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Military

The Regimentalized Division
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
                         EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:   The Regimentalized Division
Author:  Major Paul B. Malone IV, United States Army
Thesis:  With  the collapse  of the communist  block, the  United
States Army needs to  reorganize, not just downsize, into  a more
flexible organization to meet the many challenges expected in the
21st Century.  That structure is the "regimentalized division."
Background:  The Army is  undergoing a reduction of approximately
one half its peak  strength of 781,000 personnel.   Although, the
Warsaw Pact is gone,  the Persian Gulf War demonstrated  the need
to retain  the dynamic  heavy armored capability  that decisively
won  the land war with  such few losses.  The  Army also needs to
retain the  capability to respond to  contingency operations with
quick strike forces such  as the light forces that  conducted the
invasions of Grenada and Panama.  In the past, approximately half
of the  Army divisions were  focused upon heavy  operations while
the other half was  focused upon light operations.   The tactics,
equipment,   operational   tempo,    logistics   and    strategic
deployability  made heavy  and light  forces incompatible  on the
same  battlefield.  This was not terribly important when the Army
could  field ten heavy divisions to an armored crisis and another
eight light divisions to contingencies around the world.  Now the
Army  will have  to  be able  to  accomplish both  missions  with
between eight to twelve divisions.  This paper is about  the Army
becoming more  flexible and, in the process, maintaining a multi-
mission capability with reduced resources.
Recommendations:    Recommend   that  the  Army   reorganize  its
divisions, with the  exceptions of the airborne division  and air
assault division, into regimentalized divisions.
                         OUTLINE
Thesis:  With  the collapse  of the communist  block, the  United
States Army needs to  reorganize, not just downsize, into  a more
flexible organization  to meet the myriad  of challenges expected
in the 21st Century.
     I.  Why change?
          A.   Congress and the President has directed the
               reduction in forces of as low as one-half its peak
               size
          B.   Luxury of structuring  the force to meet  separate
               threats in separate environments
          C.   The remaining  force  must be  flexible enough  to
               respond to threats in all environments
     II.  Historical perspective of U.S. Army Structure
          A.   Militia regiments prior to Revolutionary War
          B.   Continental Army regiments
          C.   Regiments from the end of the Revolution to
               Civil War
          D.   Regiments in the Civil and Spanish American Wars
          E.   Regiments in World War I and the "square
               division"
          F.   Regiments in World War II and the "triangular
               division"
          G.   Regiments in the Korean War
          H.   The Pentomic Division and the end of the regiments
          I.   The ROAD Division, Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars
     III. Current Situation, a heavy and a light Army structure
          A.   Reductions  to 12 divisions, seven heavy  and five
               light
          B.   Heavy force structure
          C.   Light force structure
          D.   Reserve components
          E.   Training
          F.   Downsizing versus commitments
     IV.  Solution, regimentalize
          A.   Flexibility and maximized combat potential
          B.   Light force restructuring
          C.   Heavy force restructuring
          D.   Reserve force restructuring
          E.   Improvements in training
          F.   Meeting our commitments
     V.   Conclusion
          A.   Historical legacy, a "hollow Army"
          B.   Heavy comparison of current downsized structure
               versus regimentalized structure
          C.   Light comparison of current downsized structure
               versus regimentalized structure
          D.   Flexible yet, capable
                   THE REGIMENTALIZED DIVISION
I.   WHY CHANGE?
     On 3 November 1992, the American people voted for change and
elected Bill  Clinton, the  42d President  of the United  States.
Among  the many  promises that  he made  as a  candidate were  an
increased  peace  dividend  and   a  reduction  of  the  deficit.
President  Clinton vowed  to reduce  the military  from President
Bush's  floor of 1.6 million personnel to 1.4 million.  Pressures
to reduce  the military  below that  number and  increase savings
from  the Department of Defense abound in Congress and around the
country.  The final reduction figure is, as yet, unknown.
     The  Army's  expected  reduction  from  781,000  to  535,000
personnel under President Bush will be much greater now.
The  535,000  personnel number  envisioned  12  divisions in  the
active Army.  The true number of divisions may be closer to eight
or ten before the reductions are finished.
