The Marine Corps' Role In Joint Special Operations: Are We Elite Enough? CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Marine Corps' Role In Joint Special Operation: Are We Elite Enough? Author: Major James B. Laster, U.S. Marine Corps Thesis: The nation's unified command responsible for special operation is deprived of the unique maritime capabilities of Marine Corps forces. The nation and Marine Corps would benefit by providing certain Marine units to the U.S. Special Operations Command. Background: The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified combatant command that exercises command over Navy, Army, and Air Force special operations forces based in the continental United States. Unlike the other unified commands, USSOCOM is responsible for the training, combat readiness, and certain administrative functions of assigned forces. As a result, the Marine Corps is reluctant to assign forces to USSOCOM for fear that the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander would relinquish authority and responsibility to train and equip his forces. The U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land Forces (SEALs) have profited by their relationship with USSOCOM and have actually expanded in their roles and functions within the naval service. This expansion has in many ways caused unnecessary duplication between the Navy and Marine Corps to the extent that we now have two naval infantries. The reason for this is simple; the USSOCOM requires a maritime special operations team, and the SEALs are the only players eligible for the draft. Providing certain units, such as the force reconnaissance direct action platoons, would increase the Marine Corps' employment in a maritime situation and would increase interoperability with special operations forces during joint campaigns. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should provide direct action platoons of the force reconnaissance companies, radio reconnaissance platoons of the radio battalions, and riverine assault craft units to USSOCOM. Another viable solution is to integrate these units with the U.S. Navy Special Warfare Command to form a Maritime Special Warfare Command that reports to USSOCOM. THE MARINE CORPS' ROLE IN JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS: ARE WE ELITE ENOUGH? OUTLINE Thesis: The nation's unified command responsible for special operations is deprived of the unique maritime capabilities of the Marine Corps forces. The nation and Marine Corps would benefit by providing certain Marine units to the U.S. Special Operations Command. I. Historical overview of special operations A. Background and origin of commando units B. Effectiveness and strategic value of special operations II. Background of U.S. Special Operations Forces A. Roles and functions prior to 1986 B. Reform and reorganization 1. 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act 2. 1987 Public Law 100-180 3. 1988 Public Law 100-456 C. Establishment of the U.S. Special operations Command (USSOCOM) 1. Organizational structure 2. Functions and responsibilities III. Marine Corps special operations capabilities A. Unique characteristics of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) B. Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) C. Subordinate Marine units which meet special operations criteria IV. Marine Corps' role and relationship to U.S. Special Operations Command A. Marine Corps' position regarding assignment of forces to USSOCOM B. SEALs, Marines, and the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) C. Disadvantages and problems of assigning Marine forces to USSOCOM D. Advantages of assigning Marine forces to USSOCOM THE MARINE CORPS' ROLE IN JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS: ARE WE ELITE ENOUGH? The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and subordinate units are inherently suited and capable of conducting special operations; however, Marine forces are not currently assigned under the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The nation's unified command responsible for special operations is deprived of the unique maritime capabilities of Marine Corps forces. The nation and Marine Corps would benefit by providing certain Marine units to the U.S. Special Operations Command. Why has the Marine Corps resisted pressure and invitation to provide forces to USSOCOM? This paper analyzes the problem from a historical perspective and offers solutions that will give the nation an extremely versatile maritime special operations capability. The United States military has a long and colorful history of conducting unconventional warfare and special operations. From the light infantry operations of Nathaniel Greene in the Revolutionary War to the cross border operations of USSOCOM in the Persian Gulf, the United States has always required forces capable of conducting strategic operations in support of national policy objectives. Until establishment of USSOCOM, the nation's political and military leaders were traditionally hesitant to commit military force to unconventional conflicts and fund the operations of special or elite organizations.1 The American military is structured around very traditional and conventional doctrine. The bold initiative displayed by special units is unacceptable to many conventional commanders since they lose