The KRA And Assault Support: A Case For KC-130 Modernization CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The KRA and Assault Support: A Case for KC-130 Modernization Author: Major Anthony B. Pais, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps must modernize its fleet of aging KC-130 aircraft to maintain its expeditionary power projection capability. Background: The KC-130 is an integral element to many functions of the MAGTF. It bridges gaps in capabilities and provides a versatile means of meeting multiple mission requirements across the functional responsibilities of the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), the Ground Combat Element (GCE), and the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). Likewise, while the KC-130 Hercules' flexibility of employment illustrates its enduring utility, its multi-mission capabilities are becoming more relevant to the MAGTF in the current era of declining defense budgets, decreasing forward presence, and increasing global volatility. However, half of the current KC-130 inventory will retire during the 1998 through 2005 time frame. Retirement of the KC-130 "F" without replacement or service life augmentation will result in a critical shortfall in tactical aerial refueling and logistics support to the MAGTF. The Marine Corps would be well served by investing in its KC-130 fleet now to ensure its assault support requirements of the early twenty-first century are met. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should retire its oldest KC-130 airframes, update the remaining inventory, and acquire KC-130 replacement aircraft. THE KRA AND ASSAULT SUPPORT: A CASE FOR KC-130 MODERNIZATION OUTLINE Thesis: In an era of decreased foward presence and increased global volatility, the Marine Corps must modernize its fleet of aging KC-130 aircraft to maintain its expeditionary power projection capability. I. The requirement for the KC-130 A. Force Structure Planning Group B. Marine Aviation Plan C. KC-130 Replacement Aircraft Options 1998-2030 II. No doctrinal home A. Roles and missions B. Doctrinal priorities III. Organizational orphan A. Impact of community leadership B. Tactical asset vice administrative airlift IV. Current perspective A. VMGR missions B. Anticipated future requirements V. Replacement options A. Retirement without replacement B. C-17 tanker C. Service life extension program D. KC-130 "T Plus" THE KRA AND ASSAULT SUPPORT: A CASE FOR KC-130 MODERNIZATION The multi-mission versatility of our KC-130s proved to be the linchpin of Third Marine Air Wing combat effectiveness during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This vital tanker/transport will continue to enhance the warfighting capabilities of our Corps well into the next century. MGen Royal N. Moore USMC Commanding General Third Marine Air Wing (11:12) Assault support provides tactical mobility through the airlift of personnel, supplies, and equipment into or within the battle area by helicopters or fixed wing aircraft. (18:2) The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Master Plan 1992-2002 (MMP) and the Marine Corps Long Range Plan 2000-2020 (MLRP), each dated 28 June 1991, document the continuing and increasing importance of a multi-mission aircraft capable of performing the growing number of fixed-wing assault support missions. The fixed-wing assault support role is currently accomplished by a fleet of 76 (FY 94 projected inventory) KC-130 "F," "R," and "T" model aircraft. The "R" and "T" models are projected to remain in service until 2019 and 2033 respectively. However, 38 of these aircraft (38/76=50%) are KC-130 "F" models due to retire with 40 years of service during the 1998 to 2005 time frame. The KC-130 is the only organic aerial refueler and long range transport available to the MAGTF commander. In an era of decreased foward presence and increased global volatility, the Marine Corps must modernize its fleet of aging KC-130 aircraft to maintain its expeditionary power projection capability. THE REQUIREMENT The KC-130 is an integral element to many functions of the MAGTF. It bridges gaps in capabilities and provides a versatile means of meeting multiple mission requirements across the functional responsibilities of the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), the Ground Combat Element (GCE), and the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) of the MAGTF. The requirement for organic KC-130 assets within the Marine Corps is identified in the 1991 Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) study; the Marine Aviation Plan 1992-2001 (AVPLAN); and in the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) study directive entitled the KC-130 Replacement Aircraft Options 1998-2030 (KRA Study). During August 1991 the FSPG convened to structure a reduced size Marine Corps in compliance with the Department of Defense Base Force Plan. The retirement of the "F" model without replacement and its concurrent manpower reduction was, at first glance, an appealing option. However, due to the anticipated critical shortfall of tactical aerial refueling and logistical support, the commanding generals of the Force Service Support Groups implored MGen Krulak not to reduce the KC-130 structure. As a result, the KC-130 community was the only sector of Marine aviation not cut by the FSPG. Likewise, the AVPLAN projects no reduction in the KC-130 inventory. In fact, the Marine Corps Reserve is scheduled