Military

This thesis represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with US Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States Government.

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets masters-level standards of research, argumentation and expression.

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Lt Col Pat Pentland

Thesis Advisor

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Dr. Harold R. Winton

First Reader

This thesis is part of a larger forthcoming work which further explores command relations and joint operations in the Gulf War. In addition to addressing more joint issues, this larger work will contain analyses of (international) operations, the National Command Authority, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff in the Gulf War. It will also examine the joint staff and joint operations, and make specific recommendations for future service integration.

I would also like to acknowledge the tremendous assistance provided by a number of individuals in preparing this document. They include Hal Winton (editor extraordinaire), Bob Pape, Mike Buck, Bill Arkin, Douglas Johnson, Greg Fontenot, Steve Rinaldi, Buster McCrabb, Kevin Van Sloten, Pat Beekman, Linda Hills, Dave Deptula, Ed Mann, Rich Reynolds, Tommy Crawford, Ted Bale, Randy O’Boyle, Cas Saleh, Eric Hastings, Ken Feldman, Dave Mets, Bob Scheller, Steve Ramsdell, Ali al-Saghir, Mohammed Kazam, Richard Lewis, J.C. Bozeman, N.E. Taylor, John Warden and all the SAAS instructors. I also owe many thanks to the senior officers who provided me their time to interview them, and to Phil Meilinger, without whose support, I would not have had the opportunity. These senior officers include Generals Buster Glosson, Chuck Horner, Walt Boomer, Fred Franks, John Corder, Robert Russ, Michael Ryan, John Yeosock, and Admirals Stan Arthur and Hank Mauz. Finally I owe my greatest thanks to Pat Pentland, F-111 & A-10 pilot extraordinaire, and my awesome wife, Karen.

To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison’s three models of bureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process; and Model III Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question. The value of interservice integration has been recognized for a long time. The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) made significant strides integrating the services at the most senior levels, i.e. the component commanders and above. The study concludes that, in general, at the component commander level and above during Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM, rational decisions were made and rational actions were implemented to prosecute the war (Model I behavior). The Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not make as much headway, however, in integrating the services below the level of component commander. Unlike the most senior levels of command, decisions made and actions taken were not always implemented for the most rational reason. For the most part, decisions and actions were Model I. But at times, decisions and actions were not optimal because the decisionmaker/actor lacked information, had a different service perspective, and/or inadequately understood and empathized with members of the other services (primarily Model II, but with traces of Model III as well). Based on these findings, the study suggests in order to continue to improve interservice integration, we need to teach concepts of service integration early in an officer’s career, expand joint interaction and provide some additional standardization among theaters.

The United States military lauds Operation DESERT STORM as a military success and an example of a successful joint operation. The military services, however, continue to debate the exact definition of jointness and the role of service components in joint operations. To a significant extent, the military services remain suspicious of one another and still retain their own individual service perspectives. The question therefore arises: to what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by these individual service perspectives?

In Operation DESERT STORM, the United States and Coalition forces enjoyed overwhelming resources with which to apply overwhelming force. With this abundance of force, we could afford to be somewhat inefficient in our service integration. Because we may not always enjoy the benefit of overwhelming force, better integration of all military services in joint operations may be crucial to victory in the future. Our experience in Operation DESERT STORM provides a medium to study and improve our ability to integrate the services in joint operations. An examination of our command relations prior to and during the conflict is key to the study of our experiences in Operation DESERT STORM.

In Operation DESERT STORM our most senior military officers generally interacted with one another well, made decisions, and conducted operations with mission accomplishment foremost in their minds. To an extent, differing military service perspectives did have some effect on senior officer judgment on how to integrate the services and conduct joint operations. But generally, the "most senior leaders" retained one another’s respect and worked together in a rational manner. In direct discussions, senior leaders generally resolved controversial issues based on logic, mutual trust, and understanding. The most senior leaders included:

At command levels below the most senior leaders, individual perspectives had a profound effect on command judgments that influenced service integration and the conduct of joint operations. Although individuals at these levels made decisions and conducted operations with theater mission accomplishment foremost in mind, a narrower mission focus sometimes prevailed--one often dominated by their service’s vision of war. This narrower focus degraded interservice communication and interaction. Some of the key officers below the most senior leaders included:

Once inside the tactical level of operations, services worked together without significant friction. However, the framework developed and implemented by commanders and leaders at all levels constrained the tactical organizations. Thus, while tactical commanders themselves were generally willing to work closely with units from the other services and generally did not degrade operations from a lack of joint effort, tactical units were constrained by the established framework, doctrine, and guidelines. This resulted in units of different services not working together with maximum effectiveness.

It must be noted that some controversial issues did not require resolution during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in order for the conflict to be a coalition success. This was largely due to a great deal of combat preparation time, abundant combat resources, and a safe build-up/basing area. However, it should be kept in mind that the next major conflict may find United States’ forces without the luxury of time, excess resources, or a safe basing area.

In summary, the goal of this work is to determine how commanders made and implemented decisions in Operation DESERT STORM, and how individual service perspectives influenced them. To accomplish this I will 1) outline my research and analysis methodology, 2) examine important issues concerning each of the four services, and 3) present conclusions and lessons learned. This analysis will hopefully enhance the design and conduct of future joint operations.

Joint operations are, in essence, an interaction of the different military service commands. These command relations during conflict can be best understood by examining them in the framework of the United States’ most recent wartime experience, Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Command relations will be examined by studying them through a series of joint issues. Analysis of these issues, which will involve each of the services and the senior national leaders, provides insight into the actual practice of the command relationships.

After examining the details of each issue, an analysis of the command relations within each issue will be made. Then Graham Allison’s framework of organizational behavior outlined in his book, Essence of Decision, will be used to assess the dynamics of command relationships. This analysis is conducted in order to understand 1) how joint decisions were reached among the different service commanders, 2) how joint decisions were implemented, and 3) the operational consequences of the joint decisions and actions. With this understanding, some conclusions are offered improve future joint force employment.

Before investigating the issues, it is best to review jointness and the Allison models.

Joint is defined by the Department of Defense as "activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate." Jointness will be defined as the condition of being joint. Theater commanders strive to exploit the full military capability of their assigned forces by closely integrating the efforts of the separate military services. Combat performance depends on how well the forces of the different services are integrated. National guidance directs that

All our military forces must be capable of unity of effort by integrating command and ensuring force interoperability.

Being joint is working closely together and cooperating with the other military services. On the surface this would not seem to be difficult. After all, regardless of service, military members share the same love of country and are generally willing to sacrifice even their lives to protect and defend our nation’s freedom and way of life. But, in reality, interservice cooperation was so difficult that it required the intervention of Congress with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) to further the process of bringing the military services closer together. If the military had been able to achieve better integration within itself, this congressional action would have been unnecessary.

When interacting with other military services, a military member must keep one overriding and most important perspective in mind: Is the conduct of military operations being advocated, regardless of service role, the best way for the United States to do business? Specifically, military service members must keep in mind "what is best for the nation" and not necessarily "what is best for the service". Doing well by one’s service does not always equate to doing well by one’s country. Insofar as this study is concerned, a military member will be doing the best for his nation by making decisions and taking actions which will best improve overall combat effectiveness, regardless of the effects upon the individual services. Behavior which maximizes the capability of a part of an organization at the expense of the whole of the organization is dysfunctional.

We are often puzzled by how large organizations arrive at and implement decisions. Often, the decisions and the resulting actions seem to be irrational. But we often fail to understand and appreciate the complexity of decisionmaking in large organizations. There are three basic phases to this process: 1) information input, 2) decision making, and 3) decision implementation.

In Essence of Decision, Graham Allison has developed a three hypotheses or models for explaining organizational decisionmaking. These frameworks for analysis are as follows: Model I, The Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process; and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics. Although Essence of Decision is primarily about decisionmaking at the national level, his frameworks can help us understand the decisionmaking process at other levels as well. When analyzing each of the issues in the following paper, Allison’s models will help explain how a specific decision was reached and the action implemented. This study is adapts Allison’ methodology to analyze the United States military command relations and joint interaction during the Gulf War.

