Armed Escort For The Future CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Armed Escort for the Future. Author: Major Thomas R. Kovach, United States Marine Corps Thesis: To maintain a viable amphibious assault capability the Marine Corps must adopt an attack aircraft that is capable of escorting the next generation of medium-lift aircraft. Background: The Marine Corps will have a continuing requirement to maintain a powerful airborne amphibious assault force to augment expeditionary warfare. This assault scenario calls for attached armed escort aircraft to protect the transport aircraft. Currently the AH-1W provides marginal escort to an aging fleet of CH-46E medium-lift aircraft. The selection of a future escort aircraft will have to consider the multipolar threat of the future, capabilities of the next generation of transport aircraft, and economic constraints. Enhancements to the AH-1W will not meet these projected criteria satisfactorily. A modern escort aircraft must be selected and developed immediately. Recommendations: An attack aircraft employing tiltrotor technology should be adopted as the next generation of escort aircraft for the Marine Corps. OUTLINE Thesis: The AH-1W Cobra currently provides a marginal escort capability and will experience and even greater disparity as future transport aircraft a re instituted. To maintain a viable amphibious assault capability the Marine Corps must adopt an attack aircraft which will be capable of escorting the next generation of medium-lift aircraft. This aircraft is the tiltrotor attack aircraft. I. The need for escort II. Current capabilities and shortfalls A. Speed B. Range C. Fire control D. Weapons E. Navigation F. Survivability G. Numbers III. AH-1W enhancements IV. Future requirements A. Future threats B. Future assault support requirements C. Future escort aircraft requirements D. Cost effectiveness V. Escort solutions A. General solutions B. The AV-8B C. The tiltrotor attack variant 1. Specifications 2. Flight configuration 3. Survivability 4. Performance ARMED ESCORT FOR THE FUTURE The new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps is to provide the nation with Naval Expeditionary Forces that are capable of operation forward from the sea. One important way that the Marine Corps meets this requirement is by maintaining a powerful amphibious helicopter assault force capable of projecting forces across hostile beaches and rapidly building combat power. A component of a successful helicopter assault is the employment of attack helicopters to provide armed escort for the transport helicopter flight. The AH-1W Cobra currently provides a marginal escort capability and will experience an even greater disparity as future transport aircraft are instituted. To maintain a viable amphibious assault capability the Marine Corps must adopt an attack aircraft which will be capable of escorting the next generation of medium-lift aircraft. This aircraft is the tiltrotor attack aircraft. Transport aircraft use a combination of speed, mass, and surprise to maneuver assault troops. Currently, the Marine Corps relies on an aging fleet of CH-46 medium-lift helicopters for troop transport that will soon be replaced by either a more capable helicopter or the MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft. Regardless of the airframe selected, transport aircraft are vulnerable to enemy fire in the enroute, landing, egress, and emergency extract phases of the flight. Their large profiles and lack of maneuverability present attractive targets. They must be protected by either timely warning or suppression of enemy small-arms, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, and hostile aircraft. The effective escort aircraft must therefore be capable of maneuvering to identify threats, suppressing enemy fires, navigating to the landing zone, and coordinating supporting arms fire. The AH-1W demonstrates significant deficiencies in its ability to accomplish all of these tasks. Speed is the major advantage of helicopter assault lifts. The CH-46 helicopter can move troops at a speed of 140 knots and if adopted, the MV-22 will cruise at 275 knots. (2:27) To adequately escort a transport flight the attack aircraft requires a dash speed with a 30 percent advantage. This equates to 180 knots for the CH-46 or 340 knots for the MV-22. With a dash speed of 150 knots, the AH-1W requires the CH-46 to slow down and nullifies any advantage offered by the MV-22. Therefore, the AH-1W can become an impediment rather than a complement to mission success. The range of an escort helicopter is important to maintain flexibility. If an escort has to fly maximum fuel profiles, it will not be able to respond to the uncertainties present in combat. With a full load of ordnance, the AH-1W has a fuel endurance of just under 2 hours. Planning for rendezvous and loiter time, this gives a combat radius of about 100 nautical miles. Although this range is adequate for some missions, over-the-horizon operations are questionable and escort for emergency extractions are virtually impossible. Although the AH-1W is configured to fire effective suppressive weapons such as 2.75-inch rockets and 20-millimeter rounds, it lacks a fire control computer. Since escort aircraft must be able to effectively suppress threats that cannot be pre-identified (or they would be circumnavigated), ranging to the target and a gun solution must be made on the spot. Lack of even the simplest fire control computer, which uses a laser range finder and airspeed data system to compute a firing solution, requires the pilot to guess where his hits will go and correct with windage and elevation. Most often this method results in wasted rounds and ineffective suppression. The