positive control.2 The origin of special operations and unconventional warfare dates back to the raids by Rome's Legions against Hannibal. Tacticians have always known the value of attacking an enemy in his rear area. As armies became larger, they also became vulnerable due to their long supply lines and inability to break away from support bases. Liddell Hart refers to surprise attacks and raids in the rear area as strategic dislocation by which the enemy is forced to divert his attention away from his main objective.3 Many techniques of raiding and unconventional warfare were derived from observing native cultures. The Zulu tribe in Africa was exceptionally skilled in conducting raids against the British, and the American Indians wrecked havoc on the U.S. 1Frank R. Barnett, Richard H. Schultz, and B. Hugh Tovan ed., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press and National Strategy Information Center Inc., 1984), pp. 263-264. 2Lieutenant Colonel Keith R. Grimes, Small Force - Big Impact, The Strategic Value of World War II Raiding Forces (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1972), pp. 8-9. 3Ibid., pp. 6-7. Cavalry with only small bands of warriors.4 The word commando was first used during the 1899-1909 Boer War in South Africa. The Dutch Boers formed light irregular units that dispersed throughout the countryside and conducted hit and run ambush tactics against the British Army. By the height of the war in 1902, 250,000 British soldiers were being tied down and constantly harassed by only 25,000 Boers. The British were finally forced to organize their own special commando units to adapt and counter the unconventional techniques of the Boers.5 With the exception of the Raider Battalions during World War II, the Marine Corps has resisted creating special units and has historically adapted and task organized to the situation. The Seminole Indian campaign in Florida, counterinsurgency in Nicaragua, and civic action programs in Vietnam are but a few examples of the Marine Corps' ability to wage unconventional warfare. The United States Army also hesitated to establish permanent special units and would often disband them at the conclusion of a conflict. It wasn't until the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II that the Army began to change its attitude toward special operations units. Major problems were caused, however, by ad hoc grouping of units, and activities were rarely coordinated with the operations of other 4Ibid., pp. 1-2. 5Bruce Hoffman, Commando Raids: 1946-1983 (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1985), pp. 4-5. services and agencies. In an attempt to correct these problems, President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in 1946, and the National Security Act of 1947 formally established the CIG as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in special operations and unconventional warfare expanded in size and scope during the Korean War. This expansion led to the creation of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Forces by the Kennedy Administration.6 Special operations units will most likely assume a much greater role in the next decade. The breakup of the Soviet Union has caused numerous low intensity conflicts among factions and cultures. Additionally, Soviet military weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, are not properly controlled and may be sold to countries that have hostile intentions toward the United States and our allies. Future budget cuts in intelligence programs and national reconnaissance assets will dictate the critical requirement for special reconnaissance and strike operations. Deep reconnaissance teams may in fact replace our technical collection assets. Special operations units will also grow increasingly important to counter sophisticated state sponsored terrorism. Future low intensity conflicts may also pose political and diplomatic gray areas in which unconventional 6Barnett, pp. 264-268. forces and security assistance offers the only viable options to our political leaders.7 As a result of the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt in 1980 by ad hoc joint special operations forces, the Holloway Commission report cited that failure was largely caused by service parochialism. The investigation revealed that individual services interfered with the task organization and overall function of the operation. The investigation also identified the need for a specific organization and focus on low intensity conflict and special operations.8 Prior to the Iran hostage situation, special operations were conducted by either a single service or by an ad hoc organization of several services. A single command to coordinate training and operations of all special operations forces did not exist. The Son Tay prison camp raid in 1970 is an example of a single service operation that involved only 56 U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers who flew in helicopters from Thailand to North Vietnam.9 A single service operation normally has the greatest chances for success because the chain of command is clearly established and understood by the forces. The Son Tay operation, however, was relatively simple, covered a short distance over land, and did 7Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 159-162. 