Littoral Warfare: Adapting To Brown-Water Operations CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Littoral Warfare: Adapting to Brown-Water Operations Author: LCDR Frank J. Murphy, United States Navy Thesis: Littoral warfare is not a new naval warfare function and focusing on it will not require the Navy to enact major warfighting reforms; instead, the Navy must capitalize on its historically proven capabilities and adapt traditional naval warfare functions to expeditionary operations carried out near the world's coastlines. Background: To meet the new security challenges in the post-Cold War world, the Navy has declared in its White Paper "From the Sea" a shift in strategic focus away from open-ocean warfighting to littoral warfare. Even though maritime history has demonstrated that littoral warfare is a more real application of naval combat power, focusing on it represents a radical departure from the Navy's previously stated doctrine and strategy. Still, the same warfare functions that applied to open-ocean combat against a superpower naval adversary, are applicable to littoral warfare against regional powers. Littoral warfare encompasses the landward as well as the seward portions of the battlespace. It describes the geographic area where the Navy envisions conducting its likely missions, which range from forward positioning of forces to contain crises to the introduction of naval expeditionary forces and power projection ashore to resolve them. But the Navy must do more than restate its strategic focus. Although it has the capability to execute littoral warfare missions, several warfare deficiencies limit the scale and scope of its warfighting effectiveness in the littoral battlespace. Conclusion: To correct these deficiencies, changes to Navy's training and education program, improvements to its equipment, and adjustments to its support infrastructure are necessary. The Navy will become irrelevant in the new strategic landscape unless it adapts to brown-water operations. Littoral Warfare: Adapting to Brown-Water Operations OUTLINE Thesis: Littoral warfare is not a new naval warfare function and focusing on it will not require the Navy to enact major warfighting reforms. The same warfare functions that applied to open-ocean combat against a superpower naval adversary are applicable to littoral warfare against regional powers. To be an effective naval force, the Navy must capitalize on its historically proven capabilities and adapt traditional naval warfare functions to expeditionary operations carried out near the world's coastlines. I. New Warfighting Focus A. "From the Sea" B. New security environment 1. Potential threats/challenges 2. Force downsizing 3. Withdrawal from overseas bases/presence 4. Force relevance C. Definitions 1. Littoral battlespace 2. Geographic vice functional focus 3. Naval warfare functions D. New battlespace requirements 1. Traditional & non-traditional missions 2. Training, equipping, supporting II. Force Structure & Equipment A. Anti-Air Warfare B. Anti-Surface Warfare C. Anti-Submarine Warfare D. Amphibious warfare E. Naval Shore Fire Support F. Mine Warfare G. Space and Electronic Warfare H. Force mix & operations III. Training and Education A. In-shore vs. open ocean A. Shallow-water & beachhead emphasis C. Joint/combined flavor D. Amphib-CWC integration IV. Support Infrastructure A Sealift B. Intelligence support C. Information management & data exchange D. C2 & surveillance IV. The Ideal A. Fog of the littorals B. Maintaining the mindset of expeditionary warfare 1. Battlespace dominance 2. Maneuver warfare from the sea 3. Joint interoperability focus C. Consequences The recently published White Paper "From the Sea" declared a shift in the Navy's strategic focus away from open-ocean warfare "on the sea" to a primary warfighting emphasis on littoral warfare conducted "from the sea." This focus on littoral warfare represents a radical departure from the Navy's previously stated maritime doctrine and reason for being and it aligns its maritime strategy with current national security priorities. Although "From the Sea" delineated a new direction in naval warfighting, it is not about revolutionary change to naval warfare. Littoral warfare is not a new naval warfare function and focusing on it will not require the Navy to enact major warfighting reforms. The same warfare functions that were relevant to open-ocean combat against a superpower adversary, can be applied to littoral warfare. But littoral warfare will require some changes. The key changes will be to what missions the Navy executes, where it executes them, how it prepares its forces for these missions, and the quality of the equipment and support it gives to its forces. To remain a relevant and effective naval force then, the Navy must capitalize on its historically proven capabilities and adapt traditional naval warfare functions to expeditionary operations carried out predominantly near the world's coastlines. New Security Environment. During the Cold War, the Navy's maritime strategy was appropriately focused on countering the Soviet naval threat. The Navy concentrated on the ability to wage global war at sea against a superpower adversary. But the world has changed dramatically in recent years. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have presented a new set of less distinct and more complex challenges to our military forces. Sudden regional wars are now considered the most likely contingencies. Budget constraints, force downsizing, and the steady withdrawal of forces from overseas bases have complicated these security challenges. For the Navy, this new security environment has meant that its blue- water, maritime strategy is no longer applicable to its likely future missions. Most of the areas of instability and social strife today are in major cities and urban areas that are most easily accessed by seaward approaches. In fact, 60 percent of the politically significant urban areas around the world are located within 25 miles of the coastline; 75 percent are located within 150 miles.(20:2) The military actions taken to protect U.S. interests and property in these areas will most likely come from the sea. The emergence of potential threats in these areas demanding increased U.S. presence in the littoral regions, coupled with the fiscal constraints reducing the presence of U.S. military forces overseas has meant its naval forces will likely play an even more important role in the defense of U.S. interests overseas. To meet these new security challenges and to be in concert with the new security environment, the Navy used "From the Sea" to declare its shift in strategic priorities to an emphasis on joint expeditionary operations conducted in the littoral regions and thereby maintain its relevance as a key instrument of national policy protecting U.S. interests abroad. Definitions: Before beginning a more in-depth examination of the implications of littoral warfare on naval forces, some definitions are in order to level the playing field. "From the Sea" defines littoral as the "near land" areas or coastlines of the world. It is comprised of two segments of the battlespace: Seaward--covering the area from the open ocean to the shore--and Landward--covering the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. In contrast to the vast ocean areas called "blue water" where our naval forces have historically trained to conduct strikes against powerful fleets, the littoral regions are frequently characterized by confined and congested water and air space occupied by friends, adversaries, and neutrals. The Navy affectionately calls this area near the coastline the "brown-water" area. In many ways, littoral warfare is not much different from how U.S. naval forces have actually been employed throughout their history. From the Barbary Coast Wars in the Mediterranean in the early 1800's, to the Frigate Diplomacy of the later 19th century, to the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific in World War II, U.S. naval forces demonstrated their expeditionary and power projection capabilities. Time and again U.S. naval forces have demonstrated their political usefulness by responding to regional crises occurring near the world's coastlines. For instance, the U.S. has employed naval forces in over 150 of the 200 plus regional crises that have involved U.S. interests since World War II primarily because of seaward access.(19:3-12) Littoral warfare then is actually not a new form of naval warfare but a geographical location where traditional forms of naval warfare--Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW); Mine Warfare; Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW), and Amphibious Warfare--may be conducted to execute the variety of missions required in today's security environment. Each of the traditional naval warfare functions designed to counter the Soviet naval threat "on the sea" can be applied to forward presence and expeditionary operations in the littoral battlespace. The scale of operations will change, but the basic functions remain. Certain areas, such as shallow- water ASW and mine countermeasures (MCM) should receive more attention; others, such as deep-water ASW, can be de-emphasized. The key to littoral warfare will be to obtain and maintain battlespace dominance near the coastline and inland so that expeditionary forces can be introduced rapidly and decisively. New Battlespace Requirements. Littoral warfare describes the geographical areas where the Naval Service envisions conducting its most likely missions. It can encompass a variety of operations from forward presence in peacetime, to crisis response in hot spots occurring near the coastlines of the world, and, if necessary, to the introduction of expeditionary forces as the initial enabling capability for sustained operations ashore. Within the context of the new strategic landscape, littoral warfare may also entail conducting such non-traditional military missions as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, and political stability operations, such as interpositioning, peacekeeping, and civic action/nation building. Although U.S. naval forces have a proven ability to influence events ashore, several deficiencies exist in the training, equipping, and support of key warfare functions. These deficiencies limit the scale and scope of the Navy and Marine Corps' warfighting effectiveness against the increasingly vague, yet powerful, regional threats. However, to overcome these deficiencies does not require major reforms to traditional naval warfare functions. Instead, the Naval Service must build on its historically proven characteristics to reshape its force structure and equipment to be able to conduct a wider range of traditional and non-traditional military