The Time Has Come For The Advanced Assault Amphibian CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting -TEXT- The Time Has Come For the Advanced Assault Amphibian Major T.E. McDonough Conference Group 10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Time Has Come For The Advanced Assault Amphibian Author: Major Timothy E. McDonough, U.S. Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps needs to replace its current assault amphibian vehicle, the AAV7A1, and needs to field a system that provides the Marine Corps with an over-the- horizon (OTH), high speed, assault capability. Backround: For over 45 years assault amphibian vehicles have provided the Marine Corps with its surface assault capability. The AAV7A1 is a product improved version of a vehicle first fielded in 1972. It was designed to be an amphibious armored personnel carrier capable of landing the surface assault element of the landing force from assault shipping to inland objectives. Developed using 1960's technology, the AAV7A1's high silhoutte, slow water speed and overland cruising speeds, and inadequate armor protection, will severly limit its survivability in the 21st century. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should vigorously pursue the Advanced Assault Amphibian. OUTLINE Thesis: The Marine Corps needs to replace its current assault amphibian vehicle, the AAV7A1, and needs to field a system that provides the Marine Corps with an over-the- horizon(OTH), high speed, assault capability. I. The strategic role of amphibious forces in the future A. What threats will these forces encounter? B. What missions will Marine forces perform? C. Why do we need an amphibious assault capability? II. Evolution of the Assault Amphibian Vehicle A. World War II B. Korea C. The AAV7A1 III. The Advanced Assault Amphibian (AAA) Program A. In search of alternatives B. Slow Speed Amphibians C. High Speed Amphibians D. Non-Amphibians E. Cost effectivness As the war in the Persian Gulf so vividly demonstrated, the essential demands of our military forces--to deter conflict whenever possible but to prevail in those that do arise--are certain to endure. The forward presence of our warfighters provides the conduit in our alliance relationships and signals that, if required, we're prepared to defend our national interests with military action. As we enter a period of declining defense budgets, debates will rage on the viability of sea-based forces and amphibious doctrine to cope with future threats. For the Navy, the handwriting is on the seawall. The National Military Strategy outlines a "Base Force" consisting of 450 ships and cuts will continue beyond this level for the foreseeable future(2:120). Critics warn that this downsizing seriously compromises America's maritime capability. The New World Order, whatever it implies for military strategy and required forces, is going to mandate an effective integration of our nation's maritime projection forces-- a robust Navy and Marine Corps team. This new direction has been outlined in "From the Sea", a Navy and Marine Corps White Paper. The mission of sea-based forces has been redefined to reflect the new environment. Naval forces will now concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea. For the past 45 years,the Assault Amphibian Vehicle, or AAV, has provided Marine infantry the means to conduct surface-borne amphibious assaults. Launched from amphibious ships, AAVs transport Marines to shore and once ashore, provide them armor protected mobility. The current AAV is nearing the end of its planned service life and the Marine Corps needs to field a system that provides Marines with an over-the-horizon(OTH), high speed, assault capability. Before examining the requirement to field a follow-on vehicle, the following topic areas need to be addressed: --What strategic role will Naval amphibious forces play in the future? --What threats will these forces encounter? --What missions will Marine forces perform? --Why do we need an amphibious assault capability STRATEGIC ROLE OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN THE FUTURE The United States is the preeminent maritime power in the world today. With the end ot the Cold War, the Soviet Union dismantled, and new nation states struggling for their identity in the community of nations, our world is undergoing unprecedented change. Despite the prospects of world peace, our National Military Strategy continues to rest on strategic deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response(2:7). In the future, changes will have to be made in the way we execute this strategy. As we have already seen in the Philippines, the possibility of diminished access to foreign bases and overflight rights is virtually certain. As a result, control of the sea will assume even greater significance(5:1). Any future conflict which requires U.S. military intervention will likely involve the movement of forces and equipment across key sea lines of communication. More than 95% of all the material for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM came by ship(6:14). We