United States Marine Corps Reserve Structure CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Manpower EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: United States Marine Corps Reserve Structure AUTHOR: Major Karim Shihata THESIS: For the Marine Corps, the problem is that current SMCR organization is not conducive to selective early activation of reserve units in support of crises or contingency operations. The solution to this problem is to integrate the SMCR into the active force structure providing a systematic means for selective early activation of reserve units. BACKGROUND: In operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Restore Hope reserves were used prior to or without a presidential call- up. Yet within the Marine Corps, there is no system in place to facilitate determination of what capability to activate, which units to use, or where to assign the units once activated. The SMCR's structure duplicates the active force structure and operates independently from the active forces during peacetime. The current system is not cost effective, does not facilitate rapid, efficient mobilization, and does not provide the forces most needed to reinforce the active forces. RECOMMENDATION: There are three policy changes that will significantly improve the reinforcement capability of the SMCR. First, integrating SMCR units into the active force at the lowest possible level. Second, modifying Title 10 of the U.S. Code to allow more flexibility in the use of SMCR forces to meet peacetime, contingency, and crisis response reinforcement missions. Third, changing the composition of the SMCR to enhance MAGTF capabilities rather than duplicate MAGTF functions. OUTLINE Thesis. The planned force reductions inherent in the base force concept will cause the active forces to depend more heavily on reserve components. For the Marine Corps, the problem_is that current SMCR organization and training is not conducive to selective early activation of reserve units in support of crises or contingency operations._The solution to this problem is to integrate the SMCR into the active force structure providing a systematic means for selective early activation of reserve units. I. Introduction A. USMCR structure B. USMC mission as part of new national military strategy 1. Presence, forward deployment, crisis response 2. Impact of force reduction on mission capability II. Thesis statement paragraph III. Major points supporting thesis statement - Identify problem A. Hollow active force created by reductions B. Reliance on reserves is only viable alternative C. SMCR structure does not support USMC missions IV. Solution A. Conceptual basis for organization 1. Vertical and horizontal integration 2. Reinforcement role rather than duplicate MAGTF 3. Efficiency - cost effective - reduce requirement for active force structure dedicated to SMCR management 4. Add muscle not fat to deployed MAGTFs B. Reorganization concept 1. Three basic changes required (a). Maximum integration with active forces (b). Modify title 10 of the US Code (c). Focus SMCR organization on reinforcement not duplication 2. Operational impact of reorganization 3. Force structure impact of reorganization V. Conclusion UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE STRUCTURE The Marine Corps Reserve structure is divided into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Composed of a division, wing, and force service support group (FSSG), the SMCR is essentially a mirror image of the active Marine Corps structure. This mirror image Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) structure of the SMCR, designed for a national military strategy focused on the Cold War Soviet threat, is not the optimum structure to support current and anticipated Marine Corps missions. The 1992 national military strategy requires balanced, flexible forces capable of rapid response to crises worldwide. This rapid response, ranging from nation building to conventional combat, may not be possible under the new base force structure concept. The planned force reductions inherent in the base force concept will cause the active forces to depend more heavily on reserve components. For the Marine Corps, the problem is that current SMCR organization is not conducive to selective early activation of reserve units in support of crises or contingency operations. The solution to this problem is to integrate the SMCR into the active force structure providing a systematic means for selective early activation of reserve units. The current SMCR structure does not support the specified and implied tasks of the Marine Corps derived from the national military strategy because the forward presence and rapid response missions are not reinforced adequately by a reserve force which duplicates the capabilities within the active forces, and whose organization, operations, and training are functionally autonomous from the active force. For the purposes of this paper SMCR structure includes the MAGTF structure itself, the SMCR training relationship with active forces, and the deployment and employment practices and procedures of the SMCR. There are two main reasons why the SMCR organization is critically important to the Marine Corps. First, despite