Role Of The JFACC In Future Conflicts CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Role of the JFACC in Future Conflicts Author: Major William G. Polowitzer, United States Air Force Thesis: Future conflicts will involve fewer men, aircraft, equipment, and employ more advanced systems. The reduction in assets available will make joint cooperation between all services a must at all levels of employment. Along with jointness, the future role of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) requires that he has the authority to employ all available air assets to achieve the Joint Force Commander objectives. Background: Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the importance of the JFACC in executing a coordinated and well planned air campaign. Lessons learned from past employments of air power in World War II, Korean War, Vietnam, and legislative changes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act showed the importance of unity of command. Though the JFACC concept proved critical to the success of Operation Desert Storm component commanders felt the JFACC had too much authority over air assets and lacked responsiveness to the ground battle. In some instances ground commanders retained control over organic air assets by withholding them from JFACC tasking. The overwhelming number of aircraft in theater allowed the JFACC to execute the air campaign even though some aircraft were withheld. Future conflicts will involve much fewer aircraft due to the drastic draw down in armed forces. Faced with the reality of less it becomes critical that air campaigns are planned and executed jointly and managed by one boss, the JFACC. Recommendation: The JFACC concept should be adopted by all component commanders to ensure focus and unity of effort in future air campaigns. OUTLINE Thesis: Future conflicts will involve fewer men, aircraft, equipment, and employ more advanced systems. The reduction in assets available will make joint cooperation between services a must at all levels of employment. Along with jointness, the future role of the JFACC requires that he has the authority to employ all available air assets to achieve the Joint Force Commander objectives. I. Historical role of air power A. World War II and the Pacific Campaign B. Korean War all services operated independently C. Vietnam War no unity of effort II. Differences in service doctrine A. Air Force - centralized control B. Navy - protection of the carrier C. Marines - support of the MAGTF III. The crucial role of Goldwater-Nichols A. Role of CJCS and unified CINC B. Need for jointness and problems that remain C. Unity of commend IV. Lessons learned from Desert Storm A. Unity of command B. Role of JFACC C. Air campaign 1. Phases of air campaign 2. Response to ground commanders 3. Tasking of air assets V. Future role of JFACC A. Change in roles and missions B. Smaller force structure C. Effect of advanced technology THE ROLE OF THE JFACC IN FUTURE CONFLICTS The employment of air power during Operation Desert Storm proved to be the most significant factor in winning the war. Early attainment of air supremacy, disruption of the Iraqi Command and Control network, interdiction of lines of communication and logistic capability, and finally the demoralizing effect that air power had on the Iraqi army contributed to the rapid advance and success of allied ground forces. The success of the air campaign demonstrated the value of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept when employed in combat operations. The JFACC responsibility for planning, coordinating, allocation, and tasking of air assets ensured the execution of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) theater objectives. However, component service commanders wish to shift decision making authority away from the JFACC to the individual service component. Future conflicts will involve fewer men, aircraft, equipment, and employ more advanced systems. The reduction in assets available will make joint cooperation between services a must at all levels of employment. Along with jointness, the future role of the JFACC requires that he has the authority to employ all available air assets to achieve the JFC objectives. The military services are entering a new era dominated by the dismantling of the bipolar power system of United States and the Soviet Union to a unipolar power of the United States. With no real threat to justify a large armed force deployed around the world the military is wrestling with the problem of reducing the military but, maintain a capability to respond to a worldwide conflict. As the draw down in force structure continues the overlapping capability between services diminish and the requirement to operate in joint operations intensifies. The future will require all services to readjust their doctrine to become more joint and will demand the integration of the JFACC in the conduct of combat operations. History has proven the need for JFACC: History has shown the failure of air power when divided up between ground force commanders and used at their discretion. The US military entered North Africa with its air power split between the Army Air Force and support air power assigned to individual Army units. The results were disastrous and contributed to the American defeat at the Kasserine Pass in February 1943. To correct the problem American air power became centralized under one boss, General Spaatz. The immediate success of American air power underscored the value of centralizing control of theater air power under a single commander. A similar success in unity of command occurred in the Pacific when General George