A Strategy For Command And Control Support CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - C4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: A Strategy for Command and Control Support Author: Major Daniel D. Sullivan, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps must devise and enforce a discipline that accounts for the turbulent politico-military environment in which we exist while providing a process to effectively pursue a system that supports command and control. Background: Command and control support systems have been developed in independent segments which are then patched together. These disjointed attempts serve only to frustrate the effort. Further, technology out-paces the developmental process. By the time these systems are fielded, they bear few of the contemporary capabilities. A new strategy for development and acquisition is imperative. Recommendations: While we pursue a viable command and control support system, the Marine Corps must take the lead in restructuring the programmatic approach to acquisition. OUTLINE Thesis: The Marine Corps must devise and enforce a discipline that accounts for the turbulent politico-military environment in which we exist while providing a process to effectively pursue a system that supports command and control. In light of technological advances, the established process will never deliver a state-of-the-art product. I. The strategic environment A. A climate of uncertainty B. Technology as an aid to achieve more certainty II. The operational construct A. The framework of the support system B. The factors for which we must account 1. The nature of man 2. Physics 3. The enemy III. Operational requirements A. Doctrine B. Avoiding a the construction of a critical vulnerability C. Placing the colander at the center D. Essential characteristics IV. Achieving the elusive objective A. Strategy for development B. Facilitating the strategy A STRATEGY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT By Major Daniel D. Sullivan USMC THE STRATEGIC CLIMATE As the world moves haltingly and often at obtuse angles toward what now appears to be Pax Americana, the role of the Marine Corps in supporting the fulfillment of our nation's commitments and responsibilities may include missions and a tempo never before anticipated. Uncertainty is certain. The likelihood of combinations of sudden violent upheavals among men and of nature has risen dramatically. Perceptions that any disruption of the world order will result in intervention to preserve the balance between two monolithic powers are no longer pertinent. The current and expected course of events is characterized by destabilizing politico-military situations. (3:4-23) The loss of that certainty lowers the perception of risk balanced against opportunity -- the prospect of marginal gains may elicit violence from perpetrators who have heretofore been too intimidated to act. The result: a proliferation of violent potential. At the same time, this period may be as short lived as that of Roosevelt's 'four policemen' and a completely new order may rise. Though outside the realm of our own experience, we may simply be returning to a predominant state of human affairs for which we are unprepared; one in which change is the only constant and in which we might not recognize the beginnings of wars. (3:4-24) This uncertainty, combined with our nation's geography, dictates a capability that is expeditionary. It would appear that expeditionary forces will become the chief source of power projection and forward presence. The manner in which we have effected forward presence since World War II, through forward basing, is no longer practicable for two reasons: we can no longer predict with any certainty where to place forces in order to counter an ill-defined threat, and the nation no longer desires to station forces on a permanent or even semi-permanent basis throughout the world. Naval expeditionary forces have suddenly returned to the zenith of their relevance. The uncertainty that characterizes the 'world order' is reflected throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical compendium. Although we may seek to isolate and shape the battlefield to our advantage, there is great danger in seeing ourselves in our enemies. While the values and expectations of the American people demand precise, discriminating, and measured violence aimed at obtaining a specific effect -- in other words, certainty -- the only portion of the command and control system that can meet this level of performance with any degree of assurance is the commander, exercising his military judgment. Technology must be aimed at assisting the commander in overcoming uncertainty by ordering the feedback to critical information requirements and then providing a means to execute command. (5:14) This underscores the necessity of developing a robust command and control system capable of extending the reach of the commander. The commander is challenged not only by the enemy, but also by "technological improvements in mobility, weapons, sensors, and information systems that continually shrink the available time and space, speed tempos of operation, and which generate increasing volumes of information." (3:4-4) This capability must enable the commander to communicate guidance from afar, whether receiving or providing. For the purpose of this treatise, the term 'command and control' shall be understood to encompass the support functions included in the more fashionable terminology: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and interoperability. This is not to denigrate the service