The Regimentalized Division CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Regimentalized Division Author: Major Paul B. Malone IV, United States Army Thesis: With the collapse of the communist block, the United States Army needs to reorganize, not just downsize, into a more flexible organization to meet the many challenges expected in the 21st Century. That structure is the "regimentalized division." Background: The Army is undergoing a reduction of approximately one half its peak strength of 781,000 personnel. Although, the Warsaw Pact is gone, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated the need to retain the dynamic heavy armored capability that decisively won the land war with such few losses. The Army also needs to retain the capability to respond to contingency operations with quick strike forces such as the light forces that conducted the invasions of Grenada and Panama. In the past, approximately half of the Army divisions were focused upon heavy operations while the other half was focused upon light operations. The tactics, equipment, operational tempo, logistics and strategic deployability made heavy and light forces incompatible on the same battlefield. This was not terribly important when the Army could field ten heavy divisions to an armored crisis and another eight light divisions to contingencies around the world. Now the Army will have to be able to accomplish both missions with between eight to twelve divisions. This paper is about the Army becoming more flexible and, in the process, maintaining a multi- mission capability with reduced resources. Recommendations: Recommend that the Army reorganize its divisions, with the exceptions of the airborne division and air assault division, into regimentalized divisions. OUTLINE Thesis: With the collapse of the communist block, the United States Army needs to reorganize, not just downsize, into a more flexible organization to meet the myriad of challenges expected in the 21st Century. I. Why change? A. Congress and the President has directed the reduction in forces of as low as one-half its peak size B. Luxury of structuring the force to meet separate threats in separate environments C. The remaining force must be flexible enough to respond to threats in all environments II. Historical perspective of U.S. Army Structure A. Militia regiments prior to Revolutionary War B. Continental Army regiments C. Regiments from the end of the Revolution to Civil War D. Regiments in the Civil and Spanish American Wars E. Regiments in World War I and the "square division" F. Regiments in World War II and the "triangular division" G. Regiments in the Korean War H. The Pentomic Division and the end of the regiments I. The ROAD Division, Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars III. Current Situation, a heavy and a light Army structure A. Reductions to 12 divisions, seven heavy and five light B. Heavy force structure C. Light force structure D. Reserve components E. Training F. Downsizing versus commitments IV. Solution, regimentalize A. Flexibility and maximized combat potential B. Light force restructuring C. Heavy force restructuring D. Reserve force restructuring E. Improvements in training F. Meeting our commitments V. Conclusion A. Historical legacy, a "hollow Army" B. Heavy comparison of current downsized structure versus regimentalized structure C. Light comparison of current downsized structure versus regimentalized structure D. Flexible yet, capable THE REGIMENTALIZED DIVISION I. WHY CHANGE? On 3 November 1992, the American people voted for change and elected Bill Clinton, the 42d President of the United States. Among the many promises that he made as a candidate were an increased peace dividend and a reduction of the deficit. President Clinton vowed to reduce the military from President Bush's floor of 1.6 million personnel to 1.4 million. Pressures to reduce the military below that number and increase savings from the Department of Defense abound in Congress and around the country. The final reduction figure is, as yet, unknown. The Army's expected reduction from 781,000 to 535,000 personnel under President Bush will be much greater now. The 535,000 personnel number envisioned 12 divisions in the active Army. The true number of divisions may be closer to eight or ten before the reductions are finished. Before the initial drawdown, the Army consisted of 18 divisions: ten heavy divisions (armor, mechanized infantry, armored cavalry) designed to combat a Soviet-style threat on the plains of Europe and eight light divisions (infantry, light infantry, airborne, air assault) designed for contingency operations and operations in restricted terrain. Historically, the heavy divisions and light divisions experienced great difficulty operating and interacting on the same battlefield because of differences in strategic mobility, firepower, tempo, logistics, tactical mobility, and protection. The solution in the past was to field a heavy army for one environment and a light army for another. The result is two incompatible armies. The United States Army needs to reorganize, not just downsize, into a more flexible and integrated organization to meet the myriad of challenges expected in the 21st century. The organization that most economically ensures that the division can operate in all environments and against all known threats is the "regimentalized division." This proposal is, that with the exceptions of