must be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where prepositioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where bases are not available, and where there is a less developed economic base to support our forces once they have arrived. Given the decreasing global support for U.S. basing and overflight rights, Naval forces may be the only military capability available to national security decision-makers in time of crisis. A review of the over 200 instances of U.S. military interventions since World War II indicates 80% involved the use of Naval forces(9:30). Forward deployed Naval forces deter conflict and provide the national Command Authority with a variety of power projection options. Self- sufficient, combined arms forces that can deploy rapidly and loiter near or over the horizon from potential crisis spots will deter belligerent acts and provocations(6:12). Our Navy-Marine Corps team represents a flexible force in readiness who's aggregate usefulness to our nation includes: --Employment options across the spectrum of conflict-- from peacetime presence to regional war --Ability on short notice to deploy to a wide range of geographically dispersed areas --A forcible entry capability when required Without a strong-maritime power projection capability, the U.S. will not be able to protect its vital interests-- ensuring sea lines of communications remain open and access to the littorals of nations important for strategic resources and commerce is maintained. THE THREAT The current world situation makes it difficult to fully assess and project the threat to U.S. interests in the 21st century. Since the end of World War II, the global situation has evolved around the balance of power between the U.S. and what was the Soviet Union. However, nearly all conflicts occurred in the Third World--a trend which is continuing today. In the past, the U.S. and Soviet Union could influence the resolution of regional wars through the use of various diplomatic and economic sanctions. But, the Soviet Union is now a loose coalition of separate nation states; all are experiencing tremendous financial difficulties and many have political instability. As the 21st century nears,the risks of war, including nuclear confrontation, between the so-called superpowers are receding. However, a new period of international frictions, tensions, and conflict is rapidly unraveling. This period will see a realignment of interests, new alliances, and new forms and causes of violence including territorial disputes, economic disputes between rich and poor, and disputes over access to the world's resources(2:15). In short, we may not be looking at a kinder, gentler world. As economic problems worsen, stockpiles of sophisticated weaponry become sources of revenue and their export to Third World countries will increase. As a result, qualitative differences in military capabilities between the Third World and traditional powers will likely decrease. A few dozen Third World countries now have advanced anti-ship missiles, mines, and submarines-- more can get them. A new arms race is underway! Iran is buying Russian subs in an attempt to control the Straits of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia, in turn wants to buy more F-15E fighters. Most disturbing are accounts that various republics of the former Soviet Union have started peddling conventional weaponry wherever there is hard currency. And, with our own defense budget falling, American arms salesmen are prowling for customers. Threat forces of the future will have many similarities. Common threads in capabilities may include: --More sophisticated surveillance and intelligence gathering equipment --Increased lethality and range of weapons --Enhanced ground and air mobility (2:19) Sophisticated surveillance and targeting systems can bring formerly secure areas into the battle area and achieving tactical surprise may be increasingly more difficult for our forces. Each year the weapons of war become more accurate, destructive, numerous, and available. High-tech precision guided weapons will proliferate the battlefield. Additionally, the widespread use of man-portable antiaircratt weapons may reduce our air mobility which will place increased emphasis on forcible entry by surface means. Amphibious forces will try to avoid enemy strengths and seek opportunities to exploit weaknesses. To achieve the element of surprise, we need mobility assets sufficient to maneuver our forces on a battlefield where speed equates to survival. FUTURE MARINE CORPS MISSIONS The emphasis on maritime strategy and power projection from the sea will continue to focus the Marine Corps on maintaining quick-hitting, self-sustaining forces capable of conducting operations at all levels of conflict. The increased emphasis on combat power projection from the sea brings into sharp focus the continuing importance of "soldiers of the sea."