Looking Back At The Future: The Practice And Patterns Of Expeditionary Operations In The 20th Century CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Looking Back at the Future: The Practice and Patterns of Expeditionary Operations in the 20th Century Author: Major Richard S. Moore, United States Marine Corps Thesis: For military planners attempting to prepare for the future, the record of expeditionary operations during the 20th Century offers clear guidance at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Background: As the United States emerges from the Cold War, it faces a world for which it seems unprepared. Regional and ethnic strife, unforeseen enemies, and lingering dangers of weapons proliferation have combined to complicate strategic planning and military force structure decisions. Expeditionary operations, emphasized in the National Military Strategy, continue to grow in importance, yet remain a source of confusion. No specific doctrine exists. Given the historical record of the past century, however, confusion need not continue. Between 1898 and 1992, the British, French, and Americans conducted over 70 expeditionary operations which demonstrated common characteristics at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Despite sometimes revolutionary transformations in the world, the basic traits of expeditionary operations have changed remarkably little, offering valuable lessons for planners. As the military forces of the United States prepare for the future, they would do well to remember from the past. Recommendations: The lessons of past expeditionary operations should be used to assist military planners as they develop forces and plans for future crises. LOOKING BACK AT THE FUTURE: THE PRACTICE AND PATTERNS OF EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY OUTLINE Thesis: For military planners attempting to prepare for the future, the record of expeditionary operations conducted during the 20th Century offers clear guidance at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; the patterns and traits they exhibited remain valid today. I. Renewed emphasis on expeditionary operations A. Post-Cold War world remains unstable B. National Military Strategy stresses crisis response C. Expeditionary operations are not understood D. Past operations offer guidance II. Definition of expeditionary operations A. Early experiences underscored political, limited nature B. Definition encompasses three basic elements 1. Crisis planning 2. Deployed forces 3. Political objectives and constraints III. Strategic characteristics of expeditionary operations A. Aims centered on five basic missions 1. Restoring order 2. Protecting Interests 3. Punishing insults 4. Conducting initial wartime operations 5. Providing humanitarian relief B. Political objectives determined nature and scope of operations C. Third World formed the theaters of operations IV. Operational characteristics of expeditionary operations A. Most operations faced limited opposition B. Ports and airfields needed to be secured C. Commanders relied on two echelons of forces 1. Forward deployed forces 2. Follow-on forces D. Expeditionary force comprised joint forces V. Tactical characteristics of expeditionary operations A. Fighting conducted in urban areas B. Tactical success depended on small units C. Infantry skills predominated VI. Model for the future A. Characteristics remain valid B. Patterns of the past should not be forgotten LOOKING BACK AT THE FUTURE: THE PRACTICE AND PATTERNS OF EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY As the landing craft plowed toward the Shore, nervous Marines, most barely comprehending that, in a few minutes, they might be under fire, waited, lost in their thoughts. From the beach, a few locals gazed seaward with a mixture of relief and fear, alert to the possibility of gunfire. For the past several days, they had dodged bullets fired by soldiers, a loose term that described the current wave of armed thugs fighting for political control of the city. The Americans, now approaching from the sea and guarded by a prowling warship, promised relief. As they watched, however, the locals felt uneasy; their future depended on a foreign power. Thousands of miles away, American political leaders struggled to cope with an unexpected crisis unfolding in a remote nation while additional troops prepared to deploy. The Marines, soon to cross the beach, had begun yet another expeditionary operation. This scene, reminiscent of the past, offers a prophetic view of the future. As the United States emerges from the Cold war, it faces a world for which it seems unprepared. Sometimes vehement debates rage within Congress and between the military services attempting to define the threats of the future and the best means of dealing with them. No consensus has been reached, perhaps because the questions possess few answers. General C.E. Mundy, Commandant of the Marine Corps, framed the problem eloquently when he recently stated, "I'm not sure anyone... today could tell me with any degree of certainty who the bad guys might be in a decade or two hence."1 Since the end of the Cold War Americans have found themselves coping with crises in the Middle East, Africa, Somalia, and Bosnia. Regional and ethnic strife, unforeseen enemies, and lingering dangers of weapons proliferation, both conventional and nuclear, have combined to complicate the United States' efforts to mold a coherent response. The recently released National Military Strategy recognizes the challenges of the future. With its emphasis on crisis response and regional threats, it attempts to reconcile the volatility of the post-Cold War world with military cutbacks imposed by fiscal realities