     Before  the  initial  drawdown,  the Army  consisted  of  18
divisions:   ten  heavy divisions  (armor,  mechanized  infantry,
armored cavalry) designed to combat a Soviet-style threat on  the
plains  of  Europe and  eight  light  divisions (infantry,  light
infantry,  airborne,   air  assault)  designed   for  contingency
operations and  operations in restricted terrain.   Historically,
the  heavy  divisions  and   light  divisions  experienced  great
difficulty  operating  and interacting  on  the  same battlefield
because  of differences in  strategic mobility, firepower, tempo,
logistics, tactical  mobility, and  protection.  The  solution in
the  past was  to field a  heavy army  for one  environment and a
light army for another.  The result is two incompatible armies.
     The  United  States  Army  needs  to  reorganize,  not  just
downsize,  into a  more flexible  and integrated  organization to
meet the myriad of challenges expected  in the 21st century.  The
organization that most economically ensures that the division can
operate  in all environments and against all known threats is the
"regimentalized  division."   This  proposal  is,  that with  the
exceptions of  the 82d Airborne  Division and the  101st Airborne
Divisions  (Air  Assault)  which  have unique  capabilities,  the
remaining divisions  would be  organized into three  basic combat
maneuver  regiments  with  appropriate  supporting  units.    One
regiment would  be  armor,  the next  mechanized,  and  the  last
infantry.  (See figure 1)  The mechanized  regiment would have no
dismounted infantry  assigned.   When mechanized  infantry forces
are  required,  units  from   the  mechanized  and  the  infantry
regiments would be  task organized.  The flexibility  and savings
of  this   proposal  is  that   the  infantry  can   be  deployed
independently  as  light  infantry.    Further,  the   dismounted
infantry positions in the mechanized regiment do not exist.  This
savings allows a greater number of positions in additional active
divisions and regiments.   The division, or elements thereof, has
the capability to operate in  all land combat environments  after
task organizing.  (See figure 2)
     To illustrate the need, the utility,  and importance of this
structural change  this paper is subdivided  into three sections.
The  first is  a historical  perspective on  the regiments  which
traces the structural organization of the Army  since 1775.   The
second section is a discussion of the current situation in regard
to  the  incompatible heavy  light mix  of  divisions.   The last
section  discusses  restructuring  the  force,  both  active  and
reserve components, as regimentalized divisions.
     This proposal brings back the regiment to the permanent Army
structure.   The regiment is  the traditional home  of Army units
and was lost  during previous structural changes.   Some brigades
have become  unofficial regiments  to reestablish  their lineage,
honors, history,  and cohesiveness.  Brigades will  become ad hoc
organizations (task  forces) formed for specific  missions with a
regiment or parts  of regiments  as their bases.   These  brigade
task  forces will be commanded  by brigadier generals or colonels
depending upon the mission.
     While recognizing that modern ground combat forces include a
complex array of interdependent  components, the particular focus
of this paper is upon infantry forces.  Throughout the history of
warfare  and  into  the  foreseeable future,  in  combat  of  all
intensities and in all types of terrain, there will be a critical
need for  ground combat  infantryman to  seize and  hold terrain,
control populations and close with and either capture  or destroy
the  enemy.  Whether they travel to  the battle area by land, sea
or air; whether they move within the battle area by foot, wheeled
vehicle,  snowmobile, armored  personnel carrier,  or helicopter;
infantrymen  will be required.   In order  to add  clarity to the
proposal in this paper,  the roles and missions of  other combat,
combat support  and combat service  support elements will  not be
discussed  in detail.  There  is no intention  to denigrate their
vital contribution to victory  in combat.  This paper  focuses on
maximizing the  utility of the  Army's "all purpose  weapon," the
infantryman.
II.  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. ARMY REGIMENTAL STRUCTURE
     The  history of the regiments  in America is  older than the
United  States itself.    It began  with  the British  system  of
universal military  service through  the colonial  militia during
the period of 1607 through 1754.
     The American  colonies in the seventeenth  century were much
     too  poor to  permit a  class of  able-bodied men  to devote
     themselves solely to war and preparation for war.. .no colony
     could  afford to  maintain  professional  soldiers.   Yet...
     colonies  remained subject  to military  danger, potentially
     from  Spain  and  France  and  actually  from  the  Indians.
     Therefore,  every colony  needed  military  protection,  and
     every colony  ... obtained[ed] it by  invoking ... universal
     obligation to military service... to create a military force
     of armed civilians. (31:4)
     During  this   period,  there  were   four  major  conflicts
including King  William's War (1689-97), Queen  Anne's War (1702-
13),  King George's War (1739-49)  and the French  and Indian War
(1754-63).   Despite  these conflicts,  the British  committed no
sizable force to  the colonies  until after 1755.   The  colonies
were  essentially on their own  in regard to  their own security.