provided the commander by these functions, but to provide a focus on the ends of the oblective system rather than the means. The ends are timeless; the means are at the mercy of the vagaries of these and other times and their changing technologies. War and its instruments have changed and evolved throughout history. That evolution has been relatively slow and marked by what have been perceived as significant advances in what we now refer to as technology, interspersed by periods of stasis. This progression has been characterized by an increase in potential violence conversely accompanied by a decrease in the ability to exercise centralized command and control. From the days when generals sat astride their mounts and watched the battles from vantage points that allowed them to intervene in any circumstance we have advanced to a place where entire wars can be executed from isolated bunkers using blind probabilities as the basis for action; from stones to weapons of mass destruction. Another characteristic of this change has been its tempo; accompanying technology's advance, it has increased exponentially. The Marine Corps must devise and enforce a discipline that accounts for this turbulent environment while providing a process to effectively pursue a system that supports command and control. This strategy will have broad application for any program objectives that include changing technology. THE OPERATIONAL CONSTRUCT The Marine Corps objective system must be "the means to the end of command and control. It is a technological, organizational, and doctrinal system that provides three functions: the doctrinal delegation of forces (ie. command and control); information management (ie. communications and computers); and intelligence/information dissemination." (5:10) Command and control can and must be capable of delegation. There are three primary factors that must be considered as we create a construct within which we will pursue the objective command and control system. These are: the nature of man (thus the commander), physics, and the enemy. By constantly reminding ourselves of these parameters, we can remain focused on the objective and ensure that we do find ourselves chasing our own tails. Man's nature, and thus that of the commander, is to seek certainty; to reduce risk on the outcome of his endeavors and to his forces. From the perspective of the commander, this can be best accomplished by the imposition of order on the battlefield, particularly when he believes he possesses the greater relative military power. This desired order is achieved by the receipt of information in near-real-time that the commander has deemed critical. In this way he is able to exploit opportunities that present themselves and direct subordinate elements in the execution of orders formulated by his command element. The naive view of achieving this order embraces the belief that, while violence and its instruments are reliable and need only be directed, the exercise of command and control has somehow become so complex and convoluted that man alone can no longer be the central figure in its execution. Once this argument has been accepted, there is a danger that we may make a logical leap to the sharing or, worse yet, shifting of responsibility for execution from the commander to the command and control support system. Our doctrine clearly decries this circumstance. "Technology can enhance the ways and means of war by improving man's ability to wage it, but technology cannot and should not attempt to eliminate man from the process of waging war." (6:53) Both man and the systems he devises have principal capabilities and limitations -- where judgment is needed, so is the commander. (3:4-27) Nature and its physics work, inadvertently, in consonance with the enemy to interfere with the commander's ability to execute command and control. We can no more ignore the laws of physics than we can ignore the enemy. When we look to design our method and system of command and control, we must always keep in mind that the second law of thermodynamics says that while energy does not alter its total quantity, it may lose quality. "Chaos is the easiest, most predictable, most probable state, and it lasts indefinitely. Order is improbable and hard to create. Time is its enemy, because entropy tends to increase with time." (1:42) The parallel to the attributes of war are striking and cannot be ignored as we conceive and design our objective command and control system. Finally, the enemy conspires to undo our ability to execute command and control. Although the technological revolution will provide previously unheard of capabilities before the next century dawns, just as certain is that that same technology will provide a counter-capability. "Any advantages gained by technological advancement are only temporary, for man will always find a countermeasure, tactical or itself technological, which will lesson the impact of technology." (6:53) The implication is that the command and control system we build must have as its purpose the facilitation of warfighting rather than its conduct. "We must not become so dependent on a system that we can no longer function effectively when the equipment becomes inoperable." (6:53) Otherwise, the defeat of the system is the defeat of our forces. Concepts of command and control that ignore the nature of man, the laws of nature, and the enemy are no more than pipe dreams doomed to failure. "No degree of technological development or scientific calculation will overcome the human dimension in war." (6:11) Technological expectations and available technology must not be