Military

JFACC:  Operational Asset Or Joint Force Dilemma

 

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SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

 

 

 

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                              EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: JFACC: Operational Asset or Joint Force Dilemma

 

Author:  Major Michael C. Barton, United States Air Force

 

Thesis:: The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept evolved to

correct operational deficiencies. Is the JFACC a joint force asset or liability?

 

Background: Commanders attempt take advantage of the full range of military

capabilities of their forces. Since World War II, they have relied on theater air

commanders to integrate the air power capabilities of different nations and services into

an effective theater air campaign. The consolidation of air assets, fuctionally, was the

United States Air Force's justification for independence from the United States Army in

1947. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair

Operations, confirmed the joint force commander's authority to designate a Joint Force

Air Component Commander to coordinate the joint air operations campaign. The

emerging joint doctrine revived old tensions between the services over the control of

theater air power. The 1986 Omnibus Agreement ignited a controversy between the Air

Force and the Marine Corps. The controversy centered on Air Force, not joint, doctrine

advocating centralized control of all theater tactical aircraft under a single air component

commander (fuctional componency). The results of the air campaign in Operation

DESERT STORM demonstrate the operational utility of the JFACC. The command and

control, synchronized planning, and unity of effort missing in the Vietnam conflict were

evident in the Gulf War.

 

Recommendation:   Unity of effort through centralized control of theater air assets is the

most effective way to employ air power. Coordination is best achieved by vesting a

single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of

a common goal. Joint force commanders should designate a Joint Force Air Component

Commander when a joint force consists of two or more services with fixed wing aircraft.

 

                                    OUTLINE

I.    Introduction

 

II.   Joint Warfare

 

III.  JFACC Defined

 

IV.   The Debate

 

V.    Case Studies

 

             A. Vietnam

 

             B. DESERT STORM

 

VI.   Conclusions

 

                JFACC: Operational Asset or Joint Force Dilemma

 

      "The use of military, naval, and aerial forces in war should be directed toward a

 

single end, to win...The three forces should fuction as ingredients--or factors--of a

 

single product in which the best results can be obtained only by a proper apportioning of

 

the ingredients used." Is this a recent comment by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

 

Staff or a Combatant Commander-in Chief (CINC)? No, they are the words of Giulio

 

Douhet, an Italian general and early airpower theorist, published in his book, The

 

Command of the Air, in 1921. Nevertheless, the theory is as valid today, and just as

 

applicable, as it was seventy-four years ago. As the United States (US) Armed Forces

 

continue to downsize, joint warfare is the "US way of war."

 

      In the joint community, nothing created more controversy than the Joint Forces

 

Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept. Roles and missions, parochialism, and

 

doctrine were all factors in this emotional issue. Additionally, misconceptions about the

 

responsibilities and authority of the JFACC exacerbated the dissension among the

 

services. At the heart of the dispute is the opertional utility of centralized command

 

of theater air assets under an air component commander. What is the JFACC and what

 

authority does he wield? Does history offer any lessons pertaiing to unity of air effort

 

and theater command of the air campaign? Finally, do the advantages of centralized

 

command and decentralized execution, if there are any, outweigh the disadvantages? The

 

answers to these questions lie in joint and service doctrine, the results of previous air

 

campaigns, and the principles of war.

 

JOINT WARFARE

 

      Any student of US military history can confirm that joint warfare is a long

 

standing practice in the nation's armed forces. From the Revolutionary War, the very

 

birth of our country, to the Persian Gulf War, our armed forces traditionally fight as

 

members of joint and/or combined forces. However, some dramatic changes in the last

 

thirty years have changed the way our armed forces train, organize, and fight The

 

Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Bill of 1986, more than anything else, has

 

brought "jointness" to the forefront of military awareness. Among other things, the act

 

empowered the National Command Authority (NCA) to establish combatant commands

 

to plan and conduct joint operations.