to recieve two new KC-130 "T" models during FY 94 for a projected total of 76 KC-130 aircraft in the Marine inventory. This will round out the active and reserve structure to five operational squadrons and one training squadron. Furthermore, a recent study conducted by the Aviation Weapons Branch at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) projects a stable fleet of 78 KC-130 aircraft will be required to meet future assault support requirements. (11:5) This conclusion is based on the MMP assumption that while the total number of aircraft in the Marine inventory decreases toward the year 2010, the projected acquisition of the Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) and the Marine Attack and Observation aircraft (VMAO) increases the total number of aerial refuelable platforms. The KRA Mission Needs Statement says that there will be no changes in doctrine, tactics, organization or training that will provide non-material alternatives to the projected KC-130 shortfall. (12:4) Finally, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) study directive entitled the KC-130 Replacement Aircraft Options 1998-2030 (KRA Study) states: The aerial refueling/assault air transport requirement can only be satisfied by a modernized platform with warfighting improvements that ensure reliability, survivability, and maintainability. (19:4) Thus the need for the KC-130 within the Marine Corps and its need for modernization is widely documented. Likewise, the recognition of its ability to perform so many missions is a tribute to its enduring utility. However, while the airframes have been continuously overtasked, the Marine Corps has never fully utilized the operational capabilities of its Hercules aircraft. This is in large part due to a lack of doctrinally delineated employment options and, until recently, a general lack of understanding of its role within the MAGTF. NO DOCTRINAL HOME The Marine Corps has always had a difficult time in identifying a doctrinal home for the KC-130. The capability of the Hercules and the reliance the Corps has placed upon its KC-130 aircraft has always far exceeded their doctrinally recognized importance. This is probably due to an enduring suspicion that since the U. S. Air Force jealously guards its Title 10 airlift missions, it has always cast a jaundiced eye on the Marine Corps possession of KC-130 aircraft. In fact, the Corps has always justified its stewardship of its KC-130 aircraft as tactical refuelers - thus the "K" in its designation. Implicitly the Corps has assumed that if it aggressively promoted other uses of its KC-130 aircraft and doctrinally justified them, the Air Force would squawk "roles and missions"- possibly jeapordizing Corps ownership of its KC-130 fleet. Therefore, the many functions the KC-130 performs other than refueling have not been delineated in doctrine. Subsequently, these capabilities have never been fully recognized, funded, developed or utilized. Ironically, during the recent debate on service roles and missions the Air Force was ready to deed its aerial refueling capable HC-130 aircraft to the Marine Corps. (1:III-21) In any case, this is probably not going to occur. (2:III-28) However, the fact that the Air Force did not put a claim on the Marine Corps KC-130 assets is tacit recognition of the integral role the KC-130 plays in MAGTF operations. The February 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States says: The importance of C-130 tactical airlift and [KC-130] tanker support to the armed forces and their operations has not diminished in the current security environment. (2:III-27) FMFM 5-1, Organization and Function of Marine Aviation, and FMFM 5-3, Assault Support, are very unspecific as to what capabilities the KC-130 provides the Marine Corps. In reference to assault support these doctrinal publications are dominated by discussion of helicopter employment. Discussion of the KC-130 is primarily focused on the "K"- that is the refueling aspect of its mission. During its first 15 years of service (1961-1976), the KC-130 mission profile was dominated by transoceanic aerial refueling of fixed wing jet aircraft. With some notable exceptions (e.g. the resupply operations during the Battle of Khe Sahn) the KC-130 had a minor tactical role in Vietnam. When contrasted with the crucial tactical role the helicopter played in Southeast Asia, it is easy to understand why doctrine written circa 1970 is dominated by helicopter employment. Nearly a quarter of a century later the same equipment, albeit updated, is still being used. Likewise, these doctrinal publications do not yet reflect the implications of Foward Presence and Crisis Response outlined in the 1991 National Defense Strategy. In that doctrine is limited to equipment capabilities, this situation does not indict the Corps. Forward thinking officers have already framed future doctrine and equipment development priorities within the concept of long-range, self-deployable, over-the-horizon assault capability. To this end the force-multiplier effect of the KC-130 is germane. The KC-130 multi-mission capbilities should be fully developed and utilized to maximize MAGTF combined arms synergy. ORGANIZATIONAL ORPHAN Just as the KC-130 lacks a doctrinal home, it also lacks an organizational home within Marine aviation. Where exactly does the KC-130 fit for planning, programming, policy, and budget purposes? The Aviation Weapons Branch (APW) at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) places the KC-130 program in the Assault Support division for planning and programming. Within the Aviation Plans and Policy (APP) section the KC-130 program falls under the purview of fighter and attack tactical-fixed-wing action officers. In the past the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) have placed the Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadrons (VMGR) under the Marine Air Control Group and the Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron. Currently, the VMGR squadrons are administratively assigned to fixed-wing and rotary-wing Marine Air Groups but are operationally controlled by the Marine Air Wing. Administratively this discussion is a mute point, but it is indicative of the institutional quandry of "what do we do with the Hercs?" In response, the leadership of the KC-130 community has realized that it must proactively articulate and train to the capabilities of the aircraft. Herein the Herc community must make a home for itself. In this vein, the Training and Readiness Manual ,which outlines aviation training standards, and the KC-130 Tactical Manual, the specific "how-to" tactical employment guide, have been rewritten and expanded to reflect the broader assault support capabilities that the KC-130 can provide. Furthermore, at the 1991 KC-130 Operators Advisory Group conference, the squadron commanders recognized the need to fill crucial acquisition and policy billets in Washington, D. C. to give the KC-130 community a voice "inside the beltway." Currently, field grade officers from the KC-130 community are being rotated into these billets at HQMC, the Pentagon, and at Quantico. Also the community is well represented at the annual Assault Support Symposium whereas before 1990 it was not invited. Concurrently, there is also a strong conviction within the community that the KC-130 is a tactical fixed-wing asset and not "Marine Military Airlift Command." A corresponding change in operational emphasis struggles to prioritize tactical employment and training above routine administrative airlift. This is a constant battle. The band will always need transport and the aircrews will always need tactical training. Both can be accommodated but tactical training should have the overriding priority. It will take nothing less than a full commitment to training to make aircrews capable of operations which fully maximize the aircraft's tactical employment potential. So where does the KC-130 fit into MAGTF operations? Simply stated the KC-130 exists to support the MAGTF. Thus the primary operational focus of the VMGR squadron should be MEU(SOC) support. Long-range-night-vision-capable assault support to the MEU commander is long overdue. These capabilities are technologically and fiscally feasible. Currently, however, KC-130 operational employment priorities are not on the MEU. There are too many administrative airlift commitments and too few "Hercs." This results in the common tendency to sacrifice training in order to meet an administrative logistical commitment. One might say the KC-130 is used in general support of the Marine Corps vice in direct support of the MAGTF. This results in the underutilization of its tactical capabilities. On every level of command the KC-130 community must effectively articulate the value of its organic tactical capabilities in order to ensure that anticipated MAGTF assault support requirements are met. CURRENT PERSPECTIVE It is important to note that the KC-130 is the only aircraft in the Marine inventory involved in each of the six doctrinal functions of Marine aviation. In the Antiair Warfare and Offensive Air Support roles, the KC-130 increases the range and time-on-station of fighter and attack aircraft through aerial refueling. The Air Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Control of Aircraft and Missiles functions are augmented by "roll-in roll-out" modules such as the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and the Senior Warrior electronic intelligence van which are placed in the cargo bay of the KC-130. These airborne capabilities, coupled with the station time of the Hercules, expand the MAGTF commander's operational reach with eyes and ears above the horizon. All of these capabilities, to include helicopter aerial refueling and long-range logistical sustainment, are categorized under Assault Support. These capabilities bridge command and control, intelligence, and logistical shortfalls within the ACE, GCE, and CSSE that would otherwise be provided through agencies exterior to the MAGTF. The Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) mission statement delineates the tasks the KC-130 performs as follows: 1. Tactical aerial refueling for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft 2. Long-range aerial refueling for air-movement of Fleet Marine Force squadrons 3. Air-landed and air-delivered transport of troops, supplies, and equipment 4. Operate to and from established airfields, expeditionary airfields, and tactical landing zones 5. Rapid-ground-refueling (RGR) of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft 6. Evacuation of casualties and non-combatants 7. Provide a platform for airborne command post functions While these assault support tasks have changed little since the acquisition of the KC-130 in 1961, they have expanded and evolved with technology and tactics. The KC-130 was originally purchased primarily as a long-range