War-At-Sea or War From The Sea? CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: War-At-Sea or War From the Sea? Author: Lieutenant Commander Paul M. Pietsch, United States Navy Thesis: The U.S. Navy must continue to develop weapons and tactics to project power in the littoral areas of the world. Background: The threats faced by the U.S. Navy are changing. We no longer face a well defined threat in the open ocean. Instead we are facing a nebulous threat in the congested, shallow waters of the world's littorals. The Navy must improve or refine its antiair, antisubmarine, antisurface, antimine, and naval gunfire support capabilities. Recommendations: Continue to refine the unique requirements in the littoral areas and ensure Navy acquisition programs are tailored to meet the requirements. OUTLINE Thesis: The United States Navy presently has the ability to conduct operations in the littoral areas of the world. But, as the potential adversaries to the U.S. become better armed the Navy must refine its basic warfighting areas and tailor them to the unique requirements of the littoral areas. I. Introduction A. Thesis B. War-at-Sea II. Antiair Warfare A. SPY-1 B. Congested Airspace C. Political Solution III. Antisubmarine Warfare A. Diesel Threat B. Target Identification C. LAMPS Helicopter Use IV. Anti surface Warfare A. Target Rich Environment B. Harpoon C. Penguin V. Naval Gunfire Support A. 5-inch Gun B. 8-inch Gun VI. Antimine Warfare A. Gulf War Lessons Learned B. Importance of Mines WAR-AT-SEA OR WAR FROM THE SEA? The United States Navy is better prepared to fight in the littoral areas of the world than some would have us believe. That does not mean, however, that its weapons, tactics, and priorities do not need to be changed to focus on the challenges faced in littoral warfare. These changes are only natural since U.S. Naval forces are designed for battle in the open ocean against a well-defined Soviet threat, not for battle in a congested, shallow water environment against a nebulous threat. War-at-sea, whether in the littoral areas or in deep open ocean waters, takes place in one of three arenas: antiair, antisubmarine, or anti surface warfare. These three arenas are significantly different in the open ocean and the littoral environments. The open ocean environment is generally clear of non-combatants. That makes it an easy environment in which to detect, verify, and target hostile contacts. Conversely, the littoral environment is typically The Ticonderoqa class guided missile cruiser is the Navy's premier ship in the antiair role. The ship was designed to sail in the center of a battle group with the high value ship(s) within the protective umbrella provided by its SPY-1 radar. The SPY-1 radar is capable of tracking hundreds of contacts simultaneously. This capability is ideal in the open ocean where the only aircraft in the vicinity are either friendly or hostile. Systems onboard the friendly aircraft allow them to be identified as such on the radar's display. Hostile aircraft have no such systems; unfortunately, neither do civilian aircraft. In the littoral area, not only are there friendly aircraft and hostile aircraft but also there are innumerable civilian aircraft of all types. The SPY-1 cannot tell the difference between hostile and civilian aircraft. That means that the human operating the radar must try to evaluate hundreds of contacts a day as hostile or non-hostile simply by their flight profile. If there are active hostilities involved, the operator may only have seconds to make that determination. One need only recall the USS Vincennes' incident where a civilian airliner was inadvertently shot down to find an example of the difficulty with target identification in the littoral environment. The solution to the antiair problem is not going to be found in any potential upgrade to the SPY-1 radar. In today's economy it is also not reasonable to expect any new systems to replace the SPY-1. The solution to the problem will have to come through improved command-and-control. Prior to sustained Naval action in any area our national leaders must clearly announce to the international community that hostilities are likely and civilian aircraft must avoid the area. This announcement would not deter the United States launching a preemptive strike without warning because it could be given after our strike had been delivered. On the tactical level, the ships that are involved in the Naval action must coordinate their response to a perceived air threat. This coordination could include concurrence on target classification by more the one unit or gaining visual on the target prior to engaging. Even with all of the best command-and-control measures there will come a time when only one unit has the target on radar and there are no friendly aircraft to use as a visual platform. Then the solution falls squarely in the hands of the ship's captain. The C.O. of the ship will have to make his best determination as to the best course of action in order to protect his ship. Operating in a hostile littoral environment is a very dangerous venture; the nation's political leadership must be willing to accept the risk of collateral damage to non-combatants if it intends to project U.S. power under these conditions. Put succinctly, the right to self defense must not be withheld from commanders on the scene. Antisubmarine warfare in the littoral environment is another area that the Navy's current systems are not well suited for. Today's systems were designed to operate in deep ocean water against Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. In the littoral area, antisubmarine warfare is conducted in shallow water against third world diesel/electric submarines. The difference is significant for two reasons. First, diesel/electric submarines are virtually impossible to detect with passive sonar when they are submerged and on battery power. Submerged nuclear submarines are relatively noisy and often can be detected at significant ranges in the open ocean. The quietness of the diesel/electric submarine means that today's ships must use active sonar to stand a reasonable chance at detecting it. Submarines can hear the constant pinging of an active sonar far enough away that it can easily stay outside its detection range. Secondly, in the future it is highly unlikely that the United States will be operating unilaterally and the possibility exists that our adversary will be operating the same class of submarine as our allies. Determining who's Class-209 submarine that is operating under water during wartime with the fog of war will be very difficult.