8U.S. Government Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee on Special Operations Command; Progress in Implementing Legislative Mandates, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1990, pp. 5-6. 9Hoffman, p. 46. not require the expertise of the other services. The U.S. merchant ship Mayaquez rescue and raid on Koh Tang Island in 1975 required the participation and expertise of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Although the ship and crew were recovered, the expedient and ad hoc assembly of the forces caused major problems. The helicopterborne raid force consisted of 213 Marines from Okinawa who were quickly assembled and moved to Thailand. The Marine force then linked-up with a U.S. Air Force helicopter squadron and conducted the raid with little or no rehearsal time.10 The ad hoc nature of the Iranian rescue operation was driven by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for operational security reasons. General Jones feared that Soviet intelligence would key on the movement of several regular units and this resulted in his decision to task organize from several different services. General Jones was known to task organize special units in this manner in order to circumvent the bureaucracy and parochialism of the services.11 The Holloway Commission report cited that this ad hoc function caused shortfalls in command and control due to a foggy chain of command. The report also identified inadequacies in joint special operations planning and training.12 10Ibid., pp. 46-47. 11John E. Valliere, "Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change," Parameters (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Autumn 1992), pp. 76-77. 12U.S. GAO Report, p. 5. To correct the deficiencies of U.S. forces to conduct joint special operations, Congress enacted the Cohen-Nunn Amendment of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. The law in general facilitated the integration of all the services in joint operations. In particular, the Cohen-Nunn Amendment established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD, SO/LIC) and the USSOCOM.13 USSOCOM is a unified combatant command that exercises command over all special operations forces based in the continental United States. The Command was activated in April 1987, and its headquarters is located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The Commander in Chief (CINC) of USSOCOM exercises combatant command (COCOM) over Navy, Army, and Air Force special operations forces.14 Subsequent Congressional hearings and testimony discovered resistance within the services to implement the legislation. Congress followed-up by enacting additional legislation to force the Department of Defense to integrate special operations capabilities as a joint team. Public Law 100-180 was enacted in December 1987 and directed the Secretary of Defense to provide appropriate resources to USSOCOM. The law also gave the CINC of USSOCOM head of agency authority and established the Command's Inspector General. Head of agency authority is significant 13General Carl W. Stiner, "U.S. Special Operations Forces: A Strategic Perspective," Parameters (Carlisle Barrcks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Autum 1992), pp. 76-77. 14U.S. GAO Report, pp. 76-77. because it charges the CINC with the responsibility of developing and acquiring equipment and supplies peculiar to special operations.15 In Septebber 1988, Congress enacted additional legislation to ensure further reform within the special operations community. Public Law 100-456 mandated the following additional responsibilities to CINC, USSOCOM: - Submit budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense for assigned special operations forces. - Manage and control funds for all special operations forces. - Insure combat readiness of assigned special operations forces. - Monitor the combat readiness of special operations forces while operational control is under another unified combatant commander.l6 The law established the following missions to USSOCOM: - Conduct a special operations activity or mission under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted, unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. - Exercise command of a selected special operations mission, if directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense.17 A major reason for the Marine Corps' reluctance to assign forces to USSOCOM is the traditional mindset as a general purpose force, as well as the view that the Marine Corps does not have 15Ibid., pp. 7-8, 51. 16Ibid., pp. 8-9. 17Ibid., p. 47. special operations forces per se.18 Unlike the other services, the Marine Corps' approach to special operations after World War II was to renew old capabilities and expand training standards within the existing structure of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). New units were not created. In 1983, the services were tasked by the Secretary of Defense to develop special operations capabilities to respond to future acts of terrorism and low intensity conflict. General P.X. Kelly, Commandant of the Marine Corps, directed the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, to develop a plan to increase the special operations capabilities of the Marine Corps. General Kelly's guidance and precept in the development of this plan was that new units would not be created within the Marine Corps and that the Marine Corps' capabilities must remain maritime in nature.19 General Alfred M. Gray, the 29th Commandant, solidified the MAGTF Special Operations Capable (SOC) concept in 1987. The new training standards mandated that certain MAGTFs must be capable of conducting maritime special operations to include overt or clandestine direct action, recovery operations, and special intelligence and reconnaissance operations.20 General Gray 18Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Rogish, Jr., "Do Marines Belong in USSOCOM?," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1992, pp. 58-59. 