Kenney assumed duties as General Douglas MacArthur's air commander. Development of an air campaign to support the theater island hopping strategy of the Pacific became critical. Faced with few air assets divided between the allied forces. General Kenney developed a combined air campaign that linked directly with army and navy plans. His planning and execution of logistics and the tactical employment of air power eventually resulted in bring the war to homeland Japan. In Korea and Vietnam the inefficient use of air power resulted in a disjointed plan that lacked a focus of effort and concentration of firepower. In both cases, the lack of unity of command resulted in not one airwar but several, with no centralized planning, control, or direction. In Vietnam the airwar was fought autonomously by the Air Force, Navy, Marines, Army helicopters, SAC B-52s. and South Vietnam. North Vietnam was divided into route packages assigned to either the Navy or Air Force, and services normally only attacked targets in their route package. The procedure made mass and concentration of firepower difficult and lacked the flexibility to respond to changes on the battlefield. The air war in Vietnam failed because it executed air power without a well orchestrated plan and never achieved concentration of effort at decisive points. It resulted in the conduct of five separate wars each lacking a focus of effort to reach a common goal or objective. The absence of a joint air component commander combined with no air campaign plan established by the joint force commander resulted in a waste of effort and time. Differences in Doctrine: Air Force doctrine is based on the principals of war and the tenets of aerospace power. The most important tenant is that air power should be employed using centralized control and decentralized execution. The Air Force believes that commanders with centralized control can exploit the speed and flexibility of aerospace platforms to concentrate forces, whether in attack or defense, from diverse locations on decisive points. (2:113-115) Air Force doctrine places priority on achieving air superiority and gaining control of the air early in a campaign. Control of the air allows friendly aircraft to strike strategic targets; conduct interdiction, surveillance and reconnaissance, airlift, close air support, and other air missions. Air domination over the battlefield allows ground forces to conduct operations free of enemy aircraft attack. Employment of naval air power allows the battle group and carrier air wing commander considerable freedom in executing operations. Differences between carrier battle groups exist due to geographic locations, weapons load of aircraft, and composition of aircraft types. Carrier air wing tactics and composition are tailored to a deployment area and the battle group very seldom operates together with another carrier battle group. The ability to tailor operations for each deployment, and not be constrained by regulations, is viewed by the Navy as flexibility. Based on this method of operations the Navy has no written doctrine concerning air power. (13:51-52) Areas of Navy doctrine that lack specifics are how to conduct a major air campaign, how to achieve and maintain air superiority, and the role of interdiction and close air support (CAS) in a air campaign. Marines are deployed as integrated Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of varying sizes and capabilities tailored to meet the task at hand. Fixed-wing aircraft are an important part in employing the MAGTF as a complete combined arms force. Marine air and ground units function as a single coordinated force, operating from the same doctrine and procedures, and train together. Marine Corps doctrine employs air assets as a support element available to the MAGTF commander. The mobility of a MAGTF ground element is due to the light capability of the ground forces. Because ground forces have limited heavy armor and artillery assets they rely on the capability of the air element to compensate. Air power is treated as artillery and a key part of the Marine integrated fire support. The MAGTF commander retains control of the air element to support ground forces in the close battle area and to project power into the deep region. This control allows the flexibility to quickly respond to changes and create opportunities in the battle. The Marines believe that an air component commander would take flexibility away from the ground commander. All three doctrines present a different view on the command and control and employment of air power. Individually the service doctrines support a specific type of operation, but, in the area of joint operation problems arise with integration. The Navy and Marine doctrine uses air power as a support element to achieve a much larger mission and works in isolation. The JFACC is not restricted by one particular doctrine and can draw on all air assets to support the commander. Many times during Desert Storm Air Force, Navy, and coalition aircraft provided direct support to ground units. The centralized command structure of JFACC makes it the most efficient system for responding to air support requests. Air assets retained by each component commander and operating as separate entities are unable to coordinate and task in a joint environment. For this reason doctrines must be reevaluated and adjusted to respond to the current world situation and future conflicts. (8:99-104) Crucial role of Goldwater-Nichols: During the Carter and Reagan administrations three operations forced change upon the way the military conducted business. The dismal results and unfortunate mistakes that