". . . From The Sea:" Future Role Of The F/A-18 In The Marine Air-Ground Team CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: ". . . From The Sea:" Future Role of the F/A-18 in the Marine Air-Ground Team Author: Major W. J. Miles, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation, specifically the F/A-l8 Hornet community, will experience fundamental changes in its ability to support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as Marine strike-fighter squadrons adapt to the future naval concept of operating from the sea. Background: Dramatic changes in the world are forcing the United States to reevaluate its national security strategy. Downsizing Navy and Marine Corps force structure is the logical step to maintain consistency with a national security policy that reflects more emphasis on regional security requirements. The Department of the Navy's white paper ". . . From The Sea" defines the future of naval operations in terms of littoral operations projecting combat power, shifting from open ocean warfare to joint operations, from the sea. The MAGTF and its organic F/A-18 aviation assets combine strategic mobility and diversity with independent operational capability. The Marine F/A-18 community, with its expeditionary and flexible character is a vital component to the Marine Air-Ground team and integral to projecting power from the sea. Ultimately, changes in force structure, organization, and training requirements associated with the integration of Marine F/A-18s into carrier air wings, will affect Marine aviation's ability to support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Recommendations: The Navy and Marine Corps must carefully consider the ". . . From The Sea" concept as they restructure the forces to maintain the combat capabilities of a future naval expeditionary force composed of elements of the Navy and Marine Corps team. ". . . FROM THE SEA:" FUTURE ROLE OF THE F/A-18 IN THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM OUTLINE Thesis: Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation, specifically the F/A- 18 Hornet community will experience fundamental changes in its ability to support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as Marine strike-fighter squadrons adapt to the future naval concept of operating from the sea. I. ". . . From The Sea" A. Historical background B. Concept of littoral operations II. Marine Aviation Capabilities A. Strategic mobility B. Strategic diversity C. Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) relationship III. Advantages A. Smaller force structure B. Retained capabilities C. Combined forward presence with expeditionary capabilities D. F/A-18 integration IV. Assumptions A. United States commands the seas B. Future joint/combined operations V. Disadvantages A. Historical carrier littoral operations B. Hollow force C. U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt adaptive force planning VI. F/A-18 Tactical Considerations A. Navy air wing integration B. Training 1. Carrier work-up 2. Individual training vs block training 3. Training officers VII. Conclusion A. Decreased training and readiness B. MAGTF viability C. ". . . From The Sea" a beginning ". . . FROM THE SEA:" FUTURE ROLE OF THE F/A-18 IN THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM Dramatic changes in the world are forcing the United States to reevaluate its national security strategy. The apparent fall of the Soviet Union and with it, the demise of worldwide communist competition, places a higher priority on restructuring U.S. military forces. Downsizing the force makes sense and is consistent with a national security policy that reflects more emphasis on regional security requirements and less emphasis on challenging a non-existent global threat. At the same time, domestic challenges in the U.S. consisting of fiscal austerity, education, drug abuse, and the reality of a new political party in the White House places pressure on our military leaders to "cut the fat." We must shape our forces to meet the challenges of an unstable world with regional focus, not solely by downsizing, but by restructuring U.S. military forces without losing capability. (1:1-2) The restructuring of U.S. military forces will significantly affect the way the Navy and Marine Corps operate and define their future roles and missions. Emphasis on joint operations will be a key factor in the success of implementing combat power from the sea. Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation will be no exception. Fundamental changes being implemented will affect the way Marine pilots train and execute their missions. An increased emphasis on carrier operations is a reality and will influence the way Marine aviators do business, just as it influences Navy pilots who consistently operate at sea. Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation, specifically the F/A-18 Hornet community, will experience fundamental changes in its ability to support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as Marine strike-fighter squadrons adapt to the future naval concept of operating from the sea. ". . . From The Sea" is the U.S. Navy's and Marine Corps' conceptual answer to the challenges of a changing global and domestic environment. Lieutenant Colonel Alan P. Heim, USMC, writes in a December 1992 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings entitled ". . . From The Sea: Steady as She Goes." ". . . From The Sea" is an effort to change the course of naval strategy, articulating the role of the naval services in the new, uncertain security environment. It returns naval focus to their expeditionary environment. They will be organized, trained, and equipped to exert a positive influence on global events in peacetime, and to project power, as a key component of a joint and combined team during conflict. The key elements of Lieutenant Colonel Heim's observation are the organization, training and equipment of Navy and Marine forces. These elements will influence the U.S. Naval forces ability to execute a national security strategy of forward presence and crisis response. Consequently, the ability of Marine fixed-wing aviation to complement the MAGTF and enable the Marine air-ground team to accomplish its mission will also be influenced. Questions concerning future F/A-18 fixed-wing organization, training requirements, aircraft, and associated weapons systems must be answered. The concept, based on littoral operations, is the result of unchallenged control of the high seas. The decline of the Soviet Navy allows naval strategists to concentrate on the more complex littoral areas of the world, shifting from open ocean warfare to joint operations, from the sea. (1:1) Littoral operations bring unique requirements to the Navy and Marine Corps team. The Navy must shift from a mindset of a blue water navy. The Marine Corps must realize that the basic expeditionary nature of its forces will remain the same, but the structure of those forces and the deployment requirements placed on them will see change as the Marine Corps redefines its roles and missions. The Navy and Marine Corps are no longer separate components coming together to occasionally execute amphibious operations. Instead, both services will work together, jointly, forming a Naval Expeditionary Force ready to meet challenges in every region of the world. Marine Corps fixed-wing F/A-18 Hornets are an integral part of the ". . . From The Sea" concept. Understanding Marine aviation capabilities and its contribution to our national security is critical when debate focuses on downsizing and redefining roles and missions. Marine aviation enhances national security by providing strategic mobility to the MAGTF. (8:par 3005C(1)) The unique expeditionary character of Marine aviation allows for quick crisis response to various regional areas. Marine pilots train as naval aviators and qualify to operate from shipboard platforms. The ability to operate from the deck of a carrier gives the Navy and Marine Corps team flexibility with respect to its role as a component of the MAGTF concept or a supplement to the carrier air wing. The F/A-18's multi-role capability lends itself to both joint and combined operations in any theater. Marine aviation's contribution of strategic mobility to the MAGTF enhances U.S. national security and complements the concept of projecting combat power from the sea. Strategic diversity will be integral to the ". . . From The Sea" concept. (8:par 3005C(2)) The Navy and Marine Corps white paper defines the new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps team. The team will provide naval expeditionary forces that operate from the sea. These forces will be shaped for joint operations and tailored for national needs. (1:2) Marine aviation units, regardless of mission, tailor themselves to respond to any particular military situation. Task organizing to respond to various mission requirements is a fundamental character of Marine aviation. Integrated training with Marine ground organizations facilitates the team concept between all aviation units and Marines on the ground. An intense individual training approach, especially in the F/A-18 community, produces weapons and air combat tactics experts capable of operating in any geographical area and responding to any threat situation. Lastly, forward deployed aviation units provide worldwide regional expertise and forward presence. The strategic diversity of the Marine F/A-18 community and its ability to tailor itself to respond to changing military situations, integrate as a team with ground units, provide itself with tactical experts with its own intense individual training, and routinely deploy to forward locations, makes the Marine strike-fighter community a logical component to the ". . . From The Sea" concept. Understanding the unique relationship of Marine aviation to the overall MAGTF concept is prerequisite to comprehending the MAGTF's contribution to national security. Marine aviation is a critical element which allows the MAGTF to operate independently. (8:par3005C(3)) Marine aviation gives the MAGTF the capability of fighting as a self-contained force able to respond to any national security crisis. The MAGTF commander can