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The Time Has Come For The Advanced Assault Amphibian
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
The Time Has Come For the Advanced Assault Amphibian
Major T.E. McDonough                 Conference Group 10
                         EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:   The Time Has Come For The Advanced Assault Amphibian
Author:  Major Timothy E. McDonough, U.S. Marine Corps
Thesis:  The Marine Corps needs to replace its current
assault amphibian vehicle, the AAV7A1, and needs to field a
system that provides the Marine Corps with an over-the-
horizon (OTH), high speed, assault capability.
Backround:  For over 45 years assault amphibian vehicles
have provided the Marine Corps with its surface assault
capability.  The AAV7A1 is a product improved version of a
vehicle first fielded in 1972.  It was designed to be an
amphibious armored personnel carrier capable of landing the
surface assault element of the landing force from assault
shipping to inland objectives.  Developed using 1960's
technology, the AAV7A1's high silhoutte, slow water speed
and overland cruising speeds, and inadequate armor
protection, will severly limit its survivability in the 21st
Recommendation:  The Marine Corps should vigorously pursue
the Advanced Assault Amphibian.
Thesis:  The Marine Corps needs to replace its current
assault amphibian vehicle, the AAV7A1, and needs to field a
system that provides the Marine Corps with an over-the-
horizon(OTH), high speed, assault capability.
I.    The strategic role of amphibious forces in the future
      A.  What threats will these forces encounter?
      B.  What missions will Marine forces perform?
      C.  Why do we need an amphibious assault capability?
II.   Evolution of the Assault Amphibian Vehicle
      A.  World War II
      B.  Korea
      C.  The AAV7A1
III.  The Advanced Assault Amphibian (AAA) Program
      A.  In search of alternatives
      B.  Slow Speed Amphibians
      C.  High Speed Amphibians
      D.  Non-Amphibians
      E.  Cost effectivness
  As the war in the Persian Gulf so vividly demonstrated,
the essential demands of our military forces--to deter
conflict whenever possible but to prevail in those that do
arise--are certain to endure.  The forward presence of our
warfighters provides the conduit in our alliance
relationships and signals that, if required, we're prepared
to defend our national interests with military action.
  As we enter a period of declining defense budgets, debates
will rage on the viability of sea-based forces and
amphibious doctrine to cope with future threats.  For the
Navy, the handwriting is on the seawall.  The National
Military Strategy outlines a "Base Force" consisting of 450
ships and cuts will continue beyond this level for the
foreseeable future(2:120).  Critics warn that this
downsizing seriously compromises America's maritime
  The New World Order, whatever it implies for military
strategy and required forces, is going to mandate an
effective integration of our nation's maritime projection
forces-- a robust Navy and Marine Corps team.  This new
direction has been outlined in "From the Sea", a Navy and
Marine Corps White Paper.  The mission of sea-based forces
has been redefined to reflect the new environment.  Naval
forces will now concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver
from the sea.
  For the past 45 years,the Assault Amphibian Vehicle, or
AAV, has provided Marine infantry the means to conduct
surface-borne amphibious assaults.  Launched from amphibious
ships, AAVs transport Marines to shore and once ashore,
provide them armor protected mobility.  The current AAV is
nearing the end of its planned service life and the Marine
Corps needs to field a system that provides Marines with an
over-the-horizon(OTH), high speed, assault capability.
Before examining the requirement to field a follow-on
vehicle, the following topic areas need to be addressed:
  --What strategic role will Naval amphibious forces play in
    the future?
  --What threats will these forces encounter?
  --What missions will Marine forces perform?
  --Why do we need an amphibious assault capability
  The United States is the preeminent maritime power in the
world today.  With the end ot the Cold War, the Soviet Union
dismantled, and new nation states struggling for their
identity in the community of nations, our world is
undergoing unprecedented change.  Despite the prospects of
world peace, our National Military Strategy continues to
rest on strategic deterrence, forward presence, and crisis
response(2:7).  In the future, changes will have to be made
in the way we execute this strategy.  As we have already
seen in the Philippines, the possibility of diminished
access to foreign bases and overflight rights is virtually
certain.  As a result, control of the sea will assume even
greater significance(5:1).