occurred during Desert One, the naval air strike in Lebanon, and Grenada forced the politicians and civilian leadership to make a change in the military. Many viewed the problem as parochial and institutional attitudes within the separate services. Service chiefs viewed each operation as an opportunity to demonstrate their service capability and mission success becoming secondary. Each operation had a common problem of no clear-cut chain of command that placed one commander in charge of the overall operation. In retrospect, lessons such as this encouraged the change brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The act sought to implement jointness between the services by increasing the power of the unified CINCs, streamlining the chain of command to the President, and strengthen the role of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Goldwater-Nichols gave the CINC the power to conduct a campaign the way he saw fit without interference from service chiefs. The CINC had authority over logistics and support, the ability to select subordinate commanders, and the employment of forces. The conduct of Operation Desert Shield/Storm by General Schwarzkopf proved the success of the legislation. The creation of the JFACC resulted from the increased authority of the CINC in conducting joint operations. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces," establishes procedures for JFCs to exercise operational control through functional component commands when such a command structure will enhance the overall capability to accomplish the mission." (11:3.21-3.24) This allows the JFC to identify a JFACC, if needed, and the JFC designates the specific command authority of the JFACC. The primary purpose for a JFACC is to provide unity of effort for employing air power of a joint force. In 1986 the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Omnibus Agreement which stated that MAGTF commander retains operational control of his organic Marine air. However, it allowed the JFC the authority to assign missions, through the JFACC, to Marine air to ensure unity effort. The Navy and the Marines could withhold assets to the JFACC to allow commanders to provide direct support of MAGTF ground forces and support of maritime operations. Though the end result of the Goldwater-Nichols act was to provide the CINCs more control over employing forces and streamline chain of command, component commanders still fought the attempt to integrate their forces into a joint operation. A report on Operation Desert Storm, conducted by Rep. Les Aspin and Rep. William Dickinson of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), identified that though the success was due to joint operations, "The Marines were unwilling to leave all their fixed-wing aircraft at the disposal of the JFACC staff for use in the Air Tasking Order (ATO)." (1:42) Desert Storm: The theater campaign consisted of a four phase operation that integrated the air and ground campaign together. The JFACC envisioned the execution of the air campaign in three phases: (1) strategic air phase; (2) air supremacy in the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO); and (3) battlefield preparation phase. The destruction of the Republican Guard and Iraq's army became the emphasis of the third phase. The overwhelming number of air assets available allowed the JFACC to strike targets in all phases almost simultaneously. (8:150) The air campaign provided one plan implemented by one boss, the JFACC, and executed by individual flying units. The success of the air plan is attributed to the unity of effort in execution and effective coordination of the JFACC. JFACC planners could select from a large pool of aircraft, with several different capabilities, and match the correct aircraft and munition against the correct target. Some commanders argued the JFACC plan relied solely on Air Force doctrine and not compatible with sister service doctrine. Both Navy and Marine doctrine are more suited for a smaller and limited operation involving far less aircraft and a simpler command structure. But when judging the air campaign and how it was executed one should look at it from the entire theater of operations. The JFACC command and control structure effectively integrated over 2000 aircraft, widely dispersed, into one plan and achieved the JFC vision of the offensive operation. Captain Steven U. Ramsdell, a naval observer sent to the Gulf in the midst of the war, reported on naval strike planning and campaigning execution. His investigation revealed that "the Navy lacked an appreciation for the operational level of warfare, which prevented the service from planning and waging an effective naval air campaign. The Navy did not bring to Desert Storm any system for planning and directing air campaigns because the Navy does not possess such a system." (8:257-258) The JFACC concept worked because he and other commanders all worked together as a team, but problems did exist. As the ground campaign approached disagreements between the JFACC and the ground commanders occurred concerning targets to be bombed. During the battlefield preparation phase the Marines felt that more priority should be placed on destroying tanks and artillery. To solve this problem Marine air assets were held back from the JFACC until all Marine sorties were totally eliminated from JFACC tasking. (12:63-64) Though only a small number of aircraft when compared to the total aircraft available it represented a fragmented execution of the plan. A study conducted by the House Armed Services Committee after the war stated, "Problems of joint operation were still experienced; for