...From The Sea Future Challenges For Naval Aviation CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: ...From the Sea - Future Challenges for Naval Aviation Author: Major Daniel G. Peters, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The integration of Marine and Navy fixed wing aviation into an effective warfighting arm of the future Naval Expeditionary Force will require more than simply the assignment of Marine squadrons to carrier air groups: the Navy and Marine Corps must implement changes in structure, organization, doctrine and training as they pursue a New strategy...From the Sea. Background: Changes in National Military Strategy as a result of the Cold War and reductions in the defense budget have resulted in a new vision for America's Naval Forces...From the Sea. This concept tasked Navy and Marine fixed wing aviation to integrate to a degree unequal led in their seventy-seven year history. Toward this end, Marine squadrons have begun workups for carrier deployments and Adaptive Force Packages have resulted in the controversial placement of Marine ground units and helicopters on aircraft carriers. These efforts, while significant, fall short of the mark; changes in structure, organization, doctrine and training must follow. Naval Aviation structure must change to reduce cost while taking optimum advantage of existing platforms. The task organization of Marine and Navy units into Naval Expeditionary Forces should continue to be explored. Doctrine must keep up with and codify successful innovations for fleet- wide implementation. Training should improve integration while avoiding the pitfalls of multi-mission tasking--mediocrity. Additionally, a review of ship and aircraft procurement must support the combined vision of naval strategy. Recommendations: Success in future operations may rely on the commanders ability to make maximum use of our combined remaining fixed-wing assets. Changes in doctrine, organization, structure and training will enable an integrated Navy-Marine Corps team to better support our Naval Expeditionary Forces ...FROM THE SEA - FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR NAVAL AVIATION Thesis: The integration of Marine and Navy fixed-wing aviation into an effective warfighting arm of the future Naval Expeditionary Force will require more than simply the assignment of Marine squadrons to carrier air groups: the Navy and Marine Corps must implement changes in structure, doctrine, organization, and training as they pursue a new strategy...From the Sea. I. Navy and Marine Aviation A. Historical roles and missions B. Current division of labor C. Shift in strategic and fiscal direction II. Future structure options A. Retain all Marine Air functions B. Selected fixed wing functions supported by Navy Air C. Complete synthesis into Navy Air III. Doctrinal changes A. Establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command B. Mission IV. Organizational changes A. Adaptive Force Packaging B. Task organizing Naval Task Forces C. Command structure V. Equipping Naval Aviation A. Carrier reductions 1. Fewer carriers 2. Smaller carrier B. Amphibious and multi-role ships C. Aircraft development 1. VSTOL missions 2. Future procurement VI. Training A. Mission challenges B. Navy-Marine integrated training ...FROM THE SEA - FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR NAVAL AVIATION The Navy and Marine Corps recently announced plans to begin the integration of Marine fixed-wing squadrons into Navy carrier air wings. This integration, scheduled to begin with the work up of F/A-18 squadrons for deployment on the USS Lincoln and Roosevelt in 1993, serves two purposes: it allows Marine fixed- wing squadrons to substitute for Navy squadrons scheduled to stand down as a result of recent budget reductions and it is the first step in the Department of the Navy's latest strategic posture...From the Sea. This strategy stresses the projection of Naval air power ashore in support of Marine ground forces in the littoral regions of the world. (9) Although the practice of temporarily assigning Marine squadrons to carriers is an inherent capability of Marine aviation, the concept of permanently assigning Marine aviation to aircraft carriers as part of a Naval task force is significant departure from recent historical functions of Marine and carrier aviation. The integration of Marine and Navy fixed-wing aviation into an effective warfighting arm of the future Naval Expeditionary Force will require more than simply the assignment of Marine squadrons to carrier air groups: the Navy and Marine Corps must implement chances in structure, organization, doctrine and training as they pursue a new strategy...From the Sea. Historical Roles and Missions. Marine and Navy aviation have, from their inception in 1916, maintained a high degree of functional compatibility and supportive infrastructure. Shared procurement, maintenance and supply systems have contributed to a close working relationship; however, the roles and