From The Sea: The Right Strategy/The Wrong Tools AUTHOR LCdr Carl B. Lawrimore, USN CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues FROM THE SEA: THE RIGHT STRATEGY/THE WRONG TOOLS Thesis: U.S. Naval strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to a focus on regional challenges concentrated in the complex operating environment of the "littoral" areas of the world: However, our current Naval force requires fundamental changes in order to be able to respond to strategic demands. I. Changing national strategy A. From global to regional focus B. Budget considerations II. New Naval strategy A. Operating forward from the sea B. From a "blue water" to a "brown water" Navy III. An "enabling force" A. The MAGTF B. Tailored for national needs IV. Naval force doctrine A. Current versus new doctrine B. Shaped for joint operations V. Current problems A. Inadequate weapons systems B. Questionable Navy commitment C. Adequacy of funding VI. Solutions A. Develop the right doctrine B. Restructure Naval forces C. Restore/reprogram scarce funding D. Procure the right weapon systems FROM THE SEA: THE RIGHT STRATEGY/THE WRONG TOOLS Naval service priorities have changed along with our national security strategy as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the belief that future conflicts will grow from emergence of regional/ethnic rivalries around the world. Our strategy has shifted from dealing with confrontation in a bi- polar world to confronting multi-polar threats where probable use of military force will be expeditionary in nature. Consequently, U.S. Naval strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to a focus on regional challenges concentrated in the complex operating environment of the "littoral" areas of the world. However, our current Naval force requires fundamental changes in order to continue to successfully operate in this environment and to respond to strategic demands. The new defense strategy formulated in the Secretary of Defense posture statement of 1990 recognized that the massive, short-warning threat posed to Central Europe by Soviet military forces, which could quickly escalate to global war, had been eliminated. But the regional defense strategy of this document also acknowledged that nondemocratic powers might attempt to achieve hegemony in regions that remain critical to U.S. interests. (1:6) The ability of the United States to implement this new regional strategy has been dependent on retaining a credible alliance structure, quality personnel , technological superiority and critical warfare capabilities. This regional defense strategy consists of four essential capabilities : strategic nuclear deterrence/defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. Of these four capabilities, forward presence and crises response are capabilities the naval service has been ably performing for many years in a relatively stable environment. To adapt to this new regional defense strategy in an unstable environment, naval forces must fundamentally restructure to respond to potential low-intensity contingencies, and the new force structure must be sufficiently flexible and powerful to project an enabling power in littoral areas. The new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps team is to provide the nation with naval expeditionary forces, that are shaped for joint operations, which project power from the sea, and are tailored to specific contingencies. (6:2) Since 1981 the Navy-Marine Corps team has strengthened its ability to operate in this environment and has made great strides in updating doctrine and procuring weapon systems to ensure effectiveness in littoral warfare. These naval forces have also established a full partnership in joint operations and, as the nation's expeditionary force, have been most capable of responding swiftly and forcefully to almost any regional crisis. However, continued budget constraints and disputes in doctrine development threaten to impede the naval services' ability to maintain a fully credible and effective strategy to respond to evolving strategic demands. The restructured naval force must expand on and capitalize upon its traditional expeditionary roles. (6:3) Specifically, Naval Expeditionary Forces must ensure they remain: -Swift to respond while forward deployed, on short notice to crises in distant lands. -Structured to build power from the sea to respond to national strategic needs, -Capable of sustaining support from the sea for long-term operations, -Unrestricted by constraining land borders in order to enter the scene of crises, -Flexible to respond to multiple regional threats in different parts of the world, This renewed emphasis on the Navy operating increasingly within the littoral areas of the world is a difficult adjustment for the "blue water" sailor to make. Transforming the current blue water Navy, which has concentrated enormous manpower and budgetary assets toward possible confrontation with the Soviet Navy, to a "brown water" Navy with a focus toward confronting numerous potential regional threats within the littoral areas of the world will require a fundamental shift in mindset and doctrine. The new Secretary of the Navy will have many obstacles to clear, foremost being the dwindling defense budget, in order to successfully transform our Navy-Marine Corps team into a truly naval expeditionary force. A majority of the Navy's ships are surface and subsurface combatants designed to operate and fight in the deep open ocean environment. Amphibious shipping, specifically designed to carry marines to a regional