Model I: The Rational Actor

This model is the foundation or "base" model to explain the behavior of large organizations. The unit of analysis is decision by choice. It assumes the decisions reached and actions implemented are accomplished by rational actors for rational reasons. It also assumes that the decision makers have necessary and accurate information on which to base their decisions.

Action in Model I is accomplished by rational choice. Goals and objectives are established, all reasonable options are considered and evaluated, and the consequences of all actions are considered. By choice, the option which best ensures the desired outcome is selected. Finally, the decision is fully implemented as intended. Note that effective upward and downward communication is essential to a Model I process. Without clear communication, information does not flow properly in either direction. Without accurate information, truly rational unbiased decisions/actions are difficult to obtain.

Model I sounds nice and is the optimum manner in which to conduct business, but it does not exist in many instances in the "real" world. Thus, in this analysis, for decisions or actions to be termed Model I, they will not have to be absolutely perfect. For the decision or action to be considered Model I, the decision or action must be clearly closer to a Model I reality than to the other two models. For purposes of this paper, a decision or action will be considered Model I when the following occur:

Model II: Organizational Process. This model explains behavior of large organizations as the result of the processes and procedures of the sub-organizations which make it up. Organizational decision and action become the result of sub-organizational influence. Standard operating procedures and routines dominate. Organizational perspectives influence decisions and affect how decisions are implemented. Perspectives are influenced by available information, personnel recruitment, tenure in organization, group pressures, and distributions of awards and punishments.

Members of the organization tend to avoid uncertainty in lieu of confronting it; therefore, the tendency of members is to rely on routines and standard operating procedures. Major change and learning in the organization generally occurs only with a dramatic performance failure or an organizational crisis occurs. Decision implementation is often complex because there is often room for different interpretations of the decision. These different interpretations may result in actions occurring which were not exactly what the decision maker had in mind.

Organizations acting within Model II will often lack flexibility and far-sightedness. Long-range planning becomes institutionalized and disregarded. Conformity to the organization, its ideas, and "proven" methods will usually result in actions that are not optimal. Hard choices are sometimes avoided and tradeoffs/compromises are made to facilitate action and accommodate others. This again results in less than optimum actions.

Individuals or organizations operating without the availability or benefit of all the necessary information to make rational decisions and operate within Model I will be considered operating within Model II. Rational decisions with the "big picture" in mind cannot be made with incomplete information. Sometimes this lack of information is the fault of the organization making the decision or taking the action. At other times the organization/individual may not be at fault. But in either case, the best rational decisions cannot be made with incomplete data. Organizations will be considered to be operating Model II when the following occur:

Model III: Bureaucratic Politics. This model explains the behavior of large organizations as the result of bargaining among players in the organization. Actions are political resultants. Each individual actor is considered to have his/her own view and influence on the decision and how it is implemented.

Model III behavior is the most difficult behavior to demonstrate. It is unusual for specific individuals to admit selfish motivations as the basis for their actions and decisions. However, even if unproved, Model III is still very important. Perceptions of officers that other groups or individual are acting in consonance with Model III can result in dysfunctional behavior. For example, if a Marine officer believes Army officers are acting Model III at the expense of the Marine Corps, whether true or not, the Marine officer may begin making decisions and acting in what he sees as the best interests of the USMC. In this instance, a perception of Model III behavior led to actual Model III behavior. A spiraling effect can result when the Army officers became aware of the Model III Marine behavior.

Decisions made in Model III are often the result of bargaining. The individual officer’s power determines his/her ability to influence decisions and actions. An officer’s stand is determined by personal priorities and perceptions, goals and interests, stakes, deadlines, and implications of the issues. Power determines influence, which determines the officer’s impact. Power is determined by bargaining advantages, skill, rank, will, and by the perception of the other players. Failure in this instance can degrade the individual in the eyes of other officers and result in a loss of effective power/influence.

Bargaining is not random. Action channels exist to channel routines, interactions, and actions. Both informal and formal rules exist for players to abide by. Officers fight for specific outcomes and, even when a decision is made, the "fight" may often continue. Continuing can result in overturning a decision or varying the implementation. Solutions to problems are not discovered by detached analysis of the main problem, but by analysis of the specific area of a problem an officer is working.

Rarely do individuals view the same issue in the same manner. Issues may take on a slightly different focus depending on the player’s perspective as well as organizational perspectives/traditions, etc. Insight into others’ perspectives may be limited. This is especially true when communication is degraded.

Demands on individuals differ depending on their position/rank in the organization. The primary demand on the individual at the top is to preserve options until more certainty is obtained. Individuals in the middle lean toward gaining horizontal support. Lower level individuals generally attempt to get the higher level actor’s approval.

In Model III, connections (such as good-ole-boy networks) are important to individuals competing to influence a decision and action. Connections mean information, support, and increased influence. Time in position is important for connections and influence. Later arrivals, who are not as established, must, through time, build and develop influence and power. Well-connected appointees with obvious high power support may transcend others to a degree.

There is also a strong need for advocates of specific actions and/or options in Model III, i.e., the advocate conforms to the position of his/her service. An advocate can provide dynamics, alternative ideas, and research initiative for worthwhile endeavors which might not otherwise exist. However, effective advocates can unduly influence decisions and actions through pure ability to "sell" an idea. In this regard, an advocate must be formally recognized, and the advocate’s ability to influence the "selling" of an option must be considered as part of making the decision. If a course of action is sold too well, the decision maker should be alerted and take special interest in alternate courses of action before making his/her decision.

The survival and well-being of the organization may become more important in the minds of its members than the organization’s mission and the reason it was created. If organizational survival becomes an issue which influences the decision, Model III occurs.

For purposes of this paper, Model III will be considered when the following occur:

An important modification to Allison’s framework is also being added to Model I for purposes of this study. It will be termed Model I Plus (Model I+). This designation explains an outcome when an individual, acting primarily inside Model I, acts voluntarily to support another organization beyond a rational requirement to do so. Model I+ differs from Model III in that this action, completed with empathy and understanding of the other actor(s), is selfless. In Model III, the act is used to gain bargaining power or leverage for later benefit. So a decision or action will be considered Model I+ when the decision maker, not bound by rational requirement, at no cost to the larger organization, implements the decision or action to help others, knowing he will not realize a direct benefit in doing so.

Not all decisions and actions have to be accomplished in one specific manner or method. Often there are several ways to achieve the same end. In Operation DESERT STORM, with an abundance of resources, there were alternate ways to accomplish many of the specific missions. This, in turn, led to frustrations and rivalries because many individuals had a workable solution, but only one could be implemented.

The amount of time a leader has to devote to the implementation of a decision will affect how closely the vision of his decision is translated into action. When decision makers have little time to spend on oversight of a decision’s implementation, there exists a greater opportunity for the final action to diverge from the leader’s intention. Some leadership styles advocate the subordinate taking a great deal of initiative in the implementation, such as auftragstaktic.

Individual decisionmakers and actors, due to constraints beyond their control, may be forced into Model II/III operating modes. One common reason, among several possible reasons, for this situation to occur is simply a lack of enough information when a decision has to be made. To be Model I, the decisionmaker requires all necessary information (in theory, perfect information) to make a purely rational decision. If adequate information is not available, a rational decision can be made, but it may not be the best solution possible for the given problem. Individuals can perform within a Model II/III with the best of overall intentions, but without adequate information, they cannot reliably perform inside Model I. In other instances an individual will often honestly believe that his/her sub-organization, which has provided and supported the individual, is inherently right. The individual will believe supporting the sub-organization position will result in doing what is best for the larger organization. These individuals will often be inclined to support standard practices because of their faith in the organization and the organization’s ideas. Some individuals become, to varying degrees, "organizationally brainwashed."