aerial refueler designed to provide logistical support in secure areas. Over the years, however, the assault support mission envelope has expanded. The KC-130 is now more frequently placed in hostile tactical situations in direct support of the MEU(SOC). Recent examples include Operation Sharp Edge in Liberia and Operation Eastern Exit in Somalia. While careful mission planning substantially decreases direct exposure to known threats, the limitations of the present fleet of KC-130 aircraft severely restrict the tactical employment options available to the MAGTF commander. The tactical limitations of the current KC-130 have become increasingly apparent as the Marine Corps takes on greater expeditionary responsibilities in a volatile post cold-war world. Likewise, the relative importance of the KC-130 to the MAGTF commander has increased. The KC-130 is the only long-range assault support capability organic to the Marine Corps. While its flexibility of employment and mission capability are a testimony to the enduring utility of the KC-130, its present tactical limitations highlight follow-on capabilities crucial to its future viability. The following list provides a general outline of necessary capabilities and survivability modifications: 1. Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS) 2. Forward Looking Infared (FLIR) 3. Heads-up Display (HUD) 4. Defensive electronic and infared countermeasures (DECM/IRCM) 5. Integrated communication and navigation suite to include Satellite Communication (SATCOM) and the Global Positioning System (GPS) 6. Variable Speed (refueling) Drogue (VSD) 7. High speed low-level air-drop capability 8. Improved range performance REPLACEMENT OPTIONS The 1992 Mission Area Analysis 33: Assault Support (MAA-33) study concludes that due to material deficiencies the "Marine Corps possesses a marginal capability to provide the required assault support to the MAGTF of 1999." (18:1) "Part and parcel" to these material deficiencies is the impending retirement of nearly half of the Marine Corps KC-130 fleet. The KC-130 is not specifically mentioned in the MAA-33. This is probably due to the relative near term focus of the analysis. MAA-33 looks out to 1999 which is the same year the projected KC-130 shortfall begins. Specifically mentioned, however, in the MAA-33 analysis is the MLR. Currently the most pressing need in the Assault Support community is a replacement for the aging CH-46. The CH-46 is rapidly approaching 30 years of operational service and has already undergone one service life extension. The airframes are old, dynamic components have marginal rework tolerance, and the maintenance man-hours per full-mission-capable flight hour has climbed almost asymtotically. The similarities between the CH-46 and the KC-130 "F" are replete. So what options can the Marine Corps pursue in order to prevent the KC-130 "F" from turning into another CH-46? The KRA study directive identifies four specific alternatives to be examined: 1. Allow the KC-130 "F" to retire without replacement 2. Develop a C-17 "tanker variant" to replace the KC-130 "F" 3. Institute a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the KC-130 "F" aircraft (SLEP II) 4. Procure an updated KC-130 "T" (KC-130 "T Plus") (19:4) As previously mentioned, under current circumstances retirement of the "F" model without replacement is not a viable option. The FSPG validated the current inventory. Also the anticipated acquisition of the MLR and VMAO dictates a level if not a slightly increased inventory of KC-130 aircraft into the out-years. In any case, wholesale retirement of airframes in the 1998 through 2005 time-frame would necessitate closure of two of the three active duty VMGR squadrons. Presently, this would precipitate a critical shortfall in assault support to the FMF. The next option, acquisition of a C-17 tanker, may be dubbed the "gold-plated giant." The C-17 is cost prohibitive in fiscal terms and in manpower requirements. Furthermore, while technologically feasible, a tanker variant has not been developed. Research and development costs would be in addition to the 300 million dollar unit cost of the baseline C-17. This amount dwarfs the 35 million dollar fly-away cost of Lockheed's updated C-130 "T Plus." Additionally, the C-17 provides strategic inter-theater mobility which is a role much different from and well outside the purview of the KC-130 tactical intra-theater assault support mission. The third option, institution of a SLEP for the "F" model, is not ideal but may be feasible. It should be noted that a SLEP extends airframe life only and due to budgetary limitations only partially remedies the reliability and maintainability factors of airframe longevity. Additionally, it should be noted that the "F" models have already undergone one SLEP. To assess which aircraft would qualify for another SLEP, a service life assessment program (SLAP) would have to be instituted. (9:1) The SLAP would differentiate which airframes are capable of continued service through installation of a structural data recording system (SDRS). This differentiation would be based on a long- term fatigue life assessment and therefore would need to be instituted in the near term to effectively designate airframes to undergo SLEP prior to reaching the 1998-2005 "F" model operational service life retirement window. Additionally, a three-phase Avionics System Improvement Package (ASIP) upgrade is underway. The ASIP program was