The militia  was generally organized into  companies ranging from
65  to 200 personnel, and,  in some states,  these companies were
grouped into  regiments.   The regiments were  primarily infantry
because artillery and cavalry seemed too extravagant.(25:10)
     Despite  some notable  exceptions such  as Roger's  Rangers,
most  militia  units did  poorly in  combat,  and the  system was
deteriorating when the Massachusetts Minutemen met General Gages'
British Regulars at Lexington  and Concord beginning the American
Revolutionary War.   On  14 June  1775, the  Continental Congress
joined  in the cause with the New England colonies and authorized
the formation of ten  companies of riflemen and absorbed  the New
England  Colonial Militia  thus giving  birth to  the Continental
Army. (25:12-14)
     The  organizations used  during the  Revolution  varied from
colony  to colony,  but  the basic  two  that were  present  were
companies of 50 to  100 soldiers and regiments that  consisted of
eight  to  ten  companies.     Battalions  were  synonymous  with
regiments for most of  the next century.  The  greatest challenge
that  General   George  Washington,  Commander-in-Chief   of  the
Continental Army, had  was keeping  his army in  the field.   The
colonies  and the  Continental Congress  failed to  authorize the
long-term enlistments  for the army (most were for three months),
and  as  soon  as  the  troops  were  trained  their  enlistments
terminated. (25:15-17)  The Continental Army  eventually raised 88
regiments  of infantry  from the  colonies and  an additional  16
regiments  of federal  troops.   Their effectiveness  was suspect
because  they  were continually  consolidated  and absorbed  into
other  organizations  due to  losses  in  battle, desertions  and
short-term enlistments.  When  Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown
on 18 October 1781,  there were 60  regiments of infantry in  the
Continental Army; by November 1783 there remained only one.  On 2
June 1784, the Congress eliminated the last regiment of infantry,
leaving only 80 artillerymen in the Continental Army. (3:8)
     From 3 June 1784  to the present,  the Army has had  Regular
Army  infantry  troops  normally  organized  into  regiments  and
companies.  The oldest regiment, the 3rd Infantry, the Old Guard,
traces its lineage back to the First American Regiment, which was
known  until  3 March  1815.   The  consolidation of  46 infantry
regiments into eight after the War of 1812 was  done according to
the seniority of the commanders of the surviving eight regiments.
The old 1st Regimental  Commander was the third most  senior thus
the 3d Infantry became the oldest regiment in the Army. (3:12-15)
     Between  the  Mexican and  the  Civil Wars,  the  concept of
platoons  (half companies), sections  (half platoons), and squads
(half sections)  emerged due to  the increasing lethality  of the
weapons.  This  increased range  and accuracy resulted  in   more
dispersion  and  required  a  more active  chain  of  command and
increased subordinate initiative. (3:16,17)
     When  the Civil  War  began in  1861,  there were  only  ten
regiments  in  the Regular  Army  scattered  in company  outposts
primarily in the West.  Only nine more Regular infantry regiments
were  raised for  the Civil  War, while  the rest  were volunteer
regiments from the  states.  These regiments  numbered over 1,700
for the North. (3:21)   Brigades  were groupings of  four or  more
regiments, while  divisions consisted  of three or  more brigades
and, finally,  corps consisted of several  divisions. (26:97)  The
South  had  642  regiments, each  with  companies  of  around 100
enlisted. (3:23)
     After  the  Civil  War,  the  Regular  Army  expanded  to 45
regiments to preside over  the South and fight the Indians in the
West.   In  1869, the  45 regiments  were reconsolidated  into 25
which lasted until the Spanish American War. (3:26,27)
     In  1898, the United States  found itself at  war with Spain
with  only   13,000  Regular  infantry   troops.    Due   to  the
improvements  in range,  accuracy,  volume of  fire of  repeating
rifles,  and   command   and control  difficulties  from  increased
dispersion,   the  ten   company regimental  organization  appeared
obsolete.   Thus,    three  battalions  of  four companies  of  127
enlisted  each  became   the  new regiments.    The new  regimental
strength was  1309  as  compared to 878 during the  Civil War.  The
new  battalions  compared to  Civil  War regiments  in  regard to
dispersion and firepower.   The  Regular Army did  not expand  in
regard to structure;  it stayed at 25 regiments.   A total of 141
regiments (mostly Volunteer) served  in the war although  many of
these for less than a year. (3:28-30)  The Army  raised was formed
into seven  corps.  A corps consisted of three divisions, while a
division consisted  of three brigades and a  brigade consisted of
three regiments. (25:140)
     During World  War I, 297 infantry  regiments were eventually
raised.  This war was the first in which the machine gun was used
extensively, and it forced another change in the structure of the
Army.   Due to the trench warfare  and emphasis on attrition, the
United States Army developed  a very personnel intensive "square"
division  concept.   A division  of 28,000  men consisted  of two
brigades of infantry (8,500 men each).  Each brigade consisted of
two  infantry  regiments  (3,800   men  each)  and  a  machinegun
battalion.   Each  regiment  consisted of  three battalions,  and
headquarters, supply  and  machinegun companies.   The  battalion
still  consisted   of  four  rifle  companies   (250  men  each).