allowed to shape our perspective of war and warfighting. Just as certain as the tools of warfighting have changed, the fundamental precepts and principles of warfighting remain timeless; they cannot be re-engineered to fit a command and control support system that cannot meet the requirements to exercise them, no matter how tempting the available technology appears. The construction of the Marine Corps objective command and control system must recognize the implications of the environment in which we pursue this process. It must cope with the seduction by expectations; it must be prepared for the disappointment of reality; it must guard vociferously against the incremental diminution of warfighting requirements when reality diminishes expectations. Further, we must immediately reject offhand any attempt at technocratic tyranny; recognizing it as an act of condesention completely counterproductive to the progress of the objective system. For, after all, if we do not understand that to which we acquiesce, how can we be certain it serves us ? Obviously, the tactics, techniques and procedures of warfare will continue to evolve. Just as obvious is that we cannot anticipate technologies that will exist even five years from now. We cannot settle for today's technology to fight tomorrow's warfare. We must achieve a concept of development, procurement, and fielding that is flexible enough for this continual evolution and its assimilation into the system. Particularly in the area of command and control technologies, time has made obsolete the requirement for any significant investment in research and development by the Marine Corps. Our doctrine supports the exploitation of existing capabilities. (6:52) We must program for capabilities rather than specific items of equipment. Otherwise we fall victim to, and then become an ugly caricature of, programmed obsolescence. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Doctrine, on the other hand, consists of fundamental concepts which remain valid throughout the multidimensional spectrum of war and over time. The Marine Corps has embraced the doctrine of maneuver warfare. It is a "doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver" (6:58) in both space and time. The enemy and his ability to wage war is our objective rather than the territory on which war is waged. "War ashore is dominated by speed, surveillance, command and control, an the importance of delivering the first blow." (5:4) This doctrine emphasizes the importance of the commander's ability to build, conceive and communicate his vision of the battlefield. When an enemy seeks out our vulnerabilities, he will undoubtedly recognize that one is the decision maker and his command and control system. Our enemies must by now understand that we must rely upon technology rather than labor. This technological substitution is most apparent in precision guided weapons, integrated surveillance systems including space-based systems, high speed decision aids, netted command and control systems, and increasingly sophisticated command, control, communications and electronic combat systems. (5:4) Certainly, this technology must be classified as one of our centers of gravity. It will be targeted by even the least sophisticated enemy. Although Marine commanders must synchronize space and electronic warfare in their combat plans, and be prepared to direct it if called upon to fight forces at the strategic or operational levels, their focus will primarily be upon the defense against it. That defense must be created prior to war. The requirements for the Marine Corps objective command and control system must recognize its vulnerability to electronic warfare and other forms of interdiction when facing a sophisticated and/or resourceful enemy. At the operational and tactical levels, our command and control system must facilitate the destruction of the enemy's. This will be done by interlacing the capabilities of the system itself with doctrinal fundamentals. We must always be wary of perceiving the enemy as ourselves as we design the objective system. Although it is certain that the strategic and operational technology available will provide invaluable assistance against an enemy who arrays himself against us with organized and centrally controlled regular forces, the benefit derived may be at the margin when facing irregulars or when performing in a quasi-combatant role. We must recognize the limitations and constraints of available technology. Since advances are exponential while procurement proceeds along a geometric path (a divergence compounded by fiscal austerity) we must strive to streamline the manner in which we field systems to capture commercial innovation. This means that rather than programming for equipment procurement, we program for overarching concepts, the achievement of which will be supported by acquisition in real-time. It is conceivable that generations of the hardware and software will be, in relative time, shorter and shorter. An important implication is that small wealthy nations may have access to technology before we do if we continue with business as usual. The linchpin of the objective Marine Corps command and control system is the commander. Hardware, software, and its links to the battlefield are simply peripherals which allow the commander to see the battlefield. The commander remains the dominant factor. Thus the system must serve the commander and not the converse. Solidly establishing this principle as fundamental to the objective command and control system provides the defense against its greatest vulnerabilities. This is a result of