  Any future conflict which requires U.S. military
intervention will likely involve the movement of forces and
equipment across key sea lines of communication.  More than
95% of all the material for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM
came by ship(6:14).  We must be able to deploy substantial
forces and sustain them in parts of the world where
prepositioning of equipment will not always be feasible,
where bases are not available, and where there is a less
developed economic base to support our forces once they have
  Given the decreasing global support for U.S. basing and
overflight rights, Naval forces may be the only military
capability available to national security decision-makers in
time of crisis.  A review of the over 200 instances of U.S.
military interventions since World War II indicates 80%
involved the use of Naval forces(9:30).  Forward deployed
Naval forces deter conflict and provide the national Command
Authority with a variety of power projection options.  Self-
sufficient, combined arms forces that can deploy rapidly and
loiter near or over the horizon from potential crisis spots
will deter belligerent acts and provocations(6:12).
  Our Navy-Marine Corps team represents a flexible force in
readiness who's aggregate usefulness to our nation includes:
  --Employment options across the spectrum of conflict--
    from peacetime presence to regional war
  --Ability on short notice to deploy to a wide range of
    geographically dispersed areas
  --A forcible entry capability when required
  Without a strong-maritime power projection capability, the
U.S. will not be able to protect its vital interests--
ensuring sea lines of communications remain open and access
to the littorals of nations important for strategic
resources and commerce is maintained.
  The current world situation makes it difficult to fully
assess and project the threat to U.S. interests in the 21st
century.  Since the end of World War II, the global
situation has evolved around the balance of power between
the U.S. and what was the Soviet Union.  However, nearly all
conflicts occurred in the Third World--a trend which is
continuing today.  In the past, the U.S. and Soviet Union
could influence the resolution of regional wars through the
use of various diplomatic and economic sanctions.  But, the
Soviet Union is now a loose coalition of separate nation
states; all are experiencing tremendous financial
difficulties and many have political instability.
  As the 21st century nears,the risks of war, including
nuclear confrontation, between the so-called superpowers are
receding.  However, a new period of international frictions,
tensions, and conflict is rapidly unraveling.  This period
will see a realignment of interests, new alliances, and new
forms and causes of violence including territorial disputes,
economic disputes between rich and poor, and disputes over
access to the world's resources(2:15).  In short, we may not
be looking at a kinder, gentler world.
  As economic problems worsen, stockpiles of sophisticated
weaponry become sources of revenue and their export to Third
World countries will increase.  As a result, qualitative
differences in military capabilities between the Third World
and traditional powers will likely decrease.  A few dozen
Third World countries now have advanced anti-ship missiles,
mines, and submarines-- more can get them.
  A new arms race is underway!  Iran is buying Russian subs
in an attempt to control the Straits of Hormuz.  Saudi
Arabia, in turn wants to buy more F-15E fighters.   Most
disturbing are accounts that various republics of the former
Soviet Union have started peddling conventional weaponry
wherever there is hard currency.  And, with our own defense
budget falling, American arms salesmen are prowling for
  Threat forces of the future will have many similarities.
Common threads in capabilities may include:
  --More sophisticated surveillance and intelligence
    gathering equipment
  --Increased lethality and range of weapons
  --Enhanced ground and air mobility (2:19)
  Sophisticated surveillance and targeting systems can bring
formerly secure areas into the battle area and achieving
tactical surprise may be increasingly more difficult for our
forces.  Each year the weapons of war become more accurate,
destructive, numerous, and available.  High-tech precision
guided weapons will proliferate the battlefield.
Additionally, the widespread use of man-portable
antiaircratt weapons may reduce our air mobility which will
place increased emphasis on forcible entry by surface means.
  Amphibious forces will try to avoid enemy strengths and
seek opportunities to exploit weaknesses.  To achieve the
element of surprise, we need mobility assets sufficient to
maneuver our forces on a battlefield where speed equates to
  The emphasis on maritime strategy and power projection
from the sea will continue to focus the Marine Corps on
maintaining quick-hitting, self-sustaining forces capable of
conducting operations at all levels of conflict.  The
increased emphasis on combat power projection from the sea
brings into sharp focus the continuing importance of
"soldiers of the sea."(6:14)
  Marine Corps operational forces are expeditionary,
combined arms, air-ground task forces(MAGTF).  The value of
the MAGTF is measured in terms of presence, potential, and
power.  Strategically mobile and immediately available,
MAGTFs are capable of performing a wide variety of missions
from special maritime operations to joint and combined
operations.  Noncombatant evacuation, in-extremis hostage
rescue, humanitarian assistance and amphibious raids are
examples of the types ot diverse missions which the MAGTF
can execute.
