Liaison; Our Doctrinal Stepchild CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Liaison; Our Doctrinal Stepchild Author: Lieutenant Colonel David H. Robinson, U.S. Army Thesis: The Army's doctrine for the execution of liaison is vague and incomplete. As a result, different organizations expect different competencies and capabilities from liaisons, and inappropriately resource their liaison functions. Background: As a vital aspect of command and control, liaison is universally employed by military forces worldwide to attain unity of effort between various echelons of command. Despite the criticality of liaison, the U.S. Army's major field manuals offer a paucity of guidance for commanders who must staff, equip, and dispatch or receive liaisons. Further, existing doctrine pro- vides those who must perform liaison with little more than a page of generalities in a single field manual. This paper explores the current state of U.S. Army doctrine concerning liaison, and offers requirements and alternatives to address the shortcomings discovered. Recommendation: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College should publish a doctrinal handbook for liaison. OUTLINE Thesis: The Army's doctrine for the execution of liaison is vague and incomplete. As a result, different organizations expect different competencies and capabilities from liaisons, and inappropriately resource their liaison functions. I. Perspective A. What is liaison? B. Why is it important? C. What is the role of doctrine? II. The current state of doctrine A. FM 100-5, Operations B. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations C. FM 100-10, Combat 8ervice Support D. FM 100-15, Corps Operations E. FM 71-100, Division Operations F. Assessment of doctrine III. Where should we go? A. Alternatives B. Recommendations LIAISON; OUR DOCTRINAL STEPCHILD by Lieutenant Colonel David E. Robinson, United States Army Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, defines liaison as "that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action." (6:1-41) Organizations throughout the Army--and the world--assemble, exchange, and employ liaisons as a matter or routine, and all are dispatched to achieve the goals contained in FM 101-5-1's definition. Almost all of the U.S. Army's manuals that discuss doctrine for maneuver and warfighting contain a reference to liaison. In all cases these references state the need for liaison at many levels of command, and one manual (FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations) provides some detail concerning the selection of personnel for liaison duties, their importance to organizations, and broad procedures for their employment. Yet while all of these manuals voice a doctrinal need for liaison, none of them address the techniques and procedures that liaison personnel should use to discharge their duties. As such, organizations lack common guidance on how to select, train, equip, and employ liaisons, and liaison personnel lack a doctrine from which to develop the skills necessary for this critical function. In today's military environment of increased joint, multina- tional, and coalition warfare, the importance of effective liaison has grown accordingly. Field Manual 101-5 provides the following functions of liaison (5:4-5): - Mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action - Cooperation and understanding between commanders and staffs of headquarters or units working together, and - Tactical unity of and mutual support by adjacent units. Since unity of purpose plies a common thread throughout this list, we find that liaison facilitates one of the principles of war; unity of command. With the military environment attaining new heights of complexity, successful attainment of unity of command becomes more difficult, making the need for effective liaison more essential. As representatives of other commanders and staffs, liaison personnel impart a vital human dimension to the otherwise sterile transfer of information between commands: they interpret the value of information for the members of other staffs, and assist them in determining the relative importance of particular actions. This is a critical role that cannot be left to half-hearted measures or last minute solutions, but rather should be carefully anticipated and resourced prior to deployment to a theater of operations. Organizations throughout the Army routinely send liaison individuals or teams to other organizations for long (resident) or short (periodic) terms. Because they lack common Army refer- ences, all of these liaisons must develop their own techniques and procedures to discharge their duties. By default, organiza- tions must craft their own guidance for liaison in the form of standing operating procedures (SOPs). These SOPs are often modeled on the SOPs of other organizations or evolve with the organization's experience. This ensures that each liaison will be unique and tailored to the circumstances (a good thing), but it also ensures that none of the liaisons will start with a foundation of common understanding (a bad thing). Much time and energy are therefore wasted in developing the liaison's underly- ing principles for operation. This lack of common doctrine leads organizations to create liaisons that are ill-suited to their mission: either too many or not enough soldiers are assigned, too much or not enough equipment is provided, and too much or too little is expected of them. As the Army's capstone manual, we would expect to find information about the criticality of liaison in FM 100-5, Opera- tions. Of the two references to liaison in this manual, we find one deals with doctrine and the other with technique. The doctrinal reference appears as a single sentence in a paragraph entitled Ensure Unity of Effort, where we are admonished that "Liaison among units must be automatic and effective." (2:23) The reference to technique appears in the section Preparing the Defense, where the authors advise that we establish liaison with adjacent units, supporting organizations, and civilian officials. (2:144) Interestingly, no mention of liaison is made in the section Preparing for Attacks. (2:124) One would assume that if liaison is essential for the defense, it should have no lesser importance in the offense. Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, pro- vides the fullest treatment of this paper's topic. Page 2 of this paper lists the functions of liaison as defined by FM 101-5 (found in the section Common Procedures in Chapter 4, Staff Activities). When commanders and staffs select soldiers to fulfill these functions, FM 101-5 offers this selection criteria (5:3-28): ... experience, ability to communicate effectively (lan- guage capability), and other criteria which will enhance effective liaison activities. This manual presents nearly a full page of vague and generic techniques that liaisons should perform before, during, and after their mission. (5:3-28) This single page makes FM 101-5 the single most authoritative source on the subject in Army doctrine. And while this criteria may be of some use in choosing soldiers to perform liaison, the FM gives no guidance about how an organi- zation should structure a liaison team. The size and composition of a liaison team is driven by many factors (including the relative sizes of the organizations and their staffs, the amount of information to be exchanged, and hours of operation at the host headquarters), but FM 101-5's criteria doesn't address how to determine the number of soldiers required, nor does it address selection criteria for other than the soldier charged with the primary liaison duty. Chapter 8, Control of Operations, de- scribes the functions, roles, and structure of the Army's doc- trinal command posts (CPs). Although other manuals describe liaison as located in the main CP, FM 101-5's description of the main CP remarkably fails to mention liaison at all. (5:8-5) Appendix A, Staff Relationships, gives the reader a set of matrices that describe the information and coordination require- ments of primary and special staff sections, yet it is devoid of any reference to liaison. (5:A-1 to A-41) This shortcoming is regrettable, because here our doctrine writers missed an excel- lent opportunity to describe the relationships between liaison and a command's staff sections. Combat service support (CSS) is one battlefield function that thrives on effective liaison. The diverse units that provide CSS--from Forward Support Battalions in divisions to organiza- tions in Echelons Above Corps--use liaison extensively to coordi- nate customer support, maintain communications with providers and consumers, and oversee the proper employment of their resources. Despite this vital aspect of effective CSS, FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, contains not one reference to liaison. It does devote two paragraphs to command and control of CSS, leaving the bulk of information for organizing and executing CPs to FM 101-5 and organizationally specific FMs for CSS units. (3:1-7) One might argue that FM 100-10 is to sustainment what FM 100-5 is to operations. Yet if liaison was at least accorded mention in Operations, so should it's criticality be emphasized in Combat Service Support. Corps Operations, FM 100-15, offers some specificity concern- ing which organizations send liaison to the corps, where it's located in the corps command and control system, and who is responsible for hosting the liaison elements. (4:2-1) Here we find liaison doctrinally located in the main CP headquarters cell, with the liaison elements placed under the chief of staff. (4:4-8) After offering this cursory information, the only other reference to liaison functions is found in Appendix C, Command Post (CP)/Cell Functions, where the authors state that "The major functions of the [main CP] headquarters cell [is]...to provide and accept command liaison elements." (4:C-0) Field Manual 100-15 presents only one additional comment about liaison; in its discussion of passage of lines/relief in place, Corps Operations encourages the establishment and exchange of liaison between the organizations performing these missions. (4:7-16) As the major source of doctrine for corps operations, we would expect FM 100-15 to discuss the creation of corps liaison teams, the interaction of the corps staff with these teams, the corps' reception and integration of liaisons from other organizations, and the interaction of the corps staff with these teams. Unfor- tunately, Corps Operations has none of this information. Because the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College produced both FM 100-15 and FM 71-100, Division Operations, it's understandable that FM 71-100 should echo FM 100-15's shortcom- ings in its description of liaison. Once again (and appropriate- ly so) we find command liaison located within the CP headquarters cell. (1:3-7) And we find exchange of liaison discussed as a planning factor for relief in place and passage of lines. (1:6-22 and 6-25, respectively) This is all FM 71-100 has to offer about liaison. Notably absent from these field manuals are expectations for the liaison function; expectations of the sending organization, the receiving organization, and the liaison soldiers themselves. Before liaisons depart, commanders and staffs will prepare them by defining their mission and giving guidance for mission accom- plishment. Again, because there is no common doctrine, liaisons from several organizations will arrive at one headquarters with different agendas, demands, attitudes, and levels of knowledge. And since each liaison operates with unique expectations, none of them will use common procedures to receive, process, record, and distribute information. The lack of published techniques and procedures for the actual conduct of liaison activities reduces the development of expectations to a trial-and-error process. The tempo of future operations will not allow a breaking-in period for liaisons, and the inefficiencies attendant to this process may well result in poor coordination with reduced unity of effort. A further problem relates to manpower; although all organiza- tions acknowledge the need for liaison, few tables of organiza- tion and equipment resource this function. Organizations are left to create liaisons out-of-hide, or seek augmentation person- nel at the last minute. The first approach usually produces a soldier that the organization would rather do without, while the second approach usually produces a soldier who is neither "accli- matized" to the organization or knowledgeable of its current status. Both approaches result in poor representation at the receiving organization, with the undesirable consequence of the receiving staff developing poor perceptions of the sending unit. Common sense will prevail in the absence of doctrine, yet the presence of doctrine would ensure sending and receiving organiza- tions consider these factors before liaison is established. The inadequacies of current liaison doctrine can only be addressed by publishing specific guidance for all liaisons, regardless of their organization or assignment. Three courses of action appear to present the most feasible solutions: - Publish a separate field manual for liaison - Expand existing doctrinal manuals to more fully address liaison - Publish a joint manual for liaison The first course