establishing its principal objectives as the enhancement of unity of effort, compensation for human limitations by enhancing human capabilities and creating a common situational awareness. (3:4-4) As a result, plans and orders will be conveyed more vividly; dissemination of commander's intent throughout the tactical organization in this manner will ensure decentralized execution is aimed directly at mission accomplishment. Establishing the commander as the centerpiece of the objective system does not diminish the importance of the peripherals. The Marine Corps system must link the commander to all available support systems. That link allows the Marine Corps to work in concert with all services; to be joint. It is the link that enables the commander to fight with all accessible resources to reduce risk, identify opportunities, and act. However, they constitute a series of seams that extend vertically and horizontally. Employed in concert with doctrinal philosophy, emphasizing the utility of commander's intent-to bind the seams of the system, harmonious initiative is achieved. Unity of effort is not imposed by the control available through the system. The system functions on the principles of management by objective and intrusion by exception. It is the use of the system to disseminate the commander's intent and effect lateral coordination which will enable optimal employment of doctrinal principles. (6:71) The objective system must provide the commander and his staff with critical information through all sources: component, joint, and combined. The development of virtual communications networks across multiple entry points coupled with a flexible command and control structure tailored for broad application and further adaptable for unanticipated situations and missions will support this doctrinal philosophy. What are the essential requirements for the objective system? First we need a doctrinal, organizational, and technological system that enables the commander to interface with any resource. The system must be readily adaptable throughout the multifaceted spectrum of conflict; through every variation of violence, enemy technology, strategic commitment, and purpose of presence. Next, the system must incorporate a force-wide network that recognizes the occurrence of rifts in the seams and responds to system deficiencies not by requiring more effort of the commander and his staff but by being 'smart' enough to recognize the requirements for 'repair', 'healing' itself invisibly regardless of echelon and in any joint or combined interface. Third, the system must facilitate coordination of all weapons at the disposal to the commander without regard to source or service. (5:14) Of significant import is the link to surveillance assets that are not organic to the force -- national and other theater assets -- in a relationship directed from outside the force. Key to taking advantage of all-source input is imaginatively engineered software that is capable of interfacing with a variety of inputs whose common binary format allows it to transcend language and form; to translate when necessary, not only the input language, but also its product to serve the commander's. needs. It is imperative that the system's relationship to these assets focus on the commander's critical information requirements and recognize fulfillment. All forms of surveillance, organic and inorganic, must be linked across time and space and provide the framework to structure the information required in a manner that is eminently useful to the commander. This framework must recognize the sensor spectrum; recognize that many inputs are limited to specific acquisition assets and that to paint the battlefield, it is necessary to combine the total spectrum. The system must enhance the employment of sensors by recognizing the place on the battlefield that is not completely painted, enabling the commander to most effectively manipulate and direct the effort. The system itself must be as passive as technology allows. Otherwise it is its own enemy and constitutes an even greater vulnerability. It must be so, or even the least wealthy nation will compromise it. The Viet Namese entered our command, control, and communications system and gained tactical and operational advantage with a crude system consisting of our own equipment. Passive because the electronic picture presented must not display a focal point of electronic emissions; rather a distribution of signals that offers so many possibilities that the identification of the central node may not be readily accomplished. Passive from the viewpoint of the user also. If the system requires unwarranted management effort, then it has not relieved the commander and his staff of burden; only parodied it. From the foregoing, it is apparent that all functions of command and control must be linked and are dependent upon an aspect of support that presents a seam: communications. We can anticipate vulnerability. Although we will possess a global capability soon, we must develop a structure that recognizes that nature and the enemy will independently and in unison achieve success isolating nodes of the command and control system. The increased capacity to download information in volume and speed and across space and by a variety of media must be realized. While the Marine corps will play a role in the development of the communications structure, we must realize that we will neither individually dictate requirements for the communications support system nor anticipate completely reliable communications and must, therefore, assume flexibility within our command and control