Mine Warfare - Where Is It Today? CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Mine Warfare - Where Is It Today? Author: LCDR Janice A. Lawrimore, United States Navy Thesis: As mines become an inexpensive weapon in the inventories of many countries of the world it is essential that we design and field mine warfare forces that are able to deploy in response to crisis versus just being able to protect our own harbors. Background: The U.S. Navy has historically encountered difficulties when confronted with a sea mine threat in a wartime environment. They have repeatedly been ill prepared to detect and clear mine fields in a timely manner in advance of an amphibious assault. As a result of this inability, theater commanders have had their options restricted and have had to alter their war plans to accommodate the mine threat. The failure to effectively clear mines in advance of an amphibious landing during Desert Storm is just the latest failure. The lack of emphasis on mine warfare is a result of three inter-related issues: 1) the Soviet Union blue water threat that consumed a large proportion of the Navy budget, 2) The Soviet ability to mine U.S. harbors and our corresponding emphasis on port breakout, 3) a NATO agreement that assigned primary responsibility for minesweeping to our European allies. The nominal coast and relative simplicity of mines, when compared to the threat generated, has assured their inclusion in coastal, third world county weapons inventories. If, as the most recent National Security Strategy requires, the United States is to operate effectively in the littoral areas of the world in response to regional crisis the mine threat must be confronted and neutralized. Recommendation: The Navy must continue to support and fund the mine warfare program that was initiated following Desert Storm. Improvements in the areas of systems technology, command and control, training and pre-crisis intelligence collection are essential to assure a viable program is in place for the next crisis. OUTLINE Thesis: As mines become an inexpensive weapon in the inventories of many countries of the world it is essential that we design and field mine forces that are able to deploy in response to crisis versus just being able to protect our own harbors. I The Mine Countermeasure Force prior to 1989 A. Historical perspective B. Mission C. Force Structure D. Equipment E. Priority in the budget process II Issues that have driven the changes within the mine warfare community A. Difficulties encountered during Desert Storm B. Congressionally directed changes C. Break-up of the Soviet Union D. Significant changes to the National Security and National Military Strategies 1. Crisis response 2. Littoral vice blue water III Current Mine Countermeasure Structure and Future Plans A. Force structure and location B. Platforms/command ship C. Research and development initiatives D. Training E. Intelligence F. Very shallow water/surf zone MCM IV Assessment A. Are the changes sufficient to meet the future threats? B. Why the Marine Corps should continue to remain involved in the mine warfare evolution Mine Warfare - Where Is It Today? Following the Persian Gulf War the United States Navy is once again faced with the need to relearn a lesson from the past. Namely, the ability to detect and successfully counter a sea mine threat is an essential component of amphibious warfare. The use of sea mines and the need to counter the threat they impose is not a new concept. The United States has been involved with sea mines and mine warfare since the Revolutionary War when David Bushnell attempted to sink a British frigate with rudimentary moored mines. Naval history, from the Civil War onward, is rife with examples in which mines have significantly impacted the speed and success of naval campaigns and amphibious landings. From Admiral Farragut's entry into Mobile Bay in 1864, the invasion of Normandy during World War II, the delayed landing at Wonsan, Korea in 1950, Operation End Sweep in Vietnam, and several recent operations short of war in Southwest Asia, the Navy has had to deal with mine threats. The inability to effectively clear mines for an amphibious landing during the Persian Gulf War was just the latest failure. The relative simplicity and nominal cost of sea mines, when compared to the sizable threat that they generate, has assured that these weapons are a part of virtually every arsenal throughout the world. Iraq's use of mines in the Persian Gulf and the Allied Coalition's inability to clear the minefields prior to offensive action, is a prime example of the significant threat which mines can create. More than any other weapon system of comparable cost, mines have the ability to level the playing field. They can nullify the advantages of overwhelming force and firepower with relatively little risk. As mines become an inexpensive weapon in the inventories of countries around the world, it is essential we design and field mine warfare forces that are able to deploy in response to crisis and that can credibly counter mine threats in a timely manner. Considering the long history of mine warfare and the known threat that mines can generate, the question must be asked, why has the Navy apparently been so remiss in dedicating resources to this warfare community? Secondly, following our failure to effectively clear mines prior to Desert Storm and recognizing that mines are a continual threat, what is being done within the Navy to correct the problem and are the efforts adequate? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to understand the threat assessment, mission, and force structure that existed prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The mine warfare community has been subjected to cyclical interest and funding throughout its history. With the end of World War II the U.S. Navy, unlike its European counterparts, allowed the proficiency, talent, and assets within the mine countermeasure (MCM) community to stagnate and then wither. This lapse of interest can be attributed to cuts in the defense budget as well as a strategic focus that was increasingly oriented toward the Soviet Union and the coming Cold War. It was not until October 1950, when an amphibious landing by 1st Marines and 10th Corps at Wonsan, Korea had to be postponed, that attention was redirected to the threat posed by mines. The landing of 50,000 men in a powerful 250-ship armada had been held at bay for nearly a week by sea mines, some of 1904 vintage. Vice Admiral C.T. Joy, Commander Naval Forces, Far East concluded that: The main lesson of the Wonsan operation is that no so-called subsidiary branch of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be neglected or relegated to a minor role in the future. Wonsan also taught us that we can be denied freedom of movement to an enemy objective through the intelligent use of mines by an alert foe.1 The lesson lasted until 1958, when once again construction funds were deleted from the tightening budget. This general lack of interest was further compounded by a NATO agreement that assigned primary responsibility for Atlantic minesweeping to our European allies. Mine countermeasures remained a low priority until Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr. became Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1970. Recognizing that the Navy was made up of three unions, aviation, submarine, and surface, he made himself "...the head of the mine warfare union to try to get an equal balance of interest within the United States Navy in this very important field."2 Identifying the need to centralize control of air, sea, and ___________________ 1Cagle and Mason, The Sea War, as quoted in T.M.Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes", (Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1991), p.79. 2Norman Polmar, "The U.S. Navy: Mine Countermeasures," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1979, p.117. undersea MCM assets he established a two-star type command in Charleston, SC and transferred both administrative and operational control of all MCM assets, less minesweeping helicopters, to this command. For the first time since World War II a single officer exercised command responsibility for the operational readiness of all MCM assets. The benefit gained by this change was offset to a degree by Zumwalt's belief that mine countermeasures could be more effectively conducted using aircraft rather than surface ships. During his watch the active surface MCM fleet was reduced from sixty-four ships in 1970 to nine in 1974 and two active airborne MCM (AMCM) helicopter squadrons were established. The benefits of consolidated command were short lived as declining budgets and higher priorities caused the new CNO, Admiral Holloway, to again reorganize type commands. He transferred the MCM assets back to the surface commanders and downgraded the mine warfare command to a technical advisor/ liaison role. Not until the early 1980s, when the Reagan administration embarked on the 600-ship Navy program, was any serious effort made to revitalize the surface MCM fleet. Thirty- one modern, high technology ships and new MCM systems were programmed into the budget. Unfortunately so much time had passed since the last MCM ship had been built that the unique building techniques had been forgotten and had to be relearned resulting in delays in the program. During the 1970s and 1980s U.S. MCM forces conducted several successful operations in such areas as the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf as a result of third world country and terrorist actions. The emphasis within the MCM community, however, remained focused on the Soviet capability to mine U.S. harbors. To counter this perceived threat and augment existing active and reserve assets the Craft of Opportunity Program (COOP) was implemented. The program was comprised of twenty-two units, one for each key port, and four reserve crews per unit. The Navy's focus was clearly directed to the potential port breakout requirement created by the Soviet Union. Understandably, and not without reason, this focus remained until the late 1980s. At the time Iraq invaded Kuwait the Navy's MCM force consisted of two active and eighteen reserve ocean minesweepers (MSO) of 1955 vintage, three new Avenger class mine countermeasure vessels (MCM), two active and two reserve AMCM squadrons, two explosive ordnance disposal (EOD-MCM) detachments and sweep gear which had not changed appreciably in twenty years. Because these assets were directed toward U.S. port breakout they relied heavily on the local economy for their logistics support. As such, they were not structured to effectively participate in long term overseas deployments. Compounding the problems resident within the MCM community was their position in the overall Navy hierarchy. The MCM community as a whole received little