missions in the littoral battlespace, reorient its training and education programs to be relevant to littoral warfare, and reconstitute its support infrastructure to adjust to the logistics, intelligence, information data-exchange, and command and control (C2) requirements of joint operations conducted in the littoral regions of the Third World. Force Structure and Equipment In essence, the Navy and Marine Corps have the basic force structure and equipment in place to conduct littoral warfare within the context of regional crises and non-traditional military missions. No nation currently has the power to prevent U.S. naval forces from dominating anywhere at sea, establishing and maintaining local control of any littoral area when needed, projecting power ashore whenever called on to protect U.S. interests.(3:21) But that is not to say that more shouldn't be done. Several platform and equipment deficiencies exist which, if ignored, will limit the Naval service's ability to execute missions in the littoral regions. In general, the Navy should shift the programming and development emphasis to ships better suited for littoral operations. It should program for equipment that will improve the ability to conduct littoral warfare and ensure the U.S. maintains its technological advantage. And, it should look for new and better ways to employ existing forces. The following more specific force structure recommendations, framed within the context of the Navy's traditional warfare functions, will put the Navy and Marine Corps in a better position to conduct littoral warfare: Anti-Air Warfare. The Naval Service must maintain its high-tech advantage in aircraft and air defense equipment and weapons systems. DESERT STORM vividly demonstrated that high-tech systems will defeat low-tech systems. However, the proliferation of high-tech missile systems to Third-World countries mandate that U.S. naval forces work to keep their technological advantage in all warfare areas. Force air defense, both for the fleet at sea and the troops ashore, will continue to be critical to success of littoral warfare missions. Defense against tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) is just as important to the troops ashore as defense against coastal defense cruise missiles is to the fleet supporting those troops close to the shore. Unfortunately, several Third- World countries now possess large quantities of these missiles. Many countries are on the verge of obtaining low-observable technology which will lower the radar cross section of missiles and aircraft posing a threat to naval forces operating in the littoral areas. The in-shore clutter and reduced time/distance battlespace in the littoral environment complicate the problem for existing Navy early warning, tracking, and targeting systems which were optimized for use in the open ocean. To overcome these deficiencies, the Navy must continue to improve such systems as its AEGIS/SPY-1 AAW combat system and the SM-2 surface-to-air missile system for force air and missile defense. Anti-Surface Warfare. The aircraft carrier continues to be the Navy's centerpiece for ASUW. In many ways, the aircraft carrier as currently used and equipped is more relevant today than in the days of the Soviet threat. The carrier airwing is optimized for regional conflict. All its components functionally are capable of performing both forward presence and crisis response missions in the littoral regions. At a recent Naval Institute Seminar on the future of air warfare, RADM Riley Mixon, Director of Air Warfare Division in the Office of the CNO, supported the view that Naval Aviation--Navy and Marine air power--offers capabilities for the ambiguous international environment of the 1990's and 21st century. Admiral Mixson went on to say that with a doctrine emphasizing excellence in littoral warfare, power projection, and joint operations, carrier aviation remains a pivotal force because of its capability to generate "high-intensity, power-projection sorties" at the time and place of our choosing. (22:80) With training and weapons systems superior to any Third-World country today, carrier aviation is capable of not just striking enemy surface forces, Naval aviation has long had the ability to project power ashore, destroying or interdicting enemy ground forces and infrastructure, and to provide close-air support (CAS) for expeditionary forces during amphibious operations. While deep strikes--beyond 300 nm inland--are not strictly required for littoral warfare missions, the Navy must still maintain the capability. Air Force assets can provide more air power, but they require a forward operating base to provide sustained combat power. Carrier aviation assets must maintain its ability to conduct deep strikes and presence missions when airfields are not available in the region. The increased use of naval forces for crisis response and regional contingencies coupled with the real potential for fewer carriers in the future, will mean smaller surface combatants will be used to provide more than just a presence in the littoral regions. They must have the combat power to operate independently from the carrier to deter and contain regional conflict and to project power ashore. Modifying all Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers to support helos and equipping at least some of those helos with an attack capability will enhance this