and lack of specific threats to justify expenditures. Additionally, it introduces a new planning process, adaptive planning, that demands increased flexibility by military commanders while ensuring adequate forces remain prepared to rapidly respond to unfolding contingencies. A key element of adaptive planning and crisis response centers on the ability to deploy and sustain forces in remote areas. In short, the National Military Strategy largely focuses on the United States' ability to conduct expeditionary operations.2 These operations, planned and executed against unanticipated threats, have assumed a predominant place in American military policy. Yet, while America seems to have embraced expeditionary operations as the means of dealing with the unknown, confusion still abounds. Indeed, the term expeditionary may be the most misused in the military lexicon. Enshrouded in such catchy phrases as "Global Reach" and "From the Sea", the term often relates more to programs and budgets than military strategy or operations. In fact, each service defines expeditionary operations largely in self-serving phrases. Unfortunately, current doctrine offers little to allay the confusion. The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms fails to define the term, referring only to expeditionary forces as those "organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country"3, a broad definition of little practical use. Compounding the problem, no specific doctrine for expeditionary operations exists. Surprisingly, Navy or Marine Corps doctrine remains conspicuously absent, despite recent pronouncements by the Navy embracing littoral warfare, and the Marines' longstanding commitment to being a force- in-readiness. As the United States military prepares for the future, it does so with only a vague appreciation of the most likely demand it will face. Given the historical record of the past century, there need not be confusion over the nature and demands of expeditionary operations. As the most practiced types of military campaigns of the 20th Century, two world wars notwithstanding, they hide no secrets. Indeed, the United States, Britain, and France, alone, conducted over 70 expeditionary operations between 1898 and 1992. Most have been extensively chronicled. For military planners attempting to prepare for the future, the record of expeditionary operations offers clear guidance at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; the patterns and traits they exhibited remain valid today. These operations can no longer be viewed as interesting, but largely irrelevant, historical episodes. Instead, examined collectively, the expeditionary operations conducted during this century demonstrated common characteristics and lessons that can aid in planning for the future. No attempt to analyze the past can proceed without a clear and useful definition of what constitutes expeditionary operations. Colonel C.E. Callwell, a British Army officer writing at the turn of the century, defined them as "campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops." He continued by emphasizing the highly political and limited nature of such campaigns, offering four classifications, "campaigns of conquest or annexation, campaigns for suppression of insurrection and lawlessness, ... campaigns undertaken to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy" and, finally, campaigns of "expediency undertaken for some political purpose."4 Several years later, the Marine Corps, drawing from its experiences in Latin America, narrowed Callwell's definition even further, defined these operations as those "undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state... for the preservation of life and such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation." The manual went on to state that such operations were "not limited by their size, in the extent of their theater of operations nor their cost in property, money, or lives."5 Both Callwell and the Marines, although separated by almost four decades, agreed on the essential traits and political nature of expeditionary operations. A useful definition emerges from these early writings and experiences. Expeditionary operations comprise those military campaigns undertaken short of war for specific political purposes, usually limited in scope, with little or no advanced warning or planning, and involving the use of rapidly deployed forces from outside the theater of operations. Implicit in this definition reside three basic elements. First, expeditionary operations deal with crises short of war or the opening stages of a war when plans are nonexistent or incomplete. The crisis nature of expeditionary operations proscribes extensive planning, training, or preparation. Second, an expeditionary operation involves a situation beyond the capabilities of forward-presence forces. Naval presence missions, landings by routinely deployed amphibious units, or expanded operations by land and air forces already operating in the theater of operations, while important, do not fall within the definition of expeditionary; however violent, these tasks constitute the raison d'etre of such forces. Third, political objectives and constraints determine the operation's measure of success and its conduct. Although not always clearly articulated, political objectives govern the scope and nature of expeditionary operations. In sum, expeditionary operations must mesh limited reaction time, the necessity to deploy additional forces, and political limitations to be successful. While specific situations differed markedly, and the world underwent revolutionary changes, the nature of expeditionary operations between 1898 and 1992 remained remarkably