AH-1W does possess a modern heads up display (HUD) tied to an effective air-to-air missile, the AIM-9. However, because the missile requires one of two wing stations available for the anti-armor weapons Hellfire and TOW, the AIM-9 must often be left behind in favor of a more practical ordnance load. (4:74) The slow rate of fire of the 20-millimeter cannon is ineffective in countering either helicopter or fixed-wing threats. It is unlikely that the transport flight escorted by AH-1Ws will posses any anti-air capability Autonomous navigation to the target or landing zone appears to be a rudimentary requirement for the escort aircraft. The escort must deviate from the planned route of flight to locate threats but still find the landing zone on time. The AH-1W has no tactical navigation system such as inertial guidance or satellite positioning to aid in location of the landing zone. With no moving-map display, navigation is accomplished by the pilot who is also reacting to threats and coordinating supporting fires. This workload, particularly at night, invites errors and subsequent mission failure for lack of currently available hardware. Survivability of the AH-1W itself is also a concern. The escort aircraft is ineffective if it cannot directly face a simple threat. The only armor onboard the aircraft is found around the pilots' seats. The rest of the aircraft is unprotected and major components are not reinforced to sustain combat damage. The powerful engines are not separated by a ballistic-resistant wall, which means that a catastrophic failure of one will probably result in failure of the other. (4:74) Even the low threat found in Grenada resulted in the loss of two Cobras similarly protected. Tactics dictate placing the escort aircraft between the transports and the threat. The "wall" provided by the AH-1W is very penetrable. Lack of capabilities aside, the number of AH-1Ws in the Marine Corps, currently 120, is inadequate to provide capable escort packages for all Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). (2:2) Currently, a forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit contains four AH-1Ws. Assuming that all four of these aircraft are available for escort meets the minimum requirement of one escort for every four transports. However, combat losses, maintenance availability, and anti-armor missions have historically left the assault package short of escort aircraft. Refueling and rearming also leave gaps of support in the mission, which can only be compensated for by additional aircraft The Marine Corps chose the AH-1W as a successor to a long line of combat-proven Cobra models. Unfortunately, this choice was based on time and funding constraints which made the decision shortsighted. The AH-1W airframe can be enhanced to nearly double the payload with a 40 knot increase in speed (still well below MV-22 escort requirement) only with great penalties in time and money. (1:4) The Cobra will be well in to the second half of its 20 year service life by the time such current-technology modifications are completed. By this time, the medium-lift replacement will be fielded. If the MV-22 is selected, it will still lack a suitable escort with regard to speed and range. Spending money on Cobra enhancements will not solve the escort problem. The only solution which guarantees the Marine Corps a capable and technologically updated escort is development and procurement of an entirely new aircraft. Because the procurement system is lengthy and not overly accommodating of changes, a careful analysis of future requirements is necessary. Three broad considerations must be examined in selecting the escort of the future. They include an estimate of the threat, compatibility with the transport aircraft, and cost-effectiveness. While the end of the Cold War is the end of a well-defined major threat from a known direction, it is not the end of world-wide threat. The shift resulting from the end of the Cold War, from a bipolar to a multipolar world, creates an unpredictable future threat withe regard to direction, technology, capability, and motivation. Motivations for conflict may well be driven by economic, political, and demographic factors, as well as worldwide competition for trade. As mission profiles of the MAGTF expand, countering the enemy will become increasingly complex. This situation will be further complicated by the proliferation of high technology weaponry and equipment available to Third World nations. The Marine Corps' ability to accomplish its mission will be directly related to its success in countering the threat's capabilities in the areas of NBC warfare, IADS, communications, electronic warfare, and advanced weaponry In defining the new direction of Naval Forces, the Department of the Navy stresses the expansion of expeditionary forces to project power from the sea. This emphasis is derived from the analysis that forces must be swift to respond, structured to build power from the sea when required by national demands, able to sustain support for long-term operations, and be unrestricted by the need for transit or overflight approval from foreign governments in order to enter the scene of action Recent examples which reinforce this direction include the initial rapid response to meet the requirements for Desert Shield and to provide humanitarian assistance to storm-battered Bangladesh and the war-torn Kurds following Desert Storm. Future assault aircraft must meet several basic requirements to meet such missions in the future. They must be capable of sustained over-the-horizon (OTH) operations from air-capable amphibious ships and austere unimproved sites ashore. Even as Desert Storm intensified, Naval Forces responded to evacuation requirements