Companies consisted of four  platoons (58 men each).   During the
18 months that the United States was a belligerent in the war, 42
divisions entered Europe and 29 actually fought. (25:160,161)
     Between the World Wars, the Army shrank drastically in size.
In 1939, on  the eve of World  War II, the Army had  only 189,832
troops  organized  in five  divisions  but  scattered in  smaller
organizations  across the country.  The Army had reverted back to
the  "triangular" division organization which eliminated brigades
and  had three regiments subordinate  to the division.   This was
done because  it was believed that the larger square organization
of  World War  I would be  too awkward  and immobile  on the more
fluid  battlefields of World  War II.   The tank was  part of the
infantry  at  this  time,  and  the  cavalry  still  included  12
regiments on horse back. (4:4,5,30,35,58,66)
     Within the  infantry regiment there  were some changes.   In
the  battalion,  the  fourth  company became  the  heavy  weapons
company and  included machine  guns and  mortars.  The  remaining
rifle  companies  consisted  of  three  rather  than  four  rifle
platoons  and a weapons platoon  containing 60 mm mortars and 30
caliber machineguns.  Squads  increased from eight to  twelve men
with both a sergeant  and corporal as squad leader  and assistant
squad leader respectively.  At the regimental level, there was an
anti-tank  company.    By the  end  of  the war,  there  were 288
infantry  regiments and the strength of each one was almost 4,000
troops. (3:45-47)
     By July 1940, tanks were no longer part of the infantry and,
in fact, there were no tanks in an infantry division.  There were
several  new types  of  divisions  including  armored,  airborne,
mountain,  light  and  motorized.     The  armored  and  airborne
divisions  were considered  extremely  effective  while both  the
motorized  and  light  divisions  were  discontinued  before  any
serious commitment to combat.  The mountain division arrived late
to  the Italian theater and  saw limited action.   Light infantry
served successfully at the battalion and regimental levels in the
1st through 6th Ranger Battalions and in  other special operating
units.   However, the 67 infantry divisions bore the brunt of the
combat action in all Army theaters. (3:47-61)
     Between  World War II and  the Korean War,  the reduction of
the armed forces to balance the national budget, particularly the
Army,  was severe  to  the point  of disastrous.    The Army  had
591,000 troops  spread among ten under-strength  divisions in the
Far  East, Europe and the United States.  The divisions consisted
of three regiments  of only  two battalions.   The equipment  was
left  over  from World War  II,  and  the  remaining units  were
undermanned and undertrained.(6:25-28)  Major  General Matthew B.
Ridgway  described the Army before  the Korean War,  "We were, in
short, in a shameful state of unreadiness."(6:28)
     Unlike  World Wars  I and II,  this was  a "come  as you are
war."    On  24 June  1950, the  North Korean  Army  invaded South
Korea.  By   1  July, an  under-strength infantry  battalion task
force,  from  occupation  duty  in  Japan  was  being  mauled  in
Korea. (11:89-101)  It was  followed by the rest of  the division.
Then  three more  divisions and  several separate  regiments were
committed.  All were  threatened with being thrown into  the sea.
It was  truly a desperate time  for the Army and  attached Marine
units. (6:94.95)
     The organization that  the Army used  during the Korean  war
was essentially the same one that had  been used during World War
II, the triangular division.   All of the divisions  committed to
the war were infantry divisions, and eventually all were restored
to   their  three   regiments  of   three   battalion  structure.