use his aviation component to project power and shape the battlefield. MAGTF's with their unique self-contained aviation capability, may operate independently in all airborne assault phases. Finally, Marine aviation provides flexibility to the fleet/theater commander so that he may employ the MAGTF independently as an integrated joint or combined force. Marine aviation as part of the MAGTF is vital to the existence of the Marine Air-Ground team. The importance of Marine ground forces is unquestionable with respect to maintaining a Marine Corps. Just as evident is the importance to maintain Marine aviation organic to the Marine Corps to facilitate the MAGTF. ". . . From The Sea" requires naval expeditionary forces that can maintain forward presence and respond to regional crises. The MAGTF and its organic F/A-18 aviation assets combine strategic mobility and diversity with independent operational capability. The Marine F/A-18 community, with its expeditionary and flexible character, is a vital component to the Marine Air- Ground team and integral to projecting power from the sea. There are several advantages to gain from adopting the concept ". . . From The Sea." Fiscal realities will require a smaller force structure and ". . . From The Sea" lays the groundwork for a new focus. Smaller force structure will require that naval expeditionary forces to maintain capabilities in keeping with a new national security strategy. The focus will be on ways to tailor U.S. Naval forces to be efficient and responsive to U.S. security needs. The document lays the foundation so that the Navy and Marine Corps can direct doctrine and establish force structure. ". . . From The Sea" is the blueprint for fundamental changes in the way the Navy will approach warfare. The concept of power from the sea illustrates the Navy's responsiveness to a changing world and at the same time serves to justify the continued existence of Naval forces, specifically Naval aviation and aircraft carriers. Tough realities exist for Navy planners that may include less carrier air wings and aircraft. How will the Navy justify its force structure or make up for potential losses in assets? ". . . From The Sea" allows the Navy to take advantage of the obvious forward presence of deployed fleets and combine that with the expeditionary nature of the MAGTF. The Navy sees an opportunity to use Marine Corps aviation assets, specifically the F/A-18, while it downsizes its own forces. ". . . From The Sea" solidifies the Navy and Marine Corps team into a capable and responsive naval expeditionary force. With integrated Navy and Marine Corps carrier air wings, ". . . From The Sea" implies that Marines on the ground will have all the aviation assets they require. The concept of littoral operations makes two assumptions. The first suggests the United States commands the seas. The decline of the Soviet Navy into fragments of non-operational fleets commanded by leaders of Russia and the Ukraine suggests sea-power dominance by the U.S. Navy is one result of winning the Cold War. This assumption has some strategists believing that blue water operations are gone forever. Such a belief may be presumptuous. A drastic change in doctrine, adopting littoral operations as the only future of naval warfare, may leave the U.S. with a force structure ill-prepared to face the resurgence of a global threat Navy. Second, ". . . From The Sea" emphasizes joint operations as if to suggest that all future operations will be joint or combined in nature. Although joint operations consistently prove their worth, the concept carries a price. The potential cost lies with losing the capability to function as independent warfighting units, a historic strength of naval forces and the MAGTF. To assume that the ". . . From The Sea" concept of littoral warfare will ensure uninterrupted aviation support for the Marines on the ground is questionable to say the least. Historical examples such as Guadalcanal, and most recently the Navy's initial reluctance to operate carriers in the Persian Gulf to support Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations, sends a signal that a fundamental mind set change on the part of the Navy must take place. (11:274-278) The Navy proved that aircraft carriers can operate in littoral regions, but it is extremely premature to assume that the Navy is willing to sacrifice a carrier or its air wing to support the MAGTF. When the threat environment is high and the tactical situation requires the carrier to withdraw to the safety of blue water, what will happen to the Marines' air support? Is the carrier willing to send its aircraft to the beach and steam away-with an open deck? These questions seek answers that define the future viability of the MAGTF. Downsizing and an emphasis on littoral operations may lead to a hollow force. Some will suggest that the Marine F/A-18 community should be absorbed into the Navy. To separate the air component from the MAGTF will render the Marine Corps ground element impotent. A Marine Corps without aviation questions the need to have another light infantry force that is less capable than