Organizational brainwashing may occur in varying degrees. It occurs in most individuals to some degree. Some organizational brainwashing is even desirable. It allows commanders to predict unit actions when given specific directions. But it becomes dogma when organizational brainwashing begins to cause significant deviation from the best possible decisions and actions, and is considered undesirable.

It is possible for individual actions to fall inside more than one model simultaneously. To some extent, complex decisions and actions can include a rational process and be partly the result of organization standard operating procedures and partly the result of bargaining. Upon reflection, this is more likely the norm than packaging an organization’s output neatly inside one process.

It must be kept in mind the models are simply tools to analyze and study issues. In reducing (or simplifying) an organization’s complex decision making and implementation process in order to study and analyze it, a certain risk is taken. That is, analysis results will not be accurate with respect to the "real world/entire organization," but only accurate in regards to the simplified organization. Reducing complexity and complex issues involves risk, because reduction may lead to an understanding which does not reflect reality. The study may lose some of its richness in isolating some of the key issues. However, lessons are learned from the remaining "nuggets", with important points still valid and intact.

Having outlined the methodology, this study will now examine command relations through a series of issues affecting joint operations. Review of these issues will be in three parts. First, the issue will be examined, highlighting joint operations and command interaction. Second, the command interaction will be analyzed using the three previously discussed models. Third, in light of the command interaction, the effect of the decisions on joint operations will be examined and evaluated.

The US Navy wanted to extend their normal BVR ROE over much of the Gulf Theater. However, General Horner (CENTAF Commander and JFACC) and his staff were concerned about possible air-to-air fratricides. Many Coalition aircraft would be operating north of the Saudi Arabian/Kuwait border continually when the war began. Further complicating the problem was the employment of stealth aircraft. To avoid shooting friendly aircraft, Horner introduced stringent BVR ROEs. These ROEs required friendly fighters to make two types of independent verifications that detected/suspected bogeys were indeed bandits before air-to-air ordnance could be expended. Navy aircraft, however, did not have the on-board capability to accomplish this task. The F-14’s could interrogate the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders, but did not have more advanced electronic identification features. The F/A-18 had the advanced electronic features, but could not interrogate the IFF. Most USAF fighters, on the other hand, had both capabilities on their aircraft, thereby ensuring a high degree of confidence and an advantage over the Navy aircraft in firing Beyond Visual Range (BVR).

On BVR ROE, Horner stated, "Long before the war started, we concluded we couldn’t live with unrestricted BVR because of the Stealth at night, primarily. And we also concluded it wasn’t required because the Iraqi’s weren’t going to pose that big a threat. We were going to take out their command and control and then we were going to shoot them down. So, the decision was one of practicality, not one of doctrine."

Corder commented,

The F-14 with the Phoenix could fire at targets 55 or 60 miles away, and the Navy wanted to be able to employ it. The Navy wanted to use AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System) to distinguish enemy aircraft from friendly, but, again, the USAF commanders were reluctant. AWACS, by itself, was unsatisfactory because AWACS-identified positions can be off as much as five or six miles.

The United States Navy (USN) normally trained for a less restrictive ROE. In "Blue Water" they could engage anyone that entered their fleet battlespace who was not identified as friendly. They were not accustomed to the BVR measures imposed by the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). One reason for the difference in BVR ROE is the possible repercussions of a enemy aircraft breaking through to an aircraft carrier. Even a single fighter has the potential to sink an aircraft carrier.

A possible reason for the difference in these capabilities was the traditional way in which the different services practiced to employ fighter aircraft. The USAF looked more toward the "air-saturated" Central European environment wartime contingency. There, literally thousands of fighters from both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would be mixed in the air battle, making enemy fighter identification difficult. As a result, the USAF developed and procured extensive identification systems to avoid or reduce fratricides. The USN, on the other hand, expected and practiced to operate its carriers and aircraft in a more independent and controlled environment. In this more controlled contingency environment, the Navy fighter aircraft could and would enjoy freer BVR ROE without unreasonably endangering friendly aircraft. Operation DESERT STORM, with its large numbers of multi-national and multi-service aircraft, more closely resembled the USAF Central European environment than the USN independent/contingency model.

Within the Navy, at levels below Admiral Arthur, there was much frustration over the USN’s inability to employ the Phoenix Missile System freely. Frustrated naval officers helped influence Arthur in his decision to pursue a more liberal BVR ROE. At least some USN pilots, before and during the conflict, believed the USAF was establishing a BVR ROE, not so much to prevent fratricides, but to optimize USAF air-to-air capabilities at the expense of the USN. The Navy representatives to the JFACC’s Special Planning Cell offered, "This war was utilized by the USAF to prove ‘USAF Air Power’, not to prove that combined forces or even joint forces could force multiply and more effectively conduct the war. For example, the F-14 was originally restricted from forward combat air patrol (CAP) positions because CAP aircraft were required to have the ability to electronically identify (EID) and interrogate IFF, friendly and foe." It should be noted that the BVR ROE controversy inside the USN was not entirely homogenous. Dependent on the carrier, the opinions differed to a degree. An explanation why this occurs is included in the analysis.

Finally, only a few days before the war, the Navy belief that it was being slighted by the USAF on BVR ROE was forwarded to Arthur, who confronted Horner and pressed for a more liberal BVR ROE policy. Horner conceded that the USN had legitimate concerns about the restrictions in BVR ROE, but believed the restricted BVR ROE was the best way to conduct business. The two flag officers agreed to disagree about the issue, and Arthur indicated he would address the issue with Schwarzkopf.

Horner remembers,

Both senior officers remained on very good terms with one another, respecting the other’s different viewpoints. Neither believed the other to be harboring underlying motives and, in essence, both believed the other was operating in a rational, objective manner.

Horner and Arthur were both acting rationally--they just disagreed. In hindsight, Horner had the better argument, realizing at the time, the risks to friendly aircraft outweighed the potential good the more limited BVR ROE would have produced. In fact, the Iraqi Air Force never significantly threatened coalition attackers after the first few days. And even during the first few days, the Iraqi fighters were handily dispatched by the coalition air-to-air teams. Being empathetic and conciliatory, Horner discussed the issue further with Arthur and agreed to open up some areas for less restrictive ROE. This pleased Arthur. Since the JFACC had agreed to more liberal BVR on a limited basis, it looked promising that the F-14’s would be allowed to employ the Phoenix Missiles in a less restrictive manner. However, this was not to be the case.

Although Arthur and Horner had agreed to open some areas for less restrictive BVR ROE, some officers below Horner resisted. They were concerned that less restrictive BVR ROE would lead to fratricides and were not aggressive about implementing Horner’s agreement. One officer stated aircraft strike sorties were scheduled, to some degree, to prevent less restrictive BVR ROE implementation. Most of the USAF officers on the JFACC staff truly believed the less restrictive BVR ROE was unnecessary and increased the risk for coalition aircraft. This belief, in the end, led to some passive and some subtle resistance to a more liberal BVR ROE. Corder stated,

Although Horner had agreed in principle to make the BVR ROE less restrictive, the Special Information Section (SPINS) in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) was written in such a manner as to prevent the less restrictive ROE from being implemented. After a period of time, Arthur realized the SPINS was effectively blocking the less restrictive ROE from being implemented. However there were more critical areas that required his time and effort. Arthur was unable to spend the time necessary to get the less restricted BVR ROE implemented.

An incident which complicated the BVR issue occurred on the first night of the war. On that night, a USN A-6 Intruder was shot down over southern Iraq. An unqualified air controller, who was the USN liaison officer on board the E-3 Airborne Warning And Control System aircraft stated "it looked like a blue-on-blue incident", with a USN F-14 Tomcat inadvertently firing a missile against the A-6. This was reported up the chain of command to General Corder, the CENTAF Deputy Commander for Operations. When Corder informed Horner of the incident, Corder indicated Horner became furious and at the time, was less inclined to accommodate the Navy in making the BVR ROE less restrictive.

