Marine Expeditionary Unit Aviation Forces And The Integrated Air Defense System Threat CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Marine Expeditionary Unit Aviation Forces and the Integrated Air Defense System Threat Author: Major Mark D. Mahaffey, United States Marine Corps Thesis: MEU aviation forces lack an adequate capability to penetrate a hostile integrated air defense system (IADs). Background: The end of the Cold War has signaled a dramatic improvement in the prospects for peace, security, and economic progress, but it must be remembered that we still live in a very troubled world with danger, uncertainty, and instability in many regions. Crises, war, and challenges to U.S. vital interests will continue to be very real possibilities. With the decline of the Soviet Union and a shift in focus from a bipolar to a multipolar world, the Department of the Navy (DoN), with the release of the White Paper entitled From The Sea, has officially endorsed an emphasis in warfare away from blue water to littoral operations. Yet, with all these changes, there still exists a "business-as- usual" mentality within certain branches of the DoN. With the cancellation of the Sidearm missile program by the DoN, over the objections of the Marine Corps, and the reluctance of the Navy's Air Warfare Department to favorably endorse the requirement for the replacement weapon, the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM), there appears to be a dichotomy in the official position of the DoN. Without a standoff jamming capability, adequate defensive electronic countermeasures (DHCM) systems, or a compatible anti-radiation missile capability, the forces most likely to become engaged in littoral conflict, i.e., MEU aviation forces, will remain extremely vulnerable to any potential adversary's IADS. Recommendation: The Naval Air Warfare Department should set aside past parochial interests and fully support continued enhancements concerning USMC aircraft DECM equipment and the development and procurement of the AARGM. OUTLINE Thesis: Though formidable in nature, Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) aviation forces lack an adequate capability to penetrate a hostile integrated air defense system (IADS) or to protect airborne assault support forces from an adversary's air defense weapons. I. Threat A. Demise of the Soviet Union B. Proliferation of lethal air defense systems II. Commitment of MEU Forces A. Flexible response B. Composition of the ACE D. Reliance on carrier-based aircraft support III. Navy's Air Warfare Department and USMC at odds A. Navy's position: Dedicated CVBG support B. USMC position: Autonomous capability 1. Dedicated jamming platform for the MEU 2. Enhanced DECM equipment for MEU ACE 3. Requirement to replace the Sidearm IV. Advanced (Helicopter Compatible) Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) A. Historical overview B. Capabilities C. Congressional support D. . . . From The Sea MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT AVIATION FORCES AND THE INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM THREAT by Major Mark D. Mahaffey, USMC While the end of the cold war is the end of a well defined threat from a known direction, it is not the end of worldwide threats. The shift resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union, from a bipolar to a multipolar world, creates an unpredictable future threat with regard to direction, technology, capability, and motivation. In his January 1993 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, the then Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, made the following statement concerning the security of the United States: The world is still a dangerous place. In addition to a major regional conflict in the Persian Gulf, we have seen renewed ethnic, religious, and national violence in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. It is true that the United States no longer faces the threat of a global war beginning in Europe, a conflict that might have resulted in a nuclear confrontation between superpowers. But we do face serious regional contingencies - threats that may be triggered by any number of events, are difficult to identify in advance, and could be made more dangerous by the spread of high-technology weapons. As a result, the challenges of the next few years are likely to be complex and difficult. (2:vi-vii) As mission profiles of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) expand, countering the enemy's capability will become increasingly complex. This will be further compounded by the proliferation of high technology weaponry and equipment available to Third World nations. Marine Aviation is acutely aware of the threat posed by adversary integrated air defense systems (IADS). Verification of this statement can be found in the MAGTF Threat Summary section (Appendix A) of the final reports entitled, Marine Corps Mission Area Analysis MA-33 Assault Support and Marine Corps Mission Area Analysis MA-34 Offensive Air Support, dated November 1991 and February 1992, respectively: "At any level of conflict, integrated air defense networks, whose capabilities vary with the level of sophisticated communications networks, present the greatest threat to assault support and offensive air support (OAS) operations." (10:A-1) (11:A-1) Regardless of the spectrum of conflict (low, medium, high), it is apparent that any potential adversary will be armed with relatively inexpensive, easily obtainable, highly mobile, lethal air defense gun and missile systems. These weapons, in conjunction with their associated search, acquisition, and target track radars, are becoming increasingly effective in detecting and engaging low- flying aircraft employing terrain flight techniques while also becoming less