consistent. Politically, two general eras framed their conduct. Imperialism dominated the period from 1898 until World War II. British, French, and American operations sought to maintain or increase control of geographic areas. European nations strove to protect and subdue colonies. Although colonialism continued to be anathema to most Americans, their operations in Latin America and China belied a desire for economic, if not political, control of the regions. After 1945, the Cold War and its aftermath largely determined the objectives of expeditionary operations, although the British and French persisted in their colonial interests. The international political structure, however, seems to have little affected strategic, operational, and tactical concepts and principles underpinning expeditionary operations. In fact, the radical changes in the international state system brought by World War II and, later, the end of the Cold War did not diminish the propensity of nations to conduct expeditionary operations, nor did it change their basic goals or approaches. Whether quelling unrest in Haiti in 1915 or feeding starving civilians seven decades later, the characteristics remained essentially the same.6 Despite the large number of expeditions, certain fundamental strategic concepts persisted. Political objectives centered on five basic missions- restoring order, protecting national interests, punishing perceived insults or transgressions, conducting initial combat operations at the outset of a war, or providing humanitarian relief. Every expedition attempted to achieve one or more. Significantly, nearly 90 percent sought to restore order or protect national interests, aims that included both peacemaking and peacekeeping. Practice taught that one usually embraced the other. American landing parties in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic during the first three decades of this century forcibly established control over chaotic situations to protect property and citizens. In some operations, particularly in recent years, restoring order served as a precursor to other goals. Humanitarian relief missions often included the necessity to gain and maintain control before food or relief supplies could be distributed. While the most hazardous, combat operations pursuant to a larger conflict proved to be a rarity for expeditionary forces. Instead, most wartime combat occurred only after several months of preparation and cannot be classified as expeditionary. Although fighting may have occurred in an expeditionary operation, it served as a means to achieving one or more basic political objectives. Whatever the precedence or combination of objectives, political, rather than military, considerations determined the nature and scope of operations, often down to the lowest levels. While at times frustrating to commanders, the intrusion of political concerns into military decisions typified most expeditionary operations. In fact, both politicians and soldiers understood that diplomatic and military actions demanded close integration. Rather than being a last resort, expeditionary operations comprised but one tool to resolve the crisis. The British task force commander during the Falklands War in 1982 remained acutely aware of, if not always comfortable with, the political ramifications of his actions.7 Long-term results of expeditionary operations depended largely on political compromise, not military defeat of enemy forces. As Callwell proclaimed, "the beating of the hostile armies is not necessarily the main object, even if such armies exist...."8 Because of the need for an enduring political solution, more than half the operations lasted in excess of six months. Significantly, those whose mission involved restoring order tended to extend for more than a year. That the United States' presence in Somalia continued beyond its planned six weeks should have come as no surprise to political and military leaders. Politics, not military victory, dictated its scope. Finally, undeveloped areas of the world formed the principal theaters of operations. Suffering from internal chaos and absence of political structure, countries in what, in the 195Os, became known as the Third World most often erupted into turmoil. Before 1945, European colonies, Latin America, and China provided an almost continuous chain of crises. After World War II, former colonies and emerging nations, many in the same regions, shifted to the forefront. Given the instability that typified these areas, the need for Europe and the United States to use armed force to protect their interests and restore order hardly seems surprising. The strategic objectives and setting greatly influenced operational level actions. Nearly three-fourths of expeditionary operations initially faced limited opposition, although sporadic, and occasionally vicious, fighting might continue for long periods. As expeditionary forces established order or achieved their immediate objectives of protecting citizens and property, opposing forces frequently dispersed or disbanded, often to reappear later as guerrillas or bandits. They tended to be poorly organized and trained, although some possessed weapons equal to and occasionally more advanced than those of the expeditionary force. Rather than applying overwhelming strength, however, relatively small expeditionary forces found they could attain their objectives by exploiting superior discipline and training. Success, as the French reaffirmed in Kinshasa in 1978, depended on relatively small, rapidly deployed forces able to decisively react to unpredictable situations. Yet, despite the relatively light opposition normally faced by expeditionary forces, they enjoyed only limited freedom of