the 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Divisions (Air Assault) which have unique capabilities, the remaining divisions would be organized into three basic combat maneuver regiments with appropriate supporting units. One regiment would be armor, the next mechanized, and the last infantry. (See figure 1) The mechanized regiment would have no dismounted infantry assigned. When mechanized infantry forces are required, units from the mechanized and the infantry regiments would be task organized. The flexibility and savings of this proposal is that the infantry can be deployed independently as light infantry. Further, the dismounted infantry positions in the mechanized regiment do not exist. This savings allows a greater number of positions in additional active divisions and regiments. The division, or elements thereof, has the capability to operate in all land combat environments after task organizing. (See figure 2) To illustrate the need, the utility, and importance of this structural change this paper is subdivided into three sections. The first is a historical perspective on the regiments which traces the structural organization of the Army since 1775. The second section is a discussion of the current situation in regard to the incompatible heavy light mix of divisions. The last section discusses restructuring the force, both active and reserve components, as regimentalized divisions. This proposal brings back the regiment to the permanent Army structure. The regiment is the traditional home of Army units and was lost during previous structural changes. Some brigades have become unofficial regiments to reestablish their lineage, honors, history, and cohesiveness. Brigades will become ad hoc organizations (task forces) formed for specific missions with a regiment or parts of regiments as their bases. These brigade task forces will be commanded by brigadier generals or colonels depending upon the mission. While recognizing that modern ground combat forces include a complex array of interdependent components, the particular focus of this paper is upon infantry forces. Throughout the history of warfare and into the foreseeable future, in combat of all intensities and in all types of terrain, there will be a critical need for ground combat infantryman to seize and hold terrain, control populations and close with and either capture or destroy the enemy. Whether they travel to the battle area by land, sea or air; whether they move within the battle area by foot, wheeled vehicle, snowmobile, armored personnel carrier, or helicopter; infantrymen will be required. In order to add clarity to the proposal in this paper, the roles and missions of other combat, combat support and combat service support elements will not be discussed in detail. There is no intention to denigrate their vital contribution to victory in combat. This paper focuses on maximizing the utility of the Army's "all purpose weapon," the infantryman. II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. ARMY REGIMENTAL STRUCTURE The history of the regiments in America is older than the United States itself. It began with the British system of universal military service through the colonial militia during the period of 1607 through 1754. The American colonies in the seventeenth century were much too poor to permit a class of able-bodied men to devote themselves solely to war and preparation for war.. .no colony could afford to maintain professional soldiers. Yet... colonies remained subject to military danger, potentially from Spain and France and actually from the Indians. Therefore, every colony needed military protection, and every colony ... obtained[ed] it by invoking ... universal obligation to military service... to create a military force of armed civilians. (31:4) During this period, there were four major conflicts including King William's War (1689-97), Queen Anne's War (1702- 13), King George's War (1739-49) and the French and Indian War (1754-63). Despite these conflicts, the British committed no sizable force to the colonies until after 1755. The colonies were essentially on their own in regard to their own security. The militia was generally organized into companies ranging from 65 to 200 personnel, and, in some states, these companies were grouped into regiments. The regiments were primarily infantry because artillery and cavalry seemed too extravagant.(25:10) Despite some notable exceptions such as Roger's Rangers, most militia units did poorly in combat, and the system was deteriorating when the Massachusetts Minutemen met General Gages' British Regulars at Lexington and Concord beginning the American Revolutionary War. On 14 June 1775, the Continental Congress joined in the cause with the New England colonies and authorized the formation of ten companies of riflemen and absorbed the New England Colonial Militia thus giving birth to the Continental Army. (25:12-14) The organizations used during the Revolution varied from colony to colony, but the basic two that were present were companies of 50 to 100 soldiers and regiments that consisted of eight to ten companies. Battalions were synonymous with regiments for most of the next century. The greatest challenge that General George Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, had was keeping his army in the field. The colonies and the Continental Congress failed to authorize the long-term enlistments for the army (most were for three