19U.S. Marine Corps, MAGTF Warfighting Center Concept Publication 8-1, Operational Concept for Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Combat Development Command), pp. 1-1, 1-2. 20Ibid., pp. 1-1 to 1-6. testified in March 1989 before the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding the special operations capabilities of certain Marine units. He stated that Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) were capable of conducting many of the same operations that legislation requires of USSOCOM. He further stated that the MEU (SOC) units routinely worked with USSOCOM units to complement and not compete with USSOCOM roles and functions.21 The Marine Corps is currently classified by JCS Publication 3-05 as a conventional general purpose force, but may be equipped and tasked organized to conduct certain special operations.22 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication-1 (JCS Pub-1) defines special operations as follows: Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized Department of Defense forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible. The capabilities of many Marine Corps units fall under this definition of special operations. In particular, the Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) MEU (SOC), the force reconnaissance companies, and the radio reconnaissance platoons of the radio battalions clearly perform special missions commensurate with the JCS Pub-1 definition. 21U.S. GAO Report, pp. 17-18. 22Ibid., p. 18. The MEU (SOC) is a MAGTF of combined arms that uniquely integrates air and ground combat power and logistics under one commander of the same service. It is the nation's only special operations capable force that lives, trains, and forward deploys as one team. All MAGTFs are capable of conducting certain special operations; however, the MEU (SOC) is specifically tailored to complement USSOCOM forces in order to provide the CINCs with strategic and operational flexibility.23 Each MEU (SOC) is capable of conducting conventional operations using combined arms of infantry, armor, artillery, and close air support. This unique MAGTF is also certified in 21 selective special missions prior to deploying to a theater of operations. Included in these special missions is the capability to conduct in-extremis hostage recovery when time doesn't allow the deployment of USSOCOM forces. The MEU (SOC) gives the warfighting CINCs a versatile means to execute non-linear operations and apply the doctrine of sea- air-land battle. Its versatility to conduct conventional and special operations from the sea allows the CINCs to project power throughout the depth of their theaters. The capability to conduct over-the-horizon direct action missions and return to amphibious ships negates requirements for landward support. Sustainment and the ability to loiter on amphibious ships is particularly important. Future crises may require a force to 23U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 4-5 to 4-8. posture offshore for a lengthy period of time, conduct surveillance, and then strike without restrictions of overflight and landward support requirements.24 Operation Provide Comfort is one of the many operations that demonstrated the utility of the MEU (SOC). The humanitarian mission of Provide Comfort implied the use of both conventional and special operations. The 24th MEU (S0C) enabled the introduction and sustainment of the joint task force into northern Iraq. The 24th MEU (SOC) then established a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) 450 miles into northern Iraq with 23 helicopters and security to enable the joint task force to conduct humanitarian assistance to Kurdish refugees. Subsequently, force reconnaissance Marines and Navy Seals of the MEU (SOC) Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) were inserted deep into northern Iraq to conduct surveillance of Iraqi forces. Battalion Landing Team 2/8 then conducted a conventional heliborne assault to establish a security zone for the Kurds. These special and conventional operations were integrated by the MEU (SOC) commander to enable the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) to provide logistics support to the joint and allied forces and sustain the entire humanitarian effort. The joint and allied forces, including units of USSOCOM, were incapable of sustaining themselves without the organic logistics capability of the 24th MEU (SOC). Once the humanitarian effort was complete, 24Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, "Forward Presence and Stability Missions: The Marine Corps Perspective," Marine Corps Gazzette, March 1993, pp. 58-61. the 24th MEU (SOC) covered