  The MAGTf is tailored to meet specific mission
requirements.  Infantry, armor, artillery, air, and combat
service support assets are organized under the command and
control of one commanaer.  It is this unique integration of
warfighting capabilities which allows a Naval amphibious
task force to rapidly and decisively project combat power
ashore.  Rapid, flexible deployment of task organized units
will be the hallmark of the conventional capability needed
into the next century(7:24).  No other U.S. military force
combines equivalent levels or forcible entry capability,
combat power, and staying power than a MAGTF.
  An offensive forcible entry capability requires this
nation be prepared to conduct operations on short notice to
protect national interests.  It is in this context that the
requirement to project amphibious forces anywhere in the
world remains a vital capability in support of the national
security strategy.
  The Marine Corps has a statutory responsibility
to,".. develop in coordination with the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, the doctrine, tactics, and equipment employed by
landing forces in amphibious operations(4:1-1).  Amphibious
forces can provide a peacetime presence and political
leverage without necessarily being committed ashore.  When a
landing is necessary, the amphibious assault exemplifies the
essence of maneuver warfare-- warfare where speed and
flexibility are the cornerstones of winning.  The amphibious
assault concentrates superior combat power at a critical
time and place to achieve tactical surprise and a favorable
force ratio over an opposing force.
  One need only recall the events of the Persian Gulf to
counter those that say the amphibious assault has gone the
way of the buffalo.  An amphibious assault was planned
during operation Desert Storm as a means of tying down six
Iraqi divisions.  Fourth and Fifth Marine Expeditionary
Brigades were poised and ready on 24 February to initiate
the first amphibious assault since Inchon.  The threat from
the sea not only tied down Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti
coast, it in no small way contributed to the success of the
ground assault by coalition forces into Kuwait.
  In addition to Kuwait, Marines were prepared to exercise
the amphibious assault option in Panama.  Because the U.S.
had overflight rights and secure bases to land at, an
assault from the sea was not necessary.  The important point
is we had the option.  Flexibility was the key to achieving
military success in Panama as well as Kuwait.
  After World War I, when events in the Pacific pointed to
the possibility of war, Marines developed the amphibious
warfare concepts than were the foundations for U.S. and
Allied victories in World War II.  During the war, before
the advent of the helicopter, the surface assault was the
only option available for Marines to move from ship-to-
shore.  Drawing upon conventional infantry tactics, the
concept of ship-to-shore movement stressed dispersion and
  The Marine Corps' primary means of projecting the landing
force ashore was the Amphibious Tractor.  Affectionately
known as "Alligators", these vehicles were launched from
amphibious ships between five and ten thousand yards from
the landing beaches.  Swimming at speeds of five to eight
knots, the "Alligators" were able to transport men and
supplies over reefs and other obstacles through the use of
tracks and water propulsion units.
  Vulnerable to mines and small arms fire, the amphibious
tractors nevertheless proved indispensable in providing
Marines the requisite mobility to win at places like Tarawa,
Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.  By the end of the war almost 20,000
vehicle were produced(1:244).
  Amphibious tractors carried the Marines ashore at Inchon.
During the Korean War they were used primarily as logistics
vehicles and proved their versatility in operations
throuqhout the rugged, mountainous terrain of Korea.
  During the 1950's, with the advent of the helicopter,
amphibious doctrine was expanded to incorporate the
heliborne assault.  The helicopter provided a quantum leap
in capability by extending the range Marine forces could
deploy to.  In fact, the helicopter provided an over-the-
horizon(OTH) assault capability to the Navy-Marine team.
Marines now had two means to satisfy amphibious assault
mission requirements-- the helicopter and the amphibious
vehicle.  With a heliborne and surface assault capability
potential enemies were faced with a significant targeting
problem.  No longer could enemy weapon systems be
exclusively oriented on surface assault craft;  the threat
from the air had to be addressed.  More importantly,
heliborne assaults could reach deep into flank or rear
positions forcing the enemy to disperse his forces in order
to cover all possible landing zones.