months), and as soon as the troops were trained their enlistments terminated. (25:15-17) The Continental Army eventually raised 88 regiments of infantry from the colonies and an additional 16 regiments of federal troops. Their effectiveness was suspect because they were continually consolidated and absorbed into other organizations due to losses in battle, desertions and short-term enlistments. When Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown on 18 October 1781, there were 60 regiments of infantry in the Continental Army; by November 1783 there remained only one. On 2 June 1784, the Congress eliminated the last regiment of infantry, leaving only 80 artillerymen in the Continental Army. (3:8) From 3 June 1784 to the present, the Army has had Regular Army infantry troops normally organized into regiments and companies. The oldest regiment, the 3rd Infantry, the Old Guard, traces its lineage back to the First American Regiment, which was known until 3 March 1815. The consolidation of 46 infantry regiments into eight after the War of 1812 was done according to the seniority of the commanders of the surviving eight regiments. The old 1st Regimental Commander was the third most senior thus the 3d Infantry became the oldest regiment in the Army. (3:12-15) Between the Mexican and the Civil Wars, the concept of platoons (half companies), sections (half platoons), and squads (half sections) emerged due to the increasing lethality of the weapons. This increased range and accuracy resulted in more dispersion and required a more active chain of command and increased subordinate initiative. (3:16,17) When the Civil War began in 1861, there were only ten regiments in the Regular Army scattered in company outposts primarily in the West. Only nine more Regular infantry regiments were raised for the Civil War, while the rest were volunteer regiments from the states. These regiments numbered over 1,700 for the North. (3:21) Brigades were groupings of four or more regiments, while divisions consisted of three or more brigades and, finally, corps consisted of several divisions. (26:97) The South had 642 regiments, each with companies of around 100 enlisted. (3:23) After the Civil War, the Regular Army expanded to 45 regiments to preside over the South and fight the Indians in the West. In 1869, the 45 regiments were reconsolidated into 25 which lasted until the Spanish American War. (3:26,27) In 1898, the United States found itself at war with Spain with only 13,000 Regular infantry troops. Due to the improvements in range, accuracy, volume of fire of repeating rifles, and command and control difficulties from increased dispersion, the ten company regimental organization appeared obsolete. Thus, three battalions of four companies of 127 enlisted each became the new regiments. The new regimental strength was 1309 as compared to 878 during the Civil War. The new battalions compared to Civil War regiments in regard to dispersion and firepower. The Regular Army did not expand in regard to structure; it stayed at 25 regiments. A total of 141 regiments (mostly Volunteer) served in the war although many of these for less than a year. (3:28-30) The Army raised was formed into seven corps. A corps consisted of three divisions, while a division consisted of three brigades and a brigade consisted of three regiments. (25:140) During World War I, 297 infantry regiments were eventually raised. This war was the first in which the machine gun was used extensively, and it forced another change in the structure of the Army. Due to the trench warfare and emphasis on attrition, the United States Army developed a very personnel intensive "square" division concept. A division of 28,000 men consisted of two brigades of infantry (8,500 men each). Each brigade consisted of two infantry regiments (3,800 men each) and a machinegun battalion. Each regiment consisted of three battalions, and headquarters, supply and machinegun companies. The battalion still consisted of four rifle companies (250 men each). Companies consisted of four platoons (58 men each). During the 18 months that the United States was a belligerent in the war, 42 divisions entered Europe and 29 actually fought. (25:160,161) Between the World Wars, the Army shrank drastically in size. In 1939, on the eve of World War II, the Army had only 189,832 troops organized in five divisions but scattered in smaller organizations across the country. The Army had reverted back to the "triangular" division organization which eliminated brigades and had three regiments subordinate to the division. This was done because it was believed that the larger square organization of World War I would be too awkward and immobile on the more fluid battlefields of World War II. The tank was part of the infantry at this time, and the cavalry still included 12 regiments on horse back. (4:4,5,30,35,58,66) Within the infantry regiment there were some changes. In the battalion, the fourth company became the heavy weapons company and included machine guns and mortars. The remaining rifle companies consisted of three rather than four rifle platoons and a weapons platoon containing 60 mm mortars and 30 caliber machineguns. Squads increased from eight to twelve men with both a sergeant and corporal as squad leader and assistant squad leader respectively. At the regimental level, there was an anti-tank company. By the end of the war, there were 288 infantry regiments and the strength of