Operational Readiness In Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool Units SUBJECT AREA - Training CSC 95 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Operational Readiness in Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool Units Author: Major Peter M. Aylward, United States Army National Guard Thesis: Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool units must successfully validate pre- mobilization training to meet their early deployment schedules by focusing the limited amount of training time available on mission essential tasks necessary to accomplish their wartime mission. Background: Changes to the force outlined in the Bottom-Up Review demand that the Active Component rely on the Reserve Component to provide the flexibility needed to meet the force requirements of fighting two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). It is important to note the Reserve Component provides more than 53% of the combat support and 69% of the combat service support units that the Army needs to sustain itself in combat. Unless Congress brings back conscription, the Reserve Component, including the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, remain the primary means of rapidly enlarging the force. Of even greater importance is the fact that some units exist exclusively in the Reserve Components. Subsequently, today's force structure does not allow for any other possibility except to include Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool units among Active Component early deployers. This paper focuses on how the Army National Guard is meeting the challenges of today's force structure while contributing to the prosecution of our National Security Strategy. First, it gives a historical perspective of how our nation has used Guard units in the past to meet our nation's crises. Next, it outlines how the Army Guard's early deploying Contingency Force Pool units are part of today's power projection strategy. Third, it gives a brief overview of the Guard's roles and missions and describes the training requirements necessary to meet pre- mobilization and post-mobilization standards. Fourth, it delineates some of the constraints early deploying units face when conducting training. Fifth, it highlights how these units can maximize the limited training time available to them. Finally, this paper cites several ways the Active Component training associations can help their Army Guard counterparts prepare and train for their wartime missions. Recommendation: A successful strategy for improving the Operational Readiness in Army National Guard CFP units requires the full cooperation and coordination of both the CFP units' chain of command and Active Component counterparts. Successful execution of both pre- mobilization and post-mobilization plans depends on that unity of effort. Army and Guard leaders can facilitate improvements in the Operational Readiness of Contingency Force Pool units in several ways. First, State Area Commands (STARCs) can provide both assistance and relief that will enable CFP units to focus on conducting METL related training. Second, Readiness Groups (RGs), Reserve Training Detachments (RTDs) and Readiness Training Teams (RTTs) can provide much needed expertise to develop comprehensive training strategies and workshops that provide insight to tackling deployment and pre-mobilization training problems. Third, commanders, who are ultimately responsible for the readiness posture of their unit, must focus their soldiers to meet the high pre-mobilization training challenges. Fourth, non- commissioned officers must know the published Army standard based on current doctrine and insure that their soldiers are training to that standard. Optimizing training time during pre-mobilization is essential to successful mobilization and deployment. The Guard is working to provide soldiers, leaders and units that are technically and tactically proficient in the execution of their specific mission. Yet, problems still remain. Overcoming the inherent training constraints of personnel, time, equipment and terrain while at the same time working on noted unit deficiencies is a monumental task. Guard leaders must optimize the limited training opportunities by focusing on METL related tasks that support their wartime mission. In the end, not only will America's Army benefit from this mutual cooperation, but our nation will be able to execute its national strategy while reaping the peace dividend the end of the Cold War offers. OPERATIONAL READINESS IN ARMY NATIONAL GUARD CONTINGENCY FORCE POOL UNITS by Peter M. Aylward Major, USARNG CG#4 Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Military Studies April 1995 The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the view of either the Marine Corps Command and Staff College or any other Government Agency. References to this study should include the foregoing statement. Contents Section Page Preface 1 Historical Perspective 4 Colonial Beginnings 4 Turn of the Century to WWII 6 Korea to Vietnam 7 The Evolving Total Force Policy 8 Partners in the Total Force 10 Old CAPSTONE 10 New CAPSTONE 12 Force Structure Changes 14 Roles and Missions of the Army National Guard 17 Federal Role 18 State Role 19 Training Requirements 19 Training Readiness 19 Pre-Mobilization Training 20 Post-Mobilization Training 20 Training Constraints - Limitations 22 Personnel 22 Equipment 23 Time 24 Terrain 25 Operational Readiness Initiatives 26 Bold Shift 27 Project Standard Bearer 28 Title XI - The Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act 28 FY95 national Defense Authorization Act 29 Operational Readiness Evaluation 30 Training Opportunities-Capabilities 33 Promoting Prosperity at Home 34 Promoting Democracy Abroad 35 Peace Operations 36 Recommendations for Improving Operational Readiness 39 State Support 40 Readiness Groups, Resident Training Detachments and Reserve Training Teams 41 Unit Commanders 42 Non-Commissioned Officers 42 Conclusion 43 Appendixes Appendix A: Acronyms 46 Appendix B: Glossary of Terms 47 Appendix C: Chronology of Significant Events 50 Appendix D: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Combat Support and Combat Service Support Contributions to the Army 51 Appendix E: Army National Guard Soldiers' Participation in American Wars 52 Appendix F: Mobilization Categories and Situations 53 Notes 54 Bibliography 59 Preface Since the early 1970's, many authors have written concerning the inability of Army National Guard units to mobilize and conduct their wartime mission. Many argue the reason for the inability of the Guard to deploy in a timely manner stems from the limitations imposed by time and other training restrictions. Others simply argue the poor leadership of the Guard is to blame. Still others cite a lack of political will necessary to exercise call-up authority, or lack of courage to assume the risks of mobilizing Army National Guard units, as reasons for precluding these units from the list of early deployers. In the end, the majority of these articles conclude that too many problems exist to consider Army National Guard units ready for early deployment. Is there a choice? Changes to the force outlined in the Bottom-Up Review demand that the Active Component rely on the Reserve Component to provide the flexibility needed to meet the force requirements of fighting two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). It is important to note the Reserve Component provides more than 53% of the combat support and 69% of the combat service support units that the Army needs to sustain itself in combat. Unless Congress brings back conscription, the Reserve Component, including the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, remain the primary means of rapidly enlarging the force. Of even greater importance is the fact that some units exist exclusively in the Reserve Components. (Appendix D lists the Combat Support and Combat Service Support contributions that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve make to the Total Army). Subsequently, today's force structure does not allow for any other possibility except to include Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool units among Active Component early deployers. Therefore, Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool units must successfully validate pre-mobilization training to meet their early deployment schedules by focusing the limited amount of training time available on mission essential tasks necessary to accomplish their wartime mission. This paper does not examine the controversial issues surrounding the roundout/ roundup units. The Rand Corporation, Brookings Institute, Department of the Army Inspector General, Government Accounting Office and others have all conducted extensive reviews and detailed analysis identifying shortfalls involved when integrating these units into the Active Force.1 On one side of the argument are critics who feel that National Guard combat units' lack of proficiency poses an unacceptable risk for these units to be considered capable of early deployment. On the other side are critics who contend that DOD has inflated enemy capabilities, has used inadequate performance measures to assess reserve capability and has downplayed roundout unit capability. In between are critics who feel roundout units are a necessary and acceptable risk. Nor does this paper examine the controversial issues surrounding the inherent trade- offs associated with deploying National Guard units in terms of cost or a Presidential decision to selectively call-up the Reserve Components. Congress decides the controversial tradeoff issues surrounding capability, time, responsiveness and dollars when funding the force structure. Likewise, while the National Command Authority has access to the Reserve Components for period of 270 days under a Selective Call-up to execute our National Security Strategy, what happens after that is subject to Congressional debate. (Appendix F provides a list of the different mobilization categories as well as several mobilization situations when the National Command Authority would call the Reserves). Recent history has demonstrated this debate can and does influence the way forces flow into theater (as was the case with Desert Shield). Needless to say, while this debate occurs, forces must react and prepare to execute assigned missions. When forces arrive on scene, they must have the combat power and capability to provide the National Command Authority a strategic option while Congress continues the debate over use of military force. Instead, this paper focuses on how the Army National Guard is meeting the challenges of today's force structure while contributing to the prosecution of our National Security Strategy. First, it gives a historical perspective of how our nation has used Guard units in the past to meet our nation's crises. Next, it outlines how the Army Guard's early deploying Contingency Force Pool units are part of today's power projection strategy. Third, it gives a brief overview of the Guard's roles and missions and describes the training requirements necessary to meet pre-mobilization and post-mobilization standards. Fourth, it delineates some of the constraints early deploying units face when conducting training. Fifth, it highlights how these units can maximize the limited training time available to them. Finally, this paper cites several ways the Active Component training associations can help their Army Guard counterparts prepare and train for their wartime missions. In the end, not only will America's Army benefit from this mutual cooperation, but our nation will be able to execute its national strategy while reaping the peace dividend the end of the Cold War offers. This paper is exclusively concerned with the Army National Guard. Whenever the term Guard appears, it is in reference to the Army National Guard and not the Air National Guard. Understanding the organization, roles and missions of the Army National Guard is not an easy task. Also confusing are the differences between the Active and Reserve Components. Appendix B provides selected definitions that will enable the reader to follow this text with minimum hindrance. Furthermore, Appendix A lists all the acronyms found in the manuscript for easy referral. Finally, the bibliography identifies the sources that provided the most useful information when writing this paper. Historical Perspective For more than 350 years, the Army National Guard has been a part of a unique American military tradition. Since its birth, the United States has relied on the citizen- soldiers of the Army National Guard, previously titled the Militia, to answer its call in times of domestic and international crisis. Changes in recent years, with the end of the Post-Cold war world and diminished global but increased regional threats in the face of declining budgets, offer a new challenge to our military forces. Part of that challenge is the increased responsibility that force structure changes place on the Army National Guard. The force structure debate has long been a politically sensitive issue. On one hand, Reserve component forces are less expensive. On the other hand, reserve component forces tend to be less ready than active component forces and, consequently, require more time to respond to national emergencies. Defining the relative costs and capabilities have made it difficult for national decision makers to come to grips with an appropriate active-reserve force structure mix. Colonial Beginnings Formed in 1636, the first militia regiments protected the early settlers from hostile Indians. As time passed, militia men fought the Pequot War in New England (1637), and still later the French and Indian War (1754-1763). By 1774, the political situation between Great Britain and Colonial American had deteriorated to the point where local volunteers began to arm themselves against the standing British army. Expected to turn out in a moment's notice, these volunteers were called "minutemen." Days before the Battle of Bunker Hill, Continental Congress took control of the war effort as the volunteer force structure gave way to the newly formed Continental Army. After the Revolutionary war, Congress adopted the Constitution of the United States. Provisions of the Constitution explicitly granted Congress the power to raise and maintain forces in peacetime, and in time of war. The same document also gave Congress the power to employ these forces for internal and external