Regimental Combat  Teams (RCT), which  were left over  from World
War II, were integrated back into divisions to bring them to full
strength.  The divisions did not have organic tank battalions but
six  tank battalions  were  sent from  the  United States  to  be
attached  to  divisions. (21:36)    There  was  only  one  armored
division on  active duty in the  Army and it was  kept in reserve
because  Korea was  considered poor  tank country. (6:182.183,212)
     The Soviets detonation  of an atomic bomb contributed to the
creation  of an atomic  structure, the  Pentomic Division.   This
radical and short-lived structure eliminated, for the first time,
regiments from the  Army.   The three regiments  of the  division
were replaced by five  battle groups.  The battle  group not only
eliminated the regiment  but also the  battalion so that  command
could be  held at the grades  of captain and colonel  only.  Five
huge companies  reported directly to the  battle group commander.
This unwieldy organization lasted only four years. (21:36-38)
     In  1962,  the  new  division  emerged  the   Reorganization
Objective Army Division (ROAD).   The ROAD division came  in five
"flavors;" the old,  infantry, armored, airborne,   and the  new,
mechanized  infantry and airmobile.   All of the  divisions had a
common base of  combat support and combat  service support units.
The  triangular  structure   was  retained  but  major   maneuver
headquarters  were called  brigades  instead of  regiments.   The
allocation  of battalions  was  flexible      (mixing  armor  and
mechanized   infantry)   with    regard   to   combat    maneuver
battalions. (21:38-47)
     The ROAD division endured  during the Vietnam War, the  Cold
War, and the Persian Gulf War and, in fact, is the  basis for the
organization  that is  in use  today.   The weapons  systems have
changed  in the  past 20 years  and there is  an aviation brigade
where  there once was a battalion, but otherwise the changes have
been minor only. (29:1-1-1-4)
III.   CURRENT SITUATION, A HEAVY AND A LIGHT ARMY STRUCTURE
     On 22 March  1993, the Army Times announced the deactivation
of  the 6th  and  7th Infantry  Divisions  (Light) and  the  11th
Armored  Cavalry Regiment.    These reductions  bring the  active
force  to  12  divisions.    The current  breakout  of  remaining
divisions  include four  mechanized infantry  (1st, 3d,  4th, and
24th),  two armored (1st and 2d), one cavalry (1st), one Infantry
(2d), two light infantry (10th and 25th), one airborne (82d), and
one air  assault (101st).(5:12)   This force  structure is  seven
heavy  divisions  (four  mechanized  infantry,  two armored,  one
cavalry)  and  five  light  divisions (one  infantry,  two  light
infantry, one airborne and one air assault).  Only seven of these
12  divisions have all three  active brigades.   This compares to
the  ten heavy and eight  light divisions that  were available in
the 18 division structure.
     The ROAD armor  and mechanized infantry divisions  developed
the  current  organization  that  heavy  divisions operate  under
today.   The brigades normally  consist of three  battalions, two
armor  and  one  mechanized  infantry,  or  vice  versa.    These
organizations were ideal when the mission, enemy, terrain, troops
available  and time were all  known and could  be assumed.  These
heavy organizations  were extremely  successful against  a second
class opponent in the Gulf War.  In fact, they were so successful
that it has given people a false sense of security believing that
it  will  always  be  that  easy.(See  figure  1,  Current  Heavy
Division) (29:1-2)
     Heavy forces differ from light forces in several significant
ways.  Heavy  forces, the most  potent land combat  organizations
that   the United States  possesses, are designed  for the highest
intensity  conventional  conflict in  open  terrain.   They  have
tremendous  firepower, tactical mobility  (speed and  tempo), and
armor protection.  The disadvantages of heavy forces include slow
strategic  projection  into  theater,  the  tremendous  logistics
required to sustain a heavy  operation, and limited capability to
operate  in  restrictive terrain  such  as  mountains or  jungle.
Fielding a force  capable of decisive  victory in high  intensity
combat is a requirement that must be met.