each one was almost 4,000 troops. (3:45-47) By July 1940, tanks were no longer part of the infantry and, in fact, there were no tanks in an infantry division. There were several new types of divisions including armored, airborne, mountain, light and motorized. The armored and airborne divisions were considered extremely effective while both the motorized and light divisions were discontinued before any serious commitment to combat. The mountain division arrived late to the Italian theater and saw limited action. Light infantry served successfully at the battalion and regimental levels in the 1st through 6th Ranger Battalions and in other special operating units. However, the 67 infantry divisions bore the brunt of the combat action in all Army theaters. (3:47-61) Between World War II and the Korean War, the reduction of the armed forces to balance the national budget, particularly the Army, was severe to the point of disastrous. The Army had 591,000 troops spread among ten under-strength divisions in the Far East, Europe and the United States. The divisions consisted of three regiments of only two battalions. The equipment was left over from World War II, and the remaining units were undermanned and undertrained.(6:25-28) Major General Matthew B. Ridgway described the Army before the Korean War, "We were, in short, in a shameful state of unreadiness."(6:28) Unlike World Wars I and II, this was a "come as you are war." On 24 June 1950, the North Korean Army invaded South Korea. By 1 July, an under-strength infantry battalion task force, from occupation duty in Japan was being mauled in Korea. (11:89-101) It was followed by the rest of the division. Then three more divisions and several separate regiments were committed. All were threatened with being thrown into the sea. It was truly a desperate time for the Army and attached Marine units. (6:94.95) The organization that the Army used during the Korean war was essentially the same one that had been used during World War II, the triangular division. All of the divisions committed to the war were infantry divisions, and eventually all were restored to their three regiments of three battalion structure. Regimental Combat Teams (RCT), which were left over from World War II, were integrated back into divisions to bring them to full strength. The divisions did not have organic tank battalions but six tank battalions were sent from the United States to be attached to divisions. (21:36) There was only one armored division on active duty in the Army and it was kept in reserve because Korea was considered poor tank country. (6:182.183,212) The Soviets detonation of an atomic bomb contributed to the creation of an atomic structure, the Pentomic Division. This radical and short-lived structure eliminated, for the first time, regiments from the Army. The three regiments of the division were replaced by five battle groups. The battle group not only eliminated the regiment but also the battalion so that command could be held at the grades of captain and colonel only. Five huge companies reported directly to the battle group commander. This unwieldy organization lasted only four years. (21:36-38) In 1962, the new division emerged the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD). The ROAD division came in five "flavors;" the old, infantry, armored, airborne, and the new, mechanized infantry and airmobile. All of the divisions had a common base of combat support and combat service support units. The triangular structure was retained but major maneuver headquarters were called brigades instead of regiments. The allocation of battalions was flexible (mixing armor and mechanized infantry) with regard to combat maneuver battalions. (21:38-47) The ROAD division endured during the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and the Persian Gulf War and, in fact, is the basis for the organization that is in use today. The weapons systems have changed in the past 20 years and there is an aviation brigade where there once was a battalion, but otherwise the changes have been minor only. (29:1-1-1-4) III. CURRENT SITUATION, A HEAVY AND A LIGHT ARMY STRUCTURE On 22 March 1993, the Army Times announced the deactivation of the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions (Light) and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. These reductions bring the active force to 12 divisions. The current breakout of remaining divisions include four mechanized infantry (1st, 3d, 4th, and 24th), two armored (1st and 2d), one cavalry (1st), one Infantry (2d), two light infantry (10th and 25th), one airborne (82d), and one air assault (101st).(5:12) This force structure is seven heavy divisions (four mechanized infantry, two armored, one cavalry) and five light divisions (one infantry, two light infantry, one airborne and one air assault). Only seven of these 12 divisions have all three active brigades. This compares to the ten heavy and eight light divisions that were available in the 18 division structure. The ROAD armor and mechanized infantry divisions developed the current organization that heavy divisions operate under today. The brigades normally consist of three battalions, two armor and one mechanized infantry, or vice versa. These organizations were ideal when the mission, enemy, terrain, troops available and time were all known and could be assumed. These heavy organizations were extremely successful against a second class opponent in the Gulf War. In fact, they were so successful that it has given people a false sense of security believing that it will always be that easy.