Arthur remembered the incident very well. He commented,

However, Corder remains convinced there was a USN blue-on-blue incident. Corder recalled,

When Horner was questioned about the incident after the war, he simply stated, "As far as them shooting down the A-6, that was a rumor which was never confirmed. I do think it certainly quieted down the [BVR] controversy for awhile."

Arthur was somewhat disappointed about the limitations placed on the USN aircraft. He understood the reasoning and, in general, agreed with it. But, he believed it was possible to accommodate both restrictive and less restrictive BVR ROEs. Arthur believes the coalition’s failure to do this resulted in less than optimum air-to-air operations. The Coalition did not take advantage of the F-14/Phoenix Missile System to the maximum extent possible and that during the Iraqi Air Force exodus to Iran, the longer range Phoenix might have shot down a larger number of fleeing aircraft. (At the time, the Allied leaders did not know the reason for the exodus; neither did they know if the diverted Iraqi aircraft would be re-deployed against the Coalition from Iran.)

After interviewing all the senior participants regarding this issue, this author believes the fratricide did not occur. But until Arthur could complete his investigation, it appeared that the fratricide did 0ccur. It was a naval officer who made the initial assessment. Corder, however, was not acting within Model III behavior. Based on the facts at the time, Corder honestly believed the Navy had shot down one of their own and took action to prevent further such incidents.

Horner and Arthur enjoyed a good component commander relationship. Each respected the other and interacted in an open, straightforward manner. Horner and Arthur made decisions that were generally the result of Model I interactions. However, the two individuals did have some honest disagreements. One of these disagreements was discussed: the issue of BVR ROE.

Horner believed in a more restrictive BVR ROE, but in fairness and in the interest of good interservice relations, he agreed to accommodate the less restrictive BVR ROE on a limited basis. Horner’s agreement to a less restrictive BVR ROE for limited periods, was Model I+. The unrestricted BVR ROE, however, were never really implemented. This was largely due to the failure of the Horner/Arthur agreement to overcome the Model II bureaucratic mass. Some officers in the USN believed the USAF was out to get more kills than the Navy and wanted to "compete" more evenly with the USAF. USAF planners were concerned about fratricides, especially with the F-117’s.

Although Horner supported an effort to open up some areas to the less restricted BVR ROE, a lot of latitude was given to subordinate commanders to implement it. The subordinate commanders and staffs believed Horner thought the less restrictive BVR ROE unnecessary and, therefore, were not aggressive in implementing it. The alleged shootdown, supported by the unqualified USN officer on the AWACS, lent additional credibility to the USAF argument for a period of time, and provided a reason to avoid the less restrictive ROE. Horner might have overcome this Model II outcome with more forceful direction to his staff.

There are four reasons the Horner-Arthur agreement did not carry enough weight to overcome the Model II bureaucracy. First, insufficient emphasis was placed behind the less restrictive BVR ROE initiative by the flag officers. There were, however, a myriad of other important issues requiring Horner’s and Arthur’s time and efforts. Therefore, the leaders could not place enough time on the issue to implement it successfully. Second, the agreement between Horner and Arthur was more accommodating guidance than a strong, hard directive. This accommodating guidance carried less weight than a vigorous directive, and the Model II bureaucracy had enough weight to stall the initiative. The third reason revolves around the alleged USN blue-on-blue incident. This alleged incident provided support for individuals opposed to the less restrictive ROE to successfully delay it (Model II). Even though the blue-on-blue incident was never substantiated, for a period of time the possibility of it occurring carried weight. The fourth reason was inadequate Navy representation in Riyadh. With only a one-star and a liaison team in place, it was more difficult for naval personnel to effect changes and influence the Air Force-dominated JFACC Staff. Liaison officers cannot replace rank and staffing.

Arthur’s location during the war aboard the USS Blue Ridge made it more difficult for him to interact effectively with the JFACC and the JFACC staff. While there is still debate today between Arthur and Admiral Mauz as to where the Commander, United States Navy Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT), should have been physically positioned, there is little doubt that COMUSNAVCENT and his staff would have been more effective interacting with the JFACC and his staff in person. Liaison officers did not fill the void.

Some officers in the Navy perceived the USAF acting Model III (i.e. the USAF getting the bulk of the air-to-air kills at the expense of the Navy). This perception had an operational impact. It led to frustrations between the services and to a degree, less cooperation. One example of this was when one Marine liaison officer began working "around" the ATO process to divert more air to Marine targets. He stated, "...the Navy, not too happy with the Air Force, was happy to cooperate in working around the ATO." This diversion of air to the Marines will be examined in more detail in the next chapter, but essentially, some strike sorties were diverted from their primary planned targets. Navy perceptions of USAF Model III behavior contributed to their willingness to help the Marines circumvent targeting, effecting operations.

Group-think was prevalent within the Navy during the Gulf War and this exacerbated Navy perceptions of USAF Model III behavior. Group-think can easily occur when large numbers of individuals work and live together. This was noted by Navy Captain Steve Ramsdell when he visited each aircraft carrier during the war while working for the Naval Historical Center. In regard to perceptions and decisionmaking on ships, he noted the following:

It is important to note that group-think must be carefully avoided. It can happen not only on ships, but in any organization where individuals work very close together for extended periods of time. It becomes more important to be a "team player" than to advocate different ideas, which are often seen as dissent. This type of perspective is insidious because officers, trying to be team players, really believe they are acting and deciding for rational reasons, not because they are being influenced by others or an organizational perspective. Group-think can lead to Model II and sometimes Model III behavior.

One must keep in mind there were significant differing service perspectives below the Horner/Arthur level. These differing perspectives often involved group-think and affected not only the BVR ROE issue, but also other issues between the USN and USAF such as strike planning, strike implementation, and tanker allocation. While the highest levels of command functioned in a Model I rational environment, lower levels of command often functioned in accordance with Model II and with perceptions of Model III. Since organizational output is affected by the entire organization, not just the highest level of leadership, it is accurate to state the BVR ROE implementation was, in the end, a combination of the three models. The restricted BVR ROE was implemented for Model I reasons. However, the less restrictive BVR ROE, agreed to by Horner, was not implemented because of both Model I and Model II/III explanations. Personnel in the USN believed the USAF was acting Model III by restricting the USN participation, although this author does not believe this to be true.

There was concern by the USN that the USAF was placing itself in a position to garner the bulk of the air-to-air kills. The restricted BVR ROE was seen to be one method of accomplishing this. But while many USAF personnel were pleased that this situation favored the USAF, the restricted BVR ROE was nonetheless adequate and effective in mission accomplishment. The USN did not possess the state-of-art identification equipment the USAF possessed. While some USAF actions can be explained by Model II, getting most of the air-to-air kills in the war was not a significant motivation to the USAF. However, it was important enough to the USN that a number of naval officers became very frustrated when it appeared the USAF would be able to kill more aircraft. The air planners were concerned with gaining air superiority and striking targets, not winning the air kill competition. By not directly following Horner’s guidance to open up some airspace for a less restricted BVR ROE, Model II explains some of the actions by the air planners. They believed the less restricted BVR ROE was unnecessary. Contrary to the JFACC’s Model I+ guidance, they passively resisted his direction. Model II, regardless of rationale, prevailed.

This issue also highlights the importance of each service understanding that "joint" does not mean equal. Joint simply means that elements of more than one service participate. The amount of participation should be based on the rational employment of weapon systems, not on an equal, and possibly irrational basis. Desires for one’s service to participate in operations to justifying future funding are Model II. Mission and situation determine the weapon or weapon system. It is not the weapon or weapon system that determines the mission.

The impact of the Model II actions and Model III perceptions could have had a greater impact in a more closely contested conflict. In the Gulf War, the abundant air resources allowed some inefficiency in command relations and joint operations without a corresponding degradation in combat capability. In future conflicts, where the United States might not enjoy overwhelming capability, such degradation in joint integration could be disastrous.

Overall in this issue, the USN below the component commander level believed the USAF was acting Model III. The component commanders came to an understanding, but at levels below them, the USAF did act Model II to some degree. The USN realized this, became more frustrated with the USAF, and reacted Model II, sometimes in instances concerning other issues.