(6:14) Marine Corps operational forces are expeditionary, combined arms, air-ground task forces(MAGTF). The value of the MAGTF is measured in terms of presence, potential, and power. Strategically mobile and immediately available, MAGTFs are capable of performing a wide variety of missions from special maritime operations to joint and combined operations. Noncombatant evacuation, in-extremis hostage rescue, humanitarian assistance and amphibious raids are examples of the types ot diverse missions which the MAGTF can execute. The MAGTf is tailored to meet specific mission requirements. Infantry, armor, artillery, air, and combat service support assets are organized under the command and control of one commanaer. It is this unique integration of warfighting capabilities which allows a Naval amphibious task force to rapidly and decisively project combat power ashore. Rapid, flexible deployment of task organized units will be the hallmark of the conventional capability needed into the next century(7:24). No other U.S. military force combines equivalent levels or forcible entry capability, combat power, and staying power than a MAGTF. AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CAPABILITY An offensive forcible entry capability requires this nation be prepared to conduct operations on short notice to protect national interests. It is in this context that the requirement to project amphibious forces anywhere in the world remains a vital capability in support of the national security strategy. The Marine Corps has a statutory responsibility to,".. develop in coordination with the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the doctrine, tactics, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations(4:1-1). Amphibious forces can provide a peacetime presence and political leverage without necessarily being committed ashore. When a landing is necessary, the amphibious assault exemplifies the essence of maneuver warfare-- warfare where speed and flexibility are the cornerstones of winning. The amphibious assault concentrates superior combat power at a critical time and place to achieve tactical surprise and a favorable force ratio over an opposing force. One need only recall the events of the Persian Gulf to counter those that say the amphibious assault has gone the way of the buffalo. An amphibious assault was planned during operation Desert Storm as a means of tying down six Iraqi divisions. Fourth and Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigades were poised and ready on 24 February to initiate the first amphibious assault since Inchon. The threat from the sea not only tied down Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti coast, it in no small way contributed to the success of the ground assault by coalition forces into Kuwait. In addition to Kuwait, Marines were prepared to exercise the amphibious assault option in Panama. Because the U.S. had overflight rights and secure bases to land at, an assault from the sea was not necessary. The important point is we had the option. Flexibility was the key to achieving military success in Panama as well as Kuwait. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE After World War I, when events in the Pacific pointed to the possibility of war, Marines developed the amphibious warfare concepts than were the foundations for U.S. and Allied victories in World War II. During the war, before the advent of the helicopter, the surface assault was the only option available for Marines to move from ship-to- shore. Drawing upon conventional infantry tactics, the concept of ship-to-shore movement stressed dispersion and speed. The Marine Corps' primary means of projecting the landing force ashore was the Amphibious Tractor. Affectionately known as "Alligators", these vehicles were launched from amphibious ships between five and ten thousand yards from the landing beaches. Swimming at speeds of five to eight knots, the "Alligators" were able to transport men and supplies over reefs and other obstacles through the use of tracks and water propulsion units. Vulnerable to mines and small arms fire, the amphibious tractors nevertheless proved indispensable in providing Marines the requisite mobility to win at places like Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. By the end of the war almost 20,000 vehicle were produced(1:244). Amphibious tractors carried the Marines ashore at Inchon. During the Korean War they were used primarily as logistics vehicles and proved their versatility in operations throuqhout the rugged, mountainous terrain of Korea. During the 1950's, with the advent of the helicopter, amphibious doctrine was expanded to incorporate the heliborne assault. The helicopter provided a quantum leap in capability by extending the range Marine forces could deploy to. In fact, the helicopter provided an over-the- horizon(OTH) assault capability to the Navy-Marine team. Marines now had two means to satisfy amphibious assault mission requirements-- the helicopter and the amphibious vehicle. With a heliborne and surface assault capability potential enemies were faced with a significant targeting problem. No longer could enemy weapon systems be exclusively oriented on surface assault craft; the threat from the air had to be addressed. More