  To combat the surface assault, high-tech missile systems
were developed to destroy Naval amphibious ships as they
closed on the beach.  The near shore (5000 yard) launch of
amphibious vehicles, mandated by the vehicle's slow water
speed, put ships in "Harms Way".  The use ot anti-ship
missiles in the Falkands, light antiaircratt missiles in
Afganistan  and our most  recent experiences with naval
mines in the Persian Gulf serve notice that the Third World
now has the potential to seriously challenge larger more
modern forces(9:33).  OTH amphibious assault tactics became
essential to survival.  Consequently, by the mid 1980's the
Navy embarked on programs like Landing Craft Air-Cushion
(LCAC) to reach tull OTH capability by the late 1990's.
  Current Marine Corps amphibious doctrine calls for
coordinated heliborne and surface assaults into the
objective area.  The means available to accomplish the
surface assault is the Assault Amphibian Vehicle 7A1
(AAV7A1) -- a full tracked amphibious vehicle which was
originally fielded in 1972.
  Developed using 1960's technology, the AAV7A1 is capable
of achieving a maximum water speed of 8 knots.  The vehicle
not only transports embarked Marine infantry from ship-to-
shore during the assault, it also provides mobility and
armor protection once ashore.  A product improvement program
is now underway to enhance the AAV7A1's warfighting
capability until a follow-on system can be fielded in the
2005 time frame(8:22).  Despite product improvements, the
vehicle has significant deficiencies in the areas of
mobility, survivability, and firepower.  Realizing these
drawbacks, the Marine Corps submitted to the Department of
Defense (DOD) a Mission Needs Statement to  a replacement
system.  Atter assuming  his post as Commandant of the Marine
Corps in 1987, General A.M. Gray established the Advanced
Assault Amphibian (AAA) Program  as  the Marine Corps' top 
ground weapons development priority for the decade of the
1990's.  The objective of the AAA Program is to field a
replacement weapon system for the current AAV7A1.  The
system must provide the Marine Corps with an OTH, high
speed, forcible entry amphibious assault capability for the
2005 time frame and beyond.
  The AAA Program has been in the Concept,Exploration,and
definition phase of the acquisition cycle since August of
1988.  During this critical phase of the program, an
operational requirement has been developed by the Marine
Corps Warfighting Center in Quantico,Virginia--a requirement
which will continue to drive the design of the system(3:27).
Based on the threat and the OTH operational concept, the
following essential characteristics were identified in the
Required Operational Capability (ROC) approved by the
Commandant  of the Marine Corps in April of 1991.  The
system will:
  --Carry the Marine rifle squad with attachments(17-18
  --Provide all-around armor protection to embarked infantry
  --Achieve a minimum water speed of 25 knots
  --Achieve an overland cruising speed to keep up with the
  --Defeat Soviet type armored combat vehicles of the time
(BMP) with its main gun
  At this point, it would be wise to review the differences
between an armored personnel carrier (APC) and an infantry
fighting vehicle (IFV).  By definition, the AAV7A1 is an
amphibious APC.
  The Marine Corps' mechanized warfare principles emphasize
maneuver of forces as a means of avoiding attrition style
combat.  Marine infantry mounted in AAvs must have equal
mobility with tanks--they are viewed as complimentary
systems on the battlefield(8:23).  During movement to an
objective area, AAVs generally follow tanks or occupy
overwatch positions.  In the attack, the infantry in the
AAVs are dismounted at some position short of the objective,
while the AAVs support by fire.
  The philosophical position that the infantry fights best
dismounted has driven the Marine Corps to support the
fielding of amphibious APCs, like the AAV7A1, to support
mission requirements.  The difference between an IFV, like
the Bradley, and the APC is one of degree, not of principle.
The IFV concept is based on a heavier armored vehicle in
which the infantry primarily fights from inside the vehicle,
dismounting only when absolutely necessary.  The IFV is also
heavily armed and equipped with a weapons system capable of
defeating certain enemy tanks.
  Obviously, both the APC and IFV have strengths and
weaknesses.  The APC is clearly superior if numbers of
infantry transported is important.  For example, the AAV7A1
can transport three times (18) the number of infantry than
its Bradley Fighting Vehicle (6) counterpart.  However, the
IFV with its increased armor protection levels is favored in
a mechanized warfare environment where the enemy is likewise
fighting mounted in vehicles.