the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces and then returned to amphibious shipping.25 As characterized by Operation Provide Comfort, Army Rangers, SEALs, and other special operations forces under USSOCOM are not tailored to provide and sustain the myriad conventional and special capabilities of the MEU (SOC). Although USSOCOM has forces more appropriately suited for certain special operations, they must have time to assemble from different services, rehearse, and move to the crisis theater. The MEU (SOC) gives the NCA/CINCs a versatile, forward deployed, and uniquely task organized team when there is-not time to deploy a special operations force from the continental United States. The force reconnaissance company provides significant special capabilities to the MAGTF. The primary mission of the force reconnaissance company is to conduct preassault and deep reconnaissance and surveillance operations in support of the MAGTF. A secondary mission is to conduct direct action (DA) and in-extremis hostage recovery (IHR). The company is located within the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG) of the Marine Expeditionary Force. It consists of five direct action platoons and five deep reconnaissance platoons. The direct action platoons provide long range direct action and in-extremis hostage recovery capabilities to the MAGTF commander. The direct action platoon is structured around three six-man 25Brigadier General James L. Jones, "Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991, pp. 99-107. assault teams with a total of fifteen teams per company. The deep reconnaissance platoons conduct deep ground reconnaissance and surveillance in support of the MAGTF. The Marines of force reconnaissance company are all highly skilled infantrymen and are qualified in parachuting, scuba diving, and special close quarters battle and beaching techniques.26 In the case of the MEU (SOC), a detachment from the force reconnaissance company is assigned to the MEU (SOC) commander to provide direct action and deep reconnaissance and surveillance. This detachment also serves along with Navy SEALs as the strike unit of the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF). The MSPF is normally tasked organized into four elements: (1) Command element - The commander is selected by the MEU (SOC) commander. (2) Covering Unit - This unit normally consists of one or two rifle companies of the ground combat element that provides security and covers the withdrawal of the strike unit. (3) Strike Unit - This unit is normally a composite force consisting of Navy SEALs and force reconnaissance Marines to provide reconnaissance, direct action, and hostage recovery operations. (4) Aviation Combat Support Unit - This unit is normally a composite detachment of the air combat element to provide air assault, close in fire support, close air support, and airborne command and control.27 26U.S. Marine Corps, Table of Organization Number 4718, Force Reconnaissance Company, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group, Fleet Marine Force, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps), pp. 1-4. 27FMFM 1-2, pp. C-8 to C-9. The radio reconnaissance platoon of the radio battalion is also part of the SRIG and is task organized into direct support teams to conduct signal intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic warfare operations.28 Members of the platton are airborne qualified and possess skills necessary for employment in conjunction with force reconnaissance. A detachment from the radio reconnaissance platoon normally deploys with the MEU (SOC). Because of the littoral-brown water threat in several parts of the world, particularly Latin America, the Marine Corps has conducted extensive research and exercises to develop expertise in riverine assault operations. The Marine Corps procured seven 35 ft. riverine assault craft (RAC) and have exercised reinforced rifle platoons in riverine patrol, raid, and assault operations in Central America. This concept is regularly exercised in conjunction with the operations of the U.S. Navy's special boat units to support the U.S. Southern Command initiatives in counternarcotics training to numerous Latin American countries. The Marine forces of Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Argentina have specifically requested the assistance of the U.S. Marine Corps in developing riverine capabilities. The primary mission of these Latin American Marine forces is to combat illicit cocaine operations along the maze of river networks. These numerous river networks of the Amazon Basin serve as the principal lines of communications throughout many of 28U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 7-19. the Latin American countries. During the period May to July 1990, the Marine Corps assisted the Colombian Marine Corps in training a riverine counternarcotics strike force. Since then, numerous combined U.S. Navy and Marine Corps riverine exercises have been conducted in numerous Latin American countries to assist in the development of their riverine interdiction and assault capabilities. These exercises were requested by both the country teams and CINC, U.S. Southern Command to enhance the theater objectives of developing a viable riverine force capability.29 A significant aspect of these exercises is that the participation by