conflict and to put them ashore in an assault, has been allowed to dwindle in size because the Amphib Navy has historically been viewed as less prestigious than the other surface communities. Thus, a fundamental shift in mindset is critical to a successful shift in strategy. Additionally, emphasizing procurement of amphibious shipping is also necessary to support a "brown water" navy capable of fulfilling strategic requirements. The unique capabilities of the naval amphibious forces make them ideal for providing the initial "enabling force" very often required in most regional crises. An enabling force supplies the means and opportunity to insert Marine forces into a crisis to initially stabilize the situation which allows follow-on joint forces ample time to mobilize, employ and intervene. Quick response of a credible armed force in a given crisis can make the difference in stabilizing the situation. Additionally, this armed force must be fully capable of operating in a joint environment for ease of integration into the unified commander's joint force if the crisis proves to be of such magnitude as to require a much larger force. Focusing on the littoral area, the Navy and Marine Corps, as the enabling force, can seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow the entry of heavy Army or Air Forces. (6:4) Thus in terms of naval strategy, the new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps team is to provide naval expeditionary forces shaped for joint operations, which are capable of maneuvering from the sea to immediately respond to a unified commander's direction to intervene in a crisis. Naval force doctrine is evolving to enable deployed amphibious forces to configure expeditionary force packages that can respond to various crises. At present naval expeditionary forces, while deployed overseas, are fully capable of responding to a wide range of crises from humanitarian relief and non-combatant evacuation operations to major offensive operations. Naval forces can also sustain long-term operations due to their unique self-sufficient logistics system. This harmony is more apparent than real as will be discussed later. Task organizing into tailored expeditionary force packages is generally accomplished by constructing a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) which is embarked on Navy amphibious ships. Today's MAGTFs are credible, mobile, sustainable, and flexible forces with combined arms capabilities in a wide range of operations including crisis response, presence, disaster relief stability operations, and humanitarian relief. (2:51) The MAGTF has been a credible capability for many years. Retention of this capability is needed if we expect to have a viable expeditionary force well into the next century. A MAGTF has all the characteristics inherent in a naval expeditionary force: balance, flexibility, recoverability, reusability and strategically, operationally, and tactically mobile and sustainable. (3:45) This expeditionary capability is enhanced when Marine flyaway forces are used in conjunction with a forward deployed MAGTF. These air contingency forces are able to make long-range reinforcing deployments on short notice. The strategic importance of such rapidly deployable and employable forces highlights the synergistic effects of Naval expeditionary forces. With a diminishing Defense budget however, the Navy and Marine Corps are now forced to review the structure needed to meet global commitments and other possible contingencies. Eventually this rethinking will lead to some dramatic changes that require looking at force structure in different ways. (3:45) To remain effective and tailored for national needs naval forces will need to be creative and innovative as force structure shrinks. The large draw down in personnel and reduction of amphibious shipping will likely result in smaller MAGTFs deploying more frequently, if all current commitments are to be met. Naval forces must be both capable and affordable, supported by relevant concepts, doctrine, and training. These changes will refine and implement the operational capabilities of expeditionary warfare so that Naval forces can help provide the National Command Authority with a full range of options. (6:10) Current Naval force doctrine resides in numerous Naval Warfare Publications and in various Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFM). Naval force doctrine, specifically Navy doctrine, is still weighted heavily toward countering a "blue water" threat that was historically presented by the Soviet Union. However, this threat became drastically diminished after the coup attempt in 1991 and decreases even more as time passes. But Navy force structure as well as ship mix, remains configured to meet this "blue water" threat. Current Naval amphibious doctrine was developed in the 1950s and issued in 1962. Dramatic changes have occurred in the world in the past 30 years, but amphibious doctrine has changed very little in that period. As Admiral LaPlante remarked "Littoral warfare is going to be the mode of warfare in the future. Amphibious forces will be involved in that, but, clearly, much more broadly than in executing conventional assaults. We need an institutional way to think about those sorts of things, and how we're going to establish command relationships and what the tactics are going to be." (4:37) Development of future Naval doctrine must be accomplished with a clear understanding of national objectives and not with the goal of furthering Mahanian ideals. This effort must include contributions equally