The following is a summary of command interaction as it impacted the BVR ROE:

• The CINC, CENTAF Commander and the NAVCENT Commander operated Model I.
• The CENTAF Commander operated Model I+
• In the USN, below the component commander level, Model II behavior occurred
• In the USAF, below the component commander level, Model II behavior occurred
• Some in the USN believed the USAF was acting Model III at USN expense and this in turn exacerbated problems in integration

Insofar as joint air defense is concerned, the resulting joint effort in the Gulf War was adequate and effective. The final result of the air defense effort was that no coalition surface forces were successfully engaged by Iraqi aircraft and there were no confirmed coalition air-to-air fratricides. The restricted BVR ROE in the air defense role was more than adequate for the circumstances in the Gulf War. Arthur, however, believes the coalition might have been more successful in offensive operations against Iraqi aircraft fleeing to Iran if the BVR ROE had been less restrictive. In retrospect, the destruction of those fleeing aircraft would not have a significantly affected the outcome of the war. The debate continues. In the future, much of this issue could be resolved before an actual conflict situation arises. This can be accomplished by upgrading identification equipment on naval aircraft while jointly developing and practicing interservice BVR doctrine and/or ROE. Each of the services must appreciate the others’ concerns and primary procedures for accomplishing their differing missions.

Most of the joint concerns of the US Marine Corps (USMC) were abated early during Operation DESERT SHIELD. For General Walt Boomer these concerns included 1) the USMC (both ground and air) maintaining autonomy within the theater and not being apportioned out among other forces; 2) the possible conduct of an amphibious operation; 3) USMC reporting directly to the CINC (that is, not through a separate land component commander) with Boomer maintaining command of both Marines, Central Command, (MARCENT) and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF); and 4) maintaining direct control of USMC tactical fixed-wing assets. The resolution of the last two concerns had a significant impact on the integration of Marine air operations.

First, the Marines wanted to be left intact as the IMEF. This was done and the IMEF was given its own area of operations rather than being assigned under other units.

The second concern was the conduct of one of the USMC’s specialties and primary missions, an amphibious assault. Eventually, the threat of an amphibious landing was used very effectively as a deception to mislead Iraqi forces, but the landing itself was not accomplished for Model I reasons. These reasons included the threat of high casualties, probability of significant collateral damage to Kuwaiti infrastructure, and limited tactical utility of this operation.

Third, the Marines wanted the IMEF commander to be able to report directly to the theater CINC. While on the surface this might not seem important to command relations and the conduct of joint operations, it was. With some deliberation, the CINC agreed to this. This meant, however, that IMEF, essentially a corps-sized unit, would enjoy direct reporting to the CINC while the US Army corps commanders would have to report to the CINC through the 3rd Army Commander, General Yeosock.

Fourth, Boomer wanted to function as both the Commander, IMEF and Commander, Marine Central Command (COMMARCENT). Holding both positions and reporting directly to the CINC would give Boomer a tight control on Marine Corps participation. The two positions, however, require two different perspectives: to prepare for combat and two conduct it. As Commander, IMEF, Boomer’s primary responsibility was to plan and direct US Marine tactical operations in their area of responsibility. As COMMARCENT, his primary perspective and concern would be theater-wide: to integrate US Marine operations into all joint and combined operations.

There was some disagreement between the Marine Corps Commandant, General Gray, and Boomer as to whether COMMARCENT and Commander, IMEF, should be the same person. General Gray wanted COMMARCENT to be a different three star flag officer stationed in Riyadh. Boomer disagreed and maintained he could effectively perform both functions from his forward headquarters in Jubail. Boomer observed, "I felt very comfortable being dual-hatted. That being said, there was a degree of paranoia back in Washington at this headquarters that somehow the Marine Corps was getting the short end because I wasn’t at the table every night in Riyadh. Nothing could have been farther from the truth." In the end, Gray’s plan to move MARCENT headquarters to Riyadh, proposed in mid-December, was scuttled by Schwarzkopf because the CINC did not want significant command changes occurring so near to the commencement of hostilities.

The good working relationship established between Schwarzkopf and Boomer influenced the CINC in his decision to support Boomer’s positions on the USMC maintaining direct reporting to the CINC and maintaining MARCENT Headquarters away from Riyadh. On their working relationship Boomer commented as follows:

The decision to leave Boomer in both positions would influence the fifth issue, control of airpower. Marine Corps doctrine and the 1986 Omnibus Agreement argue that a synergistic effect is created when airpower and ground forces combine properly. In other words, the Marine Corps believes that the sum of combined effects is greater than the sum of the two operating separately. The Marine maneuver units also possess less organic indirect firepower (artillery) than equivalent-sized US Army units. The US Marine Corps makes up for this shortfall with its organic, fixed-wing tactical airpower, which the US Army does not possess.

Marine aviators generally pride themselves first and foremost on the support they provide their ground forces. General Royal Moore, commander of the 1st Marine Air Wing during the Gulf War emphatically stated, "Marine air was there when needed." The bulk of Marine tactical aviation training focuses on close air support (CAS) and close interdiction. In addition to the training emphasis, most Marine aircraft are designed for shorter combat ranges.

USAF doctrine stresses centralized control and decentralized execution. Most USAF airmen believe all tactical airpower resources, from all services to include the Marines, should be under central control of a JFACC and allocated where needed the most. Tactical fixed-wing aviation is very expensive to operate and maintain. Husbanding resources in one area can only come at the expense of other areas. Horner believed tactical airpower needed to be centrally coordinated, but was less emphatic about airpower being centrally controlled in respect to operational employment. From the beginning Horner did not attempt to gain operational control of US Marine air, but did insist that excess sorties be made available to him and that all Marine sorties be on the Air Tasking Order (ATO).

The Marine component and the Air Force component commanders, Boomer and Horner, immediately struck off on the right note. Boomer recalls the following:

Horner agrees his relationship with Boomer was excellent. On the component commander level they worked well together. Horner stated, "Boomer and I worked well together. It wasn’t any effort. Obviously, the Marine air is going to support the Marines to the maximum extent just because of the payload and range. It made sense. Common sense. You do common sense things and don't worry about doctrine. Doctrine is bullshit on things like that."

However, at levels below the component commander level, the relations were not as smooth. Glosson was in charge of air planning for the JFACC. General Royal Moore was the commander of the Marine air wing. Both had very specific ideas on how the air campaign should be conducted and Marine air integrated. Boomer admitted, "Now, in terms of control of air space, General Horner and I were probably a lot more flexible than our staffs. We are not going to get hung up on air space and air control. Let's just get the job done and we will work out something."

Horner also felt that below the component commander level significant frictions existed. Horner noted,

Horner brings up several important points. The first is the 1986 Omnibus Agreement. This agreement states the Marines will obligate Marine air in excess of their air support needs to the JFACC for tasking. There was and still is controversy about defining exactly what "excess air" means. During Operation DESERT SHIELD it was worked out before the start of the air campaign that all the A-6’s and 50% of the F/A-18’s were to be dedicated to the JFACC effort. Then, when Marine air was needed for battlefield preparation, all of it would be re-dedicated to IMEF.

Next is the Air Tasking Order issue. The Saudis insisted that all sorties flying in Saudi Arabia had to be in the ATO. This agreement was established in August; the Saudi Arabians were sensitive about having foreign aircraft flying over their soil on a regular basis with no apparent Saudi control. Horner proposed the ATO as the method for the Saudis to control the air effort over their country, by giving the Saudis "approval" authority over its content. This move to give the Saudis control over foreign flights in their airspace alleviated their concerns. The ATO proposal also gave Horner considerable leverage in forcing all air forces into a centralized execution plan. Since all the air forces had to be in the ATO to fly, the ATO became a reality to other services who had little or no practice using it.