  Concentrating on surface means of delivery, the AAA
Program Office examined a variety of options to replace the
AAV7A1 which were generally grouped into three categories:
  --Slow amphibious vehicles carried to shore from OTH on a
high speed craft
  --Development of a new high speed AAV capable of self
deploying from OTH to shore
  --Non-amphibious vehicles carried to shore from OTH on a
high speed craft
  A slow speed amphibious vehicle cannot achieve water
speeds in excess of 10 to 12 knots.  Every AAV the Marine
Corps has fielded sinc the first "Alligator" falls into this
category.  Why?  Quite simply, technology has not , until
recently, Supported the development of high speed amphibious
  Launched from beyond visual and radar  range, OTH
operations will originate from 25 to 50 nautical miles
offshore(10:34).  A slow amphibious vehicle travelling in
moderate seas (2-3 foot swells) would require 3 to 4 hours
to transit this distance.  Fuel loss, coupled with the
fatigue the crew and embarked infantry would experience,
mandate faster ship-to-shore delivery systems be utilized.
  Several delivery systems were examined by the AAA Program
Manager during Concept Exploration.  Industry surveys were
conducted to analyze the cost and operational utility of
several high speed craft(10:36).  No existing or projected
delivery system was found equal to the capability of LCAC.
More importantly, since the future amphibious ship mix has
been designated to operate with LCAC, the addition of other
high speed craft or sleds to carry AAVs is not supported
within the Department of the Navy (DON) .  Aside from
operational considerations, there is no space to accommodate
them within the well decks--well decks already preloaded
with LCACs.
  The Program Office analyzed the following slow speed
amphibious options:
  --AAV7A1-- The current vehicle was analyzed reconfigured
with major product improvements including bolt-on armor and
an Upgunned Weapons Station.
  --AAV7A2 (slow)-- This is a conceptual vehicle proposed by
the David Taylor Research Center (DTRC), the DON lab
facility which supports the AAA Program Office.  The vehicle
is based on the current AAV7A1 hull design; however, it is
equipped with a new 30 mm gun to improve its firepower and a
more powerful rotary engine for improved mobility.
  --AAAV (slow)-- Also a conceptual design from DTRC, the
hull is made of composite material to improve ballistic
protection.  This vehicle is equipped with the same turret
or weapon station as the AAV7A2 (slow)--30 mm gun-- and the
same engine.  The newly designed hull would be considerably
smaller than either the AAV7A1 or AAV7A2 (slow) which
equates to survivability on the battlefield.
  The Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle, or AAAV, is
defined as a high speed amphibian capable of self-deploying
from OTH to shore.  Of all the potential solutions being
considered, this one has generated the most visibility and
widest range of interest both inside and outsice the Marine
Corps(7:24).  It is certainly the most technically
challenging option, and the one with the least amount of
empirical data readily available(7:22). In many respects,
AAAV is considered the "vertical step" in assault amphibious
vehicle development.
  The important point to keep in mind is that until very
recently the technological risks associated with development
of a fast amphibious vehicle were viewed by many as
unacceptable.  However, during the past 13 years significant
progress has been made by DTRC.  The development of
composite hulls, lightweight track, and electrically driven
high speed water jets have all greatly reduced vehicle
weight.  Additionally, the development of high horsepower
engines, including rotary engines, now provides the power to
propel future amphibious vehicles at high speeds on land and
in water.
  The third category of possible options includes non-
amphibian vehicles, vehicles incapable of operating in open
ocean or surf zones.  Like slow-swimming amphibian vehicles,
non-amphibious vehicles require a high speed craft to
transport them from ship-to-shore.
  Six non-amphibian candidates were analyzed by the Program
Office--the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV 25), the Army's
M113A3, the Army'S Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Army'S
Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (FIFV) and a notional
future Marine Corps Armored Personnel Carrier, APC(X).
  Affordability will undoubtedly play a key role in the
success or failure of the program.  There are ways to drive
program costs down without sacrificing operational
capability.  Why not field a "Mixed Fleet" comprised of both
fast and slow amphibians?  For example, in the Persian Gulf
the first mechanized ground unit deployed along the Kuwaiti
border was a Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF)-- 7th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade.  Prior to being married up with their
operators who were airlifted into theater, the brigade's
AAVs were administratively off-loaded from Maritime
Prepositioning Shipping.  Do the AAVs assigned to MPF units
have to be configured for high speed OTH operations?
The AAA Program Office is now investigating the "Mixed
Fleet" option.  Both high and low speed vehicles in the
fleet would utilize a common hull, suspension system, and
power plant.  Additional rotary engines in the high speed
variant would be required to achieve high water speed.  MPF
vehicles would be configured for slow speed and operational
units would be equipped with a combination of slow and fast
swimmers.  Common systems and components would simplify
logistics support and training requirements.