system. And though restoration capability is at the heart of recovery, we cannot rely upon it. We must assume that we will benefit from technological advances and that the proponent will consider our requirements critical. This communications support will remain a seam that will degrade. At a minimum, we must insist that the communications links be flexible and redundant. But the communications support suite is, in reality, only a set of hardware. Our ability to enhance system performance, survivability, and overall effectiveness of communications through software applications is the manner in which we will protect this seam. This will be accomplished by making no node the singular focal point. To this end we can enhance the restoration capability in such a manner that makes the process invisible by tasking the system to enforce a routing routine that not only restores but also deceives the enemy as to the location of the central command and control nodes. The objective command and control system must provide a capability to collect and disseminate intelligence and information across the battlefield. The system must facilitate fusion, whether literally or by ordering information and identifying deficiencies in a manner that is of use to the commander. Two concerns are that the volume of intelligence and information may become so great that it cannot be transmitted, and, if received, that it creates noise because it is disordered. "Only if the message has been properly encoded at the source will it overcome the muddling effects of the noise, so that, when the message is decoded at the destination, it retains its original, intended structure and form." (1:159) That proper coding is accomplished by the establishment of the commanders' priorities at both ends of the transmissions. Given time and technological advances, the objective system will be capable of processing phenomenal volumes of data. But the enemy will recognize that the commander who relies completely upon the system is easily defeated by taking time from him. When we mismanage our relative technological advantage by neglecting time, our warfighting effort is easily disrupted. The system must recognize the commander's prioritization and order intelligence and information for acquisition and dissemination according to it. Time poses yet another dimensional problem. Communications will be accomplished by a number of methods, some of which are not electronic. Queuing of information by priority may also serve to disorder the receipt of information. The system must recognize this and query validity of otherwise accurate data misplaced in time. It must be the commander who determines the artistry of the portrait he desires painted. The clarity of the tapestry which is constructed by the system can become confused and out of focus without the capacity to discard information which is invalid in time; it could create a picture consisting of multiple images; worse yet, it could simply be wrong. The commander, whose nature is to desire order, must always remember that uncertainty can be masked in the certainty which appears to be provided by the image presented by the system unless he accounts for time. (2:fwd) Thus a central feature of the objective system is reinforced: that the commander must be able to orchestrate its functioning rather than to adapt to it. We should assume that for the foreseeable future this will remain the condition under which we will function, barring an inconceivable and highly unlikely technological breakthrough. Rather than relying on a concept that includes artificial intelligence, we must design architectural intelligence that recognizes the commander as a functional portion of the objective system. The role of the commander will remain the center of its architecture; he is irreplaceable. When he becomes replaceable, not only the system, but all else is obsolete and this construct becomes academic. The wide variety of employment options for the Marine forces does not constrain the requirement for flexibility; rather it reinforces it. Marine commanders must be able to interface with a shifting array of resources and command relationships. Depending upon the scenario, he must respond to potential commanders afloat, both Marine and Navy, to a variety of joint task force commanders ashore and afloat, from small specific mission execution to broad direction from a geographic commander in chief, and be capable of orchestrating the entire array of forces as the commander of a joint task force. The importance of and requirement for interoperability are apparent. (4:2) This objective system must be capable of configuring a data base from all sources, using organic data resources and real time links with displays that clearly depict the situation on the battlefield. The Marine commander's critical information requirements are functionally similar to those of his Naval counterpart and vice versa. Those requirements are so detailed and explicit that they will certainly meet any requirements of any systems with which it might be required to interface. But we cannot rely upon operational association with the Navy as a constant and the design must take this into account. The characteristic of Marine Corps tactical force structure is expansion and contraction of combined arms forces from deployment and transition to on scene presence through a variety of means, and ranging in complexity through myriad joint/combined task force configurations as the character of the crises changes. Force build-up is facilitated by smooth transitions and poses challenges in every functional area as well as