importantly, heliborne assaults could reach deep into flank or rear positions forcing the enemy to disperse his forces in order to cover all possible landing zones. To combat the surface assault, high-tech missile systems were developed to destroy Naval amphibious ships as they closed on the beach. The near shore (5000 yard) launch of amphibious vehicles, mandated by the vehicle's slow water speed, put ships in "Harms Way". The use ot anti-ship missiles in the Falkands, light antiaircratt missiles in Afganistan and our most recent experiences with naval mines in the Persian Gulf serve notice that the Third World now has the potential to seriously challenge larger more modern forces(9:33). OTH amphibious assault tactics became essential to survival. Consequently, by the mid 1980's the Navy embarked on programs like Landing Craft Air-Cushion (LCAC) to reach tull OTH capability by the late 1990's. Current Marine Corps amphibious doctrine calls for coordinated heliborne and surface assaults into the objective area. The means available to accomplish the surface assault is the Assault Amphibian Vehicle 7A1 (AAV7A1) -- a full tracked amphibious vehicle which was originally fielded in 1972. Developed using 1960's technology, the AAV7A1 is capable of achieving a maximum water speed of 8 knots. The vehicle not only transports embarked Marine infantry from ship-to- shore during the assault, it also provides mobility and armor protection once ashore. A product improvement program is now underway to enhance the AAV7A1's warfighting capability until a follow-on system can be fielded in the 2005 time frame(8:22). Despite product improvements, the vehicle has significant deficiencies in the areas of mobility, survivability, and firepower. Realizing these drawbacks, the Marine Corps submitted to the Department of Defense (DOD) a Mission Needs Statement to a replacement system. Atter assuming his post as Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1987, General A.M. Gray established the Advanced Assault Amphibian (AAA) Program as the Marine Corps' top ground weapons development priority for the decade of the 1990's. The objective of the AAA Program is to field a replacement weapon system for the current AAV7A1. The system must provide the Marine Corps with an OTH, high speed, forcible entry amphibious assault capability for the 2005 time frame and beyond. IN SEARCH OF ALTERNATIVES The AAA Program has been in the Concept,Exploration,and definition phase of the acquisition cycle since August of 1988. During this critical phase of the program, an operational requirement has been developed by the Marine Corps Warfighting Center in Quantico,Virginia--a requirement which will continue to drive the design of the system(3:27). Based on the threat and the OTH operational concept, the following essential characteristics were identified in the Required Operational Capability (ROC) approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in April of 1991. The system will: --Carry the Marine rifle squad with attachments(17-18 Marines) --Provide all-around armor protection to embarked infantry --Achieve a minimum water speed of 25 knots --Achieve an overland cruising speed to keep up with the M1A1 --Defeat Soviet type armored combat vehicles of the time (BMP) with its main gun At this point, it would be wise to review the differences between an armored personnel carrier (APC) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). By definition, the AAV7A1 is an amphibious APC. The Marine Corps' mechanized warfare principles emphasize maneuver of forces as a means of avoiding attrition style combat. Marine infantry mounted in AAvs must have equal mobility with tanks--they are viewed as complimentary systems on the battlefield(8:23). During movement to an objective area, AAVs generally follow tanks or occupy overwatch positions. In the attack, the infantry in the AAVs are dismounted at some position short of the objective, while the AAVs support by fire. The philosophical position that the infantry fights best dismounted has driven the Marine Corps to support the fielding of amphibious APCs, like the AAV7A1, to support mission requirements. The difference between an IFV, like the Bradley, and the APC is one of degree, not of principle. The IFV concept is based on a heavier armored vehicle in which the infantry primarily fights from inside the vehicle, dismounting only when absolutely necessary. The IFV is also heavily armed and equipped with a weapons system capable of defeating certain enemy tanks. Obviously, both the APC and IFV have strengths and weaknesses. The APC is clearly superior if numbers of infantry transported is important. For example, the AAV7A1 can transport three times (18) the number of infantry than its Bradley Fighting Vehicle (6) counterpart. However, the IFV with its increased armor protection levels is favored in a mechanized warfare environment where the enemy is likewise fighting mounted in vehicles. Concentrating on surface means of delivery, the AAA Program Office examined a variety of options to replace the AAV7A1 which were generally