Paradigm Paralysis: Doing More With Less In The Transport Helicopter Community CSC 1993 SUBJECT Area - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Paradigm Paralysis: Doing More with Less in the Transport Helicopter Community Author: Major Christopher E. O'Connor, United States Marine Corps. Thesis: Operating a transport helicopter squadron below 100 percent of its authorized table of organization (T/O) manpower strength is an inefficient, labor intensive way of doing business. The Marine Corps must change its staffing policies and incorporate innovative new ideas to rectify manpower shortages. Background: The Marine Corps has never manned its transport helicopter squadrons at 100 percent T/O. The Marine Corps created staffing goals and manning levels in an attempt to account for personnel shortages; however, these procedures were marginal at best and did not correct the problem. Transport helicopter squadrons still do not have enough personnel, and must rely on enlisted Marines to perform extra duties in order to carry out all their missions. This paradigm of doing more with less has hindered the transport helicopter community and adversely affected enlisted personnel. Recommendation: The Marine Corps must reorganize its staffing policies and incorporate new ideas in order to rectify chronic manpower shortages in the transport helicopter community. PARADIGM PARALYSIS: DOING MORE WITH LESS IN THE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER COMMUNITY OUTLINE Thesis: Operating a transport helicopter squadron below 100 percent of its authorized table of organization (T/O) manpower strength is an inefficient, labor intensive way of doing business. The Marine Corps must change its staffing policies and incorporate innovative new ideas to rectify manpower shortages. I. The Marine Corps has never manned its transport helicopter squadrons at 100 percent of T/O. A. Marine Corps' staffing policy has been inadequate. B. Manning levels have created manpower shortages. C. Operational commitments do not reflect manning levels. D. Manpower shortages adversely affect enlisted Marines. II. Transport helicopter squadron's T/O is inadequate. A. T/O does not allow squadron to conduct peacetime training without augmentation. B. T/O does not support wartime missions. III. Headquarters, Marine Corps must reorganize staffing policies. A. T/Os should be the only criteria used to man squadrons. B. Squadrons must review their T/Os for accuracy. IV. Aerial gunner MOS should be created. A. MOS training would follow a formal training program. B. New MOS would rectify manpower shortages. V. Enlisted ground-air exchange program should be incorporated. A. Program would be an incentive to ground combat Marines. B. Program would enhance the Marine air-ground team. PARADIGM PARALYSIS: DOING MORE WITH LESS IN THE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER COMMUNITY As the Marine Corps enters into the joint arena, there is one problem that has been around for so long that it is now accepted as the status quo. Doing more with less has always been the trademark of the Marine Corps; however, this philosophy has become a paradigm paralysis within the transport helicopter community. Operating a transport helicopter squadron below 100 percent of its authorized table of organization (T/O) manpower strength is an inefficient, labor intensive way of doing business. The Marine Corps must change its staffing policies and incorporate innovative new ideas to rectify manpower shortages. Helicopter squadrons were designed to be manned at 100 percent of their T/O strength. This provides the squadron with an adequate number of mechanics, hydraulics and avionics men, crew chiefs, and other personnel to efficiently maintain the aircraft and operate the squadron. However, as a result of service-wide manpower shortages, Headquarters, Marine Corps had to deviate from T/O manning and established staffing goals. A staffing goal is a Headquarters, Marine Corps reduction to a unit's authorized strength. For example, instead of having eight hydraulics men as per the T/O, the squadron will have seven per the staffing goal. Furthermore, staffing goals are no guarantee that the squadron will receive everyone it rates. The squadron will ultimately be manned by its parent air group. If there are not enough hydraulics men in the group to man every squadron at 100 percent, the squadron will receive less than the number it rates. So instead of eight as per the T/O, or seven as per the staffing goal, the squadron could receive only six hydraulics men as its manning level. This would be a 25 percent reduction in T/O strength. Since the same procedure is applied to each of the enlisted Marine occupational specialities (MOSs), the squadron could find itself drastically short in numerous personnel specialities. When Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (HMLA-169) deployed to Southwest Asia for Operation Desert Shield, the squadron deployed