susceptible to currently fielded on-board countermeasure systems. In this regard, it is imperative that we never equate or confuse Low Intensity Conflict with Low Technology Conflict. (12:1) Historically, commitment of our forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) has been this nation's first response to crisis or contingency situations. Traditionally, these forces have been called on when U.S. lives and property are threatened abroad. In recent decades, these protection responsibilities have included deterring and countering the threat of international terrorism to American citizens, conducting noncombatant and hostage rescue evacuations, and providing humanitarian assistance to countries suffering natural or man-made disasters. It is important to note that not only must these forces provide responsive and capable evacuation lift, but they must also be prepared to conduct these operations in the midst of armed conflict. (18:12) The unique composition of the MEU, providing a fully integrated air-ground component, provides our National Command Authority (NCA) with such a capability, while also affording a degree of flexibility and latitude of employment options not offered by other forces. The standard composition of a MEU aviation combat element (ACE) is 12 CH-46 medium lift helicopters, 4 CH-53E heavy lift helicopters, 4 AH-1W attack helicopters, 2 UH-1N utility helicopters, and 6 AV-8B vertical/short take-off and landing (VSTOL) jet aircraft. Though formidable in nature, MEU aviation forces lack an adequate capability to penetrate a hostile integrated air defense system (IADS) or to protect airborne assault support forces from adversary air defense weapons. Regardless, principal tasking for the conduct of these missions has been assigned to the AV-8B and the AH-1W. Unlike Navy and Marine Corps carrier-based attack aircraft, such as the F/A-18 Hornet that is capable of employing the high speed anti-radiation missile (HARM), or the EA-6B Prowler, electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, that is capable of both HARM employment and radar jamming, neither the Harrier nor the Cobra is capable of employing the HARM or of jamming radars. Conversely, unlike the Harrier and the Cobra, neither the Hornet nor the Prowler is capable of conducting operations from amphibious ships. Support from these aircraft is available only when the MEU is conducting operations in conjunction with a carrier battle group (CVBG). Given the existing world threat and the likelihood that a forward deployed MEU could be employed without the support of carrier based aviation, it is imperative that MEU aviation forces possess an organic capability to engage and destroy adversary air defense systems. (1:1) With this deficiency identified, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), in the early 1980s, drafted an operational requirement for a short range, quick reaction, anti-radiation missile suitable for employment off Marine AH-1, AV-8, OV-10, and F/A-18 aircraft. Approval of the Operational Requirement Document (ORD) was given by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in May 1982. Subsequent development and procurement resulted in the initial fielding of the AGM-122 Sidearm missile in February 1990. Forward deployed MEU aviation forces would now possess the much sought after autonomous capability required to suppress threat radar directed air defense systems. Over the objections of Marine Aviation, however, the Department of the Navy (DoN) terminated funding support for the Sidearm missile program during the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 90 budget appraisals. With an identified requirement of nearly 5000 weapons, the Navy suspended fielding after delivery of fewer than 800 missiles. Today, as a result of the actions taken by the DoN, the Marine Corps finds itself once again in the position of being unable to provide adequate protection to the embarked aviation platforms and the vital cargo they transport, i.e., Marines and sailors, aboard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) ships, from threat air defense weapons. Solutions on how best to provide this protection also find the Navy's Air Warfare Department (N88) and the Marine Corps at odds. (1:2) With the publication of the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper entitled From the Sea, which expresses a shift in the focus of Naval warfare from blue water to littoral operations, N88 would have the Marine Corps believe that a CVBG will always be readily available to support MEU operations. With carrier-based aircraft on station, the Navy contends, the requirement for an air suppression weapon suitable for employment off AV-8Bs and AH-1Ws is no longer valid. With regard to this contention, several points have been erroneously omitted. Ongoing discussions concerning DoD force structure downsizing and the likely reduction in the number of aircraft carriers in the DoN inventory from the existing twelve to possibly nine, or even eight, will have a significant impact on the Navy's ability to provide dedicated carrier support to the MEU. This point seems to have been overlooked by N88. Given the recent historical examples of forward deployed MEUs conducting operations without carrier support, such as occurred during operations "Eastern Exit" and "Sharp Edge," and the even more recent witnessing of the withdrawal and repositioning of the carrier task force supporting Marines during the ongoing "Restore Hope" operation, USMC concerns about the validity of N88s contention are highlighted. It is important to note the underlying message contained within the publication From the Sea: "Even with the end of the cold war, regions of the world remain extremely hostile and volatile." (14) The potential therefore continues