grouped into three categories: --Slow amphibious vehicles carried to shore from OTH on a high speed craft --Development of a new high speed AAV capable of self deploying from OTH to shore --Non-amphibious vehicles carried to shore from OTH on a high speed craft SLOW SPEED AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES A slow speed amphibious vehicle cannot achieve water speeds in excess of 10 to 12 knots. Every AAV the Marine Corps has fielded sinc the first "Alligator" falls into this category. Why? Quite simply, technology has not , until recently, Supported the development of high speed amphibious vehicles. Launched from beyond visual and radar range, OTH operations will originate from 25 to 50 nautical miles offshore(10:34). A slow amphibious vehicle travelling in moderate seas (2-3 foot swells) would require 3 to 4 hours to transit this distance. Fuel loss, coupled with the fatigue the crew and embarked infantry would experience, mandate faster ship-to-shore delivery systems be utilized. Several delivery systems were examined by the AAA Program Manager during Concept Exploration. Industry surveys were conducted to analyze the cost and operational utility of several high speed craft(10:36). No existing or projected delivery system was found equal to the capability of LCAC. More importantly, since the future amphibious ship mix has been designated to operate with LCAC, the addition of other high speed craft or sleds to carry AAVs is not supported within the Department of the Navy (DON) . Aside from operational considerations, there is no space to accommodate them within the well decks--well decks already preloaded with LCACs. The Program Office analyzed the following slow speed amphibious options: --AAV7A1-- The current vehicle was analyzed reconfigured with major product improvements including bolt-on armor and an Upgunned Weapons Station. --AAV7A2 (slow)-- This is a conceptual vehicle proposed by the David Taylor Research Center (DTRC), the DON lab facility which supports the AAA Program Office. The vehicle is based on the current AAV7A1 hull design; however, it is equipped with a new 30 mm gun to improve its firepower and a more powerful rotary engine for improved mobility. --AAAV (slow)-- Also a conceptual design from DTRC, the hull is made of composite material to improve ballistic protection. This vehicle is equipped with the same turret or weapon station as the AAV7A2 (slow)--30 mm gun-- and the same engine. The newly designed hull would be considerably smaller than either the AAV7A1 or AAV7A2 (slow) which equates to survivability on the battlefield. HIGH SPEED AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE The Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle, or AAAV, is defined as a high speed amphibian capable of self-deploying from OTH to shore. Of all the potential solutions being considered, this one has generated the most visibility and widest range of interest both inside and outsice the Marine Corps(7:24). It is certainly the most technically challenging option, and the one with the least amount of empirical data readily available(7:22). In many respects, AAAV is considered the "vertical step" in assault amphibious vehicle development. The important point to keep in mind is that until very recently the technological risks associated with development of a fast amphibious vehicle were viewed by many as unacceptable. However, during the past 13 years significant progress has been made by DTRC. The development of composite hulls, lightweight track, and electrically driven high speed water jets have all greatly reduced vehicle weight. Additionally, the development of high horsepower engines, including rotary engines, now provides the power to propel future amphibious vehicles at high speeds on land and in water. NON-AMPHIBIANS The third category of possible options includes non- amphibian vehicles, vehicles incapable of operating in open ocean or surf zones. Like slow-swimming amphibian vehicles, non-amphibious vehicles require a high speed craft to transport them from ship-to-shore. Six non-amphibian candidates were analyzed by the Program Office--the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV 25), the Army's M113A3, the Army'S Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Army'S Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (FIFV) and a notional future Marine Corps Armored Personnel Carrier, APC(X). COST-EFFECTIVENESS Affordability will undoubtedly play a key role in the success or failure of the program. There are ways to drive program costs down without sacrificing operational capability. Why not field a "Mixed Fleet" comprised of both fast and slow amphibians? For example, in the Persian Gulf the first mechanized ground unit deployed along the Kuwaiti border was a Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF)-- 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Prior to being married up with their operators who were airlifted into theater, the brigade's AAVs were administratively off-loaded from Maritime Prepositioning Shipping. Do the AAVs assigned to MPF