. The Fatah

 

originated in 1957 and boasted an estimated membership of over 11,000 by the late

 

1980's. The United States Department of State's 1988 publication of Terrorist Group

 

Profiles, describes the Fatah as the military arm of the Palestine Liberation

 

Organization (PLO). Fatah is an acronym spelled backwards representing Harakat

 

al-Tahrir al Filistini. The phrase translates as Palestine Liberation Movement.

 

Former Fatah leader Yasir Arafat (Abu Ammar) assumed leadership of the PLO in

 

1969. The Fatah utilized the name Black September Organization from approximately

 

1971 to 1974. Some sources speculate that Arafat utilized the name to distance

 

himself and the PLO from the actions of the BSO. Many terrorist experts speculate

 

that Arafat controlled the BSO and utilized it as his primary military force. Arafat

 

attempted to keep the association at arm's length to provide a factor of plausible

 

deniability. Black September represents the results of the culmination of tensions

 

between the Fatah and the Jordanian government. In September 1970, King Hussein's

 

military forced the group out of Jordan and into Lebanon.

 

      The expulsion of Fatah from Jordan and Egypt severely limited the group's

 

ability to launch cross-border operations into Israel. Thus, the Fatah resorted to

 

increased terrorist activities as a means to attack Israel. Black September conducted

 

nine major terrorist attacks in 1971 and early 1972 prior to the Munich Olympic

 

incident. On September 6, 1971, the London Times reported that the BSO had been in

 

contact with the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group in West Germany. In addition, the

 

London Times reported that Andreas Baader met secretly in Beirut with Palestinian

 

officials in February 1971, prior to his arrest.14 However, there was no specific

 

information regarding possible agreements between the two groups.

 

      Also, five days after the Munich incident, an Israeli recruited agent ambushed

 

case officer Zadok Ofir in Brussels. Ofir was working under official cover as the First

 

Secretary at the Israeli Embassy in Brussels. He received an urgent phone call from

 

his agent claiming that an emergency meeting was necessary. The agent was an Arab

 

traveling on a Moroccan passport. At a meeting set at the Cafe Prince, Ofir's recruited

 

agent shot him in the abdomen at point blank range. Ofir survived the shooting and

 

the ensuing investigation determined that the individual Ofir went to meet was a

 

double agent and an active member of the BSO.15

 

                                   CHAPTER 3

 

                                ISRAEL RESPONDS

 

 

 

      Golda Meir and Committee-X

 

      The results of the failed rescue mission in Germany caused Israeli Premier

 

Golda Meir great distress. The reluctance of German police to utilize experienced

 

Israeli commandos in the rescue attempt also disappointed Meir. However, she

 

publicly praised the West German police for tang aggressive action against the

 

fedayeen in Munich and encouraged other countries to follow suit.1  Israel maintained

 

then, and still does, that a 'no compromise' stance is the only viable solution in

 

stemming terrorist aggression.

 

      As a result of the Munich incident, in conjunction with growing BSO terrorist

 

activities, Golda Meir developed a new counterterrorism policy. General Aharon

 

Yariv accepted the new position of the Prime Minister's Advisor on

 

Counterterrorism. Golda Meir, General Yariv, and Mossad Chief General Zwi Zamir

 

also persuaded the Israeli Cabinet to form a top secret counterterrorist committee.

 

Meir tasked the committee with devising an appropriate response to the Munich

 

massacre. Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan chaired the special panel,

 

known simply as "Committee-X."2 (According to Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman,

 

authors of Every Spy a Prince, the journalist, Yoel Marcus, was the first to expose the

 

activities of "Committee X" in Har'aretz on June 10, 1986.) The panel concluded

 

that the most effective means to make a clear statement that Israel would not tolerate

 

terrorist activity was to authorize the assassination of any Black September terrorists

 

involved in the Munich incident. This directive included any individual identified as

 

either directly or indirectly involved in the planning or the execution of the assault on

 

the Israeli athletes in Munich.

 

      Committee-X assigned the Mossad the task of implementing the panel's

 

directive. The committee made it clear to the Mossad leadership that the objective was

 

to kill the BSO members and create terror within the terrorists' organizations. It was

 

not a mission devised to capture and/or prosecute suspects. Mossad Chief Zwi Zamir

 

appointed senior agent Mike Harari to oversee the development of the special covert

 

action teams. Harari worked in conjunction with a Mossad operations officer,

 

Abraham Gehmer, who worked under official cover as the First Secretary of the Israeli

 

Embassy in Paris. The Mossad established Paris as their regional base for European

 

operations.3

 

 

      Case Studies

 

      In order to implement the directive issued by Golda Meir's Committee X,

 

Harari and his superiors chose an unusual but historic approach. Harari formed

 

several assassination teams, each with specific mission parameters and methods of

 

operation. The panel tightly compartmentalized the teams to the point that the teams

 

were unaware of one another. The Mossad intended to succeed in achieving the

 

panel's, and particularly Golda Meir's, objectives. In this respect they attacked the

 

problem from varied angles, hoping to develop an interlocking information net which

 

terrorist targets would be unable to avoid. If one method was ineffective or missed a

 

lead, another team would probably fill the gap.

 

      Two particular units are described in this paper which represent two different

 

methods of personnel recruitment, headquarters control, support, and intervention.

 

The success of these teams becomes apparent through close examination of their

 

methodologies. The Mossad headquarters element developed one team utilizing staff

 

operations officers supported by recruited assets of regional stations and managed

 

through standard Mossad headquarters' procedures; one of these is depicted in the

 

"Lillehammer" case study. The second unit recruited staff officers and highly trained

 

specialists and set them outside the arm and control of the government; this is the

 

"Avner" group case study. The theory was to covertly support this team financially

 

and let them operate with complete anonymity outside the government structure.

 

Their only contact was with Harari, established through covert signals and then only

 

on rare occasions. Harari provided the unit a list of target names and instructions for

 

obtaining funds through covert accounts prior to deployment.

 

      As described earlier, the details of Avner's covert action team in the second

 

case study is primarily derived from George Jonas' book, Vengeance. Avner, a former

 

Mossad officer is the principal source of information detailing the team's operations.