the U.S. Navy special boat units are under the command of USSOCOM. Additionally, many joint ancillary operations are conducted in Latin America by Marines and USSOCOM SEALs and Army Special Forces working together within the same task force. The Marine Corps Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Branch (SO/LIC) indicates that Mr. David Locher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations (ASD, SO/LIC), is currently seeking to establish a Marine Component Commander and assign Marine forces to USSOCOM. To date, the Marine Corps has an exemption from assigning forces to USSOCOM. There are several reasons why the Marine Corps is hesitant to participate in USSOCOM. Unlike the other unified commands, 29Colonel James Magee, Information Paper prepared for General A.M. Gray, "Potential Questions That May Be Asked of the CMC During FY91 Congressional Hearings" (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps (SO/LIC), 5 February 1991), pp. 3-8. USSOCOM is responsible for the training, combat readiness, and certain administrative functions of assigned forces. Training and combat readiness are normally the responsibility of the component providing the forces to the unified commander. As a result, the Marine Corps is reluctant to assign forces to USSOCOM for fear that the MAGTF commander would relinquish authority and responsibility to train and equip his forces. Most senior Marine leaders favor the continued support of USSOCOM operations with both conventional and special missions, but desire to retain control of training and administrative functions. In a report to the Secretary of Defense in Septebber 1989, Admiral Crowe made the following statement concerning the establishment of USSOCOM: ...In 1950, the military departments became separate administrative headquarters to provide forces to the unified and specified commanders who, together with the national command authorities, now constituted the chain of command. Recently, we have come full circle in the evolution of functions with the establishment of USSOCOM - a command which embodies the pre-1947 organizations in modern guise as a unified command with both administrative and combatant responsibilities. While the foregoing explains the Marine Corps' guarded position, there are many positive aspects of Marine forces being assigned to USSOCOM. The Navy SEALs were assigned to USSOCOM immediately upon its establishment as an operational headquarters. The SEALs have profited by their relationship with USSOCOM and have actually expanded in their roles and functions within the Naval Service.30 This expansion has in many ways 30Rogish, p. 58. caused unnecessary duplication between the Navy and Marine Corps to the extent that the nation now has two naval infantries. The traditional function of the Navy SEALs was to conduct hydrographic reconnaissance and other pre-assault tasks in support of amphibious operations. Over the last several years, SEALs have added the following ground operations to their menu: - Direct Action (DA) - Counterterrorism (CT) - Foreign Internal Defense/Mobile Training Teams (FID/MTT) - Raids The problem is that SEALs are not properly trained in the infantry skills, tactics, and techniques required to conduct complex infantry-related operations of direct action and raids. The lack of infantry skills were noted during the SEALs participation in Operation Just Cause, and General Stiner subsequently mandated that all SEAL officers attend the U.S. Army Ranger School. Additionally, the Navy Special Warfare Command is requesting to send SEAL officers to the Marine Corps Infantry Officers Course at The Basic School.31 The reason for this is simple; the USSOCOM requires a maritime special operations team, and the SEALs are the only players eligible for the draft. General Stiner, Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command recently stated that USSOCOM forces were involved in many 31Major John R. Allen, Information Paper, "Attendance of U.S. Navy Special Warfare Officers (SEALs) at the Infantry Officers Course" (Quantico, Virginia: The Basic School, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 8 November 1991), pp. 1-5. of the same operations predominantly conducted by Marine forces such as Eastern Exit, Sea Angel, and Provide Comfort.32 Finally, the Marine Corps' absence from USSOCOM caused major problems during Operation Desert Storm because only USSOCOM forces were authorized to conduct cross border deep reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Therefore, Marine force reconnaissance assets were not employed prior to the ground campaign.33 This problem must be solved. Is it really in the best interest of the nation and U.S. Naval Service for Navy SEALs to conduct complex infantry-related missions to include training foreign nations in infantry tactics? Can Marine infantry battalions trained in the MEU(SOC) program conduct many of the same missions currently being conducted by U.S. Army Rangers under USSOCOM? Has the Marine Corps lost opportunities for employment as a maritime special purposed force of choice due only to our absence in USSOCOM? These questions address both the benefits and negative concerns of assigning Marine forces to USSOCOM. The negative concerns are mostly based on old traditional and parochial values. Finally, the Marine Corps' current position concerning assignment of forces to USSOCOM may give the impression to Congressional leaders that Marines are resisting jointness and refusing to implement the spirit and intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 32Stiner, pp. 1-12. 