(1:128) Unlike the antiair problem which must be dealt with through procedural changes; the antisubmarine problem must be solved with technological changes as well as tactical changes. The problem with detection and classification of a diesel/electric submarine requires the development of new sensors, both acoustic and non-acoustic, and the development of expanded procedures for the integration of coalition submarines into the Navy's battle group. The Secretary of the Navy, in his paper ".. From the Sea." laid down the framework for fully integrated ASW in the littoral environment. The Navy will integrate attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and mine warfare assets into expeditionary task forces.(6:4) John F. Morton writing for the Naval Institute's magazine "Proceedings" clearly stated the future ASW challenge when he wrote the following: The Navy believes that the most likely regional ASW scenario will take place during a prolonged pre- hostilities period and will involve two-to-five opposing diesel subs. If so, the ideal course of ASW events would begin with the quick deployment of advanced surveillance assets, SSNs and P-3s (if no air threat), followed by a forward deployed SURTASS ship. Mobile and task-force ASW assets would then commence area clearance operations in the littoral operating area. Once they establish sea control, expeditionary forces could conduct strike and amphibious operations. In the event of a compressed pre-hostilities period, the on-scene commanders will have to rely on innovative force packaging. For example, some ASW war fighters advocate a number of helicopter options such as putting two helos on each escort, deploying them on auxiliaries or operating them from the land.(2:126) Increasing the number of ASW helicopters in the battle group, as expressed in Morton's article, will require significant expenditures of money. Operating helicopters as ASW search platforms as part of an innovative force package is an interesting concept but an understanding of how ASW helicopters operate must be gained prior to attempting it. Historically, ASW helicopters have been employed as reactionary vehicles; responding to a sonar contact gained by some other sensor in the battle group. The helicopter would launch and proceed to the area of interest. Once on station the helicopter places sonobuoys in the water hoping to gain contact on as many buoys as possible. After contact is gained the aircrew on board the helicopter in concert with its parent ship, via the data link, would begin to refine the contact in order to achieve attack criteria for its torpedo. The Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) helicopter is the helicopter system employed by the Navy's escort ships. The cornerstone of the system is the data link between the helicopter and its controlling ship. The data link is a "pencil-beam" directional system which means that the ship can only link with one helicopter at a time. Traditionally this has not been a concern because there was no reason to have multiple LAMPS helicopters operating from the same ship at the same time. Operating the LAMPS without its data link significantly degrades its capability to process the acoustic data it receives from its sonobuoys. The cost of installing link capabilities to auxiliary ships would be prohibitive, but Morton's idea has merit if the ASW module on board the supporting aircraft carrier is equipped with multiple data link receivers so it could link simultaneously with more than one LAMPS helicopter. The final war-at-sea arena, antisurface warfare, is also adversely affected in the littoral area. As with the previous two arenas, the problems revolve around detecting and/or identifying the threat at stand off ranges. The waters in the littoral areas can be crowded with shipping. This makes detecting a hostile contact difficult. The Navy's primary antisurface missile is the Harpoon missile that, despite a sophisticated guidance system, cannot pick the hostile contact from a group of contacts particularly if the contact is a small gunboat. Assigning manned tactical jet aircraft against small gunboats is a diversion of assets away from their primary power projection mission and therefore negatively affects the overall operation. The only other weapon available is an armed helicopter. Unfortunately, the only helicopter compatible missile in the Navy's inventory, the Penguin missile, has such a short range that the helicopter must operate within the hostile ship's weapon envelope in order to launch it. The solution to the antisurface problem is also a technological one. Improvements to the seeker-head of the Harpoon missile must be made. A video data-link between the missile and the firing ship with a field of view big enough to allow an operator to designate the target of interest is the most viable solution. The problem with the range of the Penguin missile is of such magnitude that the Penguin should be replaced by another missile. The preferred missile would have a stand-off range of at least fifteen nautical miles. Additionally, new coordinated tactics allowing multiple, simultaneous launches from multiple helicopters on different azimuths from the target must be developed. Fighting in the littoral areas also includes extending naval influence on to the land. The most significant way to do that is through amphibious operations. Unfortunately, the Navy no