 

      A combatant command, according to Joint Pub 3-0, is a command with a broad

 

continuing mission under a single commander. Combatant commands typically have

 

geographic or funtional responsibilities. A number of command relationships are

 

available to strengthen unity of effort in joint force operations. The combatant

 

commander can control the conduct of military operations or may delegate that authority

 

to ajoint force commander (JFC). Joint force commanders establish command

 

relationships and assign missions to achieve their objectives efficiently. To that end, the

 

JFC may establish funtional component commanders

 

      to provide centralized direction and control of certain fuctions and

      types of operations when it is feasible and necessary to fix

      responsibility for certain normal, continuing funtions, or when it is

      appropriate and desirable to establish the authority and responsibility

      of a subordinate commander. These conditions apply when the scope

      of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of

      forces from more than one service be directed toward closely related

      objectives and unity of command and effort are primary

      considerations.1

 

A Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is an example. Functional

 

component commanders normally exercise operational control (OPCON)2 over assigned

 

and attached forces and, based on the commander's decision, tactical control (TACON)3

 

over additional military capabilities or forces.

 

      Joint forces usually organize with a combination of service and functional

 

components exercising operational responsibilities. Service components provide logistic

 

and administrative support for their forces. Clear and uncomplicated command lines are

 

one of the main advantages of operating through service components. Nonetheless, JFCs

 

normally designate a JFACC when a joint force consists of two or more services with

 

aviation assets, especially if more than one service has fixed wing aircraft. The

 

commander establishes the JFACC's authority and responsibilities, and designates

 

supported or supporting relationships among components, based on his concept of

 

operations.

 

      The commander may employ forces through his functional components or he may

 

choose to use them primarily to manage and coordinate selected functions. In either

 

case, an effective functional component staff is joint and individual service

 

representation is proportional to the mix of forces. Functional component staffs normally

 

cannot operate efficiently without prior training and seldom get the opportunity to train

 

together. Therefore, functional component staffs must identify critical billets and then

 

ensure joint staffs contain not only the personnel, but also the expertise, to fill these

 

positions. Additionally, liaison elements to and from other components facilitate

 

coordination.4

 

JFACC DEFINED

 

      The idea of a joint air component commander is not new. There are numerous

 

examples from World War I and World War II5 of a single airman successfully

 

exercising centralized control of theater air forces. Unfortunately, US airmen ignored

 

their predecessor's lessons learned in the Korean and Vietnam Wars6. There are two

 

common lessons learned from the Korean and Vietnam air wars. First, and foremost,

 

service parochialism dominated the air wars. And second, disregarding the lack of a

 

single air commander, both wars lacked an air campaign plan with a clear set of

 

objectives. The latest joint doctrine, and the subsequent formalizing of the JFACC

 

concept, emerged to overcome these shortcomings.

 

       Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

 

Associated Terms, defines the joint force air component commander:

 

      The joint force air component commander derives authority from the

      joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational

      control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate

      commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the

      accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will

      normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint

      force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by

      the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be

      limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the

      joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force

      commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other

      service component commanders and other assigned supporting

      commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend

      to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various

      missions or geographic areas.7

 

      A quick analysis of several key phrases in the definition clarifies several common

 

misconceptions about the JFACC's authority and responsibilities. First, the JFACC

 

clearly derives any and all of his authority from the JFC. He is a tool available to the

 

JFC: Joint Pub 0-2 states that the commander establishes the specific command

 

authority, i.e., OPCON or TACON, assigned to the JFACC. Second, a support

 

relationship (or TACON) is normally the command authority the JFACC needs to

 

employ augmentmg forces. The Air Force's JFACC Primer states, "JFACCs typically

 

will exercise OPCON over assigned and attached forces, and TACON over the other

 

forces made available for tasking."8 Finally, the JFC assigns the JFACC's

 

responsibilities which typically include an apportionment9 recommendation and the

 

allocation10 of apportioned sorties. The JFC determines the apportionment in

 

consultation with component commanders based on his objectives. It is obvious that the

 

joint staff wrote the JFACC definition very carefully in an attempt to appease all

 

services. However, the definition makes one thing perfectly clear: the combatant

 

commander is in charge.