warfighting doctrine itself. Further, air, land, and sea warfare must be as seamless as possible. The objective system's architecture must be formed by the requirements for task organization and structure for continuity of command and echelonment. (3:4-26) The same redundancy that produces the flexibility for a variety of task organizations and command relationships enhances survivability. At each combat operations center is a node which acts as a ganglion from and to which extend all the peripherals that comprise the entire 'central nervous system'. Because we have assumed there is little likelihood of a higher level artificial intelligence being included in the command and control support system, it is more akin to the functions found in nervous systems of lower life forms. These have evolved to compensate for the high likelihood of critical destruction or loss of portions of the animal by decentralizing nervous system functions in multiple ganglia. This allows for the regeneration of the lost functions. In the objective system, this is accomplished by providing the redundant capabilities and capacity at numerous command elements. Although this will require intra-system relationships that violate the traditional discipline imposed by the chain-of-command, it does not reinforce that behavior because it is invisible to the user and acts only to support the higher level commander. This not only allows numerous users to assume the role of incapacitated elements, but also facilitates compositing, thus transitions in command relationships. The node in the tactical and combat operations centers terminates with tactical displays, integrated information management, and accessibility to tactical communications that support warfighting missions. It provides multimedia access to units, other force commanders, and any variety of resources. (5:31) It uses technology to enhance command and staff functioning. It does not require tasking for routine information. "The days of staff coordination to establish coordination links are past." (3:4-26) The objective system absolutely retains functionality in garrison/peacetime as well as during war. Although the priorities change somewhat, the objective system serves as the primary information and communications system thereby ensuring training sustainment. Systems that require duplicate training efforts due to conditions that vary depending upon the activity in which the unit is engaged are anathema. Continuous training is key to success and must be directed toward achieving the rapid tempo, agility, and unity of effort essential to decisive victory. (3:4-30) The scope of the embedded training is made most effective because it is performed as a consequence of daily activity. ACHIEVING THE ELUSIVE OBJECTIVE What is the strategy for developing the objective system? Although operational requirements for the objective system are best identified by top down analysis, the foundation of the system is the construction of capabilities at the base -- which are the nodes which service commanders. Vertical constructs linked horizontally are the key. Horizontal constructs tend to isolate functions and are contrary to the concept of a homogenous, resilient capability. However, horizontal constructs must be used to establish priorities for acquisition. The departure from antiquated programming constraints is clearest here. Stability in the process can be achieved through a focus on operational requirements. Operational requirements are constant relative to technology. They provide the simplest form of continuity in the pursuit of constructing the objective system. This will not guarantee and is not aimed at efficient procurement, but it will maximize the effectiveness of the product. Though it may seem odd, most efficient does not ensure the lowest cost. The only way to ensure efficiency is to focus on items of the system: equipment or subsystems. Procurement will occur as technology, and its product, the 'things' that make up the system, is developed which achieves the operational requirements. With the common thread provided by the overarching concept, construction will progress toward the objective goal regardless of fiscal realities. Unlike a programming emphasis that focuses on horizontal constructs based upon equipment available now or in the near term, delays in procurement of capabilities that achieve the functional concept may mean an even more capable system at a lower cost. Vertical constructs result in shared building modules useful across the spectrum of functional utility plus reduce isolation and duplication of effort. By moving away from the horizontal or 'stovepipe' systems that serve only one function, we eliminate isolated efforts which are contrary to the principal of mutual support. This serves to minimize redundant effort which achieves economies unthinkable in the efficiency construct. Further, vertical integration facilitates intraoperability which is the microcosm for effecting interoperability. This flies in the face of business as it is done today. The vision of the objective system is itself the management tool that will provide the discipline and power the construct within which we proceed. Integrated development and technological linkage serve to enhance both the assimilation of information the commander uses to build his view of the battlefield and the construction of the objective system itself. This is at odds with the Newtonian approach that the program objective memorandum (POM) process encourages and which bastardizes the 'past as prologue to future' in an absurd application whose 'antiquation is prologue