AEGIS ship's ability to do ASUW and support expeditionary operations in the littoral areas. Additionally, surface combatants must be equipped with the detection and tracking equipment that provide better target classification in the high-clutter environment of coastal operations. And they must have the weapons systems to counter the likely small craft threat in the littoral region. Anti-Submarine Warfare. The Navy is the undisputed world leader in ASW. It has excellent training and best ASW equipment in the world. Navy subs have an important role to play in littoral warfare. Submarines can influence the land battle by conducting stealth strikes against land-based targets with TOMAHAWK land-attack cruise missiles (TLAMs). Submarines can also be used to conduct covert surveillance and insertion of special forces against the enemy close to shore. However, the number of countries with submarines and related technologies is growing steadily and is cause for concern. Iran recently took delivery of its first of three Russian Kilo-class diesel submarines and is rapidly preparing to conduct operations in and near the Persian Gulf. To counter threats such as this, the Navy must exploit its high-tech advantages to overcome shortfalls resulting from ASW weapons and equipment designed primarily to operate in an open-ocean environment. The ability to conduct shallow-water (<200 feet) ASW is essential to littoral warfare. However, the Navy does not have a sonar or a weapon that can operate effectively in shallow water. Its torpedoes have problem with bottom and surface capture. Current Navy detection and tracking sonars were optimized for the deep-water threat expected against the Soviet Navy and are not effective in shallow water. The Navy needs to modify existing systems where it can and develop and deploy new shallow-water systems. But this must not come at the expense of eliminating all deep-water ASW, because that technology and proficiency once lost may never be regained. Amphibious Warfare. Amphibious warfare plays an essential role in projecting sustainable combat power ashore in support of national interests. Unfortunately, the Navy has neglected its amphibious shipping in favor of the more glamorous carrier aviation and submarine fleets. That trend must be reversed to maintain amphibious warfare as a viable military option. Successful amphibious warfare in the future will depend on the Navy- Marine Corps team's ability to conduct operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS). OMFTS applies the principles of maneuver warfare--speed, firepower, surprise, and lift--to break down enemy defenses without the traditional frontal assaults seen in the Pacific in World War II and at Inchon in the Korean War. OMFTS calls for a different mindset. In OMFTS, the amphibious battle begins at sea, not on the beach. Launches can occur out as far as 100 nm to ensure security and tactical surprise or they can occur closer offshore. In OMFTS, naval forces use their speed and combat power to penetrate a number of different sites on the beach and establish a beachhead or rapidly drive inland. At a recent amphibious warfare roundtable discussion, the Navy and Marine Corps amphibious warfare leaders, RADM LaPlante and Maj. Gen Jenkins, both agreed that, "the World War II amphibious frontal assaults are remote possibilities in today's modern warfare." Instead, the majority of forcible entry missions will be accomplished through "high-speed maneuver from the sea." According to Admiral LaPlante, the combination of helos, air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC), and light-armored infantry are the "heart of maneuver warfare and the most viable means to overcome the difficulties inherent in the littoral warfare environment." (10 :36) Contributing to the decreasing likelihood of major frontal assaults is the lack of the ability to conduct rapid logistics buildup ashore with fewer amphibious ships in the force. Even in DESERT STORM, the Navy would have found it difficult to have sustained 4TH MEB past the normal 15-days of supplies it carries, if 4TH MEB had conducted an amphibius operation in Kuwait. While OMFTS is doable with today's forces, several deficiencies in the amphibious force limit the scope of its capabilities. The Navy must act quickly to modernize its amphibious fleet. Shortly after the year 2000, several classes of amphibs will reach the end of their service life. By the year 2007, 80 percent of today's amphibs will retire, including all of its LST-class tank landing craft, all of its LSD-class dock landing ships, and all five Charleston-class LKA amphibious cargo ships.(3:30) If the Navy fails to modernize its amphibious fleet, it will not have sufficient transport, ship-to-shore lift, aviation, and command and control to put the maximum combat power ashore rapidly with minimal risk to personnel and equipment. Some help is coming. The Navy is procuring at least seven LHD- class amphibious assault and command ships to replace some of the big-deck amphibious ships being retired. It must continue with plans to build the new class of amphibious ship, the LX, to replace its retiring LPD-class ships. If the Navy does not build the LX, by the year 2007 its amphibious fleet will not have the capability to support amphibious lift requirements and its deploying amphibious ready groups will be reduced to two ships.