interest or emphasis in the defense budget process; procurement of submarines and surface combatants to counter the Soviet blue water threat remained the top priority. Two events have occurred in recent years that could permanently change the manner in which the Navy views mine countermeasures and the MCM community. The first of these events was the Persian Gulf War. With the onset of the conflict the Navy faced a situation that they had not encountered in nearly forty years. For the first time since Korea the Navy was confronted with the need to clear extensive minefields, in a hostile wartime environment, in advance of an amphibious landing. As was the case at Wonsan, the Navy was unable to clear the fields in advance of the ground offensive and, as a result, approximately 24,000 Marines missed the fight of a lifetime. The difficulties encountered off the coast of Kuwait served to once again focus attention on the lack of effective mine counter- measure capabilities. Not only was the amphibious landing affected by the inability to effectively clear mines, the Navy temporarily lost two ships as a result of mine strikes. Both of these ships, the USS Tripoli (LPH-lO) and the USS Princeton (CG- 59), were actively engaged in the mine clearing effort at the time they were damaged and were located in areas that were thought to be clear. The attention generated by the problem in the Persian Gulf was not limited to the Department of the Navy but extended to the Department of Defense and the U.S. Congress as well. The embarrassment caused by the aborted amphibious landing led to Congressional demands for improved capabilities. Representative Charles E. Bennett, chairman of the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, noted: The war in the Persian Gulf brought to the fore some shortcomings in the mine countermeasures capabilities of the Navy. Two particulars were noted. The ships, helicopters, and explosive ordnance disposal teams that comprise the mine countermeasure capability of the United States had not trained together and were not ready to begin coordinated operations when they arrived in the Gulf in October of 1990; and the ability to clear mines from shallow water and the surf zone areas in support of an amphibious landing was very limited.3 As a result of these shortcomings, Congress required an MCM master plan be prepared by the Navy and sought assurance from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the plan would be adequately funded and meet military requirements. All of the posturing and the demands for improved capabilities might have fallen victim to the passage of time if it had not been for the second crucial event - the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union came the end of the Cold War and a radical shift in the National Security Strategy of the United States. The bi-polar threat that had been the underpinning of both national and military strategy for forty years gave way to a multi-polar, regional focus. This new focus emphasizes the use of political and economic agendas, in conjunction with military deterrence, to achieve regional and global stability. The most recent National Military Strategy ___________________ 3U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Hearings on H.R. 5006, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Seapower, (Washington DC: GPO, 1992), p.85. Hereafter cited as H.A.S.C., H.R. 5006. also acknowledges the declining Soviet threat and has broadened its scope to encompass four fundamental requirements of an effective military. In this new era the military must ensure strategic deterrence and defense, exercise forward presence in key areas, respond effectively to crises, and retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces should the need arise.4 It further identifies potential regional conflicts and contingency crisis response as the probable norm rather than the exception in future employment of the armed forces. The military's ability to successfully respond to crisis tasking is predicated on its ability to enter a conflict area quickly with an appropriate amount of force. This in turn might require an amphibious landing that would require rapid clearing of mines as a precursor. The likelihood of this scenario occurring is extremely high for a variety of reasons. First, a quick review of the world's hotspots reveals that most are accessible by sea, are in regions that are themselves unstable, and are where the United States does not necessarily have formal alliances. Second, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and a growing need for hard currency among the Confederation of Independent States, the ability to obtain Soviet military technology has become increasingly easy for most third world countries. Third, the relatively low cost ___________________ 4U.S., Department of Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: N.p., 1992), pp.7-8. of mines, when compared to the damage they can inflict or the paralysis that they generate, makes their use highly cost effective. While any one of these reasons is sufficient to justify the need for an effective mine countermeasure capability, when combined, they create an argument that cannot be ignored. Acknowledging that the blue water threat posed by the former Soviet Union has in large part been dissipated and that crisis response is the watchword of the future, the U.S. Navy has been forced to rethink its maritime