instance, in the withholding of some combat assets from the overall plan of the air campaign." (1:xi) Though a few problems with jointness arose, the sheer abundance of air assets allowed the air campaign to accommodate all service concerns on the priorities of the air war. The prioritizing of targets to be hit became an issue of controversy between ground commanders, concerned with the enemy in front of their position, and the JFACC adherence to the air plan. It became a balancing act between conducting the phases of the air campaign, servicing the requested enemy targets, and having enough air assets left to do an effective job. To stop the air campaign from falling apart and lose focus the JFC directed his deputy commander to resolve the problem. The deputy commander developed a prioritized target list based on requests by ground commanders and submitted to the JFC for approval. The approved list provided the JFACC the focus of effort in continuing the air campaign and preparing the battlefield. Also the action left in tact the authority of the single boss, the JFACC, to integrate all available air assets into a single plan. Air Tasking Order: The daily flying schedule came from the air tasking order (ATO) and provided details and guidance on all missions flown in theater. Sometimes over 300 pages in length the ATO provided; mission call signs, radio frequencies, air refueling tracks, altitudes, target location, type of munition, time on target, and much more . The ATO served as a single source document for the entire air campaign. Planning for the ATO involved a 48 hour process, identifying targets to be hit two days into the future. Criticism of the ATO process centered on the length, lack of access, and the 48 hour targeting process. To some this translated into a rigid planning process that had central command and control and lacked the flexibility to respond to changes on the battlefield. To answer these problems one must ask the question; what alternative system could have tasked over 2700 sorties a day? The answer is none. The ATO system provided the most effective way at the time to integrate aircraft from several locations using a USAF computer network. Problems arose when the Navy lacked the capability to hook up the communication gear necessary to access the network from aboard aircraft carriers. The work around required courier aircraft to deliver the ATO to the carriers daily. From the command and control aspect the JFACC provided the initial guidance to his planners when developing the daily ATO. His staff consisted of representatives from all services to provided the expertise on tasking Navy and Marine aircraft and ensure the correct capability matched the correct target. The results of these efforts were later stated by the JFACC, Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, as; The joint force concept integrates all services into one coordinated plan.... Marine attack aircraft accompanied by Air Force suppression of enemy air defenses assets and escorted by Navy fighters made for effective and lethal packages. Working together, the services were able to limit duplication of effort, minimize breakdowns in communication and fly 110,000 sorties without...air-to-air fratricide. (9:22) The JFACC air tasking methods gave way to the decentralized tactical air operations that are essential to modern air/land warfare. The problem of the ATO 48 hour planning cycle must be addressed and can be shortened when all services are operating the same communication gear. But to confuse the planning cycle with not having the capability to respond to changes on the battlefield is a mistake. The JFACC and his staff did override the printed ATO and redirected scheduled sorties in response to the ground commander's request. The battle of Khafji and the bombing of the Iraqi army withdrawing from Kuwait City demonstrated the capability to respond to short notice tasking. In both cases, the JFACC redirected Air Force, Marine, and Navy air in response to changes on the battlefield. The JFACC had the authority to retask all available assets and proved the efficiency of centralized control. Role of JFACC: The JFACC concept proved its value during Desert Storm in the planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of more than 2,700 coalition aircraft, representing 14 national or service components. He integrated operations into a unified and focused 43-day air campaign using the air tasking order that provided the necessary details. The value of centralizing control and decentralizing execution allowed the flexibility to meet changes on the battlefield with mass and concentration of firepower. When formulating the air campaign the JFACC is not restricted by one particular service doctrine but is driven by the JFC concept of operations. He takes the JFC vision of how the theater campaign will unfold and incorporates the air plan in with the ground plan to achieve the objectives. Both plans complement one another when executed. A critical aspect to any ground offensive is unity of effort, directed by a ground component commander, and the same holds for an air offensive, directed by the JFACC. Rear Admiral Riley D. Mixson, commander Carrier Group Two during the Gulf War, commented on the effectiveness of the air campaign and the JFACC; The air campaign was orchestrated by the Air Force under its umbrella for coordinating air warfare - the air tasking order. The six months of Desert Shield enabled Red Sea and Persian Gulf naval forces to learn to operate within this system. and I do not know of a better way to orchestrate 2,000 - 3,000 sorties per day from the four services and the