to exist for the necessity to employ forward deployed MEU and carrier forces simultaneously in different regional areas. If the Navy could not provide dedicated carrier support to Marine forces with twelve active carriers, then it must be concluded that the Navy will be less likely to provide the requisite support with fewer assets. For the purpose of discussion, however, let's consider a scenario that supports the Navy's view that adequate carrier-based aircraft will be provided to support MEU operations. In this scenario, the critical issue is the validity of the Navy's contention concerning the employment of anti-radiation missiles from attack helicopters and VSTOL platforms. Recall that the Navy contends such a capability is not required, given the presence of air suppression fixed-wing platforms. A recent classified study conducted by the Center for Navy Analysis (CNA), a Naval research organization and "think tank," suggests that the view held by the Navy Air Warfare Department concerning this issue is in error. Unclassified references to this report highlight the fact that an anti-radiation missile (ARM) autonomously employed by an attack helicopter is superior to any other weapons system at protecting transport helicopters against pop-up threat radar systems. Further, the report strongly endorsed the requirement for ARM employment from attack helicopters and VSTOL aircraft even when employed in conjunction with other air suppression weapons/platforms. (8:1) Though not formally addressed by either N88 or Marine Aviation, a possible alternative to the CVBG solution, that could correct the IADS penetration deficiency, would be to field a dedicated airborne jamming platform for deployment with our amphibious forces. In concept, this platform would provide similar capabilities and support to our amphibious forces as the EA-6B presently provides to our carrier forces. Given the existing fiscal constraints and declining defense budget, one might ask how the DoN could afford to develop such a platform. While the Department of Defense (DoD) continues to drawdown force structure and to "neckdown" infrastructure where possible and prudent, it is conceivable to foresee a single type, model, series, aircraft being introduced by the DoN to replace the ageing inventory of E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, S-3 Viking antisubmarine warfare aircraft, and KA-6s, tanker variant of the Intruder all-weather attack aircraft. (7:28) The up-front cost associated with development and procurement of this new, common, multi- role/multi-function aircraft, would be offset by the reduction in costs associated with the maintenance and support of one, vice several, different aircraft types. Of the technologies presently available to satisfy such a requirement, the tilt-rotor concept appears most feasible and mature. (7:28) Given that the MV-22 tilt-rotor is still a primary candidate in the Marine Corps search for a medium lift helicopter replacement (MLR), it appears viable that this one platform could satisfy the Corps' MLR requirement, the Navy's neckdown replacement requirement, and additionally fulfill the requirement for an organic amphibious airborne early warning and jamming platform for our forward deployed MEU forces. Through development and employment of an appropriate role- in/role-out package compatible with the MV-22, each deploying MEU could be provided with a much desired and heretofore lacking, capability. The inherent compatibility of the MV-22 with amphibious shipping, coupled with the extended on-station-time provided by a tilt-rotor aircraft, make it the ideal candidate to perform this mission. Conversely, limitations associated with currently fielded rotary-wing assets, such as limited range, poor on-station-time, and slow airspeeds, make this idea unsuitable for implementation on existing platforms. Though this approach would not alleviate the deficiency highlighted with threat air defense systems today, because of the time frame necessary for program initiation, it is an approach that warrants additional discussion, debate, and future consideration. Another point to address is the necessity to provide our MEU aviation forces with enhanced defensive electronic countermeasures (DECM) capabilities. The antiquated DECM equipment employed on our MEU aviation assets has failed to keep pace with the technological advances of threat air defense weapons systems. (10:20) The currently fielded radar warning receivers (AN/APR-39 and AN/APR-44) provide only minimal cuing against threat continuous wave (CW) radar systems and no warning against adversary millimeter wave systems. (13:VIII-21-1) Given the proliferation of potential threat systems that operate in this region of the electromagnetic spectrum, such a limitation could prove disastrous. The countermeasures dispensing system (AN/ALE-39), consisting of two dispensers with a combined dispensing capacity of only 60 expendables, is woefully inadequate given the existing threat and the average sortie duration of an assault support or VSTOL platform. Additionally, the AN/ALE-39 is complicated to use, lacks an adequate inventory of expendable types (chaff, jammers, flares) necessary to decoy modern air defense systems, lacks adequate interface with other on-board DECM systems, and relies solely on manual initiation for expendable release. (13:VIII-21-1) The currently employed active countermeasure systems (AN/ALQ-144 and AN/ALQ-157) lack the requisite capability to decoy modern state-of- the-art missile systems. (17:51) When combined with the previously mentioned deficiencies concerning radar detection and countermeasures dispensing, the lack of a sufficient on-board active system compounds an already extremis situation. In fairness to the DoN, numerous programs currently