security. A debate ensued concerning the size and type of force this nation would employ. Weary of the large standing armies in Europe that were expensive to maintain, Congress opted for a more equitable solution, a solution that would not require the increase levying of taxes to pay for such an Army. In 1792, Congress passed the Militia Act that established the force structure Congress felt necessary to meet the requirements of the infant democracy. This act allowed the states to maintain standing militias composed mainly of volunteers. Unfortunately, the Militia Act left the affairs of raising and equipping the militia up to the individual states. In many states, volunteer militia men paid for their own uniforms and equipment and served without pay. Other states simply ignored the act, because it had no provisions for non-compliance with the law. In 1898, the Spanish-American war raised the question over the President's right to "federalize" the militia. Largely dependent on the militia-volunteers, the Spanish American war uncovered serious flaws in the military's ability to mobilize and deploy. Success as a world power required the United States to consider serious reforms of its military. Charged to modernize the Army, Elihu Root, Secretary of War under President McKinley, knew that money to affect such a change would have to come from Congress. Once again, Congress would decide the fate of our nation's Armed forces. Turn of the Century to World War II Since the turn of the century, Congress has decided the debate between costs versus capability. In 1903, the Dick Act formerly established the National Guard as the nation's primary reserve component force. The Dick Act established formal procedures for the federal government to take a more active role in organizing, training and equipping the National Guard in line with the standards of the Regular Army. In 1916, in response to the war in Europe and the revolution and political unrest in Mexico, again a debate ensued concerning the difficulty in mobilizing the state militias. Subsequently, Congress passed The National Defense Act which guaranteed the state militia's status as the Army's primary reserve force and mandated the title: National Guard. Throughout this century the National Guard has responded to our nation's wars, declared or undeclared and other national emergencies. During World War I, the National Guard provided eighteen combat divisions, about 40% of the entire American Expeditionary Force.2 Many of these Divisions, notably the 26th and 42nd Divisions were among the best trained divisions in the Army and served as first-line troops. According to captured records, Germans listed eight American Divisions as excellent or superior. Six of the eight were National Guard units. Again in World War II, the National Guard provided a significant contribution to the Allied victory.3 Divided between the Pacific and European theaters, nineteen National Guard Divisions engaged in combat and earned more than 148 Presidential Unit Citations. Guardsmen fought in every battle from Bataan to Berlin, and fourteen National Guardsmen received the Medal of Honor. Korea to Vietnam Between World War II and the Korean War, the National Guard acted as an expansion force for a total and prolonged mobilization. in June 1950, the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula found the United States once again unprepared for war. The president did not mobilize the first Army National Guard units until August of that year. This partial mobilization of the reserves put eight National Guard divisions on active duty.4 Two National Guard divisions deployed to Korea, two went to Germany and the rest provided a rotation and replacement base back in the States. When it was over, National Guard units returned home having maintained a reputation for patriotism, courage and competence equal to the reputation earned during World War II. Following the Korean experience, a rapid-response role for the reserve began to take shape.5 The high political costs and dramatic consequences associated with mobilizing citizen-soldiers made them exceptionally effective as an instrument for signifying United States' resolve. President Kennedy played this political card in the early '60s, calling up more than 45,000 National Guard soldiers to active duty for the Berlin Crisis and another 14,000 during the intense, albeit brief, Cuban missile crisis. Using reserves as instruments of diplomacy has its downside. Reservists mobilized during this period became disgruntled and complained to the press about their ill-defined military mission. Conversely, failure to use the reserves also has its negative side. Seeking to limit the expanding war in Vietnam, President Johnson astounded the defense establishment by refusing to call up the reserve components. Failure to call up the reserves had disastrous consequences. First, failure to mobilize the National Guard dissipated the Army's leadership and experience levels as the war progressed. Failure to mobilize also forced the Army to take "out of hide" the forces it could not get from the National Guard. The Army debased the forces stationed in other theaters to fill the ranks in Southeast Asia. Second, once it became apparent that the president was not going to call up the Guard, it became a haven for those seeking to avoid military service. Dedicated Guardsmen agonized over the disintegration of their units that took years for the impact to diminish. More importantly, Johnson's policy"...without involving the larger community, meant that the general populace had no stake in it, and therefore no motivation to ensure that the sacrifices of those that did serve were in some way validated by the eventual outcome."6 The Evolving Total Force Policy General Creighton Abrams, when he served as Chief of Staff of the Army, tried to avoid repeating the same mistake. He adopted a force structure that would never again allow the United States to go to war without the reserves. A highly decorated hero of three wars, Abrams saw first hand how"... unprepared America was for each of them."7 Both the Military Service Act of 1971 and the Defense Authorization Act of 1973 publicly reaffirmed the nation's reliance on the reserve component. These congressional actions sought to integrate the Reserve Component with the Active Component and became the foundation for the Total Force Policy. In 1976, Congress passed Section 673b of Title 10 U.S.C., which gave the president access to the Reserve Component without having to declare a national emergency or even partial mobilization. Section 673b authority also allowed the president to meet deployment requirements for major contingencies without stockpiling military capability in the active force. More importantly, Section 673b authority allows the president to augment the active forces for a limited time without a debate with Congress. (See Appendix F). Finally, access to the reserve's capabilities allowed planners to rely more on the Reserve Component for inclusion in operational missions. This reliance is such that some military capabilities exist solely in the reserve forces and thus are unavailable without at least a selected call-up (unless individual soldiers willingly volunteer for active duty). In 1983, the Total Force structure became a reality, when approximately 50% of the Army's combat support and 70% of the combat service support units were in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Seven years later in August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the President promptly mobilized selected National Guard combat support and combat service support units. The Department of Defense eventually federalized 398 Army National Guard units and 62,411 soldiers for Operation Desert Storm.8 In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, summarized the contributions of these soldiers: The success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last ten years to strengthen the Total Force concept.9 Recently, the sources and nature of the global threat, the emerging realities of fiscal constraints and the lessons learned from Desert Storm have forced Congress to open this debate again. Inevitably Congress and the Department of Defense must make adjustments to cope with the realities of new policy, and the global strategy and missions required to achieve it. The current down sizing of our military establishment, coupled with the simultaneous increase in world deployments, demands even more of the reserve components. Today, the reliance on the National Guard, in particular the Contingency Force Pool (CFP) units, is part of our national strategy. Designated as early deploying units, CFP units provide the theater Commander in Chief an accessible, available and capable rapid augmentation and reinforcement force. In times of a national crisis, National Guard Contingency Force Pool units must be capable of meeting pre- deployment standards and, ultimately, capable of performing their wartime mission. Partners In the Total Force Following the experience of fighting an unpopular war in Vietnam, the Army leadership sought to embrace the will of the American public by mobilizing the National Guard. First articulated in 1970, the "Total Force" policy sought to integrate Active and Reserve component units. In 1974, under the titles CAPSTONE and Directed Training Association (DTA) (See Appendix B), the Army aligned Active component units with Reserve component units into wartime organizations. Designed to support the Cold War era strategy, these programs focused on supporting requirements of a Unified or Specified Commander in Chief in specific Outside Continental United States. (OCONUS) areas. Old CAPSTONE Also created to permit rapid integration of Reserve Component units into a cohesive fighting organization, Reserve Component units would conduct wartime planning during peacetime with the assistance of an Active Component counterpart. Under the titles Cortrain, Roundout/Roundup and Affiliation, these formal relationships sought to improve the training proficiency of Reserve Component units. CAPSTONE planning associations tied the Reserve Component unit to a specific war plan. Reserve Component units received initial mission planning guidance from their CAPSTONE wartime command. Unit planning and training focused on this wartime mission guidance. CAPSTONE guidance had to be specific enough for the unit to formulate its Mission Essential Task List (METL). Pre-mobilization and post- mobilization training would generally focus on wartime missions that had specific Reserve Component/Active Component alignments based on a CINC's OPLAN. Roundout/Roundup units were centerpieces of this strategy. Only selected Active Component divisions participated in this program. Under this concept, an Active Component division would consist of two Active Component brigades augmented by a third Reserve Component "Roundout" brigade that would bring the division up to full strength.10 Using this approach, the Army planned to fight on future battlefields with the Reserve Component at its side and the support of the American people behind its cause.11 This had one major and significant implication: America would never again go to war without mobilizing the Reserves. The first real test of the "Total Force" strategy was Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. While successful in deploying more than sixty Colonel/Lieutenant Colonel Army National Guard commands to South West Asia, the Army failed to deploy combat Roundout/Roundup maneuver brigades and battalions.12 Although the Army military leadership may be partly to blame for undercutting a well conceived and meticulously planned strategy, they do not shoulder all the blame.13 Part of the blame goes to the Department of Defense and the incremental way in which it mobilized National Guard units for federal service. Because Operation Desert Storm was a selected call-up, Army planners worked under restrictions imposed by law (See Appendix F). Back then, a fundamental flaw in the law, under Title 10, United States Code 673b, limited the President's Selected Reserve call-up to 200,000 reservists for 90 days, with the possible extension of another 90 days. Consequently,"...the Army lacked specific plans for correcting personnel and equipment shortages under a limited call-up...."14 However, except for roundout units,15 the Army's overall implementation of the Total Force policy resulted in a high degree of success. This successful integration of reserve units was the result of years of considerable efforts to meet high standards of readiness and deployability. Working relationships, particularly between reserve component units and VII Corps, endured the change of mission from Europe to Southwest Asia and contributed to the smooth transition into the new theater.16 New CAPSTONE To project power worldwide on short notice, today's force must be adaptable and accessible. In attempting to achieve this agility, the new force structure strategy redefines CAPSTONE. CAPSTONE no longer reflects a wartime relationship.17 The new CAPSTONE strategy orients the pooling/force generation concept to support deploying corps and major contingency requirements based on the requirements of a unified or Specified Commander in Chief (CINC). Designed to support the CONUS- based contingency strategy, the new CAPSTONE shifts the focus from specific OPLAN traces to contingency operations under a CONUS based corps. Oriented on fighting and winning two simultaneous major regional contingencies, CAPSTONE now aligns force packages based on geographical and functional factors. Rapid force generation and force power projection worldwide provides the CINC with strategic agility. Essentially, both Active and Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units form a pool designed to support the Crisis Response Force. Called the Contingency Force Pool, these units are no longer tied to any single war plan or theater of operation. Rather, Army planners have developed force packages designed to meet worldwide requirements based on the warfighting CINC's requirements. A unit's capabilities determine its selection to fill a requirement in a force package. The National Guard Bureau closely monitors the readiness posture of all its early deploying units. If the unit is not ready when required, the Bureau may substitute another unit in its place. Additionally, the Army has discontinued the Roundout/Roundup concept. In its place, a new concept, the Enhanced