 

Although the Israeli Government has acknowledged that covert teams were deployed

 

after the Munich incident to assassinate PLO terrorists, official details regarding the

 

teams' actual methods remain classified. Considering the nature of the mission, it is

 

doubtful that any absolute official evidence of the assassination program exists.

 

Newspaper reports, investigative reports, police reports, and unclassified United States

 

government files all verify the assassinations of the PLO terrorists. Many western

 

journalists also speculated that the assassinations were conducted by the Israeli "Wrath

 

of God" assassination teams. It is debatable whether the Mossad actually used the

 

term "Wrath of God," or if the media attached the title. It may also have been utilized

 

by Israeli propaganda specialists to increase PLO paranoia.4  Former officers of the

 

Mossad have also verified the firearms methodology utilized by Mossad specialists, to

 

include their preference for the Baretta .22 caliber pistol. These officers also

 

acknowledged that the Mossad incorporated an internal assassination section.

 

 

      Lillehammer

 

      The first case examines the details of the attempted assassination of Ali Hassan

 

Salameh in Lillehammer on July 21, 1973. This operation resulted in the exposure of

 

seven Israeli officers in a highly publicized media event. The operation was clearly a

 

failure for a myriad of reasons. This case, however, examines the elements of a

 

sensitive operation coordinated and implemented though headquarters procedures and

 

the inherent problems in such an operation.

 

      Harari was the controlling officer for the mission to assassinate BSO leader Ali

 

Hassan Salameh, the primary architect of the Munich massacre, and the Mossad's

 

number one target. Numerous publications have identified Harari as the chief of the

 

Lillehammer operation. Victor Ostrovsky, a former Mossad Staff Operations officer

 

from approximately January 1983 to 1987 and co-author of By Way of Deception,

 

(1990) specifically identified Harari as the Chief of the Metsada. He defined the

 

Metsada as a highly secret organization within the Mossad which operates combatants.

 

Within the Metsada is the "Kidon," a specially trained, elite assassination unit.

 

According to Ostrovsky, kidon is a translation of the word 'bayonet,' and is the

 

operational arm of the Mossad responsible for kidnappings and executions.5

 

Ostrovsky also commented that after his recruitment into the Mossad, he learned he

 

was being groomed for the Kidon.

 

      After a year of searching and following endless erroneous leads, the Mossad

 

finally acquired confirmed intelligence placing Salameh in Lillehammer, Norway. The

 

Mossad wanted to seize the opportunity and act immediately on this information.

 

General Zwi Zamir, the Mossad Chief, was monitoring the developments in Israel

 

while Harari developed and deployed the assassination team. Harari selected five

 

Mossad staff officers as the primary engagement unit for the operation. The action

 

element included Dan Arbel, Abraham Gehmer, Zwi Steinberg, Michael Dorf, and

 

Yigal Zigal. It seems odd that since the Mossad incorporates a special unit to conduct

 

these operations, that Harari did not choose to deploy an established kidon unit for the

 

assignment. The support team, composed of regionally recruited assets including

 

Marriane Gladnikoff, conducted the necessary surveillance of Salameh and monitored

 

his movements. In addition, they established safe houses and acquired the vehicles

 

required for the "action" unit.6

 

      The culmination of this mission occurred in July 1973, more than a year after

 

the reported initial deployment of the assassination teams. On July 21, 1973, the

 

Israeli assassination team shot and killed an innocent man closely resembling Salameh.

 

Earlier that day the surveillance team followed the individual they believed to be

 

Salameh to a local public swimming pool. Soon after, he exited with an obviously

 

pregnant woman. At approximately 1400 hours, the assassination team arrived

 

in-country and proceeded to the Oppland Tourist Hotel where they registered under

 

alias names. The surveillance team reported that they observed the assumed Salameh

 

enter a movie theater with the same pregnant woman at approximately 2000 hours.

 

The action team departed the hotel and deployed to intercept the target after he left

 

the theater. The target and female companion exited the movie at approximately 2235

 

hours and took a bus to an area just a "short walk" from their flat. As they began

 

their walk from the bus stop to the flat, two members of the action team exited a

 

Mazda and began firing into the man believed to be Salameh with Baretta .22 caliber

 

pistols. The pregnant woman crouched over the dying man, screaming as the team

 

escaped from the scene. Individuals in the neighborhood notified the police, who

 

arrived at the scene within the next few minutes. The team dropped the Mazda at a

 

predesignated point and transferred to a Peugeot rented from a Scandinavian rental

 

company to transport them out of Lillehammer.7

 

      The authorities identified the dead man as Ahmed Bouchiki, a Moroccan,

 

working as a waiter in Lillehammer. The pregnant woman was later identified as

 

Bouchiki's wife. The police observed the Peugeot with the assassination team on a

 

road leading away from Lillehammer after receiving reports of the shooting.

 

Unfortunately, Dan Arbel and Marrianne Gladnikoff used poor operational tradecraft

 

and utilized the Peugeot a second time to travel to the airport 24 hours later. Airport

 

personnel observed the vehicle and reported it to the police. The police located the

 

vehicle and immediately arrested both occupants.

 

      During the police interrogation, Gladnikoff provided the police a safe house

 

address as her residence. She also broke down and reported that she was working for

 

the Government of Israel. Arbel had an unlisted phone number in his possession which

 

lead the police to Yigal Zigal, originally believed to be an employee of El Al Airlines.