 

      One of the most critical funtions a JFACC performs is the development of a

 

concept of air operations to meet the JFC's objectives. The concept of air operations,

 

and subsequent air campaign plan and master attack plan, integrates the employment of

 

air forces to "maximize their contribution to the combatant commander's intent"11 The

 

essence of the concept of air operations is the ability of the JFACC to synchronize the

 

operational functions in an air campaign plan that achieves strategic goals with limited

 

resources. The commander's priorities are the basis for the air campaign. The plan

 

provides airmen with broad concepts of operations, focuses on the enemy's strategic and

 

operational centers of gravity, prioritizes objectives, and defines the commander's

 

desired end state. Conceptually, an air campaign's first priority targets are enemy

 

center(s) of gravity.12 This decidedly US Air Force point of view caused great

 

consternation among its sister services, especially the Navy and Marine Corps, and fueled

 

a debate that raged for years.

 

THE DEBATE

 

      The 1986 Omnibus Agreement ignited the controversy between the Air Force and

 

the Marine Corps. The JCS approved the policy in response to concerns raised by the

 

approval of JCS Publication 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations. This

 

publication confirmed the JFC's authority to designate a JFACC to coordinate the joint

 

air operations campaign. The controversy centered on Air Force, not joint, doctrine

 

advocating centralized control of all theater tactical aircraft under a single air component

 

commander (functional componency). The Marine Corps adheres to a philosophy of

 

"joint force mission attainment through employment of service components consistent

 

with their designed warfighting capabilities."13 The Omnibus Agreement addresses the

 

command and control of USMC Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) in sustained operations

 

ashore:

 

             The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander will

      retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission

      of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground

      element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally

      be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF Commander will

      make sorties available to the Joint Force Commander, for tasking

      through his air component commander, for air defense, long-range

      interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of

      MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint Force

      Commander for tasking through the Air Component Commander for the

      support of other components of the joint force, or of the joint force as a

      whole.

             Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or

      Joint Force Commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign

      missions, redirect efforts (e.g., the reapportionment and/or reallocation

      of any MAGTF TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the

      Joint Force Commander that they are required for higher priority

      missions), and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders

      to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission' or to

      maintain integrity of the force, as described in JCS Pub 2, Unified

      Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).14

 

      In March 1989, the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development

 

Command circulated a letter asserting the Corps' support for JFACC concept.15 The

 

letter acknowledged the "operational compatibility" of Marine Corps and Air Force

 

doctrine and stated that the services' philosophical differences were "necessary and

 

correct." The letter went on to outline four general doctrinal and philosophical

 

differences between the services: (1) basic orientation to war; (2) doctrinal world views;

 

(3) battlefield development; and, (4) philosophy of joint integration. The first two

 

differences are "necessary and correct" based on the roles and missions of each service.16

 

The battlefield development and joint integration issues evoke a great deal of emotion as

 

both services cite history to support their position. While the letter accurately portrayed

 

service doctrine and the Corps' vision of the JFACC, it did nothing to diffuse the

 

growing tensions.

 

      The letter explains that the USMC views the battlefield "vertically" with

 

emphasis on extensive close air support (CAS) consisting of integrated combined arms

 

operations in the MAGTF area of operations. This concept is significant because the

 

Marine Corps organizes, trains, and equips to provide the combatant commander with a

 

Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), a combines arms team. The letter

 

characterizes the USAF view as "horizontal" with the focus on interdiction beyond the

 

FSCL and the Air Force controlling all tactical aircraft. Part of this is true: according to

 

Air Force doctrine a campaign plan places a higher priority on interdiction missions than

 

CAS missions. However, AFM 1-1 recommends that an airman or air component

 

commander, not an Air Force officer, should exercise centralized control over aerospace