Readiness Brigade, seeks to generate sufficient combat power to meet worldwide needs based on current unit readiness. No longer do these units fill a structurally aligned divisional organization with two Active Component brigades and one Reserve Component brigade. Rather, the new Enhanced Readiness Brigade concept calls for separate brigades with a self-sustaining force structure apparatus that enables the warfighting CINC to increase his combat capability. As part of an Early Reinforcing Force (ERF), these enhanced brigades"...will be able to deploy worldwide to reinforce active Army combat units with less than 90 days of post- mobilization training."18 National Guard Contingency Force Pool and Enhanced Readiness Brigades are funded and staffed at a level that improves their early deploying capability. These units maintain a higher degree of readiness to meet pre-deployment standards than was previously authorized prior to Desert Storm.19 By meeting pre-deployment standards, the units theoretically should be able to complete post-mobilization training within deployment schedule timelines. The goal is to deploy according to the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) schedule. (See Appendix B). More importantly, the new CAPSTONE provides a unit alignment (Active Component to Reserve Component) that coincides with the pooling of forces concept. It designates Active Component forces as Directed Training Associations to the Contingency Force Pool unit or units. Active Component units may have to sponsor more than one Contingency Force Pool unit because of the limited combat support and combat service support units currently in the Active Component. Because this concept does not tie Contingency Force Pool units to any one war plan, the integration of these units creates significant problems. Force Structure Changes First, force structure changes disrupt habitual relationships established between DTA sponsors and CFP units. Several times a year, Management of Change reviews update the Contingency Force Pool. Unit changes to the Contingency Force Pool result from unit inactivation or sustained poor readiness ratings.20 Force structure actions or Department of the Army (DA) guidance, drive these changes with inputs from NGB, USARC, Corps and CONUSA headquarters and approval by Forces Command (FORSCOM). Changes to the CFP list insure the most combat capable forces are available from the National Guard and Army Reserve. Simultaneously, these reviews may also result in changes in Directed Training Associations. These changes may have negative impacts in the way Contingency Force Pool units prepare and train for their wartime missions. National Guard Contingency Force Pool units rely on their Directed Training Associations for wartime guidance. This guidance helps develop training plans that support wartime missions. Directed Training Associations assist National Guard units in the development of the unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) and associated Battle Tasks. Guidance received by the Contingency Force Pool unit drives unit training. Mission guidance must be sufficient for the National Guard unit to formulate its METL. The Mission Essential Task List is a compilation of mission essential tasks that an organization must be able to successfully perform to accomplish its wartime mission.21 Similar to the old CAPSTONE concept, National Guard units must have their METL approved by its Directed Training Association. Unfortunately, the fluid environment of the current force structure draw down, coupled with force structure changes, "throws the guidance into the wind."22 The Bottom-Up Review outlined a force structure strategy that would enable the United States to fight and win two simultaneous, major regional conflicts. Until the force sizing and re-stationing that achieve this strategy are complete, changes to the force structure will continue to occur. Consequently, many units are receiving very little or no guidance from their wartime alignments.23 Second, non-habitual relationships with Directed Training Associations adversely affect the Contingency Force Pool unit's ability to conduct peacetime training necessary to accomplish their wartime missions. There is a direct link between the METL development process and the deployability of a unit. METL task development and the subsequent selection of Battle Tasks24 allow commanders to focus limited resources on essential warfighting tasks. Commanders at the separate company level and above publish their yearly training guidance to the next subordinate level of command. Commanders issue their yearly training guidance directed at attaining a desirable level of proficiency based on their METL. Accordingly, commanders plan and schedule their Yearly Training Plans focused on Battle Tasks derived from their METL. Undoubtedly, units suffer without a clear statement of the wartime guidance. Subsequent commander's guidance may miss the mark. Training priorities may lead the unit to focus on non-critical battle tasks. Lack of a focused effort, designed to accomplish the commander's intent, squanders valuable resources and time. Third, this lack of focus during pre-mobilization training may disrupt the post- mobilization training. Ultimately, post-mobilization training suffers without clearly focused wartime guidance. In turn, Post-Mobilization Training Support Requirements (PTSR) may not accurately reflect the degree and length of training required to achieve deployment standards. Hence, units may require additional training which has the potential for upsetting the time schedule for follow on forces who would compete for the same training areas and support resources at the mobilization station. Finally, these structure changes create a void for the reserve commander who relies heavily on the Active Component DTA for external directives to develop the METL. For a select number of Contingency Force Pool units there are a shortage of doctrinally correct, up to date Mission Training Plans.25 Mission Training Plans are descriptive training documents that describe the "what" and "how to" train to achieve wartime mission proficiency. They provide comprehensive training outlines that list the tasks, conditions and standards required for successful mission execution. Commanders must know the published standard for the supporting collective tasks derived from their unit's METL to assess unit proficiency. The commander develops his training program to sustain unit strengths and correct unit deficiencies based on this assessment. In the absence of current doctrinally correct standards from the Mission Training Plan, and a lack of specific Direct Training Association guidance, development of tactical standing operating procedures becomes a tricky proposition. Like a football team without a play book, during the game there may be some good blocking and tackling, but without a synchronized team effort chances for victory are marginal. National Guard leaders must not only have the correct play book (MTPs); they must also know the plays (standards) based on the overarching game strategy (wartime guidance). Anything less invites disaster. Increased reliance, force structure changes, force modernization efforts and a myriad of new training programs and requirements demand a high state of individual and unit readiness. The Bottom-Up Review provided the impetus for further clarifying service roles, missions and functions. As the transition continues from a base-force designed to win the Cold War fight, to a power projection force, the role of Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool units is even greater. Faced with these unprecedented challenges, National Guard leaders and soldiers strive to achieve excellence and accomplish the mission under severe constraints. Knowing their missions and understanding these limitations will help planners develop an enhanced, unsentimental appreciation of Army Guard capabilities when integrating National Guard units into the OPLAN. Roles and Missions of the Army National Guard The National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 established the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to review the current allocation of roles, missions, and functions among the services. Within the next year this commission will report its independent findings to Congress, Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Defense Act charged the commission with defining broad mission areas and key support requirements in an attempt to reduce duplicating overhead while achieving dynamic effectiveness.26 With the end of conscription in July 1973, the reserves provide the National Command Authority the principal means for rapidly expanding the military in times of national emergency. The basic rationale for maintaining a strong reserve force rests on economic grounds.27 Within a given budget level, Reserve forces provide the maximum military capability at a minimum cost. Barring any unforeseen changes by the Commission on Roles and Missions, the Guard's role as a strategic force supporting United States foreign policy will remain unchanged. Since 1789, the Army National Guard has provided that capability at an affordable cost. Formally established by the United States Constitution and further amplified by the United States code, the Army National Guard serves as both a Federal Reserve force and State militia. The federal government determines the number of authorized personnel and the force structure mix across the country. The states reserve the authority to locate units and their headquarters. Under this dual role, the Army National Guard is accessible to both the National Command Authority and to state governors. Federal Role The Federal Role of the Army National Guard is to support U.S. national security objectives. When ordered to Federal duty, the Army National Guard becomes a component of the active Army. Organized into 54 separate state and territorial commands, the Army National Guard's end strength (1994) is roughly 410,000 soldiers. Currently, the Army National Guard provides 53% of the combat, 34% of the combat support and 34% of the combat service support for the total Army.28 State Role The State Role of the Army National Guard is to protect life and property, and to preserve peace, order and public safety. Its community role is to participate in local, state and national programs that add value to America. Army National Guard soldiers provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies as well as community relief efforts. Each year, Army National Guard soldiers provide assistance to communities besieged by civil disturbances, snow emergencies, floods, hurricanes and forest fires. Called to state active duty29 by the governors of 47 states, approximately 34,000 soldiers participated in 326 military support missions in Fiscal Year 1993. Additionally, Army Guard soldiers participated in 4,182 drug interdiction operations in all 54 Guard jurisdictions during that same-year. Training Requirements Army Regulation 350-41 outlines training requirements and identifies a training strategy that provides a framework for meeting those requirements. "The goal of Army training is to produced a force trained to mobilize, deploy, fight, and win anywhere in the world. The objective of Army training is unit readiness."30 Yet, the Army has continually had difficulty in clearly delineating what "unit readiness"is and how to measure it.31 Training Readiness Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication One, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, refers to readiness as military capability. Milltary cability is the ability to achieve a specific war time objective. (It includes four components: force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability.) The same document refers to operational readiness as the capability of a unit to perform the missions for which it was organized or designed. Force structure decisions and funding constraints, beyond the control of the unit, drive personnel and equipment authorizations. A unit is ready if it has the necessary personnel and equipment authorized by its Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), can conduct its organizational mission and can sustain itself in the field. Effective training is what shapes soldiers and leaders into cohesive units that can perform their wartime mission and sustain themselves in combat. Pre-Mobilization Training All National Guard units conduct pre-mobilization training. The goal is to be trained on all pre-mobilization tasks prior to mobilization. The objective of that training"...is to establish a level of proficiency that provides the foundation for the execution of the post-mobilization plan culminating in validation for deployment."32 Pre-mobilization training concentrates on training critical collective and individual tasks derived from the Mission Essential Task List to the established standard. Guidance provided by the next higher wartime commander focuses this training effort.33 Pre-mobilization task proficiency provides the foundation for the next level of unit training during post- mobilization. Post-Mobilization Training National Guard units use post-mobilization training to complete training on critical Mission Essential Tasks not trained to proficiency during pre-mobilization training. When the unit arrives at the mobilization station, the mobilization station commander conducts an assessment to determine the level of proficiency the unit has achieved in mission essential tasks. The unit commander works with the mobilization station commander and identifies unit weaknesses that require post-mobilization training. Units use post-mobilization training time to correct noted deficiencies and conduct post- mobilization training identified in the FORSCOM Mobilization and Planning System (FORMDEPS). Throughout this process the active component mobilization station commanders, augmented by active component Readiness Group training teams, assist the unit in preparation for deployment. Units often need additional resources to conduct post-mobilization training required for their wartime mission. The mobilization station commander provides these resources. Each year, units must identify Post-Mobilization Training Support Requirements (PTSR) in accordance with FORMDEPS. Resources such as training ammunition, ranges, training areas and billeting are some of the many items units need to complete post-mobilization training. The unit commander's