     Light  infantry forces  are  units that  possess no  organic
heavy equipment, fight on  foot, in restricted terrain,  often at
night, and are strategically  mobile.(able to be easily airlifted
into  a theater of operation)(19:xi)   By design,  there are four
characteristics that should distinguish light infantry from other
infantry.   These are  self-reliance, mastery of  the environment
and infantry skills, versatility and high esprit.  Light infantry
units  learn to operate in  an austere environments  and are tied
logistically to whatever they can  carry on their backs.  Due  to
their  firepower and  transportation  inferiority,  they must  be
masters  of terrain and organic weapons and must often operate at
night in  rugged terrain.   This training  and attitude  develops
unique  versatility  and  initiative  over time;  thus  they  may
accomplish  a  variety  of  missions.   Finally,  this  training,
superior physical fitness and stamina,  and ability to do without
significant logistics breeds a high degree of esprit.(19:219-220)
     The reserve components  have served with the Regular Army in
every war.  They have been criticized for their lack of training,
discipline,  and professionalism  each time.   Despite  this, the
United States has been unable  in the past to maintain a  Regular
Army  force large enough to  respond to any  large scale conflict
without the assistance  of the reserve  components.  The  reserve
component is  the professional military's link  with the American
people.   They  bring the  commitment of  the American  people to
support the war  when the  citizen soldiers have  to leave  their
jobs and  families and go to war.  This dependence on the reserve
components also  tends to  dispel some  "elitism"  images in  the
Army.  The  heavy involvement  of the  reserve components  during
Desert  Shield/Storm helped  to  cement  America's commitment  to
victory.   As successful as the combat support and combat service
support  units of  the reserve  were, the  combat units  were not
combat ready.   This points to  a flaw in the  way reserve combat
units are  trained, evaluated,  and integrated into  the National
Defense Strategy.
     Training  is the glue that  keeps the Army  together.  Units
train  on their Mission Essential Tasks List (METL) which are the
missions  that they  are expected  to perform  in combat.   Heavy
units  have  different  METL tasks  than  light  units  do.   All
infantrymen in the Army are trained at Fort Benning, Georgia, the
Home of the Infantry.  The average enlisted infantry soldier gets
the  same training  for the  majority of  his combined  basic and
advanced  infantry training.  At  the end of  the training cycle,
the troops are divided by their military occupational specialties
and  become light  infantry, mechanized  infantry, indirect  fire
infantry [mortars], or  heavy anti-armor infantry [TOW missile].
The  remainder of  their training  is accomplished  on-the-job at
their  permanent  duty station  in  their  units.   Officers  and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the infantry receive extensive
training on both light,  mechanized, and combined arms operations
during their  required educational schooling  periodically during
their careers.
     One  of  the  problems  with  mechanized  infantry  is  that
training   is  centered  around  operating  and  maintaining  the
vehicle.  The squad  consists of nine men at full strength.  This
requires a three-man crew  to operate the vehicle and  leaves six
men to operate as the dismounted element.  Most often, the squads
do not have  the nine men authorized and tactics require that the
infantry stay  close to  the vehicle  to be  mutually supporting.
Thus  the training of the dismounted infantry suffers as a result
of being dependent upon the vehicle.
     Light  infantry  units  emphasize  their  infantry  training
because they  are more people intensive  than equipment intensive
and  have less  restrictions  in training  areas.   Additionally,
light  infantry units cost less to train because of less overhead
for  fuel and  repair parts and  thus can afford  to conduct unit
training  more often.    Light  infantry  troops train  on  their
infantry skills much more often than mechanized troops as a rule.
The opportunities to maximize their training time is much greater
for the light infantry.
     With  the downsizing of  the Army, its  commitments have not
been  reduced.    For  contingency  operations,  the  best  force
normally is a light  infantry unit since the  mechanized infantry
cannot be separated from their vehicles and the expense of moving
heavy forces is  normally considered not  cost effective.   While
most contingency operations are short term, the Army has provided
an infantry battalion to the Multinational Force and Observers in
the Sinai since 1982  and habitually, provides infantry companies
to  Central America,  Honduras and  Cuba, for  security missions.
Humanitarian  relief missions are on  the rise in  Somalia and in
the United States.  The  ideal force to send to  these operations
has been  light forces.   There will  be an increasing  demand to
provide light forces to contingency operations in the future.
IV.  SOLUTION, REGIMENTALIZE
     The United States has committed itself to reduced investment
in  defense.   Despite  the  fact  that  World  War  III  appears
unlikely, future  demands on  military forces  may be severe  and
unpredictable.   With manpower  reduced to approximately  half of
the 1980s strength, the Army must turn to flexibility to maximize
the combat potential  of its  surviving operational  units.   One
approach to increased flexibility is the regimentalized division.