to its end product.' The concept as the desired product vice an item of equipment or subsystem provides a focus and standard for performance. This will ensure that the best available technology will be fielded to the Fleet Marine Force with the least overhead, at the lowest cost. Competition will continue to cause the industry standard to improve meaning that it will outperform any programmatic equipment standard established. Embracing the industry standard in the development and evolution of the objective system marks two important achievements: the movement toward an open system that can readily access any data base with which it links (and configure the information in a manner useful to the commander), and more cost effective product acquisition. This concept enables the commander the ultimate flexibility to tailor his command and control support suite to mission requirements by configuring it accordingly. A resident data base can then be configured and supported to meet more than the finite, academically identified requirements, thus achieving flexibility. Not only does this flexibility extend to the shaping of required functions, it anticipates the technology which will provide a multimedia network. This network would interface with external and internal systems to provide options for communications as diverse as the imagination. How do we implement the changes that will accomplish this change in strategy ? There are two cultural shifts which must occur. First: Operational requirements must be established by a thorough top-down analysis that is based upon doctrine; analysis that is not dogmatic but is disciplined. It must be aimed at conceptual constructs (man, nature, and the enemy) that configure the objective system rather than the research, development, and acquisition of physical components. We must reject outright any attempt to facilitate the obstruction of this methodology by any individual or group special interest that accommodates any subsystem which is the product of the antiquated stovepipe approach to development. We must embrace flexibility and change, making it manageable by ensuring that potential change is accommodated both by the objective system's capabilities and by designed invisibility at the operator's station. And, very importantly, we must make a cultural shift that causes us to always remember that we are the customer and that our collective experience should have created the mindset: caveat vendor. Next: We must pursue a modified zero-based approach to acquisition. Key to this approach is the assembly, improvement, and maintenance of the objective system modularly. We field each logically derived subsystem as it becomes affordable and as technology arrives that delivers the capabilities established as requirements. We refrain from the acquisition of prototypes which portend generational irrelevance. Restructuring the programmatic approach to the POM process will require the philosophical and statutory meeting of minds with Congress. We cannot shy away from our moral and ethical responsibilities to our various constituencies. Until now, this would have not been within the realm of possibilities. But this model is applicable throughout a government that is seeking economies and enhanced effectiveness. The ethical and moral imperative becomes the refusal to shovel money into 'black holes.' With few exceptions, industry will remain ahead of our expectations and demands in the development of the objective command and control system. This is the almost absolute exception when we are supported by the established bureaucratic acquisition process. The strategy acts to advance us long an evolutionary progression in doing business that reduces programmed obsolescence, bureaucratic inertia, and overhead. Significantly, the issue of economies of scale are an industrial problem which cannot be passed on to us without recourse. This strategy will allow the Marine Corps to remain at the crest of the technological wave by institutionalizing a procurement approach that ensures evolutionary potential and growth from the objective system. This fully embraces the process of capturing the dynamics between technology and operations through multiple entry and exit points in the procurement cycle instead of the linear (and ultimately dysfuncytional) development from established operational requirements. It recognizes the dynamics between operational requirements, technological requirements, and technological capabilities which act to refine the objective system. It takes full advantage of innovation not only in technology but also in doctrine. (5:69) The result will be a revolutionary strategy that embraces change rather than being wary of and threatened by progress. It is a process that is focused on the objective and that allows evolutionary development. It is a strategy for fighting wars of the future rather than of the past. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Campbell, Jeremy. Grammatical Man. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982 2. Campen, Alan D. Forward to Science of Command and Control: Coping With Uncertainty. (Dr. Stuart E. Johnson and Dr. Alexander H. Levis, eds.) Washington, DC: AFCEA International Press, 1988 3. Command and Control: FMFM 3. Coordinating Draft #2, 3rd ed. Quantico, Va: United States Marine Corps, Nov 92 4. C4I for the Warrior. C4 Architecture and Integration Division, J6, The Joint Staff. Washington, DC: Pentagon, June 92 5. Sonata. SPAWARS. Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Navy, 1991 6. Warfighting: FMFM 1. Quantico, Va.: United States Marine Corps, 6 March 1989