with six less ordnance men than it rated in its T/O. The squadron Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Rodgers, stated in the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) that, Without the proper number of qualified ordnance personnel assigned to this squadron, an increased risk of ordnance safety violations and possible explosive mishaps, could occur during high tempo flight deck and land based operations. (8:15) The Marine Corps Battle Assessment Team further concluded that "a general shortage of skilled personnel was cited by most units." (7:34) A medium lift helicopter transport squadron's PAA (Primary Aircraft Authorized) is 12 aircraft. This figure will not vary, even though the squadron's manning level decreases. Unfortunately, the result is that there is no proportional relationship between the number of aircraft and the number of personnel available to maintain and support them. The squadron's operational commitments do not change as a result of shortfalls in the manning level. Higher headquarters expects a squadron to continue to operate and support all its external exercises and commitments, even though its personnel strength might drop below 85 percent of its T/O. Doing more with less is nothing new; therefore, few commanding officers are comfortable telling their superiors they cannot do the mission with the number of personnel on hand until it becomes extremely obvious. This usually does not occur until the squadron falls below 75 percent of its T/O. The enlisted Marines bear the brunt of reduced manning levels. They are required to compensate for shortages through increased work performance. Twelve-hour days and 6-day workweeks are the norm, rather than the exception. Despite reduced manning levels, normal maintenance requirements still exist, regular periodic maintenance inspections must be performed, and broken aircraft must be repaired. The best leadership in the world will not be able to maintain morale amidst continuous 60-hour workweeks. Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772 (HMH-772) was directed to report aboard the USS Tarawa with minimum personnel for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) and ferry home to the United States. The squadron could only take 50 percent of its maintenance department to service 67 percent of its aircraft. During Operation Sea Angel, squadron maintenance personnel were forced to work 18-hour days for two weeks to support high tempo operations. (5:11) A transport helicopter squadron is allocated 18 crew chiefs for a 12-plane squadron. The majority of the training missions the squadron flies require two enlisted aircrew per aircraft. Terrain flight (TERF), night vision goggle (NVG), and air combat maneuver (ACM) missions require a well-trained crew with a high degree of aircrew coordination. Even if the squadron is manned at 100 percent of its T/O for crew chiefs, it would be unable to conduct such training missions with all its planes. The squadron can train Marines to assist crew chiefs as qualified observers and aerial gunners; however, this requires an extensive training program. So even with a 100 percent T/O fill of crew chiefs, the squadron is undermanned and requires personnel to perform extra duties in order to carry out all its training missions. In combat, the enlisted aircrew requirements increase. The standard aircrew for a combat mission is a crew chief and two aerial gunners. The majority of the transport helicopter squadrons that deployed to Southwest Asia lacked the required number of qualified aerial gunners to man each of their aircraft. As Major Phil Gleason, Aircraft Maintenance Officer of Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 (HMH-462), remarked, "We didn't have anywhere near the required number of qualified aerial gunners when we deployed to SWA."(2:1) The Battle Assessment Team found that "the chronic lack of helicopter aerial gunners, due to severely limited peacetime gunner billets, was corrected by mass training of helicopter gunner candidates."(7:48) Who is to say that next time we will have six months to correct our personnel deficiencies? In order to alleviate manpower shortages, Headquarters, Marine Corps must change its staffing policies. Instead of relying on staffing goals and manning levels, the Marine Corps must return to T/Os as the only criteria for unit manning. This would eliminate staffing procedures that are marginal at best. By returning to T/O manning, a squadron's manpower could be determined by dividing the number of assigned personnel filling T/O line numbers by the total number of personnel listed in the T/O. This would produce an accurate percentage of T/O fill that could be standardized throughout the Marine Corps. No longer would one squadron on the east coast be reporting their manpower status as a percentage of manning level while a west coast squadron reported a percentage of staffing goal. In conjunction with returning to T/O