 

Following Gladnikoff s lead, the police responded to the safe house address and

 

discovered Yigal Zigal, Zwi Steinberg and Michael Dorf. Zigal claimed to be an

 

Israeli Security Officer assigned to the Israeli embassy. He offered the police official

 

Israeli credentials at the time of his arrest, ordered the police to leave the apartment,

 

and attempted to claim diplomatic immunity. The police disregarded the credentials

 

and took Zigal, Dorf, and Steinberg into custody. The police also discovered a

 

detailed Mossad cable of instructions in Dorf's possession identifying the Mossad and

 

specific evacuation procedures. This cable specifically ordered the unit not to carry

 

any  potentially compromising material with them during the course of the operation.8

 

Steinberg also had two keys with a blue label attached identifying an apartment in

 

Paris. After official notification, the French police responded to the address identified

 

on the key labels. The French located the apartment and identified it as another Israeli

 

safe house. Within that apartment were more keys and labels exposing almost every

 

safe house in Paris. The French authorities recovered other incriminating evidence

 

that allegedly linked the Israeli Government with other assassinations of PLO

 

terrorists. A public trial of the six arrested Israeli team members exposed the details of

 

the operation. Five team members were convicted for killing the waiter; Michael Dorf

 

was acquitted.9 Dan Raviv, co-author of Every Spy a Prince, reported that although

 

the five officers were sentenced from two to five and one-half years in prison, all five

 

were released by the Norwegians in less than twenty-two months.

 

 

      Avner

 

      The second case examines an independent team organized by Mike Harari.

 

Unless otherwise noted, the account of Avner's team was drawn from George Jonas'

 

book, Vengeance (1984). The pseudonym "Avner" represents the unit team leader

 

selected by Harari for the operation.10   Avner's unit consisted of five highly trained

 

individuals with varied specialties. Each officer had some second and third language

 

proficiencies. The different specialties included: devising alias documents,

 

appropriating vehicles, improvised explosive devices (IED), small arms, electronics,

 

business, banking, and operational security. The premise of the unit was total

 

flexibility. Although each officer had specialized skills, each team member could

 

essentially perform any task.

 

      The design of the unit closely resembled United States Army special forces'

 

units. The members formed a team without utilizing rank and formal military doctrine.

 

It was absolutely essential that the unit operate informally while creating and

 

implementing operational plans. Falling into formal military protocol during an

 

operation could prove fatal. Avner did not want to limit his team's flexibility with a

 

rigid chain of command. Also, Avner understood that as the unit chief, he could not

 

afford to isolate himself from his team in an assignment of extended duration.

 

      Harari explained that the philosophy of Avner's operation was to cut off the

 

leaders from their organization. Because terrorist groups are "unlike military forces

 

and have no life power of their own... they must be supplied with everything they

 

need for survival; money, weapons, papers, hideouts, training, and recruits." With

 

their "lifeline severed, a whole network of them will disappear."11 The objective of the

 

entire operation was to sever the leadership and throw the organization into chaos. Of

 

course, the organizations could rebuild; however, this would require time. The

 

Mossad hoped to identify the new leaders during that rebuilding process and seek

 

further opportunities to neutralize that progress.

 

      To sever any official ties with the Israeli Government, Avner's team resigned

 

from their positions in the Mossad. With no formal contractual agreements, the

 

resignations effectively terminated any further paper trails'. Due to the lack of open

 

source conclusive evidence, absolute verification that all the team members actually

 

served with the Mossad prior to this mission is not possible. Published materials have

 

protected the identities of members of this team. However, their specialized skills, in

 

concert with their understanding of covert operational tradecraft, would indicate

 

intelligence association of some form. The selection of the team members was critical

 

in matching personalities and specialties. Harari emphasized the critical aspect of the

 

permanency of the unit. The unit would not substitute officers during the course of

 

the operation. The unit would operate until the successful completion of the mission

 

or until death or injuries rendered it inoperable. The concept was for the team to

 

combine their specialties into a totally flexible lethal unit.

 

      General Zwi Zamir provided the team with a list of priority targets, which

 

included the following: 12

      Ali Hassan Salameh

            Developed and executed the assault on the Israeli athletes at Olympic

            Village;

      Abu Daoud

            Arrested in Germany, March 1973; confessed to his involvement in

            Munich; admitted member of the BSO, directed by Fatah leader Yassar;

      Mohmoud Hamshari

            PLO member and coordinator of Munich incident;

      Wael Zwaiter, a.k.a., Abdel Wael Zuaiter

            Arafat's 2nd cousin, organizer of terrorism in Europe;

      Dr. Basil Raoud al-Kubaisi, a.k.a., Bassel Rauf Kubeisy

            Coordinated logistics for the Popular Front for the Liberation of

            Palestine;

      Kamal Nasser

            Official spokesman for the PLO;

      Kemal Adwan

            Chief of sabotage operations for Al Fatah in Israeli occupied territories;

      Abu Yussuf, a.k.a., Mahmoud Yussuf Najjer

            High ranking PLO official;

      Mohammed Boudia

            Linked with European PLO;

      Hussein Abad al-Chir

            PLO contact with KGB in Cyprus;

      Dr. Wadi Haddad

            Chief terrorist linked with Dr. George Habash.

 

      Prior to deployment, Harari brought the team together in Israel for a few days

 

of "refresher courses" and in-depth briefings regarding the Mossad's current

 

intelligence on each target. The Mossad also provided official passports for their

 

initial deployment to Geneva, where they would set up their first temporary

 

operational base. They would then lock away any personal items and official passports

 

for the duration of the mission.

 

      Harari provided the team with only two principle rules of engagement prior to

 

their deployment. The Mossad's intent was to send a message with every assassination

 

that PLO terrorists could not hide from Israel under any circumstances. He wanted

 

the team to be imaginative and strike in creative ways. In this vein, the terrorists

 

would know that they had been "touched." If the assassinations occurred while the

 

terrorist leaders operated within their own security nets, it would send a clear message

 

that they would never feel safe. The second principle was for the team to act with

 

zero collateral risk. Harari made it clear that the unit was to ensure one hundred

 

percent identification of the target before acting. Harari did not want his covert

 

action unit to act with the same recklessness and disregard of innocents as the

 

terrorists they were hunting. If the unit could not obtain absolute identification, they

 

were to abort the mission and attempt the "hit" again at a later time. He emphasized

 

that if the team killed only three terrorists, the mission is a success, although

 

disappointing. However, if the unit killed all eleven on the list but also killed one

 

innocent, the mission would be a failure.13  This was the entirety of the team's

 

headquarters' guidance regarding operations and rules of engagement. Ironically,

 

these precepts were set almost a year prior to the failed Lillehammer incident which

 

was coordinated by Harari.