assessment of the unit's ability to conduct its wartime mission will determine these resource requirements. Without wartime guidance from the Active Component war trace, the unit commander's PTSR may not accurately reflect post-mobilization training requirements. Designing a training strategy that focuses on wartime METL related tasks and enhances unit capabilities is a challenge. The commanders training strategy results from his interpetation of the war trace guidance, coupled with his assessment of unit capabilities. Training strategies determine who, what, where and when to train. Planning training strategies ensures that training focuses on critical METL related tasks; that training frequency for a given tasks is sufficient; and that adequate resources support the training requirements. For the Army Guard CFP unit commander, this challenge is even greater because of the significant training constraints he must consider when developing his training strategy. Training Constraints-Limitations In developing training strategies that enhance unit capabilities, CFP unit commanders must consider training constraints that their units must overcome. Four of the key considerations include personnel, equipment, time and terrain. If managed properly, they can become combat multipliers that enhance a unit's warfighting capability and ability to deploy early. On the other hand, if neglected, they can undermine all the effort put into developing a comprehensive training strategy and impede early deployment. Personnel The first factor that impedes Guard deployability is individual readiness. A recent (1994) Rand Study defined individual readiness as"...available and qualified to perform assigned missions and functions." As a member of a unit, soldiers become available by law once they are ordered to federal duty. During Desert Shield, 100% of the soldiers called-up reported for Active Duty.34 For National Guard units then; personnel problems result mainly from the soldiers that are not qualified in their duty Military Occupation Skill (MOS). The National Guard receives unqualified soldiers into Guard units in several ways. Inter-service transfers, unit reflagging as a result of the Bottom-Up Review, lateral transfers and even career progression contribute to the problem of soldiers not being duty MOS qualified. Non-duty MOS qualified soldiers35, affect unit readiness to the extent that they detract from unit collective training. Units must overcome individual readiness or duty-MOS proficiency shortfalls before the unit can execute aggressive collective training. Equipment Next, three significant problems arise concerning equipment for the National Guard: Equipment maintenance, equipment mismatches (Active Component to Reserve Component) and equipment availability. Funding constraints36 and the procurement process both hinder the resolution of the first two problems.37 Equipment modernization efforts in the National Guard to achieve interoperability with the Active Component will probably take years to remedy and never fully be resolved. Therefore, deployment sequence as identified in the TPFDD must dermine the priority of effort for these units. This will ensure that the Army equips early deployers with the best and most modern equipment available. Moreover, it will allow decision makers to upgrade follow-on forces as time permits, as was the case in Desert Storm. The third problem, however, needs some thoughtful consideration, because it impedes a unit's ability to complete post- mobilization training to standard which could influence a CINC's plans for that unit when it arrives in theater. Contrary to the doctrinal maxiinum38 of training to standard and not to time, Desert Storm mobilization experiences showed just the opposite. In fact, a March 1992 General Accounting Office report found that the Army tailored training to time rather than specific proficiency levels. The problem stemmed from meeting equipment deployment dates. The Army established equipment "deployment dates to coincide with airlift and sealift capability, with the result that a unit's equipment often had to be sent to the Gulf before the unit had completed its training at the mobilization site."39 These early shipment dates also influenced the quality of training units received. Units interrupted collective training at the company level and above to satisfy shipping equipment before the unit achieved training standards. Whenever a unit was unable to complete its training deployment, the unit commander received guidance on the skills the unit needed to improve and instructions to continue training once the unit arrived in the Gulf. Time Another principal factor hampering the assignment of selected National Guard units to early deployment missions is the lack of training time. The typical Army National Guard unit has 39 days a year available to conduct training. Units divide this training time into two categories: Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT). Inactive Duty Training normally occurs on a weekend, with units training one weekend a month for a total of 24 days. The focus for IDT training encompasses individual and collective skills, with most of the time devoted to the former. The AT period usually occurs in the summer and consists of one 15-day period where the focus of training is on collective skills. By regulation, the 39 days a year that National Guard soldiers train is the minimum time required. During these 39 days, the Army leadership expects National Guard units to accomplish all the individual and collective tasks required by their wartime mission. Often these tasks are too many and too complex to master in the time available. Consequently, National Guard leaders devote a significant amount of additional time to accomplish their mission. Therefore, the extremely limited amount of actual training time within the constraints of a 39 day training year net severe readiness implications. Mandatory and recurring training that detracts from progressive building of acquired knowledge further exacerbate these limitations. Individual soldier proficiency training competes with other unit operational and training requirements. Tasking from higher headquarters to participate in community related operations such as parades, crowds out training at the organizational level. In addition, units lose valuable training time traveling to and from training areas that units require to conduct maneuver training. Because of all these time-to-train constraints, National Guard units generally focus training at lower levels, such as company and platoon.40 Terrain Finally, two problems Army National Guard units face every time they train are unit dispersion and lack of sufficiently diverse maneuver space to accommodate realistic tactical training. In the first instance a study by the Brookings Institute on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve found: On average, a reserve unit (battalion or separate company) is located more than 100 miles from its headquarters, about 130 miles from its major equipment site, more than 150 miles from its major training area, over 65 miles from a rifle range, and close to 10 miles from a motor pool.41 What that equates to is that a unit would need to spend two plus hours on the road just to get to the Unit Equipment Maintenance Site (UTES) in order to draw the equipment using buses driving the speed limit (55mph). Once the unit has drawn the equipment, traveling to the training areas could take another three plus hours (at 55 miles an hour, range regulations may allow for 35 miles an hour for wheeled vehicles, 25 an hour for track vehicles). Hence, the unit spends much of the weekend's prime training time on the road traveling to and from training. Once the unit arrives at the training site, the training area itself presents the second problem. Most of platoon and company level ARTEP tasks require a maneuver box that supports the condition within which the unit can accomplish those tasks. For example, ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP requires a maneuver box of 6 kilometers by 12 kilometers for a scout platoon to conduct the screening mission.42 Bowling alley training areas and environmental restrictions limit the amount of maneuver space. Consequently, insufficient terrain hampers ARTEP training which results in degradation of unit readiness. Operational Readiness Initiatives During the Gulf War, the call-up of National Guard units uncovered various critical problems that mobilization regulations and prior mobilization planning failed to address. First, Department of the Army wrote Army Mobilization and Operations. Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) and FORMDEPS regulations based on partial and full mobilizations and not for a selected call-up such as Desert Shield. (See Appendix F). This caused problems for the smooth transition of units at the mobilization station in the areas of personnel mobilization, clothing, finance, dental and health records. Much of the confusion concerned the standard required for unit deployment. Second, selected Combat Support and Combat Service Support units required a significant amount of personnel and equipment cross leveling. The Army had resourced many of these units at a level of authorized fill that allowed only 65% of their equipment on hand. At the same time, several units had personnel who were non-deployable for one reason or another. Third, in some cases, when units reported at the mobilization stations, mobilization station personnel ignored previous training documentation that certified a particular level of proficiency. This required the unit to revalidate tasks that they had already successfully completed. Fourth, the mission required some Combat Support and Combat Service Support units during the early phases of Operation Desert Shield before the selected call-up. Because the president had yet to call the reserves, these units were not available to the warfighting CINC. Finally, war planners selectively chose units because of the limitations imposed by the law under Title 10, United States Code 673b. War planners sought to fill force requirements with Active component instead of Reserve component units, in the event Reserve Component units would not extend beyond the 180 day limit imposed by law. (See Appendix F). All these problems delayed or prohibited the smooth transition of units at the mobilization station which disrupted plans to focus their post-mobilization training on warfighting tasks. Resolving these problems required units to use time that they might have otherwise spent training on critical mission essential tasks. Recognizing these limitations and other training restrictions, Regular Army and National Guard leaders actively sought programs and legislation that would rectify the myriad of problems units identified when the Guard mobilized for Desert Storm. These leaders established the Bold Shift program, Project Standard Bearer, Operational Readiness Evaluations, Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act of 1992 and National Defense Authorization Act for FY95, to improve the readiness and accessibility of the Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool units. Bold Shift Bold Shift is a series of seven Army initiatives that were the first of many aimed at integrating the National Guard, active Army and Army Reserve and improving the readiness of reserve forces. Two overall objectives of Bold Shift included: (1) establishment of the validation standards and criteria to be used across the Total Army for deployment (2) identification of resource shortfalls and readiness enhancements that require intervention at higher levels of command. Instituted to validate the operational readiness of early deploying units and the ability of those units to conduct their wartime mission, Bold Shift focuses on critical personnel, logistics and training tasks mainly at the company and platoon level. Project Standard Bearer Simultaneous to the Army initiatives, the National Guard has instituted Project Standard Bearer. Project Standard Bearer focuses on developing, coordinating and institutionalizing policy and programs that ensure the Guard is ready to be a full partner in the Total Force.43 Project Standard Bearer ensures that early deploying units can attain and sustain required levels of readiness through priority resourcing. The goal for Contingency Force Pool units and enhanced readiness brigades is to maintain C-1 readiness in personnel and equipment. Results of this program have shown a notable improvement in sustained readiness of these early deploying units. The current deployability rate of the Contingency Force Pool units is 97 percent.44 Another Project Standard Bearer initiative makes the 55 earliest deploying Contingency Force Pool units45 available for deployment in a volunteer federal status. Called the Operational Unit Program, it provides the gaining CINC with fully mission capable units within seven days of an alert. State Adjutant Generals volunteer units for this program. The Guard can mobilize these soldiers with their consent and the consent of the governors. It provides the gaining CINC a unique force surge without having to invoke any of the mobilization levels. Title XI - The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act In 1992, Congress passed the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act to get Guard units into the battle early and to provide decisive reinforcing forces. Also called Title XI legislation, this act was a series of 18 initiatives that enhanced the Guard deployability, made Guard units more compatible with Active component units, improved the development of Guard leaders, ensured the medical readiness of Guard soldiers and improved the Army's capability to assess Guard capabilities. Title XI to a large degree formalized the training enhancements and initiatives that were part of both the Bold Shift and Operation Standard Bearer programs. Leadership in the Guard and the Army aggressively desired to eliminate all obstacles that would inhibit early deployment Central to this goal was the integration of Active component Officers, Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers with the early deploying units. This extremely important initiative assigns 3000 Active component soldiers to the Army National Guard as Resident Training Detachments (RTD) or Reserve Training Teams (RTT) to enhance the readiness posture of the early deployers. Well under way, the Army will have