official statements to the contrary, the Marine Corps is creating a hollow active force. Second, the reduced combat power enherent in a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) causes a greater reliance on reserve forces, making their organization and training more critical than ever before to the success of the whole Marine Corps. With respect to the creation of a hollow force, it is abundantly clear that the budget cutting is producing just the type of force everyone claims to want to avoid. For example, from 1989 to the present, artillery strength within the active forces declined by 47.1 percent. Third Marine Division has only four infantry battalions, no tanks, no light armored vehicles, and only two battalions of artillery. Third FSSG and 1st Marine Air wing also have substantially reduced capabilities. First Marine Division deactivated an entire tank battalion, and the combined arms regiment (CAR) only exists on paper. The Marine divisions, wings, and FSSGs that deployed to Desert Storm no longer exist. Reductions in the combat power of its major subordinate commands (MSCs) causes the MEF to no longer have the same fighting capability that it had just 24 months ago. In order to beef-up the MEF's combat strength reinforcement or augmentation is required. During Desert Storm all of I MEF's MSCs were reinforced. During operation Restore Hope the Command Element was reinforced from throughout the active Marine Corps and by individual reservists. These two operations represent the polar ends of the spectrum of conflict into which a MEF might be deployed, yet each one required both regular and reserve augmentation. Using these two most recent MEF deployments as a basis for conclusions about future MEF deployments, it is reasonable to assume that most or all future MEF deployments will require augmentation or reinforcement. The reduced combat power inherent in a MEF means that the Marine Corps must either redefine what constitutes a MEF and what its capabilities are, or develop an effective reinforcement plan to supplement the combat power of the MEF. Given a national command structure that ear-marks specific active forces for particular regional contingencies, the Marine Corps' ability to reinforce a MEF from other active forces may be limited. In that case, the SMCR may be both the best and the only reinforcement option. If the Marine Corps does not acknowledge the smaller combat capabilities in the active force MEF structure, then it must accept the reality that some portion of the MEF's combat power must come from the SMCR. Current SMCR structure is autonomous from the active force structure and organized using the MAGTF model. Even though current plans do not envision the deployment of SMCR forces as a reserve MAGTF, the SMCR continues to organize, train, and equip itself as if that were the case. Examples of this are the reserve combined arms exercise program; training deployments by division, wing, and regimental headquarters; mobilization exercises and combat readiness evaluations conducted for those same units; and equipment purchases intended for command and control by regiment, division, and wing level SMCR headquarters. The practical consequence of this organizational structure and method of operation is a lack of horizontal and vertical integration with the active forces in all functional areas. The purpose of a MAGTF is to create the most killing power possible from a given number and type of combat forces. To create that killing power all parts of the MAGTF are incorporated into a whole, they are integrated. Each part functions in cooperation with the other like the muscles of an atheletes body. The brain controls the actions of all the muscles and moves them so they work in harmony with each other. Each muscle must do its job in conjunction with others, it must work in harmony with the rest of the body neither dominating or lagging behind the other functions. Each muscle is horizontally and vertically integrated into the whole. Similiarly, to produce the desired killing power all the elements of a MAGTF must function smoothly in conjunction with one another. In the body, if more speed or power is needed the answer is to add more muscle not additional brain. In the MAGTF, an increase in killing power is created by adding more fighting units that integrate into the force to produce the desired increase. Thus, it is logical that the SMCR's reinforcement role should focus on creating more muscle to support an already functioning brain. To produce the desired killing power the muscle provided by the SMCR must be thoroughly integrated into the deployed MEF. Lack of integration leads to inefficient mobilization and deployment practices. The isolation of the reserve component from the active component during peacetime training and operations produced a system of ad hoc mobilization during Desert Storm. That ad hoc system affected the entire mobilization process. Political considerations aside, the decision was made to activate units at the battery, battalion, and squadron level. These units were then more or less evenly distributed on a radom basis among active duty units. None of the SMCR units had previously established relationships with the headquarters to