 

      The first order of business in Geneva was to determine "hard" and "soft"

 

targets. Hard targets represented individuals who might be utilizing security teams,

 

disguises, and varied routines, and/or carrying weapons. Hard targets operate at a

 

higher clandestine sophistication level and are generally alert to sting operations and

 

surveillance. To protect themselves, they utilize covert 'tradecraft' and change their

 

schedules frequently. Soft targets are the individuals who do not hide their sympathies

 

to the Palestinian cause and lived routine open lifestyles. Their daily activities were

 

predictable and did not include security measures. These targets only operated in a

 

clandestine capacity part time. Soft targets were more accessible and required much

 

less effort in acquiring positive identification.14

 

      The team's first operational priority was to acquire recent accurate information

 

on the movements of the targets on the list. Without solid leads to begin their

 

operation, Avner decided to disperse the team throughout Europe. Each individual

 

targeted regions with which he was familiar and had established contacts. Each

 

member would expand the network of contacts in his region and develop "sources" of

 

reliable information to support the mission. It was necessary to create a foundation

 

from which to operate. This included target intelligence, weapons, documents and

 

support personnel.

 

      In the early stages, Avner developed a source who was trying to make his way

 

into the higher echelon of the Baader-Meinhof Red Army Faction. He believed that

 

introducing Avner's readily available cash flow to the group might increase his own

 

value. Avner's source assumed Avner and his partners had embezzled a great deal of

 

money and were possibly funding a small independent terrorist unit. Even if this were

 

the case, he did not inquire further because the Baader-Meinhof Organization was

 

always seeking new sources of hard currency to fund their activities. The source

 

believed if he could produce substantial ready cash from Avner, it would elevate his

 

status within the organization. As a result, the Baader-Meinhof organization provided

 

basic preliminary logistical support for Avner's early operations, while allowing him

 

the opportunity to begin establishing his underground identity and bona-fides. In order

 

to operate effectively and obtain peripheral support, Avner had to establish an effective

 

cover which would withstand close scrutiny. This required having key individuals

 

and/or organizations vouch for his authenticity; Baader-Meinhof provided the

 

foundation for Avner's acceptance in the underground terrorist networks. Avner's

 

team utilized the Baader-Meinhof association in the early stages of the mission to

 

cultivate a working network of sources.

 

      The team reconvened in Geneva to consolidate their information. After careful

 

analysis, they selected Wael Zwaiter as their first target. The group determined that

 

Zwaiter was a soft target, living and operating in Rome. The squad traveled separately

 

to Italy and rendezvoused in Ostia, an area a few miles outside Rome where they

 

secured sleeping quarters at three different sites. The weapons specialist made

 

arrangements to have five Baretta .22 caliber, semi-automatic pistols with extra

 

ammunition and magazines transported into Italy through his own established network

 

of arms' suppliers. The Baader-Meinhof group provided Avner with personnel for

 

operational support and target surveillance. The support assets reported all Zwaiter's

 

movements and daily routine. These assets were unaware of the actual mission and

 

would not be present during the actual hit.

 

      On October 16, 1972, a vehicle driven by a support team member delivered

 

Avner and one additional "shooter" to the vicinity of Zwaiter's apartment complex and

 

exited the area. A third action member occupied the passenger seat of a vehicle

 

operated by a female support asset, also in close proximity. The female was

 

responsible for signaling the group of Zwaiter's approach. As an advance team

 

approached the area, the female's passenger would exit the vehicle and she would

 

drive away from the site, signaling the team that the target was approaching and the

 

operation was a "go."

 

      The female said good-bye to her passenger and drove away as the team moved

 

into their rehearsed positions. Another couple from the support team advanced

 

Zwaiter's movements by approximately one minute. A blond female ran to join the

 

advance couple and they strolled away from the apartment complex; the final signal

 

that Zwaiter was approaching alone. The two shooters entered the complex ahead of

 

the target to set themselves in position in the lobby. Avner had conducted an advance

 

(recon) earlier to familiarize himself with the interior of the lobby and develop

 

contingency plans. As expected, Zwaiter stopped for a few minutes at a tavern across

 

from the apartment complex to make a phone call. The surveillance team had learned

 

that the local phone company had disconnected Zwaiter's phone service for lack of

 

payment. Surveillance reports also indicated that Zwaiter would routinely stop at the

 

tavern enroute to his apartment to make phone calls.

 

      After completing his call, Zwaiter continued towards his apartment on

 

schedule. The lobby was dimly lit and, as Zwaiter entered, Avner switched on

 

additional lights to positively identify his target. As Zwaiter looked up from

 

something held in his hands, a bit confused at the light, the second shooter asked the

 

target if he was Wael Zwaiter. With positive identification established, the two

 

commandos quickly drew their weapons and shot fourteen rounds (custom designed

 

22 caliber bullets) into Zwaiter. The two exited through the main lobby entrance

 

where two teammates were waiting in a vehicle to transport them from the area. The

 

fifth unit member's job was about to begin. He was the security man who would go

 

back into the scene and "sweep" it for any incriminating evidence accidentally left

 

behind by anyone involved in the action. The team drove to a predesignated area and

 

transferred to a van operated by another support asset who transported the unit to a

 

safe house. The team had successfully accomplished their first mission. The cost to

 

the Mossad for the operation was approximately $350,000 dollars.

 

      Following the Zwaiter operation in Rome, Avner's Baader-Meinhof contact

 

introduced him a new source of information in Paris. Avner's team had established

 

itself as a bona-fide mercenary group buying and selling information on terrorists.

 

Their access to quick large sums of cash opened doors with few questions asked.

 

Following their first operation, Avner secured an introduction to "Louis," a member of

 

a free lance information organization known only as "Le Group." 15  Papa, Louis'

 

father, was a former member of the French Resistance during World War II and the

 

originator of Le Group. The organization essentially grew out of the French

 

Resistance, and was predicated on the premise that there would always be a demand

 

for services and material for various groups seeking the means to further their cause.

 

Papa devised a "private" underground intelligence service which provided information,

 

weapons, documents, clothing, surveillance teams, vehicles, safe houses, etc., to

 

individuals seeking such services with extreme discretion and few questions asked.