numerous allied air forces participating. (10:38) The establishment of the JFACC provides efficiency and prevents a duplication of effort when executing the air plan. Future JFACC: Future air forces will be dominated by fewer aircraft and rely on advanced weapons as a force multiplier. With limited assets any future conflict must be planned and coordinated to be effective. Air power will still be driven by the Joint Force Commander objectives and desires and will require a JFACC for command and execution. The JFACC will function as the single source for planning, coordinating, and tasking of available air assets to execute the air campaign. Several factors will drive the execution of air power in future conflicts to use a JFACC that is subordinate to the JFC. The biggest is the success of the JFACC during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. As stated by General Horner, "the JFACC concept proved that consistency and unity in guidance reduce coordination conflicts. Operating under one coordinated plan improves efficiency and lessens the possibility of fratricide." (9:26) With limited assets available and to ensure that mass and concentration of air power is achieved a well coordinated plan is a must. The plan must integrate air assets from all branches of the armed services to prevent duplication of effort and provide the most effective mix of aircraft. The JFACC concept provides this through a targeting process made up of representatives from all aircraft weapon systems being tasked. The complexity of aircraft and the weapons they employ requires highly knowledgeable people to ensure this effectiveness. All future operations will be joint and must be coordinated together to function as one team. Jointness also will require commanders to function with knowledge of each service doctrine in the planning and execution phases. A JFACC is the best way to bring all the tasked services together under one umbrella and can keep an objective view on achieving the JFC objectives. In a joint operation no longer will commanders be able to hold on to air power for their own use. Air power is a valuable asset that must be employed wisely and used to benefit the overall theater battlefield. Advances in communication will enhance command and control to respond to changes on the battlefield. When ground forces require air support the JFACC provides the centralized coordination and tasking center to answer the call. Reacting to these requests the JFACC can redirect aircraft already tasked on the ATO to support ground forces. Aircraft diverted from preplanned missions can be replaced, depending on target priority, by planners to ensure the tempo of air operations is maintained. The problem of ATO dissemination to the tasked flying units can be solved by the acquisition of standardized communication and computer equipment between services. Once accomplished the JFACC will have direct access to all units and tasking of units can be achieved in a timely manner. It will allow the JFACC to more effectively execute his assigned air plan and respond to intelligence updates as soon as they are received. In conclusion the JFACC has demonstrated its value in the planning and execution of large air campaigns. The ability to integrate several thousand aircraft into a single plan while minimizing duplication of effort and fragmented execution. The Desert Storm success does not dictate that future conflicts must be identical in planning and execution to work. Instead it provides the mechanics to plan and implement air power from several services and countries into one joint plan that is focused and effective. The real issue is the role the JFACC should play when planning and implementing the air campaign of the joint force commander's theater campaign plan. If the JFACC is looked upon only as a coordinator then he lacks the authority to ensure that the air plan will be executed in a unity of effort. The JFACC becomes secondary to the desires of component commanders who wish to retain control of their air assets to execute as they see fit. The success of the air phase is no different than that of the land phase of a theater campaign: both rely on unity of command executed with unity of effort. A JFACC that is limited to the role of a coordinator is restricted in effectively planning, coordinating, allocation, and tasking of air assets into a decisive combat power. Desert Storm has produced government and public expectations that future conflicts will utilize high technology equipment to reduce losses and achieve national objectives. Nature of warfare has changed from committing large numbers of ground forces to using air power to achieve strategic objectives. Whether these expectations are false or too high the employment of air power can not be haphazard or disjointed. Every service has a unique capability and the JFACC is the command structure that will bring it together as one. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Aspin, Rep. (D-Wis) Les and Dickinson, Rep. (R-AL) William. Defense for a New Era - Lessons of the Persian Gulf War. U.S. Printing Office 1992 2. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force Air Force Manual 1-1. March 1992 3. Boyd, Lt.Gen. Charles G. and Lt.Col. Charles M. Westenhoff. "Request Unrestricted Climb." Airpower Journal Fall 1991:4-15. 4. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. Final report to Congress April 1992 5. Coyne, James P. Airpower in the Gulf. Air Force Association Book 1992 6. Cushman, Lt.Gen. John H. "Command and Control in the Coalition." Proceedings/Naval Review 1991:74-80. 7. 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