which they were assigned. There was no commonality of standard operating procedures, no knowledge on either parties part with respect to personel or equipment status, and no established procedures for integration of the reserve units into the active force structure. While the units were absorbed into the active forces, successfully deployed to the theatre of operations, and effectively used in combat, this success was largely due to individual initiative and the generous amount of time available, generally about 90 days, for the units to activate, deploy to the theatre of operations, and prepare for combat. There are three policy changes that will significantly improve the reinforcement capability of the SMCR. First, integrating SMCR units into the active force at the lowest possible level. Second, modifying Title 10 of the U.S. Code to allow more flexibility in the use of SMCR forces to meet peacetime, contingency, and crisis response reinforcement missions. Third, changing the composition of the SMCR to enhance MAGTF capabilities rather than duplicate MAGTF functions. The optimum SMCR structure to support the reinforcement role of the Marine Corps reserve is to integrate the SMCR into the active forces at the lowest level possible, creating a cohesive team that functions effectively throughout the spectrum of conflict. To accomplish this, the SMCR structure and function must change. The most basic change is to assign SMCR units to active commands at the battery, company, and squadron levels. This peacetime assignment and integration of SMCR units to active headquarters produces force structure savings, enhanced training opportunities, op-tempo reductions, and horizontal and vertical integration between regular and reserve forces. Assigning the SMCR headquarters functions to active force headquarters dramatically reduces the active forces committed to supporting the SMCR. Reducing the number of active personnel supporting the reserve establishment translates into higher manning levels within the Fleet Marine Forces and into a base force with less overhead and more combat power for the number of people on active duty. Using the artillery as an example, adding one reserve battery to an active battalion brings each battalion to a total strength of four batteries. During the 1980s battalions controlled as many as six firing batteries; thus, adding a reserve battery to their table of organization should not exceed their structural ability to manage equipment and personnel assets. With reserve augmentation at the battalion, regimental, division, and wing levels all additional command and control responsibilities resulting from the integration of the SMCR units with active forces can be accomplished more efficiently within the active establishment than with a separate staff in a remote location. Integrating active and reserve components under a single commander enhances training opportunities for both components. The reservists will have better access to the regular community allowing them to maintain currency in their occupational specialties. The reservists, with their longer tenure within a unit, will lend continuity to the parent command. Access to major exercises will improve reserve training. The development of standard operating procedures and a person to person working relationship between the commanders and principal staff officers will eliminate most or all the work-up time required for reservists prior to deployment. Op-tempo can be reduced by using SMCR units to participate in major exercises, conduct operations such as counter-nartcotic survellience, participate in short duration deployments as part of the forward presence mission, and fill contingency roles that may be appropriate to the specific capabilities and limitations of particular reserve units. Integrating SMCR units at the lowest possible level takes advantage of the generally high level of individual and small unit proficiency in the SMCR, and eliminates the command and control functions that are difficult to maintain at an acceptable level of proficiency. Including the SMCR units in initial plan development rather than as an afterthought produces a coherent force package that effectively uses all the capabilities of the total force. Horizontal and vertical integration of the active and reserve forces is achieved through common standard operating procedures. The reserve units are included in deployment plans in the same manner as the regular units. For employment purposes, operational procedures are practiced and standardized in advance. The result is a reserve unit that trains with its wartime parent headquarters, understands and follows the tactical operating procedures employed by that parent unit, knows when and under what circumstances it may be called to active duty, and knows all the specific actions, including times and locations for deployment actions to be taken in the event of activation. The chain of command and required actions are clear. The result is improved performance at a lower cost. To demonstrate the proposed structure, an artillery regiment under the new system is displayed graphically below. Eight reserve batteries are added to an active regiment. One reserve battery for each of the four battalions that presently comprise the regiment, and one battalion of four reserve batteries under a reconstituted regular battalion headquarters. 