The ground maneuver core of a regimentalized division consists of
three regiments:  an infantry regiment, a mechanized regiment and
an armor regiment.
     The  regimentalized division  eliminates the  light infantry
division but retains  a light infantry regiment in each division.
This  provides each division  the capability  to provide  a light
brigade  size task force to a contingency operation as rapidly as
airlift can move them.   If required, these can be combined  into
light division equivalents. (See figure 2, Light Contingency).
The regimentalized division is designed for heavy operations
after  task  organization  across   the  three  regiments.    The
mechanized regiment task organizes with a like number of units in
the  infantry  regiment.   Each  regiment exchanges  half  of its
strength,  vehicles   for  infantry,  to   form  two   mechanized
regiments.   Further  task organization  with the  armor regiment
results in  three combined arms brigades,  the same as  in a ROAD
division.(See figure 2, Heavy Contingency)
     The  reserve  components  will  be structured  in  the  same
manner.   The reserve regiments will be affiliated with an active
duty  division.    If  one  of  the  active  regiments  is  on  a
contingency operation, then a  reserve regiment will be put  on a
higher state of readiness  to deploy with the active  division as
one  of its regiments.  This will improve the interaction between
active  and reserve components.  This will also help the reserves
concentrate their training time on the  skills required for their
type  of  regiment instead  of  trying  to  satisfy multiple  MOS
training requirements.
     Regimentalized divisions will improve training.  The weapons
systems today are  so sophisticated and the  training schedule is
so full that it is impossible  to train on all of the  METL tasks
properly.   The mechanized regiments can  concentrate on gunnery,
maintenance, and  mounted movement techniques while  the infantry
regiment   concentrates   on    infantry   skills,   small   arms
marksmanship,   self  reliance,  and   physical  fitness.     The
mechanized MOS  would only be for the crews of the vehicles.  All
dismounted infantry would be trained to operate out of  vehicles,
helicopters, or on foot.   Leaders would continue to  be educated
in both heavy and light operations.  The National Training Center
and  the Joint Readiness Training Center would continue to be the
standard for large unit training  for heavy and light  operations
respectively.
     The  light divisions  assist  in meeting  our low  intensity
commitments throughout  the world.  This  proposal eliminates the
light  divisions.   The  light regiments  of  each division  will
ensure those commitments are  fulfilled and the reserve component
regimentalized  divisions  will  backfill  the  active  regiments
during other  contingencies.  Using this  proposal the capability
of a division is enhanced.
V.   CONCLUSION
     The  Army has  no idea  how much more  it will  be told  to
reduce.  Historically, the  United States has drastically reduced
the size of the beyond what was prudent.  Each time this resulted
in an "hollow  Army" that  either met disaster  during its  first
enemy encounter or  took years  to get ready  while other  allies
bore the  brunt of battle.   Regimentalized divisions  ensure the
flexibility to  operate in all  land environments and  across the
spectrum of conflict  with all  of our divisions.   This  concept
will also  ensure  that the  reserve  components will  be  better
integrated to back up and fight along side the active component.
     Take  the example  of  an Army  of  eight divisions.    This
proposal  yields   one  airborne,  one  air  assault,   and  six
regimentalized divisions.   The current organization,  reduced to
eight divisions  would yield one  airborne, one air  assault, one
light division, and five heavy divisions. (1:77)  Using the Desert
Storm model, the  current organization would leave only one light
division uncommitted while the regimentalized concept would  have
one more  regimentalized division  than was necessary  for Desert
Storm. (7:US Army  29)  Regimentalized divisions  could be further
enlarged if merged with reserve regiments.(Compare figures 3+4)
     Consider  a light  infantry  scenerio using  the same  eight
division Army.  The six regimentalized divisions could field  two
composite  divisions  from  their  infantry  regiments   and  the
airborne and  air assault  divisions for a  total of  four.   The
current  organization would  only be  able to  yield  three light
divisions: an airborne, an air assault, and a light.  The current
organization would again be short a division. (Compare figure 3+4)
     The  smaller  Army  must  change  its structure  to  a  more
flexible one to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.  It must
continue  to  meet  its   missions  and  responsibilities  in  an
uncertain world,  while retaining the  decisive combat capability
that   shattered  the   Iraqis  in   the  Persian   Gulf.     The
regimentalized division  provides the flexibility and retains the
decisive punch to meet  the threat across the entire  spectrum of
potential conflict.
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