missions of the services and their perceived functions have historically resulted in different employment philosophies. World War II saw both Marine and Navy squadrons working from carriers in the Pacific. Navy aviation's primary focus of effort can be considered the birth of the traditional role of aviation in the "War at Sea" scenario: carrier based air superiority, defense of the amphibious task forces, and anti-surface action. Marine aviation adopted the primary missions of close air support, offensive counter air, and air defense in support of Marine ground operations. Since the end of World War II, the roles and missions of Navy and Marine Corps aviation have taken more defined and divergent paths. Despite Navy carrier aviation's significant impact on successful operation during the Korean Conflict, Navy aviation began to evolve away from the direct use of air power to influence the outcome of combat operations ashore. Capabilities and training centered on the strategic concept of carrier aviation in a nuclear delivery and deterrent role while countering the Soviet threat at sea: this was a more traditional war at sea scenario. The mission of providing both deep and close air support to Marine operation ashore continued to be refined and perfected as Marine air became identified as the Air Combat Element (ACE) for a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Marine fixed wing aviation continued to maintain the capability to support carrier aviation; however, during the period 1964-1975 Navy carriers made 64 deployments in support of the vietnam War but only one carried a Marine attack squadron. During the vietnam War the division of labor between Marine and Navy fixed-wing aviation became more evident as Navy carrier aviation engaged in a campaign of strategic bombing of the North; 52 percent of the air strikes against North vietnam were conducted by Navy aviation. (2:279- 283) The lion's share of support to Marine ground combat forces was provided by Marine aviation. This pattern of division of labor continued during the defense expansion of the Reagan Era when Navy fixed-wing carrier aviation continued its emphasis on "open ocean warfighting on the sea." (12:93) Carrier air wings during this time frame utilized Marine fixed-wing squadrons as temporary fillers to augment the wing while new squadrons went through stand up or existing squadrons transitioned to new aircraft. Carrier projection of power ashore centered on singular event air strikes, such as those conducted against Beirut and Libya rather than sustained support of ground combat operations. This lack of emphasis on power projection from the sea in support of operations ashore was evident in carrier aviation's difficulty in being able to completely and efficiently integrate with the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) during Operation Desert Storm. Future structure and capabilities of Naval fixed-wing aviation will be shaped by the National Security Strategy shift from a focus on a global threat to a focus on regional challenges and opportunity.(12:1) Although shaped by strategy, it will be driven by the Department of Defense budget reductions. The Defense budget experienced a 21.4 percent reduction between 1990- 1993. For carrier aviation, this resulted in a force structure change of two carriers and two active duty carrier air wings. (1:27) Marine aviation was reduced by four fixed-wing squadrons. Most likely the Clinton administration and Congress will continue to enact deep cuts in defense spending. A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study has identified a wide range of cost- cutting options which would total 46 billion dollars over the next five years. Included in this budget reduction proposal is the early retirement of three carriers and carrier air wings as well as the cancellation of funding for the next Nimitz-class carrier. This option would leave the Navy with nine active carriers. (13) The CBO study suggest amphibious assault ships such as the Wasp-class LHD or the Tarawa-class LHA would be suited to support battle groups. (13) Structure Options for Marine fixed-wing aviation Senator Nunn's call for a comprehensive review of the services roles and missions was answered by the Joint Staff with a reaffirmation of the necessity of maintaining each service's aviation structure; however, the impact of defense budget reductions will effect the basic structure of Navy and Marine fixed-wing aviation. Both the Navy and Marine Corps have already realized reduction in the number of squadrons. The Marine Corps has retired the OV-10 aircraft, an extremely capable airborne command and control platform, and the Navy has sought the early retirement of the A-6 all-weather attack aircraft. Future structure options could include: - Retaining all Marine fixed-wing functions as a smaller force. - Selected functions relegated to either Navy or Marine fixed-wing aviation. - Increased integration of Marine and Navy fixed-wing aviation. Retaining