Marine staff planning officers at Riyadh, believing the Marines were not being supported as they should and with the loyalty to the US Marine Corps foremost in mind, began undermining the approved tasking process. In effect, the Marine officers were changing command directed/approved targeting in order to place more strikes within the Marine Corps area of responsibility. Lt Colonel Dave Deptula, USAF planning officer on the JFACC staff remarked,

This was not the only way the Marines manipulated the air targeting process. A Marine on the Riyadh planning staff acknowledged how they changed targeting another way. During the air planning process, he noted that no one really looked very hard at alternate targets. He then listed the targets the Marines wanted to strike, but not approved for strike by the CENTCOM planners, as alternate targets. Then it was only a matter of a quick phone call to the appropriate air wing asking that the secondary target be struck. The Navy wings, some very frustrated with ATO, JFACC, and BVR ROE, were often very willing to accommodate the Marine officer. In some instances, the pilots disregarded the primary target and struck only the alternate.

The Marine actions were taken because of loyalty to the "Corps" and a general perception by some Marine planners that the Marines were not getting their "fair share" of air support. One Marine officer claimed, when they did get air strikes in the Marine area of operations, it was usually by less effective Coalition member air forces. So with "Semper Fi" in mind, at the time, there was no guilt for their actions.

These actions were condoned at command levels below Boomer. General Moore stated,

General Moore did not believe in the ATO or the JFACC concept. In his opinion, the JFACC process did not respond well to the battlefield. His overriding mission, as indicated in the title of his Proceedings interview, "Marine Air: There When Needed," was for Marine air to be there for Marines. The focus was narrow enough that General Moore stated, "About 15 days prior to the ground campaign, we were into battlefield preparation. At that time, if a target didn’t do something for the IMEF and the battlefield preparation, we weren’t going. The Air Force understood that."

With the Marine air commander so focused on his own specific mission, his staff would be inclined to follow his lead. In hindsight, one Marine officer freely admits his actions were not correct and essentially not the way business should be conducted. But the actions were made with the best of intentions in support of his organization, which he believed in. It makes it that much more important for leaders to anticipate such followership and remind subordinates to keep the big picture in mind.

General Moore was also not an avid supporter of the strategic air effort. Although the Marines were always part of the strategic effort, they resisted it. In Bahrain, near the end of August, at a briefing for Admiral Mauz on the strategic air campaign, General Moore commented that the first bomb that fell on Iraq ought to be after the first Marine crossed the line with his bayonet fixed. Although the Marines participated in the strategic campaign, because of their narrower focus and doctrine, they were primarily concerned with battlefield preparation.

Glosson stated,

It must be noted that General Moore could not have conducted operations as he did without Boomer’s support. In this regard, Boomer’s primary focus, as the IMEF Commander, was preparing the battlefield. Boomer did not object to General Moore’s handling of the air campaign.

The Marine actions impacted operations. The Marine actions and insistence on directly following their own doctrine resulted in the Air Force leaders, to some degree, not being able to direct and better support initial Marine battlefield preparation. Glosson was frustrated to some degree working with the Marines and their narrower IMEF focus. He saw the theater-wide perspective and noted the impact on operations. Glosson stated,

Glosson was frustrated with the strict Marine adherence to their doctrine and their lack of empathy toward the other services. All the same, he admired the Marine fighting spirit and was determined to support them. What is unfortunate is that better joint education and training before the war, followed by more open-mindedness and communication during the war, would have resulted in better cooperation and trust. This in turn would have led to much less needless consternation during the conflict.

Some Marines noted Marine difficulty overcoming their narrow focus and the problems the Marines had integrating Marine air with airpower from other services. The "Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM After Action Report" by the Marine Liaison, CENTAF, stated,

The Marines required the support of the air assets of the other services. Although they boast a significant air arm, they had shortfalls in numbers, equipment, and ordnance. One of the most critical shortfalls was precision weapons. Even though they possessed Maverick missiles, their version of this weapon could only be employed with the assistance of a ground laser designater. During the battlefield preparation, ground troops were normally not close enough to targets to designate.

Contrary to what some of the Marines might have believed, the USAF air leaders were very concerned about the effort placed on the Marine’s front. But the Marines were not the main thrust of the battle--VII Corps was. Therefore, General Schwarzkopf was not going to place an equivalent share of airpower in the Marine battle. The Marine’s primary mission was to fix the Iraqi forces and make them believe the main thrust was north through southern Kuwait. If the Marines penetrated, so much the better. If they did not, that was all right because VII Corps was the main thrust. Of course the Marines had no real intention of just being a fixing force for the US Army. They had every intention of taking the battle right to Saddam Hussein. And their aggressive attitude showed. It showed enough that General Sir Peter de la Billiere, commander of the British Coalition Forces, whose units were initially dedicated to work with and support the US Marines, partly justified moving his forces out with VII Corps by his concern of Marine over-aggressiveness. He commented,

Sir Peter de la Billiere was also concerned that Marine budget cuts might drive the Marines to risk higher casualties to protect their existence in the long term (Model III). In essence, he did not believe the Marines, threatened by possible funding loss, would be capable of operating in a Model I or rational manner.

Horner had a great deal of respect for Boomer and the Marine units. He also appreciated what the Marines were fragged to go up against and worked to support them. Horner noted the following:

Eventually Horner found ways to get battlefield preparation air to the Marines. And during the ground campaign, the Marines were successful beyond expectations.

In essence, Boomer worked well with the other component commanders and believed an additional echelon of command between him and the CINC, such as the US Army corps commanders had with ARCENT, would degrade operations. On the location of the MARCENT commander and his headquarters element, there was disagreement between Boomer, who felt he could command effectively both MARCENT and IMEF, and the US Marine Corps Commandant, General Gray. Boomer enjoyed an effective relationship with his immediate boss, Schwarzkopf, and thought it best to continue without an echelon of command above him. Boomer also believed he enjoyed effective relationships with the other component commanders. Based on literally centuries of experience, operations between the US Navy and the Marines generally went well. Although there were corps boundary issues between the US Marines and the US Army, Marine/Army relations were good. Even on the most sensitive issue, the integration between Marine air and the JFACC, Boomer felt comfortable.

However, the addition of a separate MARCENT commander, stationed in Riyadh, may have had a positive impact on the joint air operations. If the component headquarters had been co-located, communication and direct interaction between the USAF and the USMC commanders and staff would have increased significantly. Because of the increased interaction, misunderstandings and mistrust could have been more easily overcome. With Marine commanders and command staffs working more directly with the other services, versus only liaison officers, key Marines leaders would have seen more of the big picture. With this bigger picture, integration with the other services may have improved. Many of the USMC liaison officers at Riyadh, especially reflecting upon the conflict after the war, did believe the USMC might have been too parochial. This is reflected in postwar interviews and after action reports.

General Gray was concerned about the Marine component commander and staff operations being physically separated from the other commanders in Riyadh. He believed the Marines could integrate better and be more effective by separating COMMARCENT and Commander, IMEF. and that the Marines could be better represented by the MARCENT Commander being physically located at Riyadh. While Boomer was satisfied with the command relations, General Gray was not. General Schwarzkopf, satisfied with his relationship with Boomer, did not allow the separation of IMEF and COMMARCENT to occur. Had General Gray pushed the issue a month or two earlier, it might have been more difficult for the CINC to shut off the initiative. After all, General Gray was arguing the Marines needed what the Army had: an echelon of command between the largest tactical unit (MEF/Corps) and the CINC.