strategy. The emphasis has been shifted away from open ocean, "war at sea", campaigning to one directed at the littoral areas of the world.5 With this new focus has come an increased emphasis on amphibious warfare and the ability to land troops from the sea. An obvious prerequisite to a successful amphibious landing is the ability to successfully clear any obstacles in the approach lanes, including mines. With these requirements in mind, the Navy has undertaken steps to correct the deficiencies identified during the Persian Gulf conflict and expand the ability of the MCM force to respond to contingency crises throughout the world. The most significant problem identified during the Persian Gulf conflict, the lack of adequate command and control, has been corrected. The Commander, Mine Warfare Command, originally established by Admiral Zumwalt, has been reinvested with the operational and administrative command of all surface MCM forces and the operational command of ___________________ 5U.S., Department of the Navy, ... From The Sea, (Washington DC: N.p., September 1992), pp.1-2. all AMCM helicopters and EOD-MCM forces. Working under this command are two newly created, full-time, deployable mine group commands that are charged with providing day-to-day oversight of the forces. Additionally, they are charged with conducting joint and fleet exercises to maintain readiness in support of regional conflicts and contingency operations. To further enhance training and readiness the Navy has proposed consolidation of all MCM assets in a single home port along with all the requisite maintenance infrastructure. This consolidation of assets would allow for close oversight of all units and would provide a coherent and coordinated focus on both training and maintenance. The current multiple site distribution of MCM assets does not permit such a focus. While initial consolidation has taken place with the movement of the two group staffs and a portion of the MSOs to bases at Corpus Christi and Ingleside, Texas, the balance of the move has been put on hold until base closure and budget issues are resolved.6 Another lesson learned from Desert Storm was the need for a dedicated MCM command/support ship. As noted earlier, MCM assets are not designed to be self supporting during long term overseas deployments. The Naval Sea Systems Command is currently involved in developing plans for the conversion of the USS Inchon (LPH- 12), an amphibious assault ship, to an MCM command, control, and support (MCS) ship. The converted ship will be capable of ___________________ 6Interview with LCDR Ivey Walker, Helicopter Tactical Wing ONE, Norfolk, VA, 11 March 1993. simultaneously supporting four mine countermeasure ships of the Avenger and/or Osprey classes, eight MH-53E minesweeping helicopters, and up to four EOD-MCM teams. The ship will serve as a floating port to provide both a landing platform for the helicopters and a resupply/repair/rest facility for the surface units.7 Another area within the MCM community that requires attention is the development of new countermeasure technologies. Advances in microprocessor technology have led to the development of intelligent mines which can identify individual ships, allowing for friend-foe discrimination and selective strikes. Other improvements include the ability to discriminate between sweep gear and real ships, the shaping of ground mines to give a deceptive sonar reflection, and mooring of mines in deep water using lightweight cables. Initiatives to counter these new threats have been limited at best. In an effort to offset this technology gap funding for the research and development of new mine warfare technologies has been drastically increased in the past three years. The MCM program received approximately $40 million or one half of the fiscal year 1993 sea-control and undersea superiority funding appropriation, a marked improvement from prior year funding of nearly zero.8 From this infusion of ___________________ 7Edward J. Walsh, "Minehunting Command/Control Ship Design Begins," Sea Power, March 1993, p.39. 8John F. Morton, "Technology: Insertion is the Name of the Game," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1993, p.134. monies new or improved technologies can be expected in virtually every facet of both active and passive mine countermeasures. Numerous corporations, in addition to Navy laboratories, are actively involved in new system development. Some promising possibilities include: 1) Westinghouse Corporation's development of undersea vehicles for MCM application, 2) Kaman Aerospace's development of a laser based airborne mine surveillance system, designated Magic Lantern, that the Navy intends to field test for possible production and, 3) EDO Corporation's concept of merging two unique technologies, the MK 105 magnetic influence mine- sweeping system with an air cushioned vehicle, to provide an unmanned surface MCM vehicle. While the possibilities are endless the funding is not. The Navy must ensure that the research and development of new MCM technologies is not done in a vacuum. Coordination with other Navy programs/offices, in particular the antisubmarine warfare program, is essential to avoid redundancy of effort and optimize scarce funding allocations. A Navy/Marine Corps steering group has been formed to address the critical weakness of very shallow water/surf zone mine and obstacle clearance. This group has recognized that mine countermeasure