manning, squadrons should be manned at 100 percent of their T/O. Headquarters, Marine Corps, after receiving the mandated end strength from Congress should man each unit at 100 percent of its T/O and eliminate those units that would otherwise be a hollow force. This would more efficiently manage manpower assets and provide all units with enough personnel to accomplish their missions. A squadron's manpower percentage would be allowed to fluctuate plus or minus 20 percent to take into account trainees and transients; however, when the percentage of T/O fill fell below 80 percent the squadron would stand down, as it would not have enough personnel to safely conduct its mission. In a 250- man squadron, this would occur when the squadron fell 50 men short. This policy would mirror the requirement for a squadron to maintain 50 percent of its aircraft in a mission capable status to conduct flight operations. If the squadron fell below 80 percent of its T/O, it would be restricted from conducting flight operations and supporting operational commitments until correcting its manpower shortage. This policy would change the paradigm of doing more with less and prevent enlisted personnel from being continuously overworked. This change would be in accordance with former Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett's statement in the Annual Report to the President and Congress, February 1992: Navy and Marine Corps budget priorities begin today, as we restructure, where they did in the past taking care of our sailors and Marines. Even with fiscal constraints and a smaller Fleet, we cannot allow our personnel readiness to suffer. Our men and women are of the highest caliber and have unsurpassed dedication. ...Maintaining this professionalism along with our training, readiness, and fighting spirit cannot be compromised. (1:122) While the emphasis so far has been on a higher headquarter's policy, squadrons would be responsible for a comprehensive review of their T/Os. Excess billets should be eliminated and critical shortfalls identified. This review would require an honest evaluation of squadron personnel requirements. The Marine Corps' Battle Assessment Team noted that "a thorough study of what units' actual personnel needs (are) in wartime scenario is required." (7:34) and: If train as we fight is an all encompassing scenario that the Marine Corps espouses, then the average squadron T/O needs to be increased to reflect the wartime reality...."(7:51) The result would be T/Os that would enable squadrons to successfully complete all their missions. One critical personnel shortfall that requires immediate attention is the number of enlisted aircrew assigned to a squadron. While a 12-plane squadron rates 18 crew chiefs, it does not rate any aerial gunners or observers. These billets have historically been filled as a collateral duty by enlisted maintenance personnel. In order to fly a combat mission, three enlisted aircrew are required on a transport helicopter: a crew chief and two aerial gunners. This represents a shortfall of 18 aircrew in a 12-plane squadron. Instead of relying on collateral duty personnel, a new MOS for aerial gunners should be created. This would be in line with the Marine Corps' Force Structure Planning Group's goal. Headed by then Major General Charles C. Krulak, "the goal was a concept-based, bottoms-up restructuring of the Corps - a restructuring intent upon providing the Marine Corps with the capabilities to carry out its role...." (4:15) A transport helicopter squadron would rate two aerial gunners per aircraft for a total of 24. These Marines' primary duty would be flying; however, they could also be trained in maintenance- related occupational fields as collateral duties. This change would not take maintenance personnel away from their primary duty of working on helicopters, and it would provide the squadron with the necessary number of personnel to conduct all its peacetime training and wartime missions. The aerial gunner MOS would apply to every helicopter squadron in the Marine Corps. Marines selected for the aerial gunner MOS would attend formal training conducted by a designated Marine air wing or the Aircrew Candidate School at NAS, Pensacola. The training would consist of ground and flight training and would take six to eight weeks to complete. Initial ground training would include aviation physiology and water survival, followed by classes in basic aerial gunnery. Upon completion of the ground syllabus, student aerial gunners would commence flight training. Flight training would incorporate the combat capable stage of training found in the basic aerial gunner/observer syllabus in Marine Corps Order P3500.16A, Aviation Training and Readiness Manual, Volume 3. The student would have seven flights, for 10.5 hours, and be introduced to familiarization maneuvers (FAM), confined area landings (CALs), terrain flight (TERF), night vision goggles (NVGs), and air-to-ground gunnery (AG). The