in both Liberia and Somalia. Unfortunately, the CH-53E helicopters had to complete their OTH mission unescorted because the Cobras could not make the target without refueling. If an aircraft is capable of self-deployment by aerial refueling and compatible with operations on amphibious ships, the force can reach most crises areas rapidly and without delay for over-flight approval. It is safe to say that the future threat demands assault aircraft that are ship-board capable, self-deploying, and maintainable under austere and lengthy conditions. Implied in these requirements is the need for the aircraft to have sophisticated navigation, communication, electronic countermeasures, and a self defense against NBC warfare. More specific requirements for the escort are identified by examining the capabilities of the transport helicopter. The Marine Corps has developed a Mission Needs Statement for the CH-46E replacement to fulfill the requirement for a medium-lift assault support aircraft. (7:1) This aircraft, designated the MLR for medium lift replacement, must be capable of operating off of air-capable amphibious ships and have an OTH and self-deployable capability. (7:5) With a range of 200 NM and a speed of 180 knots, the MLR scheduled for fielding in 2010 should meet the projected threat. (7:7) Fore-runners in the MLR competition include a Sikorsky conventional helicopter and the Bell-Boeing MV-22 tiltrotor, both of which meet or exceed these specifications. Consequently, the future escort must be compatible with these parameters. In a parallel program, the Marine Corps has developed a Draft Mission Needs Statement for a future attack aircraft to replace the Cobra, UH-1N, and OV-1OD. (5:8) A complete list of requirements can be found in Tab A. This aircraft has been designated the VMAO because it covers the attack, utility, and observation roles of the three aircraft it will replace. (5:8) The MNS envisions the VMAO as a tandem seat, 20 to 25 thousand pound maximum gross weight aircraft with a mission configured, unrefueled range (sea level standard day) of 500 NM, a sustained operating envelope of -45 KTAS to 325 KTAS, and a 30 minute dash speed of no less than 350 KTAS. (5:9) It must be capable of routine shipboard operations with rolling/pitching deck conditions up to a maximum deck displacement of 15 degrees roll and +or- 3 degrees pitch. (5:9) The aircraft must be capable of engaging and disengaging primary flight propulsion systems (engines, rotors, proprotors) in winds of 45 knots from any direction. (5:9) The VMAO aircraft will be capable of accomplishing assigned missions at low level and NOE altitudes at high and low speeds, during day/night operations, in adverse weather and during periods of reduced visibility. (5:9) Over-the-horizon operations will be possible with the inclusion of a precision navigation system and long range, low altitude, jam resistant communications equipment. (5:11) Survivability has been carefully considered in the VMAO specifications. A ballistic tolerance to 14.5 millimeter rounds and crashworthy components are included in the design requirements. (5:10) Economical incorporation of low observable radar, IR, and acoustic signatures will be designed into the airframe. (5:10) A fully integrated defensive countermeasures system will assist in identifying and decoying anti-air systems. (5:11) The enclosed cockpit will provide NBC protection up to MOPP IV and zero-speed, zero-altitude ejection seats. (5:10) The VMAO will have a self-deployable range of 2100 NM with internal and external fuel tanks full. (5:10) This flight will be completed in under 10 hours with defensive ordnance aboard. (5:10) An inflight refueling capability will further extend the ferry limit. Advances in avionics will give the VMAO an unprecedented fire control system tied into the HUD and a visor display. (5:11) A FLIR/TV will give a night delivery system compatible with all on-board weapons. (5:11) A minimum load of 12 precision guided munitions, 38 rockets, 2 AIM-9X, and 1500 rounds of 20/25 millimeter ammunition will is specified. (5:10) The VMAO will be cost effective for several reasons. Its design will make it suitable for a variety of additional missions. As stated in the draft MNS, the VMAO will take the place of the AH-1, UH-1, and OV-10. The VMAO will therefore be capable of performing close-in-fire support missions, command and control, utility transport including recon insert and extraction, and observation for the Marine Corps. In addition, this platform is attractive to the other services for such roles as anti-submarine warfare, combat search and rescue, and special operations. The VMAO will save money in the long term by providing a multi-mission aircraft which will have joint applications and maintenance cost-saving commonality. Additional savings will be realized in the force reduction of strategic lift currently required to deliver many of the platforms that the self-deploying VMAO will replace. The issue now remains to identify an aircraft either available or near development that can meet the future threat, be compatible with the MLR, and be cost effective. From an assault support escort view, there are at least seven platform concepts that meet the previously discussed criteria. The General Electric XV-5A Remote Fan, the Canadair CL-84-1 Tiltwing, and the Sikorsky XH-59A Advancing Blade Concept Aircraft as well as tilt-duct and fan-in-wing concepts all warrant further investigation. (5:8) However, only two platforms are flying today in the form of the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B and the XV-15 tiltrotor demonstrator developed by Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. to test concepts for the MV-22 Osprey. The AV-8B