(See figure 1, Current Heavy Division) (29:1-2) Heavy forces differ from light forces in several significant ways. Heavy forces, the most potent land combat organizations that the United States possesses, are designed for the highest intensity conventional conflict in open terrain. They have tremendous firepower, tactical mobility (speed and tempo), and armor protection. The disadvantages of heavy forces include slow strategic projection into theater, the tremendous logistics required to sustain a heavy operation, and limited capability to operate in restrictive terrain such as mountains or jungle. Fielding a force capable of decisive victory in high intensity combat is a requirement that must be met. Light infantry forces are units that possess no organic heavy equipment, fight on foot, in restricted terrain, often at night, and are strategically mobile.(able to be easily airlifted into a theater of operation)(19:xi) By design, there are four characteristics that should distinguish light infantry from other infantry. These are self-reliance, mastery of the environment and infantry skills, versatility and high esprit. Light infantry units learn to operate in an austere environments and are tied logistically to whatever they can carry on their backs. Due to their firepower and transportation inferiority, they must be masters of terrain and organic weapons and must often operate at night in rugged terrain. This training and attitude develops unique versatility and initiative over time; thus they may accomplish a variety of missions. Finally, this training, superior physical fitness and stamina, and ability to do without significant logistics breeds a high degree of esprit.(19:219-220) The reserve components have served with the Regular Army in every war. They have been criticized for their lack of training, discipline, and professionalism each time. Despite this, the United States has been unable in the past to maintain a Regular Army force large enough to respond to any large scale conflict without the assistance of the reserve components. The reserve component is the professional military's link with the American people. They bring the commitment of the American people to support the war when the citizen soldiers have to leave their jobs and families and go to war. This dependence on the reserve components also tends to dispel some "elitism" images in the Army. The heavy involvement of the reserve components during Desert Shield/Storm helped to cement America's commitment to victory. As successful as the combat support and combat service support units of the reserve were, the combat units were not combat ready. This points to a flaw in the way reserve combat units are trained, evaluated, and integrated into the National Defense Strategy. Training is the glue that keeps the Army together. Units train on their Mission Essential Tasks List (METL) which are the missions that they are expected to perform in combat. Heavy units have different METL tasks than light units do. All infantrymen in the Army are trained at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Home of the Infantry. The average enlisted infantry soldier gets the same training for the majority of his combined basic and advanced infantry training. At the end of the training cycle, the troops are divided by their military occupational specialties and become light infantry, mechanized infantry, indirect fire infantry [mortars], or heavy anti-armor infantry [TOW missile]. The remainder of their training is accomplished on-the-job at their permanent duty station in their units. Officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the infantry receive extensive training on both light, mechanized, and combined arms operations during their required educational schooling periodically during their careers. One of the problems with mechanized infantry is that training is centered around operating and maintaining the vehicle. The squad consists of nine men at full strength. This requires a three-man crew to operate the vehicle and leaves six men to operate as the dismounted element. Most often, the squads do not have the nine men authorized and tactics require that the infantry stay close to the vehicle to be mutually supporting. Thus the training of the dismounted infantry suffers as a result of being dependent upon the vehicle. Light infantry units emphasize their infantry training because they are more people intensive than equipment intensive and have less restrictions in training areas. Additionally, light infantry units cost less to train because of less overhead for fuel and repair parts and thus can afford to conduct unit training more often. Light infantry troops train on their infantry skills much more often than mechanized troops as a rule. The opportunities to maximize their training time is much greater for the light infantry. With the downsizing of the Army, its commitments have not been reduced. For contingency operations, the best force normally is a light infantry unit since the mechanized infantry cannot be separated from their vehicles and the expense of moving heavy forces is normally considered not cost effective. While most contingency operations are short term, the Army has provided an infantry battalion to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai since 1982 and habitually, provides infantry companies to Central America, Honduras and Cuba, for security missions. Humanitarian relief missions are on the rise in Somalia and in the United States. The ideal force to send to these operations has been light forces. There will be an increasing demand to provide light forces to contingency operations in the future. IV. SOLUTION, REGIMENTALIZE The United States has committed itself to reduced investment in defense. Despite the fact that World War III appears unlikely, future demands on military forces may be severe and unpredictable. With manpower reduced to approximately half of the 1980s strength, the Army must turn to flexibility to maximize the combat potential of its surviving operational units. One approach to increased flexibility is the regimentalized division. The ground maneuver core of a regimentalized division consists of three regiments: an infantry regiment, a mechanized regiment and an armor regiment. The regimentalized division eliminates the light infantry division but retains a light infantry regiment in each division. This provides each division the capability to provide a light brigade size task force to a contingency operation as rapidly as airlift can move them. If required, these can be combined into light division equivalents. (See figure 2, Light Contingency). The regimentalized division is designed for heavy operations after task organization across the three regiments. The mechanized regiment task organizes with a like number of units in the infantry regiment. Each regiment exchanges half of its strength, vehicles for infantry, to form two mechanized regiments. Further task organization with the armor regiment results in three combined arms brigades, the same as in a ROAD division.(See figure 2, Heavy Contingency) The reserve components will be structured in the same manner. The reserve regiments will be affiliated with an active duty division. If one of the active regiments is on a contingency operation, then a reserve regiment will be put on a higher state of readiness to deploy with the active division as one of its regiments. This will improve the interaction between active and reserve components. This will also help the reserves concentrate their training time on the skills required for their type of regiment instead of trying to satisfy multiple MOS training requirements. Regimentalized divisions will improve training. The weapons systems today are so sophisticated and the training schedule is so full that it is impossible to train on all of the METL tasks properly. The mechanized regiments can concentrate on gunnery, maintenance, and mounted movement techniques while the infantry regiment concentrates on infantry skills, small arms marksmanship, self reliance, and physical fitness. The mechanized MOS would only be for the crews of the vehicles. All dismounted infantry would be trained to operate out of vehicles, helicopters, or on foot. Leaders would continue to be educated in both heavy and light operations. The National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center would continue to be the standard for large unit training for heavy and light operations respectively. The light divisions assist in meeting our low intensity commitments throughout the world. This proposal eliminates the light divisions. The light regiments of each division will ensure those commitments are fulfilled and the reserve component regimentalized divisions will backfill the active regiments during other contingencies. Using this proposal the capability of a division is enhanced. V. CONCLUSION The Army has no idea how much more it will be told to reduce. Historically, the United States has drastically reduced the size of the beyond what was prudent. Each time this resulted in an "hollow Army" that either met disaster during its first enemy encounter or took years to get ready while other allies bore the brunt of battle. Regimentalized divisions ensure the flexibility to operate in all land environments and across the spectrum of conflict with all of our divisions. This concept will also ensure that the reserve components will be better integrated to back up and fight along side the active component. Take the example of an Army of eight divisions. This proposal yields one airborne, one air assault, and six regimentalized divisions. The current organization, reduced to eight divisions would yield one airborne, one air assault, one light division, and five heavy divisions. (1:77) Using the Desert Storm model, the current organization would leave only one light division uncommitted while the regimentalized concept would have one more regimentalized division than was necessary for Desert Storm. (7:US Army 29) Regimentalized divisions could be further enlarged if merged with reserve regiments.(Compare figures 3+4) Consider a light infantry scenerio using the same eight division Army. The six regimentalized divisions could field two composite divisions from their infantry regiments and the airborne and air assault divisions for a total of four. The current organization would only be able to yield three light divisions: an airborne, an air assault, and a light. The current organization would again be short a division. (Compare figure 3+4) The smaller Army must change its structure to a more flexible one to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. 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