from the "Gator" Navy and Marine Corps as well as other surface/ subsurface combatants, and aviators. To conduct maneuver warfare from the sea, the Marines and the few amphibious advocates left in the Navy have experimented with a new concept. The idea is for an amphibious task force to remain over the horizon at distances up to 5O miles at sea and instead of launching head-on attacks against enemy defenses (as done in the Pacific war) attack an enemy's soft spots. (8:31) Navy and Marine amphibious forces have been experimenting with this approach for the past seven years. This concept uses CH- 46/CH-53 helicopters to land Marines and light equipment behind enemy positions ashore where they can marry up with tanks and other heavy equipment landed ashore by Navy landing craft, air cushion (LCAC) vehicles at speeds of 50+ knots. These LCAC can maneuver along a coastline probing for undefended/unmined beaches and move inland some distance if needed to land their payloads in a relatively benign environment. The goal is to land an assault regiment by LCAC and helicopter within 90 minutes from over the horizon. Maneuver warfare--from the sea--must be the linchpin of future naval doctrine if naval forces intend to have any hope of meeting future national needs in an unstable multi-polar world where numerous regional threats may exist at any one time. This concept--maneuver from the sea--can succeed in the Navy if the right direction is chosen. However, a few major obstacles must be cleared in the near future to effectively guide the Navy and Marine Corps on the correct path to successful development and implementation of maneuver warfare doctrine and procedures. These problems that must be addressed are: -Lack of an adequate number of amphibious lift ships -Lack of a replacement for the Marine Corps medium lift helicopter (CH-46) -Reluctance of senior Navy leadership to develop naval doctrine that places more emphasis on the "brown water" Navy -Lack of adequate funding -Inadequate naval gunfire support Amphibious lift shipping. While war plans require amphibious lift for the assault echelons of two Marine Expeditionary Forces(MEFs), available funding can support only a 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault-echelon lift goal, which is the Nation's minimum requirement. If achieved, this 2.5 MEB lift goal would meet current requirements for forward deployed naval forces and still provide sufficient surge capability to lift the assault echelons of a MEB in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. (7:91) However, the Navy's inventory of amphibious ships is decreasing with the retirement of older LSDs and all the Navy's LSTs and LKAs. This decrease in amphibious shipping exceeds the Navy's planned/funded new construction replacement amphibious ships. The Navy continues to build amphibious assault ships (LHDs) and dock landing ships (LSDs), but there will continue to be a shortage of amphibious shipping unless the Navy is able to convince congress to fund a new class of amphibious ship, the LX-90, which is currently awaiting approval. Marine Corps medium lift replacement. The aging CH-46 assault medium lift helicopter, a key maneuver element weapon system that is in dire need of replacement, remains in the Marine Corps inventory and will likely not be replaced in the near future. Due to a dispute on affordability of the V-22 Osprey, Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) have been unable to agree upon a satisfactory replacement aircraft to fulfill the Marine Corps medium lift mission. Continued deadlock between Congress and DoD, coupled with the continued deterioration of the Marine Corps CH-46 fleet, will soon cause a serious degradation in our emerging capability to effectively maneuver from the sea in support of evolving strategic demands. Senior Navy leadership commitment. For many years the leaders of the Navy have mainly focused their efforts on confronting the "blue water" threat posed by the Soviet Union. Consequently, a majority of Navy funding and effort was devoted toward building weapon systems that could combat this threat. These frigates, destroyers, cruisers and carriers were considered the backbone of the fleet and were where the premium billets for line officers were located. All other surface ships, especially amphibs, were seen as second rate and offered very little opportunity to for advancement. This attitude is still prevalent today. However, the recently retired Secretary of the Navy, Sean O'Keefe, has taken a giant step in a new direction for the naval service with the publication of the Navy and Marine Corps white paper From the Sea. This was a good first step, but in order to ensure the transformation in the way the Navy intends to approach the current regional threat, emerging doctrine must be developed with an emphasis on elevating the stature of service within the amphibious fleet. Lack of adequate funding. Prospects for future defense budgets appear grim and will likely cause a drastic draw down in personnel and an equal reduction in Navy ships. Actual reductions are not yet known, but if recent estimates from Washington are accurate, a reduction below 159,000 active duty personnel for the Marine Corps will be assured. A reduction of this magnitude will cause the Naval service to look at reducing forward presence and the National Command Authority to cancel various commitments throughout the world. Lack of adequate Naval gunfire support. When the USS Missouri was decommissioned and returned to mothballs in March 1992 the last of the Navy's truly