 

The primary condition for the services of Le Group was hard currency. Papa's only

 

restriction was that he would not provide services to an official government entity. He

 

felt governments were simply too "treacherous and unscrupulous... and riddled with

 

politics."16

 

      Le Group provided the information required by Avner's team for their next

 

selected target, Mahmoud Hamshari. Avner wanted a more spectacular means for this

 

"hit" to encapsulate Harari's directive of shaking up the terrorist with their "reach."

 

Le Group deployed a surveillance team which reported on Hamshari's routine. One

 

team member acting as an Italian Journalist contacted Hamshari via telephone and

 

suggested a meeting for an interview. After Hamshari acknowledged his interest in

 

such a meeting, the caller advised him that he would be contacted in several days to

 

make the appropriate arrangements. This was a ploy to have Hamshari positively

 

identify himself on the phone. The action team planned to wire the base of the

 

telephone with explosives which they would initiate through a remote triggering

 

device.

 

      Avner and his unit went through their routine of running rehearsals, advances,

 

and signals prior to the operation. Everything was in place on December 8, 1972.

 

Hamshari sat alone in his apartment awaiting the phone call from the Italian journalist.

 

The team received their "go" signal and the explosives' specialist detonated the

 

explosives. The unit was successful again.

 

      Le Group would provide all the necessary support to Avner's team for the next

 

four independent missions; Abad al-Chir, Basil al-Kubaisi, Zaid Muchassi, and

 

Mohammed Boudia.17 The specific details of each operation are not required for the

 

purposes of this paper, only that each was conducted methodically and was successful

 

without compromise to the team. Although not on the original list, Muchassi was

 

Abad al-Chir's replacement as the PLO contact with the Soviet Union's KGB. After

 

receiving reliable information on Muchassi from Le Group, Avner's team made a

 

unilateral decision to include him in their mission. The team decided that if Abad

 

al-Chir had been selected as a target, it was reasonable to believe that his replacement

 

was also a viable target. The Mossad always taught its officers to use initiative and

 

make reasonable decisions in the field. Avner's team had acquired the information

 

required for an operation targeting Muchassi and had the opportunity and the means.

 

Unfortunately, during this operation, Avner's team encountered Muchassi's KGB

 

contact officer in a vehicle blocking the path of their escape. The team shot and killed

 

the KGB officer after observing him reach for a weapon under his jacket.

 

      In March 1973, Harari contacted Avner's unit regarding a change in

 

procedure. Harari was aware that Avner and his unit had acquired significant success

 

in obtaining intelligence on PLO terrorists. Harari's had received intelligence that

 

three targets on the original list were meeting in Beirut. He advised Avner that

 

Mahmoud Yussuf Najjer, Kamal Nasser, and Kemal Adwan were no longer on his

 

target list. Harari wanted Avner's team to provide their intelligence and sources to

 

him in support of a Mossad directed military action in Beirut. The military action

 

would include the killing of the three terrorists as well as other objectives within a

 

single orchestrated operation.

 

      Avner was extremely tentative about turning over Le Group to the Mossad,

 

especially after Papa had made it clear that he would not support organized

 

government operations. Avner was extremely concerned about losing Le Group's

 

services, as well as jeopardizing the security of his unit. He informed Harari that he

 

would not divulge his sources. Avner and Harari designed a compromise to protect

 

Le Group yet utilize their service to perform the advance, surveillance and intelligence

 

for the operation. The Mossad, in conjunction with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF),

 

would perform the actual mission.

 

      In April 1973, forty Israeli commandos conducted a covert amphibious landing

 

on a Beirut beach setting in motion an ambitious mission to strike at multiple targets

 

and deliver a decisive blow against the PLO. The operation succeeded in killing

 

Adwan, Najjer, and Nasser, as well as approximately one hundred PLO Guerrillas.

 

However, it also included two innocent casualties: Najjer's wife and one neighbor.

 

Najjer's wife had moved in front of Najjer in an attempt to shield him from fire.

 

Dwing the commotion, the neighbor opened her door out of curiosity and was killed

 

by Israeli commandos. The Israeli's reported one dead and three wounded during the

 

assault. The overall mission was a tremendous success.18

 

      In late 1973, Avner's team learned of the Salameh incident in Lillehammer and

 

realized for the first time that Harari was using other teams to target the same PLO

 

terrorists as his list. Harari never disclosed to the unit that any other teams, whether

 

controlled through Mossad headquarters or independent, were also involved in the

 

same mission.

 

      In January 1974, Avner's unit received information of Salameh's presence in

 

Sargans, near Liechtenstein, Switzerland. Salameh was reportedly going to meet other

 

PLO leaders in a church on January 12, 1974. After contemplating a number of

 

alternative plans, they concluded that an attack inside the church was the most

 

feasible. Avner and his partner entered the dark church and encountered three armed

 

Arabs. As one young Arab reached for a pistol, Avner and his partner quickly reacted

 

by shooting the three men. They continued down the church stairs toward the

 

basement where they encountered three very startled and obviously frightened priests.

 

A third team member then watched the priests as the two primary shooters went back

 

up the stairs to continue the search for Salameh. As the mission unraveled, Avner

 

made the decision to abort the operation and move to the escape phase. This was the

 

first failure of the unit and included the possible deaths of three Arabs not on their list.

 

Avner's team was distressed over the engagement with the three guards, however, the

 

unit felt justified in their actions in that the Arabs' were clearly combatants, not

 

innocents. This second attempt on Salameh had failed, but, Avner's team avoided

 

compromise or arrest.

 

      As the mission continued, in May 1974, the team found themselves in London,

 

England. Avner was attempting contact with a source with possible information

 

regarding Salameh. His source never made the prearranged meeting. Avner felt

 

uncomfortable about the aborted meeting, and also mentioned to the group that he

 

believed he was under surveillance. He related his concern that the British authorities

 

may have discovered their presence in the capital and were conducting surveillance

 

operations against the team. Only three team members were in London, where they

 

had hoped to conclude their business in three to four days then meet the other two

 

back in Frankfurt. Avner and one partner were staying at the Europa Hotel. One

 

evening after dinner, Avner decided to spend some leisure time in the Etruscan Bar. A

 

very attractive blond woman enticed Avner into a conversation for a short time at the

 

bar. As Avner left the woman and the bar enroute to his room, he passed his partner

 

heading to the bar for a drink. After a short time, Avner went back to the bar to

 

socialize with his partner but observed that both he and the woman had departed.