filled these positions by October 1996. Undoubtedly, increased Active Component support, integrated with ongoing programs, provides a mission-focused structure that enhances individual and collective training. Active Component Reserve Training Teams provide assistance to Contingency Force Pool units on an area basis. Active Component Resident Training Detachments located with National Guard Enhanced Readiness Brigade subordinate units provide dedicated training support and assistance. Unlike Readiness Groups that have an advisory role, the Reserve Training Teams and Resident Training Detachments have a direct role in the conduct and execution of unit training. Officers and soldiers assigned to the Resident Training Detachments are physically located with the unit. In addition, Reserve Training Teams and Resident Training Detachments provide invaluable experience and expertise to developing comprehensive training stragies aimed at correcting unit deficiencies. FY95 National Defense Authorization Act Besides the steps taken to enhance the readiness of the National Guard, the Army has recently established measures to improve the accessibility of those units. The FY95 Defense Authorization Act incorporated two key pieces of legislation that make Army National Guard units more accessible to the National Command Authority. Call-up Authority under"...Section 673b title 10 United States Code, is amended in subsection (a) by striking out '90 days' and inserting in lieu thereof '270 days'..."46 This change permits the President to authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to order up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve to active duty for a single 270 day period, at times other than war or national emergency. Keep in mind the 270 day period allows the President to selectively call-up the reserve without a Congressional debate. Any time after that would require Congressional approval. (See Appendix F). Another provision in the FY95 National Defense Authorization Act is the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA). ROPMA provides for the call-up of Army National Guard "elements" as needed to provide a balanced force. It implies that the Guard may deploy squads or platoons or companies or detachments piecemeal. In other words, it gives a unique surge capability without deploying entire companies, battalions or brigades. At last, this act may have removed barriers to deploying National Guard units early in a crisis. Operational Readiness Evaluation Finally, to ensure these units gained and maintained the level of readiness required for early deployment, the Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) program evaluates units slated for early deployment. Active Component, Army National Guard and Army Reserve early deployers all are subject to an ORE. Started in 1992, this program provides commanders with an external, objective evaluation of their unit's ability to perform its wartime mission in a peacetime environment. Also, the ORE evaluates post- alert and post-mobilization plans as well as identifying systemic problems that would prevent a unit from deploying and performing its wartime mission. The ORE divides the evaluation into three phases. First, the Compliance Phase evaluates the unit's ability to mobilize and deploy. Evaluators check personnel qualification records, personnel mobilization readiness files, personnel administrative files, training management records, unit mobilization files, supply management records and maintenance management records. In each area, evaluators screen critical items of information, including mission essential equipment, to identify any shortfalls that would preclude the unit from meeting its scheduled deployment dates. Readiness areas that are consistent with deployment validation receive a "GO" or "NOGO" rating depending on how well they meet evaluation criteria identified in the evaluator checklist. Second, the Training Phase consists of two parts: collective task evaluation and individual task evaluation. The ORE builds the collective task evaluation around a scenario driven, situational training exercise using the unit commander's METL in tasks that he has rated the unit (T) trained or (P) needs practice. Evaluators measure unit performance against collective supporting task extracts from the associated ARTEP or MTP to determine the overall unit proficiency. A unit receives a "GO" or "NOGO" based upon a 65% pass rate.47 The individual task evaluation consists of Common Task Testing (CTT), Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) and verifying the battle sight zero of the soldier's individual weapon. Evaluators grade the individual phase according to published Army standards. To achieve an overall "GO", 65% of the soldiers tested must pass the event. Third, the Report Phase generates several reports that identiy unit shortfalls which require corrective action. At the conclusion of the evaluation, the unit commander receives an outbrief and a complete copy of the evaluation results. Within 30 days the first general officer in the unit's chain of command receives an executive summary of the ORE results which highlight resource shortfalls and unit deficiencies. Other reports include quaterly and annual reports that keep the chain of command abreast of the trends and problems in the force. These reports require the chain of command to take action. Commands must submit corrective action plans and take appropriate follow-up actions to fix unit weaknesses and correct systemic deficiencies that impair unit readiness. The whole process takes time, but the results have demonstrated the effort is worth it. Since the inception of this program, Army National Guard early deploying units have continually made headway, alleviating many of the mobilization and deployment problems that preclude them from meeting deployment schedules. In fact, a recent First Army ORE Annual Report suggested that "standards are being...""and that"... most units are maintaining a high readiness profile which support mobilization and deployment requirements." Yet, results also suggest that Army National Guard units are continuing to experience significant problems with collective tasks and are making negligible progress during individual task evaluation. Across the Total Army, soldiers' individual skills have fluctuated, with only marginal improvements in the Army National Guard. But since 1992, Guard Contingency Force Pool units repeatedly have demonstrated their inability to conduct collective training to standard. Junior leaders do not know the published Army standard for the supporting collective tasks that support company operations. Lack of understanding METL development is the underlying problem. On one hand the ORE results indicate an improved ability to quickly mobilize. On the other hand ORE results also indicate that Guard CFP units are incapable of conducting wartime mission essential tasks upon mobilization. At first, these results appear contradictory. In essence, what they indicate is a problem common to many units undergoing evaluation during peacetime. That problem is one of perception. No combat ready unit has ever survived inspection and No inspection ready unit has ever survived combat. Author Unknown Training Opportunlties-Capabilites Changes to the national security environment have challenged this nation to develop a mix of military forces to meet future defense requirements at an affordable cost. Beyond fighting and winning two simultaneous major regional conflicts, our national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement calls on the military to do even more. Promoting prosperity at home, promoting democracy around the world and conducting peace operations are three goals of this overall strategy. As we try to maintain a military presence throughout the world, operational commitments and deployment exercises continue to strain our already heavily burdened forces. Dwindling budgets and manpower compel planners to rely often on integrating Army National Guard units into these worldwide missions. Since the Army implemented its Total Force Policy, the Army National Guard has achieved enhanced levels of capability and readiness. This readiness has been the critical factor in the ability of the National Guard to successfully respond to these other type missions. Moreover, recent readiness initiatives removed legislative limitations that previously restricted guard units from roles traditionally assigned exclusively to Active Component units. Besides answering the call to the Persian Gulf, the Army National Guard has successfully executed numerous domestic, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions around the world. Promoting Prosperity At Home A central goal to the Engagement and Enlargement strategy is to promote America's prosperity through efforts at home.48 The Army National Guard has taken this challenge head-on. In the Fiscal Year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized and funded the National Guard to enter agreements with the nation's governors to conduct pilot programs targeting youth at risk and medically under served communities.49 The goals of these programs included providing young people with the values, self-esteem, skills, education and discipline to succeed in life. Playing a leading role in civil-military drug demand reduction programs, the Army National Guard reached more than 445,000 young people last year. Guardsmen and women participated in this community based training effort by sponsoring anti-drug fairs, presentations and events. Since its inception the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program has evolved into 532 programs nationwide.50 National Guard leaders and soldiers served as mentors and role-models for these troubled youth. In addition, the Army National Guard has been a key player in the drug interdiction effort. Unlike the active component, the National Guard is not subject to restrictions of the Posse Comitaus Act, except when called into federal service. In 1982, and again in 1988, Congress enacted exceptions to the Posse Comitaus Act to give the National Guard an enhanced drug interdiction and law enforcement role.51 The success of this effort has been noteworthy. During Fiscal Year 1993, Army Guard soldiers participated in 4,182 counterdrug support operations. Working in support of various law enforcement agencies, these operations resulted in over 44,619 arrests. Moreover, these operations seized over 485,233 pounds of marijuana, 127,248 pounds of processed cocaine, 1,378 pounds of heroin, 906 pounds of opium and 29,702 pounds of hashish. In addition, Guard seized more than 5,145 vehicles, 9,218 weapons and $98,834,239. Typical missions included ground surveillance, reconnaissance and training law enforcement agencies. Promoting Democracy Abroad Promoting democracy abroad is another key part of our national security strategy. America protects its strategic interests by enlarging and assisting the community of democratic and free nations and checking global threats abroad. The same strategy seeks to promote democracy through host nations that have sufficient power to influence other nations in a region and the potential to act in accordance with United States' interests. Establishing relationships with countries that have the potential for stronger and more responsive democracies, economic growth, social reform and greater cooperation between the United States and host nations come from several key sources. Established democracies, emerging democracies and embattled or endangered democracies are the focus of this strategy. Humanitarian support, disaster relief and nation-building operations are nothing new to the citizen-soldiers of the Army National Guard who traditionally provide this domestic capability. Doctors, dentists, mayors, engineers, lawyers, firefighters, police officers, businessmen and women who make up the various Army National Guard units are exceptionally qualified to help emerging democracies cope with the difficult task of nation building. In 1993, 25,000 Army Guardsmen and units provided mission support to overseas combatant commands in support of each regional CINC's strategies for nation assistance. Primary to this effort, to support democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and former satellite republics of the defunct Soviet Union, the National Guard participates in European Commnand's (EUCOM) Joint Contact Team Program.52 This program pairs individual states with Central and Eastern European countries to assist in community to community and people to people program goals. Army Guard soldiers provide Military Liaison Teams in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Romania, and Ukraine. Military Liaison and Traveling Contact Teams spend one to two weeks briefing host nation military personnel in non-lethal areas such as medical, legal, staff and management. Similarly, the Army National Guard provided security assistance, humanitarian and disaster relief to the Republic of Maldives and Bangladesh. Moreover, deploying in support of U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Pacific Command, approximately 7,500 Guard medical personnel provided medical and dental care for local populations. Finally, almost 7,500 Guard soldiers deployed to U.S. Southern Command to support humanitarian operations and host nation missions. This resulted in the construction of over 37 kilometers of roads, 54 schools, seven medical clinics, 12 bridges, 360 culverts and 36 wells.53 Peace Operations A third part of the Engagement and Enlargement strategy is peace operations. This policy seeks to conduct peacekeeping, peace enforcement and multilateral peace operations along with other nations and agencies in the international community whenever possible. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations seek to"...prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly."54 These peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations generally require larger concentrations of combat support and combat service support forces than combat units. Under the current force structure, the Army National Guard is equipped to support the unique missions. As the Active Army downsizes, the Army Chief of Staff has called on the Army National Guard to assume a greater role in missions traditionally performed by the Active Component. One example of this is the Operational Integration Program. Designed to enhance the Army's capability to perform peacekeeping and forward presence missions, this program provides composite units of volunteers from the Army Guard and the Army Reserve. Formed this past summer, the Army organized, trained and deployed soldiers from the Active Component, United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a composite battalion. Later this year, this battalion will perform a traditional six-month Multinational Force and Observer Sinai mission. Seventy-five percent of the battalion will be Army Guard soldiers, including over half the leadership positions. Sometimes conducted instead of Annual Training, some may view these other operations as training distracters rather than training opportunities. Yet, repeatedly, Army National Guard units and soldiers prove they can successfully perform required mobilization activities within prescribed time frames that have the potential for reducing theater arrival dates. Undoubtedly, many of these domestic and overseas activities have operational objectives as their primary goal, with accompanying training sustainment benefits. When conducting these operational missions, the Army normally assigns National Guard units missions that are consistent with their military unit's mission55 and individual military specialties.56 Consequently, units conduct collective training tasks that are essential to conducting any military operation. All these programs require a plan, logistics support and usually deployment, possibly across the street, or in some cases across the oceans. To execute these programs, units must mobilize, deploy, plan and conduct operations, and then redeploy, tasks that are inherent in wartime scenarios. Collective subordinate tasks are also similar to tasks that a unit would perform in a wartime environment. Units move to and secure their area of operations. They communicate with local authorities and report to their chain of command. They sustain themselves and their equipment throughout the operation. Simultaneously, multi-echelon training takes place, as leaders and soldiers at all levels of the chain of command participate in operations. Leaders conduct current and future planning while soldiers conduct critical Military Occupation Skill training. Upon examination, these operational missions allow Army National Guard units to participate in unique training opportunities that enhance their overall military capabilities. Like conducting wartime operations in a peacetime environment, these operations have planning considerations based on the commander's METL. Whether the Army Guard is participating in joint or combined operations to promote prosperity at home, promote democracy around the world, or conduct peace operations, the focus is the same. "The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives ... [is] the combatant commander's [Joint] Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)."57 Yet, while participation in Joint and Combined exercises has significant training value, these exercises in non-traditional military operations still do not provide the gaining CINC an appreciation of a unit's true warfighting capability. Furthermore, while the National Guard CFP unit's overall capability improves from responding to many of these non-traditional missions, like their Active Component counterparts, they too suffer the inherent tradeoffs in diminished warfighting skills. Although the perception is that these operations have been successful, a closer analysis confirms the same results exposed during the ORE. Citizen-soldiers excel at tasks closely related to their civilian occupations. Yet, repeatedly, they struggle with the METL-related warfighting tasks. Bridging the gap between the results in the field and ORE results, and overcoming the diminished warfighting skills is essential for future deployments to combat environments. Recommendations for Improving Operational Readiness Just how does a National Guard contingency Force Pool unit commander focus pre- mobilization training to concentrate on conducting METL related warfighting tasks? Personnel, equipment, time and terrain constraints limit the amount of options available to the commander. Because most unit commanders already have a "full plate", any successful strategy requires the full cooperation and coordination of both the CFP units' chain of command and Active Component counterparts. Successful execution of post- mobilization plans depends on that unity of effort. Besides the enhancements that the Guard has already made, it can facilitate improvements in the Operational Readiness of Contingency Force Pool units in several ways. First, State Area Commands (STARCs) can provide both assistance and relief that will enable CFP units to focus on conducting METL related training. Second, Readiness Groups (RGs), Reserve Training Detachments (RTDs) and Readiness Training Teams (RTTs) can provide much needed expertise to develop comprehensive training strategies and workshops that provide insight to tackling deployment and pre-mobilization training problems. Third, commanders, who are ultimately responsible for the readiness posture of their unit, must focus their soldiers to meet the high pre-mobilization training challenges. Fourth, non-commissioned officers must know the published Army standard based on current doctrine and insure that their soldiers are training to that standard. State Support State Area Commands (STARCs) can help Contingency Force Pool units in three ways. First, STARCs must actively seek resources that will enhance Contingency Force Pool readiness. One offshoot of the ORE program has taught CFP units how to maximize the limited terrain available for training. Yet, environmental awareness programs will continue to crowd out unrestricted use of training areas. Funding training simulation systems, training aids and other devices will help CFP units maximize the limited training time and training areas that are available to them. Second, STARCs should pursue personnel management policies that steer the best soldiers the state has to offer to these early deploying units. CFP units should receive priority of filling critical shortages as well as priority for funding Military Occupation Skills school. Finally, State Area Commands can help Contingency Force Pool units by alleviating time consuming training distracters such as administrative requirements or outside taskings. STARCs should provide contact teams to the units to update records or conduct administrative assistance to keep the soldier's personnel mobilization files current. State Area Commands also need to minimize the outside tasking for these units to participate in parades and community events that rob the unit of valuable training time. Readiness Groups, Resident Training Detachments and Reserve Training Teams Readiness Groups, Resident Training Detachments and Reserve Training Teams can provide invaluable training assistance and advice to Contingency Force Pool units in several ways. First, help the CFP unit commanders develop unit Standing Operating Procedures that standardize procedures for routine and recurring events that support individual and collective METL related tasks. This time-consuming task is something separate company commanders, which make up the bulk of the CFP units, desperately need. More importantly, when DTA wartime guidance is lacking, Standing Operating Procedures can best facilitate the transition to new missions. Fundamental individual and collective tasks that support such common missions as Conduct a Tactical Road March, Occupy an Assembly Area and Establish a Perimeter Defense rarely change. Second, teach unit commanders and junior leaders how to conduct an assessment of training and how to incorporate that feedback into fixture training plans. Conduct this workshop simultaneously with regularly scheduled training, not in addition to it. Commanders and junior leaders need to see how the results of their training plans successfully support or detract from training METL related tasks to standard. Leaders should use additional training workshops conducted during periods other than primetime training for specialized functional training. Third, use specialized workshops to train junior officers on deployment plans and specific additional duty requirements, such as Unit Movement Officer. Unit commanders often task a junior officer to fill one of these additional duties but have neither the expertise nor time to develop the necessary skills that junior leader will require in that position. Finally, train the trainers. Junior leaders, both officer and noncommissioned officers, need assistance not just advice. Demonstrate, through example, by conducting one on one training, or when possible concurrently with other scheduled training. When assigned to an RTD or RTT, "remember, you are the expert when you arrive at this assignment; thus, the unit will expect you to provide them with the correct answers."58 Unit Commanders Commanders should capitalize on these external experts to help them develop training strategies that meet pre-deployment goals of attaining a desirable level of proficiency on related warfighting METL tasks. Once commanders have tapped into this network of expertise, they should begin to develop an aggressive training program that sustains unit strengths and works on unit weaknesses. Primary to this undertaking is integrating multi- echelon critical soldier and leader skills necessary to accomplish the mission during prime time training that is battle focused and METL related. Focusing on fundamentals and executing them to the proper standard provides the critical link between individual training proficiency and collective training that units must emphasize in all training plans. Commanders must know the published Army standard, then hold their subordinates accountable to execute training to that standard. Commanders must then assess the unit's training proficiency guided by the feedback received from junior leaders and NCOs. Based on this feedback, the commander can better focus resources and adjust training strategies that capitalize on unit strengths and overcome unit weaknesses. This will allow the commander to maximize the limited training time. Non-Commissioned Officers Non-commissioned officers must take charge of their soldiers and develop their sections and squads into cohesive fighting units. NCOs also must ensure they know the published Army standard. NCOs must take the lead in helping the commander train the trainer by training their immediate subordinates. Like all leaders, they must demand that their soldiers conduct performance oriented training to the Army standard. They should provide feedback to the commander, ensuring the number of tasks to be trained is realistic. More importantly, NCOs should assess the strengths and weaknesses of their soldiers and provide this feedback to the commander so that he can adjust his plans accordingly. Finally, they should ensure that they do not waste their soldiers' time by selecting random soldiers to conduct hip pocket training (short informal classes) that reinforce supporting METL-related individual skills. Conclusion This nation's military will continue to undergo critical realignments and resource reductions for the foreseeable future. The scope of our vital interests and the growing uncertainty of the international environment demand that today's Army be flexible, deployable and lethal.59 Desert Storm served as a wake-up call for our nation's leaders to the issue of actively seeking to integrate National Guard Contingency Force Pool units into war plans to provide the CINC that flexibility. Combatant Commanders need units with National Guard soldiers that are accessibLe, ready and capable. The leadership of the Army National Guard has risen to the challenge. Working to provide soldiers and units that are accessible, ready and capable, the Guard has made significant inroads to meeting that challenge. Legislation and chain of command involvement have eliminated the myriad of problems Army National Guard units encountered when mobilized for Desert Storm. Most of these solutions sought to correct unit deficiencies before the unit arrived at the mobilization station. The focus so far has been on facilitating pre-mobilization training with the ultimate goal of achieving proficiency on METL tasks. Unlike Desert Storm, the next conflict may not allow for lengthy post-mobilization and in-theater training opportunities. Optimizing training time during pre-mobilization is essential to successful mobilization and deployment. Today, the Guard is working to provide soldiers, leaders and units that are technically and tactically proficient in the execution of their specific mission. Yet, problems still remain. Overcoming the inherent training constraints of personnel, time, equipment and terrain while at the same time working on noted unit deficiencies is a monumental task. Guard Leaders must optimise the limited training oportunities by focusing on METL related tasks that support their wartime mission. More importantly, they must train to the published Army standard and demand that their soldiers meet these same high standards. At the same time, Guard leaders must work in conjunction with their Active Component counterparts to make the power-projection force strategy work. Our nation's leaders realize that growing dependence on the Guard carries an element of risk, but one that is necessary and acceptable. Active Component leaders should actively embrace training opportunities with their National Guard counterparts and develop realistic training strategies that support their early deploying capability. National Guard soldiers need commanders who have enough trust and confidence, to use them according to that capability. Failure to use them in that manner erodes confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission and utterly demoralizes them. More than any other time in history, "America's Army," is truly a seamless organization of Active Component, Army National Guard and Army Reserve units designed to prosecute this nation's strategy. Central to that strategy are the National Guard Contingency Force Pool units. They have proven through successive domestic and international crises that they can perform superbly when called upon to do so. In the final analysis, today's force structure does not allow for any other possibility but to send Army National Guard units along with Active Component early deployers. Appendix A: Acronyms AC Active Component AMOPES Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System