(3:30) With its projected lift, speed, and combat power, the LX will serve not only as a secondary aviation platform similar to the LPD class, but as a platform around which the Navy and Marine Corps can deploy a forward presence and crisis response package. The Naval Service needs more LCACs to replace aging displacement craft, a new amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), a new medium lift transport to replace the CH-46, and more assault helos such as the AH-1 Apache to provide close-in- fire support (CIFS) so vital to the lightly armored infantry. These platforms will provide the Marines with the combat power and speed to conduct forcible entries. They also will contribute to the survivability of the amphibious task force and permit the rapid buildup of combat power ashore. LCACs have more lift, speed, and versatility than assault displacement craft and, when equipped with the GPS satellite navigation system, can move at night. Operation DESERT STORM proved that LCACs are reliable enough to withstand multiple transportation waves and not as vulnerable to enemy fires as previously thought.(10:36) Further, the need for LCACs to provide the tank lift ashore will increase as LSTs are retired. To enhance the ship-to-shore lift capability more, the Marines need to replace the current AAV, which still employs World War II technology and has a maximum speed of only 7 knots, with one that is faster and has more mobility both at sea and on land. A mobile and agile AAV will be the key to the rapid buildup of troops and equipment ashore. Another key factor in high-speed maneuver from the sea is the Marines' medium lift helo. The CH-46 transport helo has reached the end of its service usefulness. Current airframes are experiencing mounting technical difficulties that effect readiness and combat effectiveness.(3:30) It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss whether the Marines should purchase the V-22 Osprey, buy a new medium lift helo, or just upgrade the CH-53. Suffice it to say, to meet the future requirements of lift ashore during missions such as amphibious assaults, raids, and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), the Marine Corps needs a medium lift replacement for the CH-46 that has the lift, tactical mobility, range, speed, and survivability required for maneuver warfare from the sea. Naval Shore Fire Support. Although not a naval warfare function per say, naval shore fire support (NSFS) is a key component of littoral warfare operations and needs to be addressed. Supporting Marines ashore from naval ships is a critical priority for the Corps and the Navy given the likelihood of future involvement in Third-World operations in the littoral environment. "Recent events in the Persian Gulf have graphically demonstrated the need to make quantum improvements in naval gunfire support," Admiral Frank Kelso, chief of naval operations (CNO), said in a recent memorandum detailing Navy budget cuts. (9:23) The Marine Corps understands the need for NSFS during amphibious operations all too well and it knows there may be instances when it has to rely on the Navy to provide it. For example, if 4TH MEB had actually conducted an amphibious assault against Iraqi forces in Kuwait during DESERT STORM, carrier aviation would have been the only means for CAS as 3RD Marine Air Wing (MAW) assets were dedicated to direct support of Marine 1ST and 2ND Division forces attacking on the ground from Saudi Arabia. Optimally, NSFS should integrate naval gunfire support (NGFS), limited use of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (TLAM) fired from surface and subsurface platforms, both carrier- and combatant-based aviation conducting CAS and close-in-fire support (CIFS) to troops ashore, and the use of other missiles and rockets in support of expeditionary forces ashore. NSFS assets and capabilities look formidable on paper, however, some deficiencies still exist. For one, CAS competency among Navy aircrews is lacking due to insufficient training. The Navy needs to conduct more CAS training and exercises with the Marine Corps and the Army to increase the crew proficiency and enhance the coordination between the shooters and the forward observers on the ground. Despite the loss of the 16-inch gun aboard the Navy's retired battleships, NGFS will continue to play a vital role in the family of NSFS systems. The Navy has settled on deploying a single 5-inch gun aboard its newest combatants. This gun has the range (25k yards), accuracy, and rate of fire (200 rounds/min) to meet current gunfire missions. New gun technologies should still be explored; however, the emphasis on operational maneuver from the sea may alter the scale of investment. "I don't think you can rule [guns] out, but we're not going to do World War II-style amphibious assaults" in the future, Marine Maj. Gen. Harry Jenkins, director of expeditionary warfare, said in a recent interview.