 

forces. For instance, Air Force doctrine conforms with Joint Pub 3-04, Joint Maritime

 

Operations (Air), which states, "In the maritime environment, if the JFC designates a

 

JFACC, he will normally be a naval commander." In any case, the air component

 

commander's service is not an issue because the JFACC "recommends" and the JFC

 

"approves." The point is, the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy should concentrate on

 

complementing and not competing with each other. If the Air Force develops the

 

battlespace "horizontally," Marine Corps aviation can focus on integrated combined arms

 

operations in the MAGTF area of responsibility. As the Air Force, augmented by

 

available Army, Navy, and Marine Corps assets, shapes the deep battle beyond the fire

 

support coordination line (FSCL), the MAGTF's aviation maneuver element pounds

 

targets short of FSCL in the close battle. These are overly simplified examples of very

 

emotional issues; nonetheless, in the "doctrinal" battlespace, the MAGTF, Naval

 

aviation, and the Air Force can reinforce one another.

 

      The thrust of the friction regarding joint integration centers on the USAF's

 

preference for functional componency with an air component commander.17 It is the Air

 

Force's position that allotting available airpower to individual ground units does not

 

allow for concentration on a decisive part of the overall theater campaign. The Marine

 

Corps holds to

 

      a philosophy of joint operations which focuses on overall joint force

      mission attainment through employment of service components

      consistent with their designed warfighting capabilities and in a manner

      designed to exploit those capabilities. It supports the integration of

      force at the joint level through mission planning, coordination, and

      direction of forces, rather than through consolidated command of

      subordinate components' organic assets.18

 

      This philosophy is not logical relative to aviation assets in a joint task force.

 

Consider the following example: The commander of a two division Marine

 

Expeditionary Force (MEF) decides to concentrate at the decisive time and place. After

 

consulting with his major subordinate commanders, the MEF commander decides to

 

place the preponderance of his aviation assets in direct support Division "A" (the ground

 

combat element's main effort). How does the commander of Division "B" react? His

 

only real option is to support the commander to the best of his ability. The JFC expects

 

nothing less from the MEF Commander, or MARFOR as the supporting commander,

 

regarding the apportionment and allocation of JTF aviation assets in the JTF scenario.

 

      The range, speed and firepower inherent to airpower make it the JTF's most

 

flexible and versatile asset. As such, the commander must have access to available air

 

forces at the decisive time. These concepts apply equally to the JFC and the MAGTF

 

commander. As the JFC's primary air defense and strategic strike capability, Air Force

 

doctrine places the highest priority on gaining and maintaining air superiority and

 

destroying the enemy's ability to produce or sustain military forces. The MAGTF

 

commander relies on organic aviation assets in direct support of ground forces to

 

compensate for a lack of heavy artillery. The Navy depends on its carrier air assets for

 

fleet defense. The joint force commander must carefully consider the risks and payoffs

 

associated with his apportionment decision. Is a JFACC the JFC's best option to resolve

 

these issues, and, if so, what considerations will he use in balancing these conflicting

 

demands? First, each service must keep in mind that doctrine is nothing more than basic

 

guidance. Next, the JTF mission and the nature of the enemy (including capabilities,

 

vulnerabilities, and intent) are always the critical factors in campaign decisions. And

 

finally, the JFC's priorities, not service doctrine, determine the air commander's

 

operational focus of effort.

 

CASE STUDIES

 

      The JFACC's responsibilities will normally include the planning, coordination

 

and tasking based on the commander's apportionment decision. The planning fimction

 

includes the development of a theater air campaign plan. The foundation of the air

 

campaign is the planning, coordination, and employment of airpower to achieve

 

campaign objectives that support the commander's mission and intent. An effective plan

 

will create opportunities for air and ground forces to exploit and then capitalize on these

 

opportunities. The following case studies analyze the command and control of air assets

 

in the US's two most recent major conflicts. The analysis will focus on the command

 

relationships, planning, and air war unity of effort.

 

 

VIETNAM