all the functions of Marine fixed-wing aviation, although optimum for support of the MAGTF, may not be possible under future defense budget cutbacks. Reduction in the total numbers of type aircraft will result in an increase in per unit cost to maintain and support. The cost for the Marine Corps to maintain multiple aircraft types may become restricted. This cost was anticipated in the Marine Corps' plan to "neck down" its fighter (F/A-18) and attack (AV-8B) aircraft to a single platform: the STOVL Strike Fighter (SSF). Current economic restraints may force the assimilation of aircraft communities such as the EA-6B electronic warfare platform into Navy squadrons for increased economy. As demonstrated during Desert Storm, these limited highly specialized aircraft would be used to support joint air operations or the future Naval Expeditionary Task Force as required. Relegating selected missions such as offensive counter air or offensive air support to either Navy or Marine Corps aviation could be considered a waste of assets in light of the multi- mission capability of modern Naval aircraft. The current inventory of Navy and Marine aircraft are capable of operating across a broad spectrum of missions and contingencies. Recent improvements in existing airframes such as the F-14's air-to- ground capability and the AV-8B night and radar capability increase both aircrafts' capability to perform multiple missions. The limit to which the different Naval aircraft exploit their multi-mission abilities in the future integration of Marine and Navy aviation will not be limited by aircraft type but by training, deployment platforms, and operations tempos. Although From the Sea calls for expanded integration of Navy and Marine fixed-wing aviation, the intent is apparently not for the complete absorption of Marine into Navy fixed-wing aviation. The integration of air capabilities has the potential, if applied properly, to use the combined Naval aviation capabilities as a force multiplier when compared to the more traditional roles and missions of Marine and Navy fixed-wing aviation, as From the Sea indicates: When Marines go ashore, Naval aviation on board aircraft carriers and , if required, land based expeditionary aircraft will provide them sustained high volume tactical air support ashore to extend the landward reaches of our littoral operations. (12:95) Reduction in the numbers of carriers and carrier air wings can be offset by greater integration of remaining aviation assets. Increases in command and control technologies and equipment will enable land-based forward deployed fixed-wing aircraft to play a greater role in sea control and power projection. An example of this concept could be an integrated Naval Expeditionary Force employing a land-based Aviation Combat Element (ACE) composed of Marine F/A-18, Navy F-14 and S-3 aircraft in support of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, (MEU) in the absence of a carrier. Doctrinal Changes Doctrine is a statement of how a military organization views itself with respect to the execution of its mission. Doctrine spells out the methodology and also the raison d'etre for the service. From the Sea identifies the renewal of navy and Marine Corps doctrine as an essential element in defining direction for the New Navy and Marine Corps and directed the establishment of a Naval Doctrine Command. (12:96) The Naval Doctrine Command's mission includes reviewing existing doctrine, modifying it to meet new and existing realities, and creating new doctrine as the concepts of air land battle and amphibious warfare are adapted into operational maneuver from the sea. (10) This mission is made difficult by the rapidly developing changes in Naval expedltionary force employment. For Marine fixed-wing aviation, the doctrinal changes will reflect the additional functions relating to the permanent assignment of Marine fixed-wing squadrons as part of a carrier air group and the use of VSTOL aircraft conducting a sea- control mission while embarked on a large deck amphibious ship. Organizational Changes Recent examples of Adaptive Force Packaging include the embarkation of a MAGTF on board the carrier USS Roosevelt. The concept of employing an Air Combat Element of the MAGTF from a large deck carrier represents a shift in the paradigm of Navy carrier aviation; there is at present little doctrinal guidance concerning the physical integration as well as command and control problems which will accompany this placement of a large number of Marines and helicopters on a carrier. Combining Navy and Marine fixed-wing squadrons into integrated carrier groups which form the Air Combat Element of a Naval Expeditionary Force is another example of possible adaptation of force structure to support a strategy which includes forward presence and power projection from the sea. Adaptive Force Packaging represents a shift away from the traditional employment of Carrier Battle Groups or Amphibious ready groups toward task-organized Naval