(9:23) This may diminish the importance of gun technology for meeting future fire support missions. Mine Warfare. Mine Warfare, and in particular mine countermeasures (MCM), is an integral part of amphibious warfare and therefore, plays a critical role in littoral warfare. Experiences in peacetime crises, regional conflicts, and global wars have taught us that mines present a formidable threat to our ability to achieve and maintain sea control and project power. That threat is amplified in the littoral battlespace. When one considers the fact that the former Soviet mine inventory includes between 250-450,000 mines and that many of these could be sold to Third-World nations whose mine stocks already number more than 100,000, the full dimension of the seriousness of this threat comes into focus. As ADM Frank B. Kelso observed, "Mines are the true stealth weapon of the 90's...The potential threat of mines to the movement of U.S. Navy ships and subs and to the commercial oceanborne trade carried on by practically all maritime nations is indeed global in scope and complexity--and demands a clearly focused MCM effort." (11:41) Unfortunately, the area where the Naval Service is weakest is in conducting MCM in the littoral region. Current MCM assets have minimal capability to conduct MCM in the shallow-water (200-40 feet), very shallow water (40-10 feet), surf zone (10 feet to the high water mark), and beachhead areas. Currently, the best mine-clearing technique is the brute force method which uses a combination of minesweepers to blow boat lanes to the surf zone and helicopterborne assets to seize and isolate the mined beachhead. This technique requires too much time and a controlled environment containing no direct or observed indirect fire. Additionally, the mine-free lanes are too narrow to support a heavy assault because the Navy does not have the transport room to embark the personnel and equipment necessary for more extensive MCM measures. This must change. Mines and physical obstacles in the shallow water, the surf zone, and the craft landing zone (the region from the high water mark inland) present a serious challenge to amphibious operations. Unless the Navy and Marine Corps improve their MCM efforts, it will have to abandon the concept of amphibious assaults across defended, hostile beaches. The Navy must examine closely its capabilities to conduct MCM in the littoral regions that will support a coordinated Navy-Marine Corps breaching effort. Although deep-water MCM forces will need to be maintained, the emphasis for the foreseeable future should be on the development of shallow-water MCM equipment, training, and procedures to combat the types of mines likely to be encountered in the littoral areas of Third-World regional powers. Some specific recommendations for improving MCM include: 1. Equipping all amphibious assault and MCM platforms with GPS satellite navigation receivers for mine avoidance and precise detection of minefields 2. Improved shallow-water sensors such as remotely-operated, influence sweepers acting as a precursor to surface sweepers 3. Development of rapid mine-clearing equipment, neutralization techniques, and obstacle-breaching systems 4. Better mine detection and avoidance sonars on MCM ships and other naval combatants 5. MCM C2 ships to provide better support to the MCM commander and his staff and enhance the coordination with naval forces on ships, in the air, and ashore 6. Dedicated platforms to provide maintenance and logistics support for on-station units. 7. Use of special warfare teams to detect the size and composition of seaward and surf-zone minefields 8. Exploring the use of LCACs and submarines as MCM platforms 9. Improved sweeping capability for the MHC-53 helos and MCM-1 Avenger-class minesweepers 10. Developing international cooperation to exchange MCM data and conduct shallow-water MCM training with coalition partners Space and Electronic Warfare. Current U.S. Navy and Marine Corps warfighting doctrine is shaped by a heavy reliance on space and electronic warfare (SEW) for command and control, communication links, information management, and techniques to monitor and attack enemy sensors. Littoral warfare accentuates this reliance. DESERT STORM demonstrated that SEW is a true force multiplier and that having a technological advantage in SEW is vital to success on the battlefield. According to John Davis, chief scientist at Navy's Space and Electronic Warfare Directorate, when conducted properly, SEW can, "win wars at less cost in lives and money and may also be used to resolve a crisis without combat by so deceiving, deterring, or disorganizing an enemy that it abandons an attack."(14:30) There is a growing area of concern the Naval Service needs to address. According to Duane Andrews, former assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), as the U.S. military increases its use of commercial electronics to link combat, logistics, and administrative computer networks, it is becoming extremely vulnerable to the enemy's use of attacks against our C4I systems. Despite the success seen in DESERT STORM, our information and communications security is atrocious, Andrews said, and, to worsen matters, "commercial electronics can be easily bought and analyzed by computer experts working for an enemy country."(14:30) The U.S. military needs to explore ways to protect C2 links and sensors from enemy interference techniques ranging from spreading false information to deceive our leaders, blinding our sensors, launching missile attacks on U.S. C4I centers, and crippling computers with software viruses.