student would be required to fire a minimum of 500 rounds of either .50 caliber or 7.62mm ammunition and would complete the training with a combat readiness percentage (CRP) of 60 percent. Following a successful final evaluation flight, the student would be designated an aerial gunner/observer and receive his aircrew wings. After reporting to his squadron, he would be able to perform observer duties previously introduced in the combat capable stage of training without supervision; however, he would have to complete the combat qualified stage aerial gunnery training prior to firing unsupervised. By implementing a primary aerial gunner MOS, the Marine Corps would rectify a perennial manpower shortage and eliminate the burden squadrons have had in identifying and training aerial gunners. In establishing a school to conduct combat capable training, the Marine Corps would have met the recommendation of the Southwest Asia Battle Assessment Team to simplify training. The Team recommended the following: Aerial gunner qualifications are also in need of simplification and more skins (gunner flight pay) made available to all units to ensure an adequate pool of gunners is available in times of immediate crisis. (7:6) Along with creating a new MOS, an enlisted ground-air exchange training program should be initiated between the division and wing. Selected ground combat Marines would be chosen for a one-year tour with a helicopter squadron as an aerial gunner. The Marines would be prescreened to ensure that they meet all the physical, aviation physiological, and water survival requirements prior to reporting for training. The Marines would attend the helicopter aerial gunnery school for their initial combat capable training prior to reporting to their squadron. The program would be an incentive for young Marines as they would receive crewmember flight pay while in a flight status; and upon successfully completing training, they would be authorized to wear aircrew wings. They would undergo the same advanced training in the combat ready, combat qualification, and full combat stages that is outlined in the Aviation Training and Readiness Manual, Volume 3 for aerial gunners/observers after they reported to their squadron. The program would provide a unique opportunity for ground Marines to gain first-hand knowledge about the intricacies and working conditions within the wing, and enhance the concept of the Marine air-ground team. It's time for a change. Paradigm paralysis has resulted from doing more with less, and has outlived whatever usefulness it once had. Innovative new ideas, together with changes in the Marine Corps' manning policies, are essential as the Marine Corps enters into the 21st century. Marines are the Corps' most important resource, and they must be given the proper training, resources, and necessary manpower to perform their mission. They should not be the ones to bear the burden of inefficient management. As the Commandant said in his speech at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in September 1992, "We must be a relevant, ready, and capable Corps." The policy changes and innovative programs discussed herein will ensure the Marine Corps' transport helicopter community is ready to meet the challenges of an uncertain world. Implementing these ideas will take aggressive leadership. As David Hackworth remarked, "The Pentagon has few leaders with vision who have the guts to bring the reforms that would blast our armed forces from the past." (3:176) Marine leaders have always met their challenges; it's time to destroy this paradigm which has hindered the transport helicopter community. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cheney, Dick. Annual Report to the President and Congress FY 92. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. 2. Gleason, Major Phil. Personal interview about personnel shortages during Operation Desert Storm. Quantico, Virginia, 4 February 1993. 3. Hackworth, David. "Nuke the Pentagon." Playboy, 40(January 1993), 118-120, 176-177. 4. Krulak, Major General Charles C. "A Corps of Marines for the Future: Relevant, Ready, Capable." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, 14-15. 5. Miller, Lieutenant Colonel. "Personnel Shortages, Operation Sea Angel." MCCLS Number 53143-97768. Quantico, 1991. 6. Mundy, General Carl E. Concepts and Issues: United States Marine Corps 1992. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1992. 7. Roberts, Major M. A. Battle Assessment Team Southwest Asia Aviation Study. Quantico, 15 June 1991. 8. Rodgers, Lieutenant Colonel. "Personnel Shortages, Operation Desert Shield." MCLLS Number 32108-16703. Quantico, 1991. 9. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. Aviation Training and Readiness Manual, Volume 3, MCO P3500.16A. Washington, D.C., 20 March 1991. 10. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Air Group 16, Marine Corps Air Station Tustin. Helicopter Aerial Gunnery Training.