of action--publishing a separate field manual devoted to the liaison function--offers the most compre- hensive solution to this problem. A new field manual could address long- and short-term liaisons, and liaisons in garrison and the field. This single-source document would serve as a capstone manual for all soldiers assigned to liaison, and it would clarify responsibilities and expectations for commanders and staffs of organizations that send and receive them. Produc- ing a single field manual would ensure minimal differences in interpretation between various levels and types of organizations. For example, if a separate brigade sent a liaison to its corps headquarters, both organizations would refer to one manual to determine the liaison's composition, equipment, duties, and requirements--instead of each level of command having to guess which manual the other is using. Having a single manual for liaison would also provide a common reference for doctrine writers as they revise or produce manuals throughout the Army. A final advantage of this approach is its timeliness; a single manual can be produced much faster and with less opportunity for "evolving" doctrine and discontinuities than the second approach, updating existing manuals. The second course of action would see existing, key field manuals (such as FM 105-1, and the manuals that cover theater, corps, division, and regimental/brigade operations) expanded to include an annex that discusses liaison. This approach offers a two-fold advantage: the liaison function would be precisely defined for the level of organization that the manual covers, and the manual's users would always have information about liaison readily available with their primary reference. One disadvantage of this approach would be the lengthy promulgation of liaison doctrine, as almost a decade would pass before all major doctrin- al manuals could be revised. Another disadvantage is the poten- tial for several manuals (notably in combat support and combat service support doctrine) to fall through the net and be revised without the inclusion of a liaison section. A final disadvantage would be--as discussed above--the potential for the initial liaison doctrine to distort through evolution as different doctrine writers revise subsequent manuals, resulting in discon- tinuities in liaison doctrine between manuals published over several years. All of these factors weigh heavily against this solution. The universality of the liaison duty suggests a joint publi- cation may be appropriate. Creating a joint manual appears attractive as a third course of action. The advantage of liaison doctrine common for all the services has definite appeal, particularly for those serving on joint staffs. But this ap- proach might not work for all branches, because each service has unique operating environments, personnel and equipment con- straints, and organizational needs. Considering this approach does suggest the utility of a joint liaison manual, with the justification for this publication being essentially the same as the original need for an Army doctrine. As a solution to fill a void in our joint doctrine, this course of action has merit. As a solution to the Army's dilemma, however, it has little appeal. Regardless of which course of action we choose, each approach should include these key elements: - The doctrine should catalog the skills, knowl- edge, and attitudes (SKA, collectively known as competencies) required of the liaison soldier. These SKA (similar to the ones found in TC 22-6, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide) would give soldiers a ready reference to develop and perform the individual tasks required in liaison duties. It would also clarify the expectations of sending and receiving commands, and provide the liaison's rater/senior rater with objective measures against which to compare the liaison's performance of duty. (7:46 to 73) - The doctrine should provide example structures for liaison teams sent by various, generic levels of command (battalion/squadron, brigade/regi- ment/group, division, corps, support command, etc.). These objective "tables of organization and equipment" would give commanders and staffs a starting point for the creation of their own liaisons. - The doctrine should address the physical require- ments of liaison at each level of command. This information would encompass billeting, communica- tions, transportation, and administrative/logis- tic support provided by the receiving organiza- tion. - The doctrine should describe the interrelation- ship between the liaison elements and the staffs of the sending and receiving organizations. This would clarify the roles and responsibilities of all personnel involved in this aspect of command and control. - Related to the subparagraph above, the doctrine should also list the collective tasks performed by liaison teams. This would define the roles of each soldier assigned as part of a team, and enable evaluation of the liaison function during training exercises and actual missions. Each of the three courses of action would solve the problem, but the first approach clearly offers the best alternative. Until a solution is found and applied, liaison officers will continue to operate with doctrinal guidance that is completely inadequate to their needs; organizations will continue to rely on SOPs, trial-and-error, and a "hey, you" staffing procedure; and commanders will continue experiencing difficulty establishing unity of command through the liaison function. The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth should take the lead and begin produc- tion of an Army publication for liaison, offering it as a model for the Armed Forces Staff College to consider for their produc- tion of a joint liaison manual. This single document, published as field manual or a liaison handbook, would provide those who revise Army manuals--and employ liaison--with a foundation of common doctrine to perform this necessary aspect of effective and unified command and control. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. FM 71-100, Division Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, November 1988. 2. FM 100-5, Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1986. 3. FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, U.S. Army Logistics Center, Fort Lee, Virginia, February 1988. 4. FM 100-15, Corps Operations, U.S. Army Command and Gener- al Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 1989. 5. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1984. 6. FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1985. 7. TC 22-6, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas, November 1990.