APFT Army Physical Fitness Test ARNG Army National Guard ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program AT Annual Training CAPSTONE FORSCOM alignment of Reserve Component Units with AC force for training, evaluation and deployment CFP Contingency Force Pool CINC Commander in Chief CONUS Continental United States CONUSA Continental U.S. Army CTT Common Task Testing DA Department of the Army DTA Directed Training Association ERF Early Reinforcing Force EUCOM European Command FORSCOM Forces Command FORMDEPS FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System FY Fiscal Year IDT Inactive Duty for Training METL Mission Essential Task List MRC Major Regional Contingency MTP Mission Training Plan NGB National Guard Bureau OCONUS Outside Continental United States OPLAN Operations Plan ORE Operational Readiness Evaluation PMCS Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services PTSR Post-Mobilization Training Support Requirements RC Reserve Component RG Readiness Group ROPMA Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act RTD Resident Training Detachment RTT Reserve Training Team STARC State Area Command TPFDD Time Phased Force Deployment Data TOE Table of Organization and Equipment USARC United States Army Reserve Command UTES Unit Training Equipment Site Appendix B: Glossary of Terms Army National Guard - A Reserve component of the Army, the portion of the organized militia of the 50 states, Commonwealth of Puerto and District of Columbia, whose units and members are federally recognized. Component - A part of a whole, as for example, the Regular and the Reserve components of the Army are the Regular Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Each service element is a component of the total force. Contingency Force Pool - Units, both Active Component and Reserve Component, consolidated to provide a surge capability that are required to support the Crisis Response Force. The Crisis Response Force reacts to worldwide missions. Old CAPSTONE - Active Component and Reserve Component units aligned into wartime organizations oriented toward major contingency requirements. Units were aligned based on the requirements of a Unified or Specified Commander in Chief as defined in his Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). These planning associations were designed to permit rapid integration of units into a cohesive fighting organization by accomplishing wartime planning during peacetime. New CAPSTONE - Establishes peacetime relationships among Active Component and Reserve Component units and CONUS-based corps or theater Army, based on geographic and functional factors. CAPSTONE integrates activities of warfighting CINC's, Corps, CONUSA and peacetime chains of command in training the total Army in support of the Contingency Strategy. It facilitates implementation of Title XI requirements and provides Active Component support to Reserve Component Training previously provided under DTA. Crisis Response Force - Active and Reserve component units, including forward presence units, trained and configured to deploy anywhere in the world, based on the unit's deployability posture. Directed Training Associations (DTA) - A formal relationship between selected Reserve Component units and similar Active Component units with the objective of improved training readiness of the Reserve Component unit. DTA provides Active Component training assistance in attainment of proficiency in the Reserve Component units wartime mission and evaluation during Annual Training. They also provide branch specific functional guidance, advice and support with Mobile Training Teams during Inactive Duty Training periods and exercise opportunities based on the Time Phased Force Deployment Data. Early Reinforcing Force-Primarily Active component divisions and associated echelons above division and echelons above corps support elements (both AC and RC) as well as enhanced readiness brigades that are available to add combat power to a theater commander. Enhanced Readiness Brigade- The Principal Reserve Component ground combat maneuver forces of the United States Army. Their primary federal peacetime function is to sustain the level of readinees necessary to serve as the Nations's strategic hedge against the potential of an adverse major regional conflict in a two nearly simultaneous major regional conflict scenario. In this role, they are expected to reinforce, augment, and/or backfill active component units as required by the theater commander to which thery are assigned upon validated by the Secretary of the Army. The term "enhanced" refers to increased resource and manning priorities with improved training strategies during pre- mobilization that ensure their ability to be ready to deploy at at a readiness rating of C-1 by 90 days after call-up. The brigades will be organized, equipped, and sustained to be doctrinally employable, control compatible, and logistically supportable, by any US Army corps or division. FORMDEPS-FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System Mission Essential Task List (METL)-Contains the specific tasks critical to wartime mission accomplishment. METL is derived from wartime mission guidance and external directives, and is developed without consideration of resource availability, unit manning levels, equipment on hand or the ability to train. National Guard-The Army and Air portion of the organized militia of the 50 states, Commonwealth of Puerto and District of Columbia, whose units and members are federally recognized. Reserve Component-Individuals and units assigned to the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve who are subject to call to active duty. Roundout-A Headquarters Department of the Army managed program that brings major combat units up to a designated structure by filling organizational voids from a different component. State Area Command (STARC) - A mobilization entity within the Army National Guard State Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment that is ordered to active duty when Army National Guard units in that state are alerted for mobilization. The STARC provides the command and control of mobilized Army National Guard units from their home station until arrival at the mobilization station. It is also responsible for planning and executing military support for civil defense and land defense plans under the respective area commander. Time Phased Force Deployment Data(TPFDD) - Identifies specific units for wartime requirements under gaining CINC's approved OPLANs and provides the basis for wartime planning and exercises. Title IX - Also known as the Army National Guard Combat readiness Reform Act of 1992. Congressional Legislation that established eighteen initiatives to get the Guard into battle early and to provide decisive reinforcing forces. The initiatives enhance Guard deployability, improve the active Army's capacity to assess Guard capabilities, make Guard units more compatible with active forces, improve the readiness of Guard leaders, and ensure the Guard's medical readiness. United States Army Reserve - A Federal force, consisting of individual reinforcements, combat support, combat service support and training type units organized and maintained to provide military training in peacetime, and a reservoir of trained units and individual reservists to be ordered to active duty in the event of a national emergency. Appendix C: Chronology of Significant Events Year Significant Event 1792 Militia Act provided for two categories of militia: a volunteer force and a common militia The volunteer force provided their own uniforms and equipment and were willing to undertake additional training at no pay. Unfortunately, the act did not call for any inspection of a state's militia by the Federal government. Nor did it specify any penalties for non- compliance. Consequently, in some states a once a year muster of untrained, un-uniformed militia men became the source for ridicule. 1903 Dick Act replaced the Militia Act which stood for 111 years, reaffirmed the militia as the Army's primary organized reserve. 1916 National Defense Act of 1916 guaranteed the state militias' status as the Army's primary reserve force and mandated the term "National Guard" for that force. 1970 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird outlines the Total Force Concept to guide decisions for planning for and using active and reserve forces. 1973 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger made Total Force Concept official policy of the Department of Defense. 1976 Initial Section 673b of Title 10 USC allows the president to activate Selected reserve units for 90 days up to a maximum of 50,000 reservists. 1980 Amended Section 673b allows the president to activate Selected reserve units for 90 days up to a maximum of 100,000 reservists. 1986 Amended Section 673b allows the president to activate Selected reserve units for 90 days with a possible 90 extension up to a maximum of 200,000 reservists. 1990 First major test of the Total Force Policy is Operation Desert Shield. 1992 Army National Guard readiness Reform Act of 1992. Eighteen initiatives designed to improve readiness of the National Guard. Highlights include: increasing the percentage of qualified active component personnel in the ARNG; review of ARNG officer promotions by the commander of associated active duty unit; transfers non-deployable personnel to Non deployable Personnel Account; ensures early deploying units are medically and dentally ready for deployment; and improve the equipment compatibility between the active component and the Army Guard. 1992/1993 National Defense Authorization Acts of 1992 and 1993 require the Secretary of Defense to assess alternatives for the structure and mix of future active and reserve forces. 1994 National Defense Authorization Act of FY95 amended Section 673b to allow the president to activate selected reserve units for 270 days, with no extension for up to a maximum of 200,000 reservists. Also allows Army National Guard units to be deployed as elements. Click here to view image Click here to view image Click here to view image Notes 1 Most of these arguments centered on fighting the Russian "hordes" in the Fulda Gap using combat arms units from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Some make extremely valid arguments that within the constraints of the 39 days that combat arms units have to train they just could not sustain proficiency with the weapons systems organic to combat arms units. Others argue that these models make false analogies comparing apples to oranges (Active Component units that are ALO-1 and equipped and manned at C-1 to Army Guard units that were ALO-3 and equipped and manned at C-3). see footnote 15 for a more detailed appreciation. 2 National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office, 1995 Posture Statement, (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1994), 40. 3 By 1918, the distinction between regular Army divisions (numbered 1-25), National Guard divisions (numbered 26-50), and Army Reserve divisions (numbered 51 and above) was an artificial one. Regulars, reservists, draftees and Guardsmen served in all. However, for unit lineage's, histories and morale the difference is important. Two exceptions to the numbering system are the 101st and 82nd Divisions which are Active Component. 4 National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs, A Brief History of the Militia and the National Guard, (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1986), 50. 5 Martin Binkin, US Reserve Forces: The Problems of the Weekend Warrior, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), 20. 6 Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," Parameters. XXI no. 2. (Summer 1991): 35. 7 Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," 42. 8 National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office, After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield: Operation Desert Storm, (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1991), 1. 9 NGB, After Action Report Operation Desert Shield: Operation Desert Storm, 5. 10 Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," 47. 11 Harry G. Summers Jr., "The Army After Vietnam." in Against All Enemies. Eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press Inc. 1986), 363. 12 NGB, After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield: Operation Desert Storm, 2-6. Note: Two Field Artillery Brigades and 6 Field Artillery Battalions deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Desert Storm. The rest of the National Guard commands were Combat Support or Combat Service Support units. 13 Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," 49. 14 U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Diffuculty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces, (Washington DC: GPO, 1992), 2. 15 For an enlightening insight to the Roundout debacle see Lewis Sorley, "National Guard and Reserve Forces." in 1991-1992 American Defense AnnuaL Ed. Josepb Kruzel, 183-201. (New York: Macmillan Inc. 1992). Also see Marygail Brauner, Roger Brown and Harry Thie. Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During the Persian Gulf Conflict. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1992), 22-32, 39-40, 50-51 and 64-67. 16 NGB, After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield: Operation Desert Storm, 8. 17 G-3, XVIII Airborne Corps. Information Paper. Subject: "CAPSTONE Terms of Reference." 2 March 1993. 18 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 13. 19 Prior to Desert Storm the majority of Army National Guard Combat Support and Combat Service Support units had Authorized Levels of Organization (ALO) 3, which indicate peacetime resourcing priorities. The ALO represents the authorized level of personnel and equipment for an individual unit. ALO 3 authorizes a unit to be equipped at 78 to 87 percent of its wartime requirements. As a result of Desert Storm and recent legislative changes Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool units are resourced at ALO 1, this equates to 98 to 100 percent of their wartime requirements. 20 Criteria established by FORSCOM requires a unit that is projected to be in the force structure through the end of FY95, that has maintained a C-3 rating and is organized at ALO-1. The National Guard Bureau nominates units for removal from the CFP list based on the ability of the Chain of Command to fix the noted unit deficiencies. Management of chronic and marginal units by the National Guard Bureau identifies units that have been identified as non-deployable for eight consecutive months. These units are consider candidates tor force structure reductions. 