designed to provide baseline survivability, reliability, and maintainability (SR&M) upgrade for the KC-130 fleet. Additionally, the ASIP does not include any of the necessary survivability modifications - each of which must be individually funded. Furthermore, ASIP was to have been completed by 1993 but due to budgetary constraints will not be complete until 1997. This out-year funding delay runs up against the service life of the "F" model. It is apparent that while cost-effective for upgrading the capabilities of the newer "R" and "T" models, only those "F" models which qualify for SLEP should undergo ASIP. Of equal concern is the material condition of the aircraft. A 30-year-old airplane is like any other aging machine. It requires meticulous attention to chronic problems such as fatigue cracks, corrosion, and dry-rotted wiring. These problems serve to increase the maintenance man-hours per flight hour ratio. Since the SLEP and ASIP only partially forestall "F" model retirement, "a new family car" is also part of the long term solution. In summary, procurement of the KC-130 "T Plus" is the optimal solution. Its acquisition would maximize commonality with the "R" and "T" models and would require no additional manpower. Most importantly, it would incorporate the increased range, payload, survivability, and mobility enhancements outlined above making it fully capable of performing the multi-function assault support mission. Fiscal constraints, however, dictate that the Marine Corps adopt an out-year funding strategy for long-term procurement of replacement aircraft. These new aircraft would replace the "F" model aircraft while "letting the dust settle" to reveal a clearer picture of the true number of KC-130 aircraft required to support the Marine Corps of 2010. CONCLUSION The long-range assault support capabilities of the KC-130 have been crucial in recent operations such as Shard Edge, Eastern Exit, Desert Storm, and most recently in Provide Hope. Much like the primary structural member of a bridge gives it rigidity and strength, the KC-130 is integral to Marine Corps power projection through its force-multiplying, multi-mission capabilities. However, the KC-130 "F" is quickly reaching the end of its operational service life. A replacement must be found to prevent a critical shortfall in assault support. In an era of declining defense budgets new aircraft acquisition will encounter increasing recision. For a relatively small investment though, the Marine Corps could maximize the utilization of its own Hercules fleet by retiring its oldest airframes, updating the remaining inventory, and by acquiring KC-130 replacement aircraft. For the Marine Corps, the sister services, civilian, and foreign military customers there is no replacement for a C-130 except a C-130. It is the "DC-3" of military transport in the last half of the twentieth century and will continue to fill that role well into the next. No the dust has not settled on what the Marine Corps of 2000, much less the Corps of 2010, will look like. In any case, the Marine Corps would be well served by investing in its KC-130 fleet now to ensure its assault support requirements of the early twenty-first century are met. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Preliminary Draft Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States. Washington, D.C., 1992. 2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States. Washington, D.C., 1993. 3. Dabney, Joseph E. HEK: Hero of the Skies. Marietta, Georgia: Larlin Corporation, 1986. 4. Department of the Navy. From the Sea. Washington D. C., 1992. 5. Gaines, Mike. Hercules. London: Janes Publishing Company Limited, 1984. 6. Jareb, Anthony M. Marine Aviation Combat Element 2010: Assault Support Concept of Operations Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, 1991. 7. Joseph, J.F. "Tactical Employment of the Marine Corps KC-130 Into the 1990s." Marine Corps Gazette, October 1990, 39-40. 8. Merskey, Peter B. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation. Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983. 9. Naval Air Systems Command Detachment PMA (F)-226. "C-130 SLAP Study." Cherry Point, N.C., PMA (F)-226 facsimile response to HQMC, APW-91 of 05 Feb 93. 10. Siegel, Adam B. "Lessons Learned From Operation Eastern Exit." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, 75-81. 11. U.S. Marine Corps. "Desert Storm/KC-130 Brief." Washington, D.C.: HQMC, APW-A/565-2/DA/92, 1992. 12. U.S. Marine Corps. Draft Mission Need Statement (MNS) for a KC-13O Replacement Aircraft (KRA). Washington, D.C., HOMC ltr 3900 Ser APW-91 of 03 Dec 92. 13. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 5-3, Assault Support. Quantico, 1979. 14. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 5-1, Organization and Function of Marine Aviation. Quantico, 1991. 15. U S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Master Plan (MMP) 1992-2002. Washington D. C., 1991. 16. U S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP) 2000-2020. Washington, D.C., 1991. 17. U.S. Marine Corps. MCBul 3125, The Marine Aviation Plan for Fiscal Years 1992-2001. Washington, D.C., 1992. 18. U.S. Marine Corps. Mission Area Analysis 33: Assault Support. Quantico, 1992. 19. U.S. Marine Corps. Study Directive: KC-130 Replacement Aircraft Options 1998-2030. Quantico: MCCDC ltr 3900 Ser WF13F of 27 Mar 1992. 20. U.S. Marine Corps. USMC Force Structure Planning Group Study. Quantico, 1991.