units have to be configured for high speed OTH operations? The AAA Program Office is now investigating the "Mixed Fleet" option. Both high and low speed vehicles in the fleet would utilize a common hull, suspension system, and power plant. Additional rotary engines in the high speed variant would be required to achieve high water speed. MPF vehicles would be configured for slow speed and operational units would be equipped with a combination of slow and fast swimmers. Common systems and components would simplify logistics support and training requirements. And, the technology to support high water speed is here today! It's called the Propulsion Systems Demonstrator (PSD)-- a 30-ton test vehicle which integrates state-of - the-art amphibious vehicle technologies(7:24). PSD was built by AAI Corporation for the David Taylor Research Center. It travels at 45 mph on land using a diesel engine. In water, it utilizes its three-stage water jet drive system with a turbine engine. It's the same engine found in the Army's Blackhawk helicopter. PSD has a troop carrying compartment designed to carry 18 Marines and can accommodate a 30 mm gun in its weapon station. During the past several months, PSD has undergone extensive testing and attained water speeds of 28 knots (32 mph). The AAA Program Manager is currently conducting cost estimates; however, initial indications are the "Mixed Fleet" approach will reduce overall program costs compared to either the AAAV(fast) or AAAV(Slow) options. ANSWERING THE QUESTION Given our nation's increased reliance on Naval forces to provide forward presence and crisis response, the Marine Corps' requirement to replace its aging fleet of AAV7A1s will continue to be critical. We've taken a vehicle designed in the 1960's for a 10 year service life to the technology "firewall". The Marine Corps has done its homework in defining operational requirements for a new amphibious vehicle which will fully support the OTH concept of amphibious operations. Given today's ambiguous threat environment, there are those that will contend that we do not need an OTH capability. Although the threat of global confrontation between the superpowers has disintegrated, we still need to be prepared to deal with leaders like Saddam Hussein and Kim-Il Sung. The AAA Program will have a tremendous impact on our industrial base. As the military downsizes, detense contractors will diversify, merge, be purchased by foreign investors or simply go out of business. We are already starting to see the impact of program cancellations. There are a limited number of prime contractors involved in the production of tracked vehicles. In fact, only one--FMC Corporation in San Jose, California-- has built assault amphibious vehicles for the Marine Corps during the past 45 years. Coincidentally, FMC is also the prime contractor for the Army's Bradley IFV. Given DOD's emphasis on the continuing importance of defense research and development efforts, we'd be well advised to ensure firms like FMC stay above water. The technological edge it took 20 years to develop can be lost overnight. The future generation of AAVs must provide the means to: --Rapidly project combat power ashore from OTH --Support mobility and firepower requirements during operations ashore --Conduct riverine operations --Reenter the surf zone and use littorals to envelop or by-pass enemy positions Perhaps no other weapon system in the Marine Corps' arsenal is more important to success on the battlefield than the AAV. It's critical we continue to protect our Marines with a vehicle that provides them with the speed, armor protection, and firepower required to win on today's lethal battlefield. We were lucky in the Persian Gulf. With over 700 AAVs deployed to theater, only two were lost-- one to mines and one to enemy fire. The AAV7A1's inability to keep pace with our M1A1 tank and its inadequate armor protection levels would surely have resulted in significant Marine casualties if Saddam Hussein's warfighting machine had seriously engaged U.S. forces. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bailey, Alfred D. Alligators, Buffaloes, and Bushmasters. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Wash D.C. 1986. 2. Cheney, Dick, Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Feb.,1992. 3. Feigley, Major James M. "Dynamic New Concepts to Change Amphibious Tactics." Amphibious Warfare Review, 1989. 4. FMFM 1-2 The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense. Headquarters Marine Corps, 1991. 5. Kelso,Adm Frank, B., Mundy,Gen Carl E., O'Keefe,Sean, Secretary of Navy. ... From the Sea. 29 Sept 92. 6. Mundy, Gen Carl E. "Something Old for Something New." Proceedings, November, 1992. 7. Steigman, David S. "Beach Assaults Pick Up Speed." Navy Times, Sept, 1992. 8. Sullivan, Major Michael. "Advanced Amphibious Assault Program." Amphibious Warfare Review, 1989. 9. Trainor, LtGen Bernard E. "Still Going...Amphibious Warfare." Proceedings, November, 1992. 10. Zeitfuss, Walter. "Marines Look to High Tech to Propel Amphibians into the 21st Century." Amphibious Warfare Review. 1989.