33Interview with Major Cletus Davis, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 14 January 1993. The Marine Corps should look beyond old traditional and parochial values and provide certain units to USSOCOM. This step would increase opportunities for employment in a maritime situation and would increase interoperability with special operations forces during joint campaigns. Additionally, the Marine Corps would benefit from the special and exclusive USSOCOM training standards. Designated Marine units would also benefit from USSOCOM funding for special training and equipment. The following alternative solutions are feasible and practical. Acceptability will be determined by forward thinking senior Marine leaders. 1. Provide the direct action platoons of the force reconnaissance companies, radio reconnaissance platoons of the radio battalions, and riverine assault craft units to USSOCOM. 2. Integrate the above units with the U.S. Navy Special Warfare Command to form a Maritime Special Warfare Command that reports to USSOCOM. The first solution, providing certain Marine units directly to USSOCOM is practical and relatively easy to implement. The Marine Corps' fear that these assets would be lost forever is unfounded. The direct action platoons and radio reconnaissance platoons would ramain at their current home bases and would continue to deploy with the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU). An example in this case is that SEAL detachments of USSOCOM have continued to deploy with the MEUs to form the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) over the last several years. The only change is that training and operational employment of these units, while in CONUS, would be under the direction of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command.34 Although the Marines of these special units are exceptionally skilled and closely screened, there are certain techniques and resources that only national level assets of USSOCCM can provide. After-action reports of Marine special operations capable exercises indicate weakness in clandestine insertion and extraction as well as weakness in certain techniques of the hostage recovery mission.35 The Marine Corps would benefit overall by providing units to USSOCOM through the exchange of special tactics and techniques and interoperability with the other special units of sister services. This exchange of certain training would most likely spread throughout the Marine Corps through the Special Operations Training Group (SOTG) and would enhance the basic skills of our conventional units deploying with a MEU(SOC).* The second solution is also feasible and practical, but would most likely involve extensive debate and negotiation between the Navy and Marine Corps. As previously discussed, the SEALs have expanded and are conducting many infantry related functions. This is because USSOCOM requires a maritime special 34Rogish, p. 59. 35U.S. Marine Corps, Lessons Learned System Report 71854- 82294 (00751), subiitted by 24th MEU. *I credit the first solution of this paper to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Rogish, Jr. His article, "Do Marines Belong in USSOCOM?", introduced this idea in the July 1992 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette. purpose force capable of conducting a wide range of special operations in support of national policies to include direct action, special reconnaissance, hostage recovery, and foreign internal defense. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and its blue water threat, the Navy shifted its focus to littoral or brown water warfare and has worked closely with the Marine Corps in developing a Naval expeditionary force doctrine titled, "Maneuver From The Sea." The two services recently agreed to establish the Naval Doctrine Command manned by both sailors and Marines and alternately commanded by Navy and Marine officers.36 The Marine Corps has also recently agreed to rotate F/A-18 squadrons to deploy with Navy carrier battle groups. With the closer integration of the Navy and Marine Corps to form Naval expeditionary forces, then it also seems logical to integrate the maritime special operations capabilities of both services under USSOCOM. Marines, SEALs, and Navy special boat units currently deploy together as task units to Central and South America to conduct JCS directed exercises and foreign internal defense in support of the counternarcotics program. These task units of USSOCOM SEALs and Marines are often commanded by a Marine infantry officer. The integration of certain Marine units and SEALs to form one command would give the National Command Authority and unified 36Secretary Sean C. O'Keefe, Admiral Frank B. Kelso, and General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., ". . . From the Sea: A New Direction for the Naval Services," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1992, pp. 18-22. combatant commanders a unique maritime strike force capable of supporting national policy objectives. As with the first solution, the MAGTF Commanders would retain complete control of their deep