Boomer’s and Moore’s top priority was execution of the ground war in the Marine area of operations. However, a separate COMMARCENT would not have necessarily been as concerned with the tactical focus of the ground war. A separate COMMARCENT might have looked at a broader picture and been more concerned with how the Marines ground forces and Marine air affected the entire theater. This is likely because a separate COMMARCENT and his staff at Riyadh would have interacted continually with the other component commanders and their staffs. Instead of the USMC operating with a lack of information and perspective inside Model II, COMMARCENT could have operated more on a Model I level. Boomer was correct in believing he could effectively orchestrate and command tactical operations from Jubail. But what he was unable to do was adequately change his perspective from a tactical to a joint theater outlook. This was not from a lack of desire to make the best contribution possible to the theater effort, but more from lack of interaction and perspective with the other services and a somewhat narrower tactical focus. As IMEF Commander, Boomer led the Marines through a ground operation that was nothing less than spectacular. But as COMMARCENT, his interest was weighted in supporting the Marine ground efforts--not in providing continuous and direct interaction and support to the CINC and the other component commanders as a separate COMMARCENT might. While operating rationally from the perspective of Commander, IMEF, Boomer was operating somewhat Model II as COMMARCENT.

In the end, the Marines, with few exceptions, were operating as they wanted with little interference from the other services or the CINC. Boomer was allowed considerable leeway in his command decisions concerning IMEF operations and the conduct of their portion of the ground campaign. In a conflict with less abundant resources, a CINC might not allow such independence. Although the amphibious assault operation was desirable from the viewpoint of Model II & III, with all information considered, it could not be rationally justified. As the ground war neared, operating Model I, Boomer agreed with the CINC that an assault would not be in the best interests of effective combat operations; it would be difficult to minimize casualties.

Moore operated the same way as Boomer in that he was primarily concerned with a specific mission: supporting the Marine ground forces with airpower. General Moore focused his efforts at this mission and paid much less attention to integrating airpower most effectively with the other theater assets. Had General Moore been more cooperative with the other components, particularly the USAF, more effective assets, in terms of numbers and capabilities, might have been more available to the USMC sector. USMC air, though very capable, still needed to be augmented by better airstrike platforms. The USMC air was especially lacking in precision capability during the battlefield preparation. Because of Marine adherence to doctrine and their own self sufficiency (Model II) as noted earlier by Horner and Glosson, one impact was that the Iraqi units in front of the Marines were not judged as attrited as were Iraqi units in front of other coalition units. Had the Marines not insisted on using their own air to such an extent, precision sorties would have been made available sooner.

In regards to the "gaming" of air strikes to other areas by Marines, it is classic Model III. The overwhelming loyalty was to the suborganization cause (US Marine Corps and IMEF in this instance) with a secondary concern for the "big picture". The suborganization took clear precedence over the larger organization in a number of instances. Some Marines saw themselves in competition for air assets with the other services, and being of a competitive nature, competed aggressively. Due largely to the abundant assets, this did not turn out to be a major problem in the air operations. But in different circumstances it could be. (Based solely on the Gulf War, one could expect the Marines to try to keep their own air in the absence of emergency theater needs.) Horner was the quickest to pick up on this fact and in true Model I+ fashion made a decision to ignore it. Although Boomer and Horner got along very well and worked together inside Model I, their staffs, more narrowly focused, did not work as smoothly.

Moore and Horner openly illustrate some Model III "bargaining behavior". In his comments during his interview with Proceedings, General Moore stated,

While such bargaining can be done for rational reasons, if done as the standard way of conducting business, it usually indicates a Model III environment. In the interest of interservice harmony, Horner sometimes degraded to Model III behavior and bargained in this manner to get the most effective aircraft systems on a given target. The FA-18’s were capable of striking deeper into the KTO than the A-10’s were. On the other hand, the A-10’s, with their PGM capability, were more effective in attacking mechanized and armored divisions directly in front of Marine positions. While this bargaining improved integration, it should not have been necessary. In a Model I scenario, this bargaining would have been unnecessary.

Glosson respected the Marines for their tactical expertise, but was very frustrated when it came to working with them on an operational level. For the Marines, after years of training to operate autonomously, it was difficult for them to break out of their Model II behavior. There seems to be an inbred lesson in the Marine Corps not to rely on any other service unless forced to do so. This mistrust and resulting self reliance has some justification in history when they, on more than one occasion, paid in casualties when they were not adequately supported in the Pacific during World War II. Within many Marine officers, there is a determination not to let history repeat itself.

Until the US Marine Corps air component can break out of its Model II/III environment, it will not be as effective as it potentially could be. The synergism it creates within itself, between air and ground assets, can only be created between the USMC and the other services with the same level of integration. The "Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM After Action Report" by the Marine Liaison, CENTAF, US Marine Corps, stated this succinctly.

The Marine Corps after action report is tough on the Marines, and that Marines would write such a critical report indicates the professionalism of the Corps. This report recommends that the Marines take advantage of every joint billet available with quality officers, improve joint training and education, and make equipment interservice compatible. The critical question for the USMC is, "Does the USMC see a problem and is the USMC attempting to improve integration?"

Until Marines can appreciate the USAF view of operational art and strategic attack, and USAF officers can appreciate the concept of the Marine Air Ground Task Force, there are going to continue to be frictions. It requires more than the senior service commanders working well together in a Model I environment to make the services perform well together. It requires empathy and understanding all along the line to make operations work best. Jointness is important and all the services must play ball. Being joint means applying all available assets in the most effective manner, regardless of services.

Some USAF officers thought Model II at times. When the USAF planners had stepped back and looked at the big picture, they realized, as Horner did, that the USMC had limited capability to offer the strategic aspects of the air campaign. The Marine aircraft are generally best suited for short range and close battle. The USMC enjoyed only a relatively small number of deep strike capable fighters and only very little precision weapon delivery capability. In essence, the USMC was best suited to support its own area.

It should be noted that Deptula realized, at the time, he was thinking in Model II terms. But this thought, in part due to Horner’s guidance, did not translate into action. Individuals engaged in a narrower mission focus are prone to thinking in Model II terms. Deptula’s focus was the planning of the strategic air campaign and he saw the Marine actions in conflict with his mission. Horner, on the other hand, was not as narrowly focused, and at the time could better place the Marine action in relation to the big picture. With the big picture in mind, Horner was able to make a Model I decision.

Deptula was very much concerned that precedents were being set that might cause problems for future air integration. And there should be some concern for precedent. However, one must take care to ensure that concern for precedent does not lead to Model II/III behavior and unreasonably affect current operations.

The impact of the Model II actions could have had a greater impact in a more closely contested conflict. In the Gulf War, the abundant air resources allowed some inefficiency in joint air operations without a corresponding degradation in combat capability. In future conflicts, where the United States might not enjoy overwhelming capability, such degradation in joint integration could be disastrous.

The following is a summary of command interaction analysis concerning USMC air operations:

• The CINC, CENTAF Commander, and Boomer as IMEF Commander operated Model I.
• Boomer, as COMMARCENT, in regards to air power, exhibited some Model II focus.
• The CENTAF Commander operated Model I+.
• In the USMC, below the component commander level, Model II and Model III behavior occurred.

In the end, integration was achieved between Marine air and the JFACC. But it was not always easy and without pain. If the USMC is to integrate effectively with the other services in the future, it will need to become more flexible in its doctrine and cultural mindset. More trust needs to be established between the services and forces should be integrated with less resistance. With a shrinking United States military budget, it is not reasonable for any single service to have its own aviation component which serves no service but itself. With more joint integration and practice, this should become easier.

On the other hand, the other services must be more understanding of the Marine’s special capabilities, needs, and operations. The USMC offers an example of jointness all wrapped into a single service. While all of its lessons and experiences might not be applicable to all services, there are some experiences which are. The other services need to realize the "lightness" of Marine units and their special dependence on airpower. Horner had it right when he noted the USMC fighters were especially suited to USMC operations and that it made common sense to use them in that capacity. Although USMC air has some capability to operate in other roles and missions, it makes sense to use them in the manner they are best suited.

The USMC has realized the need to integrate more closely with the other services. In an effort to improve this integration, permanent component commander positions have been established for both Pacific and Atlantic areas of operations. These position are separate from and in addition to the MEF commander positions. The MEF commander will be primarily responsible for tactical operations, and the USMC component commander will oversee integration and USMC interests at the command headquarters.