 

      Avner and his teammate had separate bedrooms which shared a common foyer.

 

As Avner went into his room he noticed the same strong perfume of the woman at the

 

bar and heard the sound of a female laughing in his partner's room. The next morning

 

Avner's partner failed to arrive for breakfast. Concerned, Avner went to his partner's

 

room to check on his welfare. After receiving no response to his knocks on the door,

 

Avner entered the room. He found his partner dead, lying naked on the bed with a

 

bullet wound to the chest. Avner contacted Le Group, which handled all the details of

 

sanitizing the room and disposing of the body. Avner also asked Le Group to provide

 

him any information they could obtain regarding the woman's identity.

 

      After arriving in Frankfurt, Avner provided the details of the death to the other

 

team members. After reviewing the information provided by Le Group, the team

 

uniformly agreed to track and assassinate the responsible woman. Although this was a

 

clear disregard of their mission parameters, the emotional impact of the incident

 

pushed them to pursue the woman. Le Group had determined that the woman was a

 

free lance assassin whom Avner had positively identified through photographs

 

obtained by Le Group. Her services were available to any one willing to meet her

 

fees. The woman resided in Hoorn, just outside Amsterdam. On August 21, 1974,

 

the team conducted a mission to assassinate the woman in the same fashion as their

 

previous operations. As the assassination team approached her, the woman

 

instinctively reached for a weapon. The team subsequently shot and killed her.19

 

There was no information available as to who had contracted her services for the hit

 

on Avner's team. Mr. Jonas reported that Avner was severely reprimanded for acting

 

unilaterally in assassinating the woman. This was clearly outside the parameters

 

initially established by Harari for team operations.20

 

      On September 14, 1974, another team member was killed while making

 

contact with a source associated with his Belgium weapons connection. Again, Le

 

Group provided all the necessary services to dispose of the body. Avner had been

 

asked numerous times if he thought Le Group had betrayed the unit and provided

 

other interest's information regarding Avner's team. Avner maintains his position that

 

Le Group never betrayed the team.  Mr. Jonas commented that he questioned Avner

 

specifically on this issue. According to Mr. Jonas, Avner clearly understood Le

 

Group's business philosophy that hard currency buys services. However, Avner

 

believed Papa was loyal to him in that there were many opportunities throughout their

 

relationship where Papa could have betrayed the team and did not.

 

      Harari directed the team to abandon the mission after the second death in the

 

team. Avner and the team made the decision not to acknowledge Harari's message

 

and try one more time for Salameh in Tarifa, along the Gibraltar Atlantic coast.

 

Salameh was reportedly in a house "on top of some low cliffs lining the beach."21  On

 

October 10, 1974, Avner's remaining team of three attempted their last operation.

 

They chose a commando style infiltration to gain access to the house. During the

 

infiltration phase, the team encountered an Arab security man with a Kalashnikov

 

assault rifle and subsequently killed him. Again, the plan was unraveling and Avner

 

aborted the operation. This was the end of their two year quest to hunt PLO

 

terrorists.22

 

      Avner' s team had deployed almost two years earlier with a list of eleven PLO

 

terrorists. Throughout this period his team succeeded in terminating eight of the

 

original eleven and one replacement PLO leader outside the list. The collateral

 

damage assessment included: one KGB officer, four PLO security men, one free lance

 

assassin, and two team members.

 

                               CHAPTER 4

 

                         ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

 

 

 

      Organizations and the Human Condition

 

      Harari's method of deploying numerous teams simultaneously with different

 

methodologies to attack the PLO problem was innovative. Golda Meir issued a

 

difficult directive to achieve. It was Harari's responsibility to assassinate top PLO

 

terrorists while ensuring zero collateral risk. He also needed to protect the Mossad

 

with a reasonable degree of deniability associated with those assassinations. Only

 

Golda Meir's Committee-X had a full understanding of the operation. Harari

 

struggled with deploying teams to assassinate PLO terrorists without associating the

 

Mossad with the actions. He also needed to screen the operation from the senior

 

members of the cabinet outside of Committee-X. He was under pressure to take both

 

official and unofficial actions against the PLO.

 

      According to victor Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception, the Mossad had the

 

required mechanisms within the "Metsada" branch to execute kidnappings and

 

assassinations. Further, the Mossad's written charter allows the Mossad discretionary

 

authority to conduct assassinations. Ostrovsky explained that the unit designated for

 

such assignments is the "Kidon." Three teams of twelve individuals each comprised

 

one unit. Generally two teams conduct training in Israel while the third team deploys

 

abroad. These teams remain separated from the other Mossad members, and are not

 

briefed on personnel, structure, or operations outside their unit. The members of the

 

assassination teams use aliases even within their own environment to ensure the true

 

identities of the individuals remain secure.1

 

      Harari utilized all the assets at his disposal as opportunities arose. Avner's

 

team deployed as an independent entity, allowing them to operate at their own pace.

 

However, when pressure was building from the Israeli Cabinet to take some sort

 

official action he combined his resources and initiated the Mossad-IDF operation in

 

Beirut. When Mossad intelligence verified Salameh's location in Lillehammer, Harari

 

assembled an improvised team to respond immediately, but this operation ended in

 

disaster: the mission resulted in the killing of the wrong person and the arrest of six

 

Israeli officers.

 

      Developing another team with the freedom to move outside the control and

 

policy of the government was an extremely bold and risky proposition. However,

 

Harari had the insight to understand that a team unburdened by a slow moving

 

bureaucratic process had the capability of moving with more efficiency and success. If

 

designed correctly, the Mossad would keep an acceptable level of plausible deniability

 

in their association with the team.