reconnaissance assets, and the direct action platoons and radio reconnaissance detachments would continue to train and deploy with their SEAL counterparts of the MEU(SOC) prcgram. Like the plan to man the Naval Doctrine Command with both sailors and Marines, the Maritime Special Warfare Command would also consist of an integrated Navy and Marine staff and commanders would alternate between Navy and Marine officers. This commander would also serve as the maritime special warfare component commander to USSOCOM. Whether the first or second solution is adopted, a formal agreement in the form of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) should be established directly between the Marine Corps and USSOCOM concerning operational support during a special operation. Currently, USSOCOM employs units of the U.S. Army 75th Ranger Regiment to conduct conventional infantry covering force operations to isolate an objective area and to cover the insertion and withdrawal of special operations forces. A situation may arise in the future that requires the conventional infantry battalion and reconnaissance elements of the MEU(SOC) to isolate a strategic objective and conduct reconnaissance and surveillance prior to the arrival of national level units of USSOCOM. Procedures should be established and rehearsed for this type of scenario to include battle handover between the MEU(SOC) and USSOCOM forces. Of course, this scenario becomes largely academic if either of the solutions is adopted. Senator Nunn has recently debated excess military programs and unnecessary duplication among the military services in context of what is best for the nation. Although the first solution is viable and would solve the problem, the second solution would clearly benefit the nation and entire Naval Service. The recent emphasis on Naval expeditionary forces in forward presence and crisis response roles dictates the importance of integrating certain Navy and Marine forces to form the Maritime Special Warfare Command. Finally, the second solution would impress our Congressional leaders that the Navy- Marine Corps team is fully cooperating to implement the spirit and intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Allen, Major John R. Information Paper, "Attendance of U.S. Navy Special Warfare Officers (SEALs) at the Infantry Officers Course." Quantico, Virginia: The Basic School, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 8 November 1991. 2. Barnett, Frank R.; Schultz, Richard H.; and Tovan, Hugh B. ed. Special Operations in U.S. Strategy. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press and National Strategy Information Center Inc., 1984. 3. Davis, Major Cletus. U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia. Interview, 14 January 1993. 4. Grimes, Lieutenant Colonel Keith R. Small Force - Big Impact, The Strategic Value of World War II Raiding Forces. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1972. 5. Hoffman, Bruce. Commando Raids: 1946-1983. Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1985. 6. Jones, Brigadier General James L. "Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq." Marine Corps Gazette (November 1991): 99-107. 7. Kelly, Ross S. Special Operations and National Purpose. Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989. 8. Magee, Colonel James. Information Paper, "Potential Questions That May Be Asked of the CMC During FY91 Congressional Hearings." Washington, D. C.: Headquarters Marine Corps (SO/LIC), 5 February 1991. 9. O'Keefe, Secretary Sean C.; Kelso, Admiral Frank B.; and Mundy, General Carl E., Jr. ". . . From The Sea: A New Direction for the Naval Services." Marine Corps Gazette (November 1992): 18-22. 10. Rogish, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J., Jr. "Do Marines Belong in USSOCOM?" Marine Corps Gazette (July 1992): 58-59. 11. Stiner, General Carl W. "U.S. Special Operations Forces: A Stragegic Perspective." Parameters. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College (Summer 1992): 1-13. 12. U.S. Government Accounting Office. Report to the Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee on Special Operations Command; Progress in Implementing Legislative Mandates. Washington, D.C., 20 September 1990. 13. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 14. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 3-21. MAGTF Intelligence Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 15. U.S. Marine Corps. MAGTF Warfighting Center Concept Publication 8-1, Operational Concept for Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable). Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 16. U.S. Marine Corps. Table of Organization Number 4718, Force Reconnaissance Company, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group, Fleet Marine Force. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps. 17. U.S. Marine Corps. Lessons Learned System Report: 71854- 82294(00751). Camp Lejeune, North Carolina: 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. 18. Valliere, John E. "Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change." Parameters. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College (Autumn 1992): 69-82. 19. Zinni, Brigadier General Anthony C. "Forward Presence and Stability Missions: The Marine Corps Perspective." Marine Corps Gazette (March 1993): 57-61.