(14:1) The Naval Service must be a full partner in the joint defense world to maintain the U.S. SEW technology advantage and develop the means to protect its C4I systems from enemy attack. Force Mix and Operations. If the Navy is to remain the Nation's premier forward presence and crisis response force, it must continue to provide a flexible yet potent force. Given the force downsizing, the geographical dispersion of potential crises and conflicts in the littoral regions, and the variety of missions to be executed, the Naval Service needs to get smarter on how to operate. The Navy needs to move away from the idea that the aircraft carrier is the centerpiece of the forward presence and crisis response mission. To meet the operational commitments of littoral warfare given fewer forces, the Navy must explore the concept of using flexible force mixes that revolve around the full range of its combat fleet, including AEGIS ships, Spruance-class destroyers, SSN-688-class submarines, and amphibious big decks. Efforts along this line are already underway. CINCLANTFLT is experimenting with a new concept called Adaptive Force Packaging that applies innovative force mixes to create naval expeditionary forces centered on the LHD, LPH, and LHA as well as the carrier. Starting this year, CINCLANTFLT will deploy various amounts of amphibious warfare capabilities on deploying carriers USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America. It will also provide a token ASUW strike force capability on USS Wasp's (LHD-1) maiden deployment as the flagship for a Marine Amphibious Ready Group. Such efforts are appropriate and should be monitored to see they remain relevant and viable in the out- years. Training Navy and Marine Corps training is conducted to prepare forces to conduct the most likely projected missions in an efficient manner. No major training reforms will be required to conduct littoral warfare. Training will still be required in the traditional warfare functions noted above. The changes will be on the emphasis and scale given to each warfare function. To be effective in the littoral warfare environment, the Navy and Marine Corps must: 1. Decrease independent, open-ocean, war-at-sea training evolutions and increase the emphasis on closer, in-shore training 2. Require integrated mine warfare training between MCM and amphibious forces focused on shallow-water MCM, beachhead mine clearing, and offensive mine laying operations 3. Emphasize shallow-water ASW training to counter the growing submarine threat of Third-World regional powers 4. Emphasize AAW training to counter the increasingly sophisticated and accurate missile threat and to increase the proficiency of handling these AAW threats in the reduced time-distance decision environment inherent to the littoral battlespace 5. Conduct joint training on a regular basis with Army and Air Force in areas exercising all warfare functions pertinent to littoral warfare, especially CAS, CIFS, NSFS, air interdiction against land targets, and air defense of troops ashore 6. Introduce the concept of focus of main effort into the Navy's Composite Warfare Commander's (CWC) concept and integrate CWC into amphibious operations. Amphibious operations always incorporate focus of main effort. CWC is used as a controlling agent for the naval warfare functions. The Navy understands little about focus of main effort and most Marines are not familiar with CWC 7. Emphasize all elements of the amphibious operation during exercises, including the assault follow-on echelon and logistics-over-the- shore (LOTS) capabilities to ensure the Navy can in fact provide sustained logistics support to forces ashore 8. Conduct combined operations training with allies to improve cooperation and instill more awareness and mutual understanding of doctrine, tactics, and capabilities. Support Infrastructure In general, the Naval Service has the basic infrastructure in place to support expeditionary operations a littoral warfare environment. However, as a result of DESERT STORM and RESTORE HOPE, some problems have surfaced which demand the Naval Service reconstitute its support infrastructure in four areas more relevant to littoral warfare: sealift; intelligence support; information management-data exchange; and command and control and surveillance. Sealift. Strategic lift is essential to Marine Corps sustainment ashore during littoral operations. Ninety percent of this sustainment comes via sealift. The Marine's Maritime Prepositioning force (MPF) consisting of 13 ships combined with U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) fleet of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) sealift ships and the Army's steadily growing fleet of Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) have demonstrated the ability to provide rapid strategic lift in support of the buildup and sustained movement of forces overseas during crises. These ships were integral to the success of operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM delivering over three million tons of dry cargo and six million tons of fuel to Southwest Asia.