maneuver. In virtually every case, the need to secure ports and, after 1945, airfields dictated initial objectives and constrained subsequent actions. The fact that many areas lacked extensive facilities mattered little; essential anchorages or landing strips could be improved. While initially committed forces might possess the capability for amphibious or airborne assault, follow-on forces and their logistics support required protected ports of entry. Modern strategic sea and airlift continue to demand safe havens to unload, while the forces they deliver consume vast quantities of supplies. In fact, as military forces became more technologically advanced, their need for ports and airfields increased. Whereas British expeditions and American landings early in the century might partially support themselves off the local infrastructure, their successors deploying to undeveloped regions in the final decade could not. Expeditionary forces increasingly found it necessary to secure a base area as a prerequisite to accomplishing their primary mission. In developing their plans, operational commanders relied on two echelons of forces. The first consisted primarily of forward deployed units. Often naval, these forces routinely maintained a continuous presence in distant parts of the world, showing the flag and prepared for sudden crisis. As such, they provided quick reaction capabilities. The British after World War II hastily deployed units based in Singapore and Hong Kong to crises in Malaya, Brunei, and Indonesia. The United States relied extensively on Marines and landing parties embarked aboard cruising squadrons to gain footholds. Whatever their source, forward deployed forces provided initial leverage to protect interests and secure lodgements for reinforcements. Their importance cannot be overstated, for they often averted crises by their proximity and ability to subdue budding problems; failing that, they formed the vanguard for larger operations. The second echelon, consisting of follow-on forces and logistics sustainment, sailed or flew from more distant bases, often the mother country itself. Several days or weeks might elapse before their arrival. Notably, units deployed from bases near the contingency area greatly increased responsiveness and probability of success. Once on the scene, these forces expanded the operating area, continued to provide security, and, all too often, faced increased opposition from enemy bands recovered from the initial incursion. Their stay might extend weeks or even months, long after the expeditionary phase of the operation ceased. Linking forward deployed and follow-on forces usually meant an expeditionary force, by design or accident, became a joint force. Before 1940, naval forces most often executed early actions, landing sailors, Marines, and, occasionally, soldiers. Later, amphibious landings became the primary domain of Marines, who often joined with hastily airlifted airborne troops. Follow-on forces normally consisted of army units, additional naval forces and Marines, and, after 1945, air forces. Rarely did expeditionary forces consist of a single service. The relationships between components at times proved contentious. A serious row occurred at Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1914 when the Navy passed control of operations ashore to the Army; no one agreed on how the previously landed Marine brigade fit into the command structure. In addition, expeditionary forces sometimes fought alongside local or other national forces. In 1927 Shanghai, units from Japan, the United States, France, Britain, and Italy combined to guard the foreign legations in Shanghai. After World War II, United Nations involvement in crises meant that expeditionary force commanders sometimes found themselves in charge of polyglot organizations. These operational level characteristics directly affected the way tactical units carried out their responsibilities. Restoring order and protecting interests while seizing a port or airfield meant the first units deployed also found themselves securing urban or populated areas, sometimes under fire. While combat may not have equalled the more costly battles of the Western Front or Pacific Campaigns, routing snipers and machine gunners from alleys could be deadly business. Complicating the problem, political concerns frequently negated conventional tactics relying on extensive use of firepower to reduce strongpoints. As the British painfully discovered in Northern Ireland, this necessitated new approaches to urban warfare. Even after gaining control, continued security demanded constant vigilance and seemingly endless manning of checkpoints and patrols. As units moved into the countryside, the pattern continued, with extended periods of patrolling punctuated by short, intense firefights. Tactical success depended on small unit leadership, initiative, decentralized control, discipline, and a keen appreciation throughout the chain of command of the political and operational nuances of the expedition. Quite often, units as small as squad size found themselves operating semi- independently to maintain order or quell opposition. Tactical decisions fell to junior officers and non-commissioned officers and placed a premium on well- trained professionals. As the American army discovered at Santiago in 1898 and the Marines learned in Haiti in 1919, poorly trained or hastily recruited troops proved incapable of coping with the tactical rigors of expeditionary operations. Paradoxically, given the proliferation of modern weapons, expeditionary operations continually exhibited a stubborn preference for basic infantry tactics and skills. From the Boxer Rebellion to Somalia, infantrymen largely determined