longer has the right type of ships with enough firepower to adequately support an amphibious assault. Two important aspects of an amphibious invasion are pre-invasion bombardment of the intended landing area and supporting naval gunfire during the assault. The ideal weapon for both functions is the 16-inch gun that is found onboard battleships. Tragically, for those Marines who will be called upon to do those future amphibious assaults, all of the battleships have been decommissioned. The loss of the battleships means the biggest gun in the fleet is the 5-inch gun. The 5-inch gun simply does not provide sufficient firepower to soften a well prepared defensive position. The solution to the lack of Naval gunfire is not as easy as it would seem. The idea of bringing the battleships back from retirement may seem logical, but the material condition of those fifty year old ships makes that option unattractive. The cost of fixing their problems would be prohibitive. Fitting newer ships with 16-inch guns is not possible since their hulls, decks, and superstructures were not designed to support them. The best solution would be to acquire an 8-inch gun that would be compatible with today's ships. An 8-inch gun would fire a projectile large enough to destroy enemy defenses. The Mk-71 is an existing 8-inch gun that could significantly enhance naval gun fire. The Mk-71 with conventional 8-inch ammunition would increase range by over 50 percent and increase area coverage 2.5 times. Using submunitions range could be increased by 300 percent and area coverage increased by 600 percent. The firing rate is 20 rounds per minute for both the Mk-71 and the current 5- inch Mk-45.(3:104) Maneuver from the sea implies not just operating off the coast of another country but it also means projecting power inland. The Navy is well versed in the use of naval aircraft to project power, but it has allowed itself to decay in its ability to conduct amphibious assaults. Perhaps the aspect of amphibious operations that is most lacking is antimine warfare. In the 1992 Annual Report to the President and the Congress the Secretary of Defense stated the most important lesson learned by naval forces in Operation DESERT STORM was in the area of mine countermeasures. He also explained that the adoption of more effective countermeasures against enemy mines, including shallow water mines, will be required in any future amphibious operations.(4:77) The inadequacy of the U.S. mine clearing capability was highlighted by the requirement for extensive reliance on coalition nations to provide minesweeping ships. Two dozen minesweepers from nine nations were used to clear over 1,000 mines from the waters off Kuwait. Japan provided four of the minesweepers which marks the first time that nation has sent military forces abroad since 1945.(5:8) Mine clearing operations present challenges in both the technological and tactical arenas. The United States will have to devote more resources to developing more mine sweeping ships and expanding the envelope of the MH-53E helicopter to allow for night towing. Unfortunately, increasing the numbers of mine sweepers will not completely solve the mine problem; increased intelligence gathering and properly refined tactics will also be required. Mine warfare has become a much more serious threat to the U.S. Navy for two reasons. First, naval mines used today are much more sophisticated than those used in the past. Second, losing a ship to a mine is unacceptable both politically and ship to a mine is unacceptable both politically and operationally. A review of the major amphibious operations in World War Two reveals that mines did not act as an effective deterrent to amphibious operations. The apparent reason for this seems to be a result of sheer numbers. U.S. amphibious operations were generally large enough and the troops were spread among enough ships so that a few ships lost to mines would not stop the assault, additionally the country was at total war and the loss of a few ships was accepted as part of the price to be paid. The sparsity of amphibious shipping combined with the lack of acceptability of losing a ship in what will probably be a limited war against some regional power have combined to give mere threat of naval mines a supernatural ability to deter robust amphibious operations.(5:185-194) Current U.S. Navy weapons allow its ships to operate in any naval environment with confidence. However, as the future threats evolve it will become increasingly difficult for the United States to gain the dominance of the battlespace necessary to wage amphibious operations. In order for the U.S. Navy to maintain its supremacy at sea the national leadership must make the commitment to support the types of weapons systems necessary to project and sustain power from the sea. An easy trap for our nation's decision makers to fall into is believing the Persian Gulf conflict was a good model for all future conflicts. The Persian Gulf conflict was without doubt a testament to the capability and responsiveness of America's military. However, it is highly unlikely the United States will have the combination of enemy ineptitude, long mobilization time, regional cooperation, and favorable terrain that it enjoyed in that conflict. The United States will need to maintain a diverse set of modern naval forces, able to function in more demanding conditions than they encountered in the Gulf War. (4:74) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Owens, VADM. W.A.. "Still a Priority." Proceedings March 93:128. 2. Morton, J.F.. "The Shallow Water Diesel: A New Priority." Proceedings March 93:126 3. Selle, R.W.. "Is There A Place For The Mk-71 8-inch Gun?" Proceedings November 92:104 4. Cheney, Dick. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. February 92. 5. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Interim Report on Military Lessons Learned in the Gulf War. CSIS 1991. 6. O'Keefe, S.. ".. From the Sea." Navy and Marine Corps White Paper. September 1992