(3:31) The Department of Defense recently conducted a Mobility Requirement Study (MRS) to examine lift requirements through the end of the 1990s. Since it was based on the need for rapid power projection from prepositioned assets or bases in the U.S., several of its recommendations relate directly to the support of littoral warfare missions. These include: 1. Improved LOTS capabilities for all MPF ships to facilitate the ship-to-shore movement of supplies and equipment during an in-stream offload 2. An additional 20 large, medium-speed roll on/roll off (RO/RO) vessels in the strategic sealift force (MPF, RRF, and FSS) to carry Marine Corps AAVs, armored vehicles, and trucks 3. Improved readiness of all sealift ships through better maintenance and more frequent activations 4. Advances in ship design and construction, propulsion systems, and cargo handling techniques 5. Improved road, rail, C2, and port infrastructure in the United States (3:31-32) Intelligence Support. The intelligence support infrastructure will have to make some major adjustments to provide more timely and relevant analysis on the more diverse, less distinct, Third-World threats likely to be encountered in the littoral warfare climate. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. naval intelligence community has focused predominantly on the collection, analysis, and production of data on the Soviet military threat. The new strategic landscape requires that the intelligence community change that focus. The predominant role of the intelligence throughout the 1990s will be to support the Naval Service conducting traditional expeditionary warfare as well as the more likely missions of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and political stability occurring near the world's coastlines. Adjustments to refocus intelligence support to expeditionary operations in the Third World should include: 1. Collection, analysis, and production of intelligence on unconventional as well as conventional threats 2. Improved coverage and availability of maps and charts for Third-World countries 3. Addressing the serious deficiency in hydrographic surveys and port and airfield studies for these countries 4. Obtaining/cataloging oceanographic data--water temperature, pressure gradients, depths, and bottom contours--for the littoral waters of Third-World countries 5. Developing the methodology for collecting, analyzing, and producing in-depth terrain, weather, and cross-country mobility studies 6. Establishing a baseline knowledge of civil, political, cultural, religious, and language factors about Third-World countries 7. Increasing the emphasis on tracking gray arms sales and technology transfers involving Third World transit points and recipients 8. Exploring ways to exploit open-source intelligence sources to complement standard intelligence sources--human, signals, and imagery(21:1-4) Information Management-Data Exchange. Improving the intelligence information and data exchange will be critical to the timely dissemination of intelligence to consumers. With smaller forces and more data to collect, analyze, and track, the Navy needs to work smarter with fully integrated computers and communications links increases. The Navy and Marine Corps need to be joint partners in upgrading the C4I capability on their big deck amphibious ships and not just on Navy carriers and flagships. Deployed amphibious ships must be able to exchange data with the amphibious landing force and troops ashore as well as with the carrier and national intelligence centers. Equipping amphibious big decks with super-high frequency communications will provide the connectivity and networking with theater- and national-level data bases. C2 and Surveillance. C2 and surveillance are the keys to effective and efficient joint operations. To operate more smartly in the littoral battlespace, the Navy and Marine Corps need to field integrated and netted sensors that provide timely and accurate targeting data on the enemy and emphasize the early and covert surveillance with a regional focus. One of the ways to do this would be to deploy more remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVs) on amphibious ships. As demonstrated in DESERT STORM, RPVs can provide the amphibious task force with real-time situation updates on the enemy at the coast and inland both prior to and during assault operations. The Ideal Throughout their history, the Navy and Marine Corps have served as the nation's fire brigade, deploying forces capable of responding to a variety of crises worldwide. The Marine Corps has always been comfortable in this role, whereas the Navy has always considered it secondary to its primary mission of commanding the seas and being prepared to defeat the enemy's fleet at sea. "From the Sea" has altered the Navy's direction. The Navy must still maintain control of the seas, but the new security environment has changed the predominant location of the Navy's likely missions and dictated that the Navy enter a crisis area with sea and air battlespace dominance. Therefore, the Navy must now learn how to navigate in the fog of the littorals by joining its sister service in executing expeditionary operations in defense of U.S. interests abroad. Littoral warfare is a geographical vice functional focus and, therefore, does not require major reforms to existing U.S. naval warfighting functions. To be successful in littoral warfare, the Navy must adapt the tools and procedures developed to fight on the open ocean to joint operations conducted from the sea. And, to ensure that littoral warfare can be executed effectively and efficiently well into the future, the Navy must maintain the mindset of naval expeditionary warfare that uses the principles of maneuver warfare in a maritime environment and emphasizes joint interoperability. This mindset must drive the force structure, the training and education, and the support infrastructure. 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