Expeditionary Forces whose composition and mix of Marine and Navy fixed-wing capabilities will be governed by the assigned or anticipated mission. For example, a carrier air group comprised heavily of strike/fighter aircraft may be task organized to support a mission which includes a preponderance of air interdiction and close air support; electronic warfare aircraft would augment the group as the threat dictates. Integrating the carrier air group with Marine aircraft, together with the reductions in numbers of squadrons, may dictate that Marine or possibly Navy squadrons phase ashore for more rapid cyclic operations in support of the Ground Combat Element. The command organization and staff could be a hybrid of the Marine Air Combat Element (ACE) and the Navy Carrier Air Group (CAG). Another option for the organizational and command structure of the future Naval Air Combat Element could be based in part on the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) concept, whereby one commander coordinates the aviation effort of Navy, Marine and Air Force elements. Equipping Naval Aviation Admiral Crowe, former Chief of Naval Operations, explored changes in seaborne forces for a 1977 conference in Problems of Sea Power As We Approach the Twenty-First Century: Long range sensor weapons systems and helicopters will increase the effectiveness of individual ships, small carriers and V/STOL aircraft may revolutionize the air picture, single units will be capable of operation independent of task forces and their mission will increase accordingly. At the same time more sophisticated command and control systems will weld these efforts into an integrated whole. (4:33) This 1977 view reflects some of the advances of the past fifteen years: satellites as long range sensors, surface and air launched cruise missiles as long range weapons, and it questions our preconceived ideas on future naval aviation platforms. What combination of large deck carriers and amphibious assault ships will be required to support the our future naval strategy? What mix of aircraft will best support this strategic concept while meeting restrictive fiscal budget constraints? Present reductions in the number of carriers is making it increasingly difficult for planners to support the Unified Commanders' requirements for carrier battle groups. Adaptive Force Packaging is one method whereby a combination of platforms can be tasked organized to meet the CINC's requirements. Procurement of both ships and aircraft should reflect future strategic requirements balanced with fiscal realities. Naval planners must reconsider the traditional concepts of carrier design and capabilities. Current American super-carrier designs displace almost 100,000 tons fully loaded; American naval planners tend to consider 40,000 tons as the minimum size for an aircraft carrier although other countries disagree. Eric Grove studies current and future carrier design in his book The Future of Sea Power: France plans to build new ships that are reported to have full displacement somewhat below this figure...The new design tries to achieve maximum utilizable deck with limited displacement...they will carry between 35 and 40 aircraft with a mix of Rafale based ACM fighter bombers and Helicopters. (5:125) Developing a smaller class of aircraft carriers to work in concert with existing and future multipurpose amphibious ships is an option which would give the Naval Expeditionary Force an additional air, surface, and subsurface capability to complement the amphibious ship's ground attack VSTOL aircraft at a relative cost savings compared to a super-carrier. Although the near future needs of Naval fixed-wing aviation will more than likely be met with conventional carriers utilizing catapults and arresting gear, future shipbuilding which includes more multipurpose platforms such as the LHD will take advantage of VSTOL fixed-wing aircraft. These ships are assigned the secondary or convertible mission of sea control and power projection. (3:5) Improvements in the AV-8B have resulted in a true night attack capability while the addition of a radar system gives the AV-8B a substantial increase in the performance on air- to-air, air-to-ground, and sea-control missions. Congress recently included funding for the building of a sixth LHD amphibious assault ship in the 1993 budget. (8) Will the increased number of VSTOL platforms be met with a corresponding increase in the number of AV-8B squadrons? Currently, the seven AV-8B squadrons would be hard pressed to support deployments on the eleven projected large deck amphibious ships. The present mix of Navy and Marine aircraft is capable of integrating both on the decks of carriers and between the decks of carriers and amphibious ships to meet the needs of the Naval Expeditionary Force. Future procurement will place a high premium on joint aircraft development to reduce research and development cost and increase interoperabllity between the services. While the F/A-18 E/F procurement and