 

      Geoffrey M. Bellman, author of The Consultant's Calling, is an expert on

 

organizational structure and functionality. He explains why an organization is only

 

capable of performing to a certain level of mediocrity. Organizational structure is

 

essential to conducting business in a modern complex society. However, it is

 

important to understand the dynamics and limitations of an organization. Bellman

 

relates that organizations are:

 

      large, awkward, and unwieldy. Usually organizations don't work very

      well because they don't fit the human creatures who work in them.

      Organizations as we have built them are more mechanical than

      'organical'... we have built awkward hierarchical structures with boxes

      and lines connecting them. We have created structures modeled after

      machines--mechanistic, sharply defined, and inflexible--that force their

      moving human parts to act like machines too. Such organizations do

      not work very well... even when everything is finely in ... there are

      significant difficulties.2

 

      This concept illustrates the dynamics of an organization relative to the decision

 

making process. It also highlights that inherent limitations exist in every system. The

 

organization is essential to conduct business in the world. To truly succeed, those

 

functioning within organizations must understand the limitations of the system and

 

determine accurate estimates of success relative to those limitations. Are the

 

objectives set forth by the command or supervisory element actually achievable within

 

the policies of the organization? Also, does the directive fall within the inherent

 

limitations of the system itself? Bellman maintains that:

 

      important organizational decisions are not made because they are

      logical and rational. Logic and rationality are used in support of the

      decision, as kind of psychic insurance. Organizations swing through

      cycles of centralization and decentralization, and they don't do it

      because it makes sense. CEO's select executives who are first loyal

      and only secondarily have managerial competence. Much of business

      does not make sense, and I am not arguing that it should. Instead I am

      arguing against pretending that it should.3

 

      The important aspect of operating within organizations and systems is that by

 

its very nature it incorporates a predetermined limitation of success. As long as the

 

mission operates under the constraints dictated by the organization's structure,

 

policies, regulations and management philosophies, it will only obtain a finite

 

predetermined level of success. Harari understood that a headquarters' controlled

 

operation automatically hindered his ability to achieve all the objectives implied in the

 

directive set forth by Golda Meir.

 

      The Israeli Prime Minister directed the Mossad to conduct specific covert

     

operations to achieve politically derived strategic objectives. Harari needed to

 

establish a secret compartmentalized operation that was streamlined and efficient.

 

Attempting to work within the official headquarters process would have undoubtedly

 

exposed the mission and/or possibly slowed it to a nonfunctional level. Outside the

 

official control of the Mossad, Avner's team conducted successful operations without

 

compromise for approximately two years.

 

      Bureaucratic processes are rigid and restrict decentralized authority and the

 

ability to work at a continued fast and fluid pace. Government agencies must live

 

within regulations which do not allow interpretation or flexibility for unique

 

circumstances. Bellman related that organizations are sharply defined and do not

 

allow flexibility. Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense (1995), further

 

demonstrates how this is magnified in government agencies:

 

      Government acts like some extraterrestrial power, not an institution

      that exists to serve us....It almost never deals with real-life problems in

      a way that reflects an understanding of the situation....Our regulatory

      system has become an instruction manual.   It tells us and the

      bureaucrats exactly what to do and how to do it. Detailed rule after

      detailed rule addresses every eventuality, or at least every situation

      lawmakers and bureaucrats can think of.  Is it a coincidence that almost

      every encounter with government is an exercise in frustration?.. In the

      decades since World War II, we have constructed a system of

      regulatory law that basically outlaws common sense. Modern law, in

      an effort to be self-executing, has shut out our humanity....The motives

      were logical enough: Specific legal mandates would keep government

      in close check and provide crisp guidelines for private citizens. But it

      doesn't work. Human activity can't be regulated without judgment by

      humans....Government cannot accomplish anything when multiple

      procedures are required for almost every decision....Process is a

      defensive device; the more procedures, the less government can

      do....Which is more important: the process or the result?4

 

 

      Howard's observations are not unique, but they highlight why Avner's team

 

was so successful. Harari removed the team from the endless regulations and

 

restrictions which the headquarters' process would have imposed. The different

 

agendas of all the bureaucratic elements directing, conducting, and supporting the

 

mission would impose limiting factors relevant to the flow and efficiency of the

 

operation. All of these different elements must adhere to rigid rules and regulations

 

mandated by federal legislation. While each element attempts to meet all their required

 

procedures, the operational timeline is proportionately delayed. Each layer of

 

bureaucracy slows the development of the operation and subsequently limits

 

decentralized authority at the tactical level. For example, the finance branch may

 

require a written request and justification for the use of funds. This element must then

 

identify the proper funding mechanism and acquire authorization to release the funds

 

through their supervisory elements. The request is transferred up and down a chain of

 

command in each element; for every deviation from the original request, amendments

 

for justification must be instituted. The efficiency of the operation is automatically

 

limited by the bureaucratic process. The political authorities create a dilemma, in that

 

they impose factors which cannot possibly be met by adhering to established

 

bureaucratic process. In many cases the process limits the degree of success of a time

 

sensitive operation.

 

      The case studies presented earlier demonstrate the limiting factors inherent in

 

each approach. The Lillehammer affair profiled the elements of a typical headquarters

 

operation. It encapsulates the deficiencies of a sensitive operation controlled through

 

an inefficient bureaucratic process. The objectives of the mission were sound and in

 

theory the Mossad had the institutional capabilities to conduct the operation with a

 

reasonable expectation of success. The breakdown was in the system itself. The

 

Mossad incorporated all the internal assets to successfully accomplish the Lillehammer

 

mission. However, the bureaucratic system was not inherently capable of assembling

 

and preparing those assets for a complex mission in a timely manner. The Lillehammer

 

operation required a cohesive team which was well trained in special operations in

 

order to succeed within the specified time parameters. Even the best special

 

operations unit might have failed due to the pace in which the operation was moving,

 

and the lack of rehearsals, geographical knowledge, and positive target identification.

 

Political leaders set political objectives and time restraints which were tactically

 

unreasonable. At best, the mission had high risk "blowback" potential.