the Marine Corps' counterpart in ground warfare, the Army. The U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, with its special purpose MAGTF, currently steams to the Mediterranean with too few Marines to really make a significant tactical difference. The price to pay takes the form of one less S-3 and F-14 squadron each, making the carrier itself less capable of conducting its mission. The U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt also takes with her a Marine F/A-18 Hornet squadron to illustrate full Navy and Marine Corps aviation integration. This exercise in adaptive force planning deploys two elements of the Navy and Marine Corps team that have less capability than either of the two elements when deployed separately. Efforts to show that the Navy and Marine Corps can accomplish more with less, combined with budget realities (the real driving force to future force structure), may give strategists a naval expeditionary force that is ill-equipped, undermanned, and lacking the mind set to conduct war at or from the sea. (9:47) Tactically, what effect will increased shipboard operations have on the Marine F/A-18 community and its ability to support the MAGTF concept? Post-Cold War era realities and a concept that advocates power from the sea will find Marine F/A-18 strike- fighter squadrons on board Navy carriers with increasing frequency. Integration into the carrier air wing will present the ultimate training challenge to Marine aviation: landing aboard a Navy carrier. At the same time, Marine officers will experience inherent training problems associated with shipboard operations. Marine Corps aviation training, which includes the Air Combat Tactics Instructor (ACTI) qualification produces strike- fighter aviators who are tactically more proficient than their Navy counterparts (Navy Fighter Weapons School [TOPGUN] opinion that compares Navy and Marine Corps aviators with similar operational flight time). The difference in pilot proficiency results from training. Shipboard operations drive the Navy's training matrix. The more time a Marine F/A-18 squadron spends attached to a sea going air wing, the less time to train the individual pilot. As the Navy and Marine Corps reshape their forces for the post-Cold War era, Marine Corps F/A-18 strike- fighter pilots will see increased integration into carrier air wings. Increased integration of Marine Corps tactical aviation into carrier air wings will have an inherently detrimental effect on Marine fixed-wing aviation training and readiness. A decrease in training and readiness levels will ultimately affect a squadron's ability to fully support the MAGTF and in turn, affect the MAGTF's ability to support U.S. national security strategy. When a squadron comes under the operational control of the carrier air wing, an intense work-up period begins. Pilots spend any hours conducting field carrier landing practice. These "bounce periods" are flown mostly at night and constitute a considerable number of the available training sorties. Factors such as crew rest and field availability will limit the amount of tactical training that a squadron training officer can accomplish. The 2-to 3-week work-up evolution will culminate in initial day/night qualifications. Once the air wing qualifies, a series of at-sea periods begin. These periods last from just a few days to 1 or 2 months, culminating in a 5-to 7-month deployment. Typically, training and readiness levels begin to decline from the beginning of work-ups through the deployment phase. Navy fighter squadrons, long accustomed to the demands of shipboard operations, invest heavily in the squadron training officer. TOPGUN graduates will form the core of a typical fighter squadron's training program. Unfortunately, shipboard commitments supersede the training officers capability to increase tactical proficiency. Availability of aircraft and parts, coupled with air wing training requirements while shore- based, compounds the training officer's ability to execute the training matrix. Therefore, individual pilot training will give way to a block training approach. Block training allows the squadron to train as a unit rather than concentrate on the individual pilot. In theory, the block training approach enhances a training officer's ability to take advantage of limited training time and available assets. Block training helps a squadron become fully combat qualified. Unfortunately, the block training approach is designed for meeting the minimum acceptable standards. These minimum standards fall short of the readiness levels that typical Marine fighter-attack squadrons strive to attain. The discrepancy results from Marine squadrons historically spending less time on board ships and having more time to devote to individual training. As Marine F/A-18 squadrons become more integrated into carrier air wings, training officers will have fewer opportunities to rely on individual pilot training for maintaining tactical proficiency. Typical carrier launch and recovery cycles do not facilitate quality training. Fuel becomes the critical factor that dictates what the crew can