the AV-8B re- manufacture appear to have the congressional support needed to extend these programs into the twenty-first century, future Naval aircraft programs such as the AX multimission strike fighter and the STOVL Strike fighter (SSF) are on less solid ground. Currently the Marine Corps is committed to the SSF as a replacement for both the AV-8B and the F/A-18. (11:36) Congress may force Naval aviation's choice between the AX and SSF; this choice will determine the future of conventional carrier and VSTOL aviation. Integrated Training. Training the future Naval Expeditionary Force must focus on increasing Naval aviation's capability to support Marine, Joint, and Coalition forces ashore while maintaining proficiency in anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air warfare. For both Marine and Navy squadrons this means a considerable change in traditional training programs. Although the Marine Corps recently deployed a squadron of AV-8B on the USS Wasp, LHD-1, with a "convertible" mission of sea control, without the long term experience of conventional Navy carrier squadrons the attempts at prosecuting anti-surface warfare would have resulted in steep learning curves at the least. Marine AV-8B as well as F/A-18 squadrons have not had the extensive training required for that highly specialized type of warfare. A recent article in Proceedings emphasizes the difficulties of integrating roles and mission from a Navy squadron perspective: Navy attack squadrons presently spend a very small proportion of their training time practicing battlefield interdiction, close air support, laser spot tracking and strafing. The bulk of Navy attack squadron training is divided between war at sea, suppression of enemy air defenses, long range multi plane attacks and strategic heavy bombing. (6:67) The degree of training and experience required to successfully accomplish these missions may make any proposal to completely integrate Navy and Marine Corps fixed-wing missions-- and not just squadrons--the equivalent of training our squadrons toward mediocre performance at highly specialized task. The high degree of training for pilots in the specialized field of close air support can be cited as a direct cause of the relative lack of friendly fire casualties experienced by Marines supported by Marine fixed-wing aviation. Naval Expeditionary Force training must highlight increased integration of Navy and Marine fixed- wing aviation's inherent capabilities and not change the individual squadron's mission. Cuts in defense spending are often accompanied with increased operation tempo, longer and more frequent deployments, and reduction in funding for training exercises. As our armed forces are reduced under the current budget cuts, the necessity for increase training must be funded if we are to do more with a leaner force. Combined exercises which highlight the interface between carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups and the MAGTF are required. Training can be enhanced by including carrier air groups participation in Marine combined arms exercises and by placing greater emphasis on Naval air integration during joint and combined air exercises. On a tactical level, increased integration of Marine Air Weapons and Tactics squadron and Naval Strike Warfare school is required. Conclusions Defense reduction rumors of the 1980's have become the realities of the 1990's. Admiral Crowe's comments on the problems of security policy and defense structure hold true today: No matter how farsighted and skillful the Navy's leaders are in making the necessary security calculations and in advising their civilian masters, the United States political climate will, in the final analysis, be the critical element in formulating security policy. (4:37) In shaping Naval Expeditionary Forces we must make maximum use of our limited resources to meet national strategic objectives. The integration of Navy and Marine aviation is not a casual disregard of almost seventy years of lessons learned which resulted in two of the world's premier air arms. Integrating capabilities while maintaining specific areas of expertise will produce a more unified force to accept the challenges of the future: shifts in national military strategy and reductions in defense spending. Naval Expeditionary Force Commanders must be able to exploit the capabilities of our remaining fixed-wing assets to the fullest. Changes in doctrine, organization, structure, and training will enable an integrated team of Navy and Marine aviation to better function in support of our Naval Expeditionary Forces. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cheney, Dick. Annual Report to Congress - FY93 January 93. 2. Flintham, Victor. Air Wars and Aircraft. New York, NY: Facts on File, 1990. 3. FMFRP 1-18 Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Data Book. Quantico, VA:Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1991. 4. George, James L. 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