General Fred Franks commanded the US VII Corps. By mission and composition of forces, he was the most important commander actually on the battlefield; during the ground campaign Schwarzkopf and Yeosock remained in Riyadh, over 300 miles south. Franks was also the most influential tactical commander in the ground operation. He made the most important tactical decisions that affected the battlespace and tactics of not only his corps, but also that of General Luck and XVIII Airborne Corps. These two units comprised the bulk of the coalition forces that would attack the most elite Iraqi ground forces, the Republican Guard.

The decision to bring VII Corps from Europe was not made until October 1990. This gave the VII Corps less time to integrate its forces and prepare for battle than the other established units. Moreover, VII Corps’ training and indoctrination was for a Central European, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conflict, which exacerbated the reduced preparation time period. Trained for a specific type of battle and trained in specific ways, moving to the Middle East environment and the Central Command (CENTCOM) arena meant a different way of conducting business and waging war for the VII Corps and its commanders.

In addition to these training differences, there were command and procedural differences. The XVIII Corps was based in the United States and prepared mentally for a variety of different theaters and contingencies. The VII Corps was based in Europe, with a very specific NATO mission mindset and outlook. The result was the XVIII Corps, with the broader mission outlook, demonstrated more flexibility in regard to accommodating CENTCOM operations than VII Corps with its narrower mission focus. It should be noted the broader XVIII Corps focus and training included extra emphasis on the CENTCOM area of operations in the 10 years leading to the Gulf War. This further emphasized the different orientations between the two corps.

One of the first frustrations encountered by VII Corps leaders was the JFACC’s refusal to recognize and implement procedures for Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), a concept born and developed in NATO. The notion of BAI was first developed by the RAF and the USAF in an effort to integrate non-US NATO air forces--those that refused to conduct Close Air Support (CAS)--into an attacking force inside and outside the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). In BAI, the strike can be inside or outside the FSCL, and attack aircraft do not need to be under the direct control of a forward air controller when delivering ordnance. The operation of BAI in a high threat Central European environment was appropriate.

The US Army in Europe liked the concept of BAI. It allowed the Corps commanders the ability to nominate targets formally and provided them with a measure of control over air assets. But while NATO planned and trained with the use of BAI in mind, not all other commands did. The USAF even back-tracked, discouraging the use of the procedure. For example, the 1984 version of USAF Manual (AFM) 1-1 defines BAI, but only as a subset of interdiction. In the current version of Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume I, and in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02), December 1989, the term BAI is not mentioned. The term BAI is mentioned in Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume II, Essay Q, "Air Interdiction and Close Air Support." But the reference simply states, however, that battlefield air interdiction is interdiction with near-term influence on the battlefield and requires close coordination between air and surface forces.

Horner saw BAI as unnecessary; a mission which would complicate and possibly degrade the application of airpower on the battlefield. So Horner eliminated BAI as an air mission type for CENTCOM. In making this decision, Horner acted within USAF and joint doctrine, but not strictly in accordance with the 31 Initiatives of 1985 where the Air Force and the Army agreed to develop and to test procedures synchronizing BAI with ground maneuver. The disconnect was that the US Army as a service, had incorporated BAI from the 31 Initiatives into its doctrine--the USAF had not.

While the BAI issue appeared to be relatively unimportant in the Gulf War, it is actually very important. It appeared to the corps commanders and staffs, that the JFACC (and the USAF) were not allowing the corps adequate influence in preparing and integrating airpower onto the battlefield. General Luck and Franks saw BAI as joint doctrine and essential to shaping the battlefield for the Operation DESERT STORM ground operation. With the 31 initiatives dialogue of 1985 in mind, many commanders in the US Army expected to have BAI available as an input to shape the battlefield. To understand this viewpoint fully, one must appreciate the corps’ and corps commanders’ perspectives. In NATO, BAI and CAS were part of Offensive Air Support which was prioritized by the Army Group Commander; therefore the corps commander in NATO had a direct input into target nominations.

In summary, Horner saw the addition of BAI as unnecessary and believed dividing interdiction into two separate categories complicated command and control without significant benefits. Although the majority of the US Army felt there was agreement between the two services on the use of the procedure, USAF officers did not.

It is interesting to note this was not the only disconnect between the two services on the employment and integration of airpower with ground forces on the battlefield. General Calvin Waller, Deputy CINC, complained the services did not fight in accordance with joint doctrine and AirLand Battle. He states,

Both BAI and Air-Land Battle disconnects are easy to understand. On BAI, the USAF never formalized it Air Force wide. And, as far as the USAF is concerned, AirLand Battle is not joint doctrine. US Army Field Manual 100-5 AirLand Battle is an Army document and one that has not been formally accepted as standard procedure throughout the Air Force. In the 31 Initiatives, the USAF "recognized the concept of Air-Land Battle"and agreed to work with the US Army within its framework, but did not adopt it as USAF doctrine. Without AirLand Battle being institutionalized within the USAF, there was not a consistent USAF commitment to the concept. Integration procedures between the USAF and the US Army varied, in fact, based on the needs and procedures of the various theaters as well as the personalities of their commanders.

The US corps is the largest tactical unit on the battlefield. It is equivalent in size to the numbered field armies of World War II and Korea, but capable of several times the effective speed and firepower of those older units. In US Army doctrine, the corps commander is responsible for countering all threats, regardless of battlefield boundaries, which may affect his unit.

In Operation DESERT STORM, neither the US Air Force nor the US Army seemed to fully appreciate the corps’ primacy on the battlefield. While the Army recognized the importance of both corps primacy and the corps commander, it is just beginning to understand the "new" corps implication in regard to airpower application.

While the corps commanders were charged with responsibility for battlefield objectives, they personally did not feel they had sufficient influence on the air order of battle. Franks stated, "I had no argument with the amount of air in there. That was somebody else's decision. But what it did when it was in there, seems to me, had to be part of the total maneuver scheme of a five division, 146,000 soldier corps. We had to complement one another, and that's what frustrated me. Eventually, because of the amount of air, we got it all done". Frank’s primary focus was tactical, and rightly so. His point illustrates his tactical perspective. But due to the importance of Frank’s tactical mission, the destruction of the Republican Guard, Franks had to think operationally as well. This complemented the theater-wide or operational perspective of the JFACC.

Tactical airpower is generally a limited resource. In the campaigns of North Africa and New Guinea in World War II, unity of command allowed the Allies to regain the initiative. In Operation DESERT STORM, Horner forged a unified air campaign of unparalleled effectiveness. In contrast, where unity of command was not achieved, such as in Korea and Vietnam, effective planning and execution became difficult, if not impossible. Although there are examples of decentralized air command, such as northwest Europe in World War II, division of the theater air effort and strategic confusion have frequently occurred together. History also indicates that airpower, generally, has been best employed when employment was controlled by an airman. Thus, while history provides some of a mixture of lessons in regards to the control of airpower on the battlefield, the majority of the evidence indicates it is a limited resource and should be centrally controlled.

For these reasons, USAF leaders have fought aggressively for centralized control and decentralized execution of air resources--and rightfully so as most historical evidence has shown. Parceling out packets of airpower to individual units, especially when it is a finite resource, has not proven to be the most productive way of employing combat aircraft. This was proven early in World War II during Operation TORCH in North Africa.

As the air campaign proceeded in Operation DESERT STORM, the corps commanders wanted a greater voice in deciding which targets would be struck. Franks, VII Corps Commander, reportedly called Waller, the Deputy CINC, and complained, "Cal, I'm not getting my share. I need your help." Although he had been very comfortable with Horner's performance during the early air campaign--and played a very minor role in it--Waller became concerned with the "battlefield preparation". He stated,

Waller put a message together for the CINC to sign. The message assigned Waller to oversee the battlefield preparation sorties. In his opinion, until he was granted that authority by the CINC, "...the air component commander still had the same kind of license to say, 'I want to divert X amount of air from, let's say, shaping the battlefield to some strategic target.'" Waller indicates the lesson he learned was that the individual who is in charge of the strategic air campaign should not be the same individual who is in charge of the tactical sh