operations, conducted with existing capabilities, in advance of an amphibious assault would negate the element of surprise. To overcome this problem a far-term concept of operations has been developed.9 This concept provides for the development of systems that will clandestinely detect mines and mine fields prior to the assault as well as development of systems to sweep in stride with the assault force. Another area that needs to be addressed, if mine countermeasure capabilities are to be improved significantly, is intelligence. To use a cliche, the best offense is a good defense. We must become sensitized to the threat. We must identify and then continuously and aggressively monitor those countries that possess both the means and tendency to use mine warfare. Current accurate intelligence will is absolutely essential to reducing the threat and aiding in any future minesweeping operations. The United States Marine Corps has more than a passing interest in ensuring an effective mine countermeasure capability exists. The very essence of the Marine Corps philosophy of warfighting rests on the ability to maneuver. The concept as discussed in FMFM-1, Warfighting, "seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope."10 The Navy's inability to rapidly and effectively counter a mine threat severely limits the opportunities that maneuver strives to create. While the Army's interest is probably not as great as the Marine Corps they too ___________________ 9H.A.S.C., H.R. 5006, p.104. 10FMFM 1, Warfighting, (Washington DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, March 1989), p.59. must be concerned with mine countermeasures at sea. Not only might they be called upon to make an amphibious landing in the future but the success or failure of the Marines could have a far reaching impact on the conduct of any land campaign. Has the Navy learned the mine countermeasure lesson this time around? Are the actions being taken by the Navy sufficient to provide a viable MCM force? The answer to the second question is "YES", the answer to the first question will not be known until forces are once more confronted with a mine threat. Admiral Frank B. Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on April 30, 1992, stated: ... we recognize the need to design and field mine forces that are able to deploy in response to crisis vice just being able to protect our own harbors. This was obviously the case in the Gulf War, and the changes we are making are indicative of the adjustments we are making to a changing world.11 Few people in the Congress or the Department of Defense would contradict this statement. However, as the defense budget becomes increasingly constrained, the propensity to cut funds from the mine warfare program may become overwhelming. The Marine Corps, as the organization that will ultimately be most affected by the success or failure of mine clearing efforts, must become a vocal proponent of these mine warfare initiatives. They must continually challenge the Navy to field more capable, flexible systems, and they must not allow Congress to lose sight ___________________ 11H.A.S.C., H.R. 5006, p.393. of the need for this capability when reviewing and approving the military budget. To fail in these efforts now will in all likelihood result in the loss of American servicemembers in the future. BIBLIOGRAPHY Brown, Major Larry K. "Mine Countermeasures and Amphibious Operations, A Line in the Sea?" Research Paper. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 20 June 1991. EDO Corporation. Proven Influence Sweep Capabilities. Pamphlet. College Point, NY: N.p., N.d. FMFM 1. Warfighting. Washington DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, March 1989. Ireland, Bernard. Sea Power 2000. London, UK: Arms And Armour Press, 1990. Interview with Ivey Walker, LCDR, USN, Helicopter Tactical Wing ONE, Norfolk, VA, 11 March 1993. Melia, Tamara Moser. "Damn the Torpedoes". Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1991. "Mines of the Future." Interview with Captain Dick B. Sluijter, Director of the Belgian-Netherlands Mine Warfare School. Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol 13 No 23 (16 June 1990), 1207. Morton, John F. "Technology: Insertion is the Name of the Game." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1993, pp.134-35. ---------------. "The ASW Industrial Base: Cooling Down." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1993, pp.133-35. Polmer, Norman. "The U.S. Navy: Mine Countermeasures." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1979, pp.117-19. Sharpe, Captain Richard, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships 1990-1991. Coulsdon, UK: Jane's Information Group, 1990. U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee. Hearings on H.R. 5006, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Seapower. H.A.S.C. No. 102-43, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., Washington DC: GPO, 1992. U.S. Department of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategy of the United States. Washington DC: N.p., 1992. U.S. Department of the Navy. ...From the Sea. Washington DC: N.p., September 1992. U.S. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington DC: N.p., August 1991. Walsh, Edward J. "Minehunting Command/Control Ship Design Begins." Sea Power, March 1993, pp.39-41. ---------------. "Magic Lantern ADMs Set for Testing." Sea Power, March 1993, pp.41-42.