  And, the technology to support high water speed is here
today!  It's called the Propulsion Systems Demonstrator
(PSD)-- a 30-ton test vehicle which integrates state-of -
the-art amphibious vehicle technologies(7:24).  PSD was
built by AAI Corporation for the David Taylor Research
Center.  It travels at 45 mph on land using a diesel engine.
In water, it utilizes its three-stage water jet drive system
with a turbine engine.   It's the same engine found in the
Army's Blackhawk helicopter.  PSD has a troop carrying
compartment designed to carry 18 Marines and can accommodate
a 30 mm gun in its weapon station.  During the past several
months, PSD has undergone extensive testing and attained
water speeds of 28 knots (32 mph).
  The AAA Program Manager is currently conducting cost
estimates; however, initial indications are the "Mixed
Fleet" approach will reduce overall program costs compared
to either the AAAV(fast) or AAAV(Slow) options.
  Given our nation's increased reliance on Naval forces to
provide forward presence and crisis response, the Marine
Corps' requirement to replace its aging fleet of AAV7A1s
will continue to be critical.  We've taken a vehicle
designed in the 1960's for a 10 year service life to the
technology "firewall".  The Marine Corps has done its
homework in defining operational requirements for a new
amphibious vehicle which will fully support the OTH concept
of amphibious operations.
  Given today's ambiguous threat environment, there are
those that will contend that we do not need an OTH
capability.  Although the threat of global confrontation
between the superpowers has disintegrated, we still need to
be prepared to deal with leaders like Saddam Hussein and
Kim-Il Sung.
  The AAA Program will have a tremendous impact on our
industrial base.  As the military downsizes, detense
contractors will diversify, merge, be purchased by foreign
investors or simply go out of business.  We are already
starting to see the impact of program cancellations.  There
are a limited number of prime contractors involved in the
production of tracked vehicles.  In fact, only one--FMC
Corporation in San Jose, California-- has built assault
amphibious vehicles for the Marine Corps during the past 45
years.  Coincidentally, FMC is also the prime contractor for
the Army's Bradley IFV.  Given DOD's emphasis on the
continuing importance of defense research and development
efforts, we'd be well advised to ensure firms like FMC stay
above water.  The technological edge it took 20 years to
develop can be lost overnight.
  The future generation of AAVs must provide the means to:
  --Rapidly project combat power ashore from OTH
  --Support mobility and firepower requirements during
operations ashore
  --Conduct riverine operations
  --Reenter the surf zone and use littorals to envelop or
by-pass enemy positions
  Perhaps no other weapon system in the Marine Corps'
arsenal is more important to success on the battlefield than
the AAV.   It's critical we continue to protect our Marines
with a vehicle that provides them with the speed, armor
protection, and firepower required to win on today's lethal
  We were lucky in the Persian Gulf.  With over 700 AAVs
deployed to theater, only two were lost-- one to mines and
one to enemy fire.  The AAV7A1's inability to keep pace with
our M1A1 tank and its inadequate armor protection levels
would surely have resulted in significant Marine casualties
if Saddam Hussein's warfighting machine had seriously
engaged U.S. forces.
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    Bushmasters.  History and Museums Division,
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2.  Cheney, Dick, Secretary of Defense.  Annual
    Report to the President and the Congress.
3.  Feigley, Major James M.  "Dynamic New Concepts to
    Change Amphibious Tactics." Amphibious Warfare Review,
4.  FMFM 1-2 The Role of the Marine Corps in the
    National Defense.  Headquarters Marine Corps, 1991.
5.  Kelso,Adm Frank, B., Mundy,Gen Carl E., O'Keefe,Sean,
    Secretary of Navy.  ... From the Sea.  29 Sept 92.
6.  Mundy, Gen Carl E.  "Something Old for Something New."
    Proceedings, November, 1992.
7.  Steigman, David S.  "Beach Assaults Pick Up Speed."
    Navy Times, Sept, 1992.
8.  Sullivan, Major Michael.  "Advanced Amphibious Assault
    Program."  Amphibious Warfare Review, 1989.
9.  Trainor, LtGen Bernard E.  "Still Going...Amphibious
    Warfare."  Proceedings, November, 1992.
10. Zeitfuss, Walter.  "Marines Look to High Tech to Propel
    Amphibians into the 21st Century."  Amphibious Warfare
    Review. 1989.

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