10 MARINES 1/10 2/10 3/10 4/10 5/10 Reg. Btry Reg. Btry Reg. Btry Res. Brty Reg. Reg. Btry Reg. Btry Reg. Btry Res. Brty Reg. Reg. Btry Reg. Btry Reg. Btry Res. Brty Reg. Res. Btry Res. Btry Res. Btry Res. Brty Res. The savings achieved by the above organization include three battalion staffs, one regimental staff, the active force support personnel associated with each of those staffs, the equipment dedicated to support the training, deployment, and employment of those units, and the facilities costs related to each of those units. A second way to enhance SMCR structure and training is to modify Title 10 of the US code as it applies to the training and activation of SMCR units. Title 10 currently calls for 48 drills and 14 days of active duty per year. Drills are conducted monthly with the two week period of active duty scheduled annually. That system reduces the SMCR's flexibility and their ability to merge their training with active force training. The law should be changed to allow more flexible scheduling; for example, the law might be rephrased to allow up to 30 days of active duty with a proportionate reduction in monthly drills. If improving SMCR training and scheduling allows reserve units to meet certain active force commitments the benefits in terms of op-tempo reduction, cost savings, and SMCR training could be substantial. The SMCR's MAGTF structure does not offer the best reinforcement package because it does not address shortages that exist in the active forces. A more profitable approach would be to identify critical shortfalls within the active MAGTFs and focus on developing those capabilities within the SMCR. For example, a recurring theme in after action reports and discussions throughout the Marine Corps is the limited capability to move supplies from the beachhead or port to the forward units. The larger the force employed in an operation the more acute this problem becomes. Rather than pile more like kind forces onto a deployed MEF, specific capabilities should be reinforced to produce the total force that will accomplish the mission. Using the above example, a truck company may be more important to activate than a rifle company. Through a thorough analysis and decision making process it is possible to identify most of the potential shortfalls and build a SMCR structure based on those identified areas. To summarize, the present and planned reductions in budget and structure seriously degrade the combat power of the active forces causing increased reliance on reserve forces. The SMCR represents a cost-effective way to bolster that combat power. However, the present SMCR structure does not complement the active component structure, or provide for the selective activation of reserve forces and their integration into the active forces required for effective support of crises or contingency operations as envisioned by the national military strategy. In operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Restore Hope reserves were used prior to or without a presidential call- up. Yet within the Marine Corps, there is no system in place to facilitate determination of what capability to activate, which units to use, or where to assign the units once activated. The solution is to organize in a manner that supports the way the Marine Corps plans to deploy and fight. There should be a seamless transition from peace to war. By integrating the SMCR into the active force at the lowest possible level, they participate in and are available for use during all phases of planning; however, the national command authorities still retain the ability to employ or not to employ reserves as they deem appropriate. Thus, integration saves force structure, is cheaper to operate, enhances combat power more effectively than the current system, builds a better trained and coordinated total force, and provides more flexibility at all levels of command than the old system. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Fogleman, R.R. Gen USAF "Views of the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Transportation Command." Lecture Command and Staff College. Quantico 8 March 1993 2. Hayden, H.J. LtCol. USMC "Sounds of Battle Around the World." Marine Corps Gazette. (March 1993) 62-71 3. Hellere, C.E. Col. USA "A Cadre System for the US Army." Military Review. (October 1991) 14-24 4. Jeremiah, D.E. Adm "In Singling Out Winners of Gulf War, Don't Forget the Winners of Cold War." ROA National Security Report. (March 1992) 34-38 5. Laughlin, G. Representative "With Major Cuts Pending, Close Look Must Be Given to Reserve Force Future." ROA National Security Report. (April 1992) 23-30, 35-37 6. Montgomery, G.V. Representative "Greater Reliance on Reserves is Essential." ROA National Security Report. (May 1992) 23, 26-27 7. U.S. Marine Corps. The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense FMFM 1-2. Dept. of the Navy 21 June 1991 8. U.S. Marine Corps. "Desert Shield/Desert Storm" Mobilization Briefing from MCRSC MCLLS Doc. #61269-17420 06/12/91 by JLJ 9. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States August 1991