accomplish before the recovery cycle begins. External fuel tanks will increase the fuel available, but the extra drag associated with these tanks makes air combat training unrealistic. (Fuel tanks will normally be jettisoned in an actual dogfight.) Carrying extra fuel tanks also results in airframe restrictions that inhibit the pilot's ability to fully maneuver his aircraft. Shipboard launch and recovery cycles do not allow aviators to fly their aircraft to its maneuvering limits. The result is a decrease in air combat skills. The same problem exists for the air to ground capable aircraft aboard ship. Downsizing the naval force will find fewer guns available for Naval Gun Fire Support (NGFS), therefore the training emphasis must be on Close Air Support (CAS). Marine Corps aviation prides itself on being the experts of CAS. Increased operations in littoral areas and power projection from the sea requires even more proficiency in CAS for both Navy and Marine Corps pilots. Lastly, the basis that forms the training core of the typical Navy and Marine Corps squadron is the training officer. In Navy squadrons, training officers are typically TOPGUN graduates. Marine F/A-18 squadrons pattern their training around a training officer that is TOPGUN, Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI), and ACTI qualified. The training officer cannot train the squadron alone. Both Navy and Marine Corps training officers rely extensively on TOPGUN and ACTI graduates to administer the training program. Typical shore-based Marine F/A-18 squadrons receive one TOPGUN quota or one WTI quota or both every 12 months. Navy squadrons, because of shipboard rotations, receive one TOPGUN quota every 18 months. Increased Marine F/A-18 shipboard integration will increase the time between available advanced tactical training quotas. Increased time between available quotas will make it increasingly difficult to maintain the training base that most Marine fighter-attack squadrons have become accustomed to having available. The result will be less emphasis on individual training. The loss of training expertise will manifest itself in an overall decrease in the training and readiness of Marine strike-fighter squadrons and ultimately influence the MAGTF's ability to fully project power from the sea. Decreased training and readiness of Marine F/A-18 squadrons will be detrimental to the MAGTF concept. If Marine aviation can no longer accomplish the mission, another service may fill the void. Potential integration of Marine F/A-18 Hornets into the Navy will separate the air from the MAGTF leaving only a Marine ground element with its associated combat service support with no airborne supporting arm. The true MAGTF will no longer exist. The Navy and Marine Corps must take care as they pursue the ". . . From The Sea" concept to not restructure the forces in a way that will lessen the combat capability of a future naval expeditionary force composed of elements of the Navy and Marine Corps team. ". . . From The Sea" represents a beginning. Careful attention to the details of downsizing and the shaping of future roles and missions will dictate what capabilities the Navy and Marine Corps team will have to support United States national security policy. Recognizing potential training deficiencies and changing the mindset of a blue water Navy will put increasing emphasis on imagination to find ways to restructure but maintain capabilities. As the naval force is restructured to reflect the concept of power from the sea, Marine F/A-18 strike-fighter squadrons will experience fundamental changes in organization and training that will effect their ability to support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. ". . . From The Sea," September 1992. 2. Byron, Captain John L. "Tough Questions for a New Navy." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1992: 70-71. 3. Harringan, Anthony. Letter to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1993: 20. 4. Hastings, Major Thomas M. "A Marriage Made at Sea." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1992: 59-64. 5. Heim, Lieutenant Colonel Alan P. ". . . From The Sea: Steady As She Goes." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1992: 26-27. 6. Mackey, First Lieutenant William J. "Marine Air in CAG's." Marine Corps Gazette, January 1993: 7. 7. Miller, Admiral Paul David. "Doing the Job with a Smaller Fleet." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1992: 54-59. 8. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. "The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, FMFM 1-2. Washington, D.C., 1991. 9. Valentino, Major Anthony, Executive Officer VMFA-312. Personal interview about F/A-18 training while attached to the carrier air wing. Beaufort, South Carolina, March 6, 1993. 10. Vlahos, Michael. "And the Politics of Change." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1992: 47. 11. Weeks, Stan. "Crafting a New Maritime Strategy." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1992: 30-36. 12. Weigley, Russell F. The Aierican Way of War. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977.