success or failure. Only in those infrequent cases when opposition proved stubborn or during the early stages of large scale combat operations did modern weaponry and firepower prove fully effective. In the early months of the Korean War, airpower played a pivotal role in preserving the Pusan perimeter. This, however, was an exception. In most expeditionary operations, superior firepower seldom contributed decisively, although its presence may have been sufficient to discourage potential opposition. Quite often the situation and enemy threat precluded effective use of air, naval, and artillery fires.9 Instead, small unit infantry tactics prevailed. The Marines who deployed to the Dominican Republic in 1916 might easily have returned in 1965 with little additional training. The fundamental strategic, operational, and tactical characteristics of expeditionary operations demonstrated over the past 90 years offer a useful model. While future operations may differ their specifics, they will contain similar traits to guide planners and commanders. Expeditionary forces can expect to operate in a lesser-developed country or region, deployed hastily to restore order and protect citizens or property and limited by political and operational constraints. The joint task force commander's freedom of maneuver will be restricted by the need to secure a suitable port and airfield. The first units on the scene, composed of relatively small forward deployed forces, will meet limited resistance as they attempt to clear opposition from the urban areas surrounding their objectives. The task, however, will be complicated by the requirement to limit damage and casualties, thereby placing a premium on small unit discipline, initiative, and infantry skills. Firepower and high technology weapons, while perhaps psychologically overpowering, may be of only limited utility. With the establishment of at least local stability, additional units will arrive to expand the lodgement and continue pacifying the area, perhaps against resurgent opposition outside the immediate environs of the ports of entry. These forces can expect to remain for weeks, if not months, while political leaders and diplomats hammer out lasting solutions. Although the details of each operation may differ, the basic attributes will persist. If this model presents a dilemma to force and operational planners, it also provides guidance. Weapons proliferation and increasing sophistication of armed forces throughout the world present potentially very dangerous threats. Yet, while force structure decisions demand attention to the possibility of wartime combat against enemies armed with modern weapons, highly trained, relatively lightly armed, strategically mobile units seem more relevant to expeditionary operations. Despite justifiable concern over the expanding military capabilities of the Third World, the historical record indicates this apprehension may be mitigated by political, operational, and tactical realities. Expeditionary forces must be capable of balancing the need for overcoming initial opposition with the inevitable political constraints and operational imperatives under which they will operate. The fundamental traits exhibited in expeditionary operations for the past century remain valid even in the face of the rapid changes confronting today's international political scene. These characteristics offer counsel to those who must execute similar operations in the future. Military plans for the coming decades will inevitably fall short if not based on a clear understanding of the practice and patterns of expeditionary operations. As the military forces of the United States prepare for the challenges of the coming years, they would do well to remember the past. ENDNOTES 1. General Carl Mundy, USMC, "Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection: Into the 21st Century," Marine Corps Gazette, January, 1992, p. 15. 2. The National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: GPO, 1992, passim; "Mobility Requirements Study," Defense, March- April, 1992, p.30. 3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub. 1-02, Washington, DC: GPO, 1990, p. 138. 4. Colonel C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers, London: HMSO, 1906, repr. Presidio Press, 1990, pp. 21-28. 5. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, Washington, DC: GPO, 1940, para. 1-1. 6. Based on an expeditionary operations database developed by the author from multiple sources. Subsequent discussion, unless otherwise specifically noted, is drawn from the database. 7. Adm. Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992, passim. 8. Callwell, Op. Cit.,p.42. 9. Although dealing with the larger scale limited wars of the post-World War II years, Robert H. Scales, Jr. notes that terrain, political restraints, training, motivation, and the logistics tail associated with firepower can negate many of its effects. Robert H. Scales, Jr., Firepower in Limited War, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1990, passim. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bartlett, Merrill L., Assault From the Sea Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 2. Bolger, Daniel P., Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988. 3. Callwell, Col. C.E., Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers London: HMSO, 1906, repr. by Presidio Press, 1990. 4. Castillon, Lt. Col. Michel L., "Low Intensity Conflict in the 1980s: The French Experience." Military Review January 1986: 68-77. 5. Cole, Bernard D., Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925-1928 Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1983. 6. 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