exist that will rectify many of the deficiencies noted. Programs such as the AN/APR-39(V)2 will correct major deficiencies with the existing radar detector while providing an enhanced capability concerning operational frequency coverage and threat prioritization. The AN/AAR-47, which has been in development for several years, promises to provide an automatic flare ejection capability eliminating the manual-only capability of today's system. (17:50) Also, a new family of expendables, including those with kinematic and nonvisible properties, are presently under development and will soon be procured to provide enhanced protection to our aircrew and aircraft. Much has been accomplished but more remains. Given the existing fiscal realities and the competing priorities for increasingly scarce funds, these programs stand in jeopardy. Continued, stronger, and more vocal support from fleet squadrons will be necessary if our forward deployed aviation forces are to be outfitted with the identified DECM systems they require. A final issue that must be addressed is the requirement to develop and field a new weapon to replace the canceled AGM-122 Sidearm. As identified, relying on carrier-based aircraft to provide the requisite support to our MEU forces would be imprudent. Also, while appreciating that standoff jamming platforms and installation of state-of-the-art DECM equipment on our aircraft would provide enhanced protection to our forces from threat radar systems, neither capability would eliminate the threat or prevent the system from operating in regions of the electromagnetic spectrum, i.e., the visible spectrum, not affected by countermeasures. To preclude this situation, a requirement exists for our forces to possess a "hard kill" capability. To provide this capability, a weapons system designed from inception for accomplishing this mission is required. In the November/December 1991 Vertiflite, Lt. Gen. Duane A. Wills, Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation (DCS/A), U.S. Marine Corps, made the following statement concerning this requirement: New/improved weapons systems for our Assault Support Aircraft are also being pursued. These systems include . . . a follow-on to the Sidearm missile which [sic] will provide increased range, seeker frequency coverage, and seeker field of view. . . . (19:11) On 15 January 1992 the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) approved the proposed mission need statement (MNS) for an Advanced (Helicopter Compatible) Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) as a replacement for the Sidearm. (12:1) The proliferation of advanced air defense weapons systems being exported throughout the Third World, coupled with the realization that our carrier- based assets are unable to provide the degree of protection necessary during the conduct of amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore, overwhelmingly supports the requirement for fielding the AARGM. Proven advances in the fields of miniaturization as related to missile seeker technology and the ability to incorporate dual-mode sensors into common seeker assemblies will provide the AARGM with significantly enhanced operational capabilities. (9:3) Such advances will correct the operational limitations associated with the AGM-122 seeker while providing the AARGM with an enhanced threat detection range, a robust countermeasures capability, a wide field of view, an expanded frequency coverage, and an off-axis delivery capability. Additionally, as Lt. Gen. Wills identified, requirements exist for the AARGM to correct range and time-of-flight (TOF) deficiencies currently identified with the Sidearm missile. By utilizing tail or thrust vector control (TVC) technologies on standard 5-inch MK 36 Sidearm missile motors, industry has demonstrated that range envelopes, given a 0 kt./25 ft. above ground level (AGL) delivery profile, of greater than eleven miles are obtainable. Further, given delivery profiles that better typify fixed wing (AV-8B) employment, i.e., 450 kts./>10,000 ft. AGL, range envelopes in excess of 15 miles can be expected. Figure 1 depicts test data obtained from actual launches of MK 36 motors utilizing tail control technologies. (16) Click here to view image Representatives of the major industrial firms associated with these advanced missile design technologies postulate that even greater ranges are obtainable in the AARGM if the existing aluminum body of the MK 36 motor were replaced with a lightweight composite structure and the new seeker dome incorporated an enhanced aerodynamic design. By minimizing drag, the same enhancements being incorporated to extend the missiles range, also serve to increase the AARGMs down-range velocity and decrease the TOF. The tactical advantage gained by these enhancements will provide the capability to engage hostile air defense systems under advantageous situations that significantly reduce aircrew exposure to threat envelopes. Such improvements, as described, would more than satisfy the operational requirements as identified in the AARGM MNS. Even in this era of declining defense dollars strong Congressional support for this program exists. In the fiscal year 1993 Congressional Authorization Summary recently released, both the House and the Senate Congressional Armed Services and Appropriations Committees recommended an increase of $10.077 million in support of the AARGM program. (1:1) That being the case, support within the Navy's Air Warfare Department still remains questionable at best. More than one year has elapsed since ACMC approved the AARGM MNS and, as is required, forwarded his approval and recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations for staffing. As of this date, the N88 staff has failed to endorse the program. Because of this "stonewalling," the DoN stands to lose the $10.077 million dollars recommended by Congress in support of this program as well as the opportunity to provide a much needed warfighting enhancement to U.S. forward deployed forces. Referencing again the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper, From the Sea, it becomes difficult to comprehend why the Navy Air Warfare Department is reluctant to support this requirement: We must structure a fundamentally different naval force to respond to strategic demands, and that new force must be sufficiently flexible and powerful to satisfy enduring national security requirements. The new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps team, both active duty and reserve, is to provide the nation naval expeditionary forces shaped for joint operations, operating forward from the sea and tailored for national needs. (15:2) The time has come for N88 to set aside past parochial interests and fully support development and procurement of the AARGM. The threat to Navy and Marine Corps aircraft from adversary air defense weapons is well documented and the requirement for a helicopter compatible anti-radiation missile has been confirmed by the Navy's own center for analysis. With the fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward littoral operations conducted from the sea, it seems only prudent that the DoN would provide those forces most likely to become engaged in littoral conflict, i.e., forward deployed MEU's, with the weapons and systems necessary for successful mission prosecution. Only through a much needed reprioritization of warfighting requirements and the dedicated support of the CNO and his staff will we achieve the identified goal of becoming a true "sea-air-land" team. Lest we forget, we still live in a very troubled world with danger, uncertainty and instability in many regions. Crises, war and challenges to U.S. vital interests will continue to be very real possibilities. While plans exist that will enable us to respond to numerous world contingencies, the real threat we now face is that of the unknown and the uncertain. Regional contingencies are many and varied and could arise on extremely short notice. Our forward deployed forces must be able to respond rapidly and decisively in order to deter or combat aggression. Such requirements as are outlined in our National Military Strategy support the need to provide our forward deployed aviation forces with enhanced capabilities to penetrate hostile IADS and the equipment necessary to protect our airborne assault support forces from threat air defense weapons. The need for these systems exist now, today! In the past we have been fortunate. Next time, we may not have the opportunity to play catch up. As Commander John B. Nichols said in his book On Yankee Station, "And next time is one day closer with every sunrise." (14:88) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bamberger, Maj. Mark H. OPNAV Invalidation of Advanced (Helicopter Compatible) Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)/Reprogramming of AARGM Funds to Generic HARM Upgrades. Position Paper, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, APW-23, 21 December 1992. 2. Cheney, Dick. Annual Report to the President and the Congress January 1993. 3. FMFM 5-1 (Advanced Copy) Organization and Function of Marine Aviation. Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia, 16 October 1991. 4. FMFM 5-30 (Coordinating Draft) Assault Support. Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia, 13 May 1992. 5. FMFM 5-40 Offensive Air Support. Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia, 27 March 1992. 6. FMFM 5-41 Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support. Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia, 28 October 1992. 7. Holzer, Robert. "U.S. Mulls Rebirth of V-22 Program." Defense News March 15-21 1993: 28. 8. Mahaffey, Maj. Mark D. Sidearm II. Briefing Paper for the ACMC, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, APW-23, 29 May 1991 9. Majumder, Dr. P. Robert. "SBIR for Dual Mode ARM Self Protect Weapon (SPW)." Overview of SBIR Phase II Program for NAVAIR Science and Applied Technology, Incorporated March 4, 1992. 10. Marine Corps Mission Area Analysis MA-33 Assault Support Final Report. Document published by the MAGTF Requirements Integration Section Proponency and Requirements Branch, MAGTF Warfighting Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, November 1991. 11. Marine Corps Mission Area Analysis MA-34 Offensive Air Support Final Report. Document published by the MAGTF Requirements Integration Section Proponency and Requirements Branch, MAGTF Warfighting Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, February 1992. 12. Mission Need Statement (MNS) for an Advanced (Helicopter Compatible) Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) (No. AAS 34.3). Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia, 28 January 1992. 13. NATOPS Flight Manual. Navy Model AH-IW Helicopter. Naval Air Systems Command 3 September 1987: VIII-21-1--VIII-21-8. 14. Nichols, Commander John B. USN (Ret.) and Barrett Tillman, On Yankee Station. United States Naval Institute July 1987. 15. O'Keefe, Sean, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II and General C.E. Mundy Jr. . . . FROM THE SEA. Navy and Marine Corps White Paper September 1992. 16. Overton, Chris. Boxoffice Program Highlights. Raytheon Company Missile Systems Division March 1993. 17. Richardson, Doug. "Airborne Electronic Warfare After the Storm." Armada International April/May 1992: 42-51. 18. "The Changing Strategic Environment." Defense 92 November/December: 2-13. 19. Wills, Lt. Gen. Duane A., "USMC Assault Support Aviation - Today, Tomorrow, and Beyond." Vertiflite November/December 1991: 8-12.