 

      The Mossad main headquarters' element orchestrated and controlled the

 

mission. Intelligence obtained through reliable sources placed Salameh in Lillehammer,

 

Norway. Salameh was a primary "hard" target and the Mossad was eager to act on

 

the intelligence. Harari attempted to assemble experienced field officers capable of

 

conducting a sensitive, high risk operation. However, he selected officers in an ad-hoc

 

fashion, ostensibly to work together as a cohesive team. In addition, the support team

 

tasked to conduct surveillance, acquire safe houses, and obtain vehicles, was

 

composed of recruited assets. Generally, assets do not operate at the same level of

 

competence and loyalty as staff officers. To this point the operational concepts are

 

sound, however, the introduction of an unrealistic tactical timetable began a domino

 

effect of fatal shortcuts. The team never worked as a coordinated unit prior to this

 

operation, yet they attempted to implement the mission without rehearsals. The ad-hoc

 

unit relied on blind faith that all the team members were competent and disciplined in

 

operational tradecraft, tactics, and security.

 

      The extremely tight time constraints required dissemination of cables to the

 

field, containing explicit instructions for individual responsibilities, tasks, and escape

 

procedures. Once information began flowing to the field, compartmentalized access of

 

the operation was sacrificed in exchange for time. The operation was moving at a

 

pace in which operational security broke down at almost every level. In their haste to

 

set the mission in motion, team members provided evidence trails of their movements.

 

This evidence chain enabled police investigators to piece the entire operational

 

network together. Three officers still had compromising material in their possession at

 

the time of their arrest leading the police to other team members. Complacency and

 

lack of good operation tradecraft procedures played a big part in the failure, but the

 

primary failure rested in expecting successful results from an operation which was not

 

feasible within the system's constraints. The pace of the mission was beyond the

 

capabilities of the organization. The bureaucratic process was unable to provide the

 

essential elements required to complete the mission successfully in the time allowed.

 

The unit did not have the time to memorize their instructions and closely coordinate or

 

rehearse their actions.

 

      The primary hit team never coordinated with the surveillance team to establish

 

positive identification of Salameh. The results were disastrous. Considering Mossad

 

intelligence, the support teams deployed where they expected to encounter Salameh.

 

The support assets assumed that the individual they had under surveillance was in fact

 

Salameh and continued to operate on that assumption. The movements of the

 

assumed Salameh did not appear to fit the scenario; his stops at the municipal

 

swimming pool, his association with the pregnant female, and the stop at the movie

 

theater. The support team never reported or discussed any of the listed key indicators

 

with the assassination team as particularly unusual for a hard target like Salameh. Still

 

to this point, the operation could possibly have succeeded. It was the responsibility of

 

the assassination team to positively identify their target before taking action. As the

 

operation unfolded, the primary action element violated the first rule issued to Avner

 

and his team by Harari a year earlier. The Mossad's first rule of engagement in

 

assassination operations provided that officers must obtain absolute identification of

 

the target prior to engagement.

 

      Considering that the mistakes made by the officers involved in the Lillehammer

 

operation were so fundamental in nature, an argument may be made that the officers

 

either did not possess the requisite skills to conduct such a sensitive mission

 

successfully, or their basic training was inadequate. However, the failure is more

 

attributable to attempting to conduct an operation beyond the capabilities of the

 

political bureaucracy. In the team's rush to meet the political objective of moving

 

against Salameh, they sacrificed routine tactical practices for speed. Apparently Harari

 

and Zamir felt the risk of rushing the operation was acceptable if it provided the Israeli

 

cabinet a successful operation against the PLO which the politicians could positively

 

exploit. The political leadership would be pleased that the Mossad was making

 

progress in their campaign against the PLO and the media could report that the PLO

 

had suffered another serious blow. The Mossad was under extreme pressure from the

 

Israeli cabinet to provide evidence that they were actively pursuing the PLO and

 

making significant progress. Only the few in Committee-X were aware of the full

 

extent of the Mossad's operations against the PLO. The remaining Israeli cabinet

 

members were not briefed on Avner's team and did not understand who was

 

responsible for the killing of so many terrorist leaders, or why the Mossad did not have

 

more reportable information regarding those incidents.5  The cabinet wanted to see

 

more Israeli influence and reporting. Harari and Zamir probably believed that a

 

successful Mossad operation against Salameh would mollify the cabinet members. In

 

Vengeance, George Jonas reported that Harari told Avner, he was under extreme

 

pressure to take "official" action and he was having a great deal of difficulty explaining

 

why the Mossad had not identified the organization moving through Europe killing

 

terrorist leaders. This was one of the primary reasons the IDF conducted the large

 

scale raid into Beirut.

 

      The officers in Lillehammer had more than adequate training and skills;

 

however, the organization forced them to abandon proven tradecraft procedures to

 

accomplish the assassination of Salameh under unreasonable tactical conditions.

 

Harari allowed political pressure to dictate the pace of the operation beyond what he

 

knew was reasonably necessary for success within the bureaucracy. This is the

 

primary reason Avner's team was designed outside the political realm of the Mossad.

 

Avner's team would not institute shortcuts bowing to political influences which might

 

jeopardize the success of the mission. Quality operations demand quality people

 

involved and quality planning from the outset. The Mossad team members understood

 

that they would operate in a covert capacity until the successful completion of the

 

mission or the team was no longer able to operate intact due to injuries or deaths.

 

They were to remain a cohesive unit. The unit learned and understood each others'

 

skill, abilities, and limitations, planning and operating accordingly.

 

 

 

      Tradecraft, Cover, and Trails of Evidence

 

      The importance of timely accurate intelligence has never been more critical.

 

As the information highway roars forward nations strive to maintain a strategic,

 

operational, and tactical advantage. Technical intelligence collection has phenomenal

 

capabilities in achieving certain objectives. Imagery, targeting, weapons, and

 

surveillance technologies continue to expand. However, the most difficult operations

 

have always involved human collection (HUMINT). HUMINT involves the

 

development and recruitment of individuals with access to sensitive information which

 

is unattainable through open sources. These recruited assets also play an integral role

 

in the planning of covert operations.

 

      Instituting effective secure covert operations with recruited "agents"