effective naval gunfire support (NGFS) platforms--the battleships--was removed from the Navy's inventory. The Navy destroyers' Mark 45, 5-inch/54 guns are the only NGFS tubes remaining in the Navy's inventory. Unfortunately, these 5-inch guns are not very effective on today's high-tech battlefield. This lack of effective NGFS severely limits the Marine Corp's ability to maneuver from the sea into a hostile environment, which may be required in today's environment. Given today's budget constraints, it doesn't appear that an adequate NGFS weapon will be developed in the near future. These problems present a large roadblock to naval service efforts at successful development and implementation of maneuver warfare doctrine, but this doesn't mean it isn't insurmountable. In terms of doctrine the Navy and Marine Corps team is changing in response to the challenges of a new security environment. (6:10) To ensure these changes are adequate to enable the naval service to maximize effectiveness against today's regional threats requires a strong commitment by naval leadership and strong support in Congress. The keys to overcoming obstacles must begin with at least partial restoration of funding cut from the Department of the Navy's budget during recent Congressional budget hearings and continue with a dedicated effort by Navy leadership to develop doctrine that encourages increased emphasis on amphibious warfare. The following choices must be made to set the Navy and Marine Corps team on the right path toward development of adequate maneuver warfare doctrine and procedures: -The Navy must obtain funding and then approve construction of the next generation replacement amphibious ship,the LX-90. This new amphibious ship will be able to embark a minimum of 700 troops; 25,000 cubic feet of cargo; four CH-46E helicopters;and two LCACs. It will provide a majority of the capabilities of the remaining 26 ships of the Austin (LPD-4), Charleston (LKA-113), Anchorage (LSD-36), and Newport (LST-1179), classes of amphibious ships that will soon be retiring at the end of their 35-year service lives. (7:91) -The Navy must convince DoD to support procurement of the V- 22 Osprey, which is an obvious choice for replacement of the Marine Corps medium-lift helicopter, the CH-46. The V-22 Osprey was found to be the most cost-effective aircraft for the Marine Corps medium-lift mission by a study conducted by the DoD- sponsored Institute of Defense Analysis. The V-22 is the right platform to fulfill the Marine Corps medium-lift requirements well into the 21st century, but DoD must first be convinced to fund it. -The regional and littoral warfighting environment requires new doctrinal thinking to get the most out of integrating the Navy/Marine Corps and the joint sea-air-land team. (6:11) The new Naval Doctrine Command being established in Norfolk will provide the right stage to initiate doctrine development that can achieve successful transformation from a "blue water" mentality toward a "brown water" regional focus. Total commitment on behalf of senior Naval leadership toward this goal is mandatory for attainment. -Restoration of funding to a level that will allow the Marine Corps to maintain active duty strength at current Base Force levels is vital to meeting all current forward presence commitments. If funding is not restored Congress and the National Command Authority must make some difficult decisions on what commitments and contingencies are not going to be met due to a shrinking armed force. -The ideal solution to ensure adequate NGFS would be to bring back all four battleships. Since this is an unrealistic goal, development and funding of installation of the Mark-71 8- inch gun for the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, replacing the present Mark-45 5-inch/54 gun would be an acceptable solution to providing adequate NGFS to the Marine Corps. While U.S. Naval strategy shifts from a global to a regional focus, it has become evident that other key factors will affect the naval forces' ability to successfully operate in this environment. Recently the Navy and Marine Corps team embarked upon a no-holds-barred reassessment of it's role in the nation's defense and the types of capabilities we must field to perform that role. This reassessment is an integral part of the reorientation of our national military strategy, which requires an increased emphasis on use of the sea to project and sustain power ashore. (5:12) The ability to rapidly maneuver Marine assault forces--from the sea--to undefended coastal areas will be a key ingredient to future naval doctrine, as the Navy/Marine Corps white paper "From the Sea" clearly emphasizes the complex warfighting requirements of the littoral areas of the world. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cheney, Dick. Annual Report to the President and Congress- FY93 February 92. 2. FMFRP 2-12 Marine Air-ground Task Force; A Global Capability CG, MCCDC April 91. 3. Hayden, Lt.Col. H.T. and Lt.Col. G.I. Wilson. "Defining the Corp' Strategic Concept." Marine Corps Gazette May 92: 44-46. 4. LaPlante, Radm. J.B. "The Path Ahead for 'Gators and Marines." Naval Institute Proceedings November 92: 34-38. 5. Mundy, Gen. C.E. "Something Old for Something New." Naval Institute Proceedings November 92: 12-14. 6. O Keefe, Sean. From the Sea, A Navy White Paper September 92 7. O'Neil, Capt. J.E. and Cdr. J.D. Hankins. "Picking the Latest Gator." Naval Institute Proceedings August 92: 91-93. 8. Trainor, Lt. Gen. B.E. "Still Going... Amphiious Warfare." Naval Institute Proceedings November 92: 30-33.