21 Definition FM 25-101, Training the Force: Battle-Focused Training, September 1990. 22 A significant part of the force structure changes includes the recent "Off Site" agreement between the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. This unit exchange between the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve swapped all the combat units from the Army Reserve to the National Guard in exchange for combat support, and combat service support units. The Memorandum of Agreement between these two components took effect 1 October 1994. 23 Commander, First United States Army. Memorandum to Commander, Forces Command and others. Subject: "America's First Army Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) Yearly Report." 4 November 1994. 24 FM 25-101, reminds us that Battalion Level is the lowest level that has Battle Tasks. Companies focus on collective training tasks that support the company METL. Company METL tasks support the Battalion METL tasks. 2-17. 25 Commander, First United States Army. Memorandum to Commander, Forces Command and others. Subject: "America's First Army Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) Yearly Report." 4 November 1994. 26 "Roles and Missions." Joint Force Quarterly, no 5. (Summer 1994): 117. 27 Martin Binkin. U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problems of the Weekend Warrior. (Washington, Dc: Brookings Institution, 1974), 19. 28 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 3. 29 When called to State Active Duty for a federally declared disaster emergency, the Federal government picks up the costs. 30 Army Regulation (AR) 350-41, Training in Units, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, March 1993), 6. 31 Thomas F. Lippiat and others, Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve Component Support Units. (Santa Monica, CA: Rend Corp., 1992), 1. See also Martin Binkin, and William W. Kaufman. Studies in Defense Policy: U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities. Risks. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), 37. See also Neal P. Curtin, Military Readiness: Current Indicators Need to Be Expanded for a More Comprehensive Assessment. 2. 32 AR 350-41, 28. 33 AR 350-41, 28. 34 NGB, After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield; Operation Desert Storm, 21. 35 For purposes here, soldiers includes junior officers below the rank of Captain that are not branched qualified and enlisted that have not been to Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Officers, Captain and above generally have been to their basic course for qualification and have received additional schooling necessary to artain the rank of Captain and above. Senior NCOs also generally have attended the requisite schooling necessary fbr promotion and billeting. 36 Congressional Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau. Memorandum for the Director Army National Guard. Subject: "Joint Authorization Conference Committee Report on the FY 95 National Defense Authorization Act." 16 August 1994, 8. 37 Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufman. Studies in Defense Policy: US Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, 104. 38 The Army doctrinally trains to standard. Training is not time sensitive. Soldiers and leaders must execute the planned training until the Army standards are met. The standard for the Army is to train according to publish Army standards found in Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and Mission Training Plan (MTP) manuals. 39 U.S. GAO, Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces, 38. 40 Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, 98. 41 Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, 99. 42 Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and Mission Training Plan (MTP) descriptive training documents which provide units a clear description of "what" and "how to" achieve wartime mission proficiency. They elaborate on wartime missions in terms of comprehensive training outlines that highlight the tasks, conditions and standards a unit must meet to achieve combat proficiency. 43 National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Army National Guard of the United States 1994 Posture Statement. (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau. 1993), 7. 44 NGB, Army National Guard of the United States 1995 Posture Statement, 22. 45 These Contingency Force Pool combat support and combat service support units (support packages one and two) are desigiied to provide echelons above division and echelons above corps support for the employment of the Crisis Response Force. 46 Congressional Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau. Memorandum for the Director Army National Guard. Subject: "Joint Authorization Conference Committee Report on the FY 95 National Defense Authorization Act." 16 August 1994, 2. 47 Units must pass all tasks that are identified as "critical", and they must pass 65% of the collective supporting tasks to achieve an overall "GO". Units that fail a critical task but achieve greater than or equal to the 65% criteria will still receive a "NOGO" because they failed a critical task. Collective supporting tasks also have critical sub-tasks that, if a leader or unit fail to accomplish, will also give them an overall "NOGO" for that particular task. 48 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington: The White House, 1994), 15. 49 Department of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1993, (Washington: Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1994). 47. 50 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 42. 51 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 42. 52 National Guard Bureau, Operations, Training and Readiness Directorate, 1995 Gold Book, (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1994), 19. 53 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 30. 54 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 13. 55 For purposes here, the unit's military mission may not necessarily be the same mission as specific wartime guidance would provide. For example an engineer construction unit may be given an over seas operational assignment as part of a Humanitarian mission to build a school. This same unit's wartime guidance may be to repair a damaged runway. 56 DOD, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1993, 6. 57 Department of Defense, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, 23 November 1992, O-I to O-30; reprint in Operational Level of War Readings, (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1994), O-10. 58 Leon I. Smith IV, "Resident Training Detachment: Captain's Perspective - Two Years Hence" Armor 103, no. 6 (November-December 1994): 49. 59 Carl E. Vouno, A Strategic Force For The 1990s And Beyond, (Washington, DC: GPO. January 1990), 17. BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Aspin, Les. The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New Era. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1 September 1993. (Author's Note: Good overview that highlights the force structure changes required by the Bottom-Up Review). Chief, Readiness Division National Guard Bureau to Director, Army National Guard and others. Subject: "3RD Quarter FY94 Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) Summaries." 1994. (Author's Note: Excellent compilation of the collective training problems National Guard CFP units experience during the Operational Readiness Evaluation). Commander, First United States Army. Memorandum to Commander, Forces Command and others. Subject "America's First Army Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) Yearly Report." 4 November 1994. (Author's Note: Good source. This document highlights the lingering problems experienced by Contingency Force Pool units, within the 20 state First Army area, two years into the ORE program). Congressional Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau. Memorandum for the Director Army National Guard. Subject "Joint Authorization Conference Committee Report on the FY95 National Defense Authorization Act." 16 August 1994. (Author's Note: Good source. This document highlights the most recent legislative changes that impact the Army National Guard). Congressional Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau. Memorandum for the Director Army National Guard. Subject "FY95 Department of Defense Appropriation Act, HR 4650." 3 October 1994 Department of Defense, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, 23 November 1992, O-1 to O-30; reprint in Operational Level of War Readings, Washington, DC: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1994. Field Manual (FM) 25-101, Training The Force: Battle Focused Training. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. September 1990. Field Manual (FM) 350-41, Training in Units. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. March 1993. FORSCOM Regulation 220-2, Operational Readiness Evaluation. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. February 1994. FORSCOM Regulation 220-3, Reserve Component Training Assessment. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. April 1994. G-3, XVIII Airborne Corps. Information Paper. Subject: "CAPSTONE Terms of Reference." 2 March 1993. (Author's Note: Excellent reference. This is one of the only documents that explains the recent changes to the CAPSTONE program. It includes a breakout of the Force Package lists and how the Directed Training Associations support the CFP units). National Guard Bureau, Operations, Training and Readiness Directorate. Gold Book 1995 Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1994. National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Army National Guard After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm. Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1991. National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Army National Guard of the United States 1995 Posture Statement. Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1994. National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Army National Guard of the United States 1994 Posture Statement. Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1993. National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Title XI Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1994. (Author's Note: Good source. This document highlights the legislative changes of the Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act of 1992 and gives some insight to the impact of those changes). Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board Fiscal Year 1993. Washington, DC: GPO, 1994. (Author's Note: Good source. This document provides an overview of all the Reserve Components (Army, Navy, Air force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Reserve), the current programs, and the future direction these forces will take). The White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington, DC: GPO, 1994. U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services., House of Representatives. Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces. March 1992. GAO/NSIAD-92-67. (Author's Note: Researchers interested in Army related Desert Shield/Desert Storm problems will find this document helpful). U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Congress. Reserve Components: Opportunities to Improve National Guard and Reserve Policies and Programs. November 1988. GAO/NSIAD-89-27. U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff. United States Army Posture Statement FY95. Washington, DC: GPO, 1994. Vouno, Carl, E. A Strategic Force For The 1990s and Beyond. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. January 1990. Secondary Sources Books Binkin, Martin. US. Reserve Forces: The Problems of the Weekend Warrior. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974. Binkin, Martin, and William W. Kaufmann. Studies in Defense Policy: US. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989. (Author's Note: Excellent source for those interested in the political controversy surrounding a decision to mobilize the Guard and Reserve.). Brauner, Marygail, Roger Brown and Harry Thie. Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active-and Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During the Persian Gulf Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1992. (Author's Note: Excellent source. A comprehensive undertaking by Rand that addresses the performance of Guard and Reserve units during Desert Shield/Desert Storm). Lippiat, Thomas F., Michael J. Polich, and Ronald E. Sortor. Post Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1992. (Author's Note: Interesting source. This document by Rand gives the impression that it is justifying why the Army did not deploy Round-Out units instead of conducting an unbiased analysis of the problem. For a different perspective see Sorley in "National Guard and Reserve Forces." in 1991-1992 American Dense Annual). Lippiat, Thomas, F., and others. Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve Component Support Units. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1992. National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs. A Brief Histoty of the Militia and the National Guard. Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1986. Sorley, Lewis. "National Guard and Reserve Forces." in 1991-1992 American Defense Annual. Ed. Joseph Kruzel, 183-201. New York: Macmillan Inc. 1992. (Author's Note: Good source for those intersted in the Round-Out/Round-Up controversy. Summers, Harry, G., Jr. "The Army After Vietnam." in Against All Enemies. Eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, 361-373. Connecticut: Greenwood Press Inc. 1986. Journals Beveridge, Reid. "Force Structure/Force Mix: The Rand Study Still Leaves Open-ended Questions." National Guard, 47, no. 4. (April 1993) 48-52. Newland, Samuel, J. "The National Guard: Whose Guard Anyway?" Parameter, 18 no. 2.(June 1988): 40-50. "Roles and Missions" Joint Force Quarterly, no 5. (Summer 1994): 117-119. Sharp, Benjamin, F. and Donald B. Skipper. "The Reserve Component Dilemma: Mission versus Time." Military Review, 64 no 11. (November 1984):