Harrier is at first glance a likely escort for the MLR. It is already fielded, combat proven, and forward deployed in the Marine Corps. However, while the Harrier can work off of amphibious ships and hover, it pays a tremendous price in payload and endurance for operating in this regime. The Harrier has just over an hour of usable time in an attached escort role making it unsuitable for just about all amphibious assault roles. It is an excellent detached escort and will necessarily be limited to that mission in support of an assault force. The XV-15 tiltrotor demonstrator has the speed and range to escort any future helicopter as well as the MV-22. An attack variant based on this model is one solution to the escort problem that guarantees the Marine Corps a future capability. Bell Helicopter has taken the data collected from XV-15 tests to conceptualize an attack variant that utilizes current technology. Bell calls this aircraft the Tactical Tiltrotor (Gunship) or TTR(G). (8:2) The airframe considered is only slightly larger than the XV-15 with the same blade diameter (25 feet) and a wider blade chord to enhance low speed maneuver capability. (8:2) The overall size is comparable to most present day attack aircraft. At 59.5 feet it is smaller than the AV-8B, although the laterally displaced rotors make it wider than the Cobra by 10 feet. (8:2) Folded, the TTR(G) presents a suitable shipboard footprint. The aircraft is sized for a crew of two in tandem with the forward cockpit used for the command pilot. (8:2) Weapons capability and flight controls are provided in either cockpit such that single pilot operation from either seat is available and the split of duties between the crew is flexible and can be tailored to mission need. (8:2) The flight controls are designed around a rate command, attitude hold system similar to the F-18. (8:2) This control logic permits hands off flight in which the aircraft will continue to fly or maneuver in accordance with its last pilot input until pilot control is reestablished. This capability lessens the crew workload on escort missions and provides greater margin of safety particularly at night and over water. The TTR(G) mirrors the high technology in developed for the MV-22. Using state-of-the-art construction with composite materials (such as graphite fibers) gives this escort inherent survivability. (7:20) The material does not heat up significantly as does a metal fuselage, significantly reducing the infrared signature sought by ground-to-air missiles. Additionally, multiple layers of woven graphite prevent the total penetration of bullets and fragments and are resistant to crack propogation. (7:20) This structure has a proven tolerance to 23-millimeter anti-aircraft rounds. (7:20) The light weight of composite construction and the added power gained by tiltrotor aerodynamics gives the tiltrortor escort a high payload capability. The TTR(G) is estimated to have a useful load of 3980 pounds and a load of 10,870 pounds if a 400 foot takeoff roll is permitted. (8:3) @This payload exceeds that of almost all current attack aircraft. This allows the inclusion of navigation, avionics, and weapons systems that were previously too heavy for helicopters to carry. There will be no need to commit weapon loads to a single threat in order to save weight. The tiltrotor escort will carry a full mix of air-to-ground and air-to-air weapons to give the transports a full range of protection The purpose of escort is to protect aircraft against ground and airborne threats that cannot be avoided ( flown over, under, or around ) or neutralized by defense suppression operations. Assault support operations must include attached armed escort in all but the most benign scenarios to ensure mission success and protect U.S. lives. The current AH-1W fulfills the escort role only marginally and enhancements will be costly and lengthy in time to complete. Even enhanced, the Cobra will not be advanced enough to escort the MLR. The task at hand is to select an escort that will meet the future threat and compliment the next generation of transport aircraft in an economical manner. The development and procurement of the tiltrotor attack variant is the only guarantee that the next generation of assault aircraft will have the escort that Marines under fire deserve TAB A VMAO REQUIREMENTS (1) Capable of sustained (OTH) operations from air-capable amphibious shipping and austere unimproved sites. (2) Dual engine aircraft with autonomous self-starting capability. The aircraft shall be capable of powering all onboard systems for maintenance or pre-mission tests through its integral auxiliary power unit. It shall also provide sufficient power for engine starting while powering critical mission equipment without power interruption. (3) Have sufficient engine power so that with one engine inoperative, cruise flight may be continued with full ordnance payload and sufficient fuel onboard to fly either the point of intended landing or return to the point of origin, whichever is shorter, and land (STOL) with a ground or deck roll of less than 100 feet (with a 15 knot headwind). (4) In the event that all engine power is lost while in flight, the aircraft must be capable of a power off glide/auto-rotation to a survivable emergency landing. (5) Minimum 30 percent dash speed advantage over the MLR. (6) An expanded flight envelope and "g" range commensurate with air-to-ground and air-to-air flight profiles (minimum desired range -1.5 to +5.0). (7) Capability to conduct continuous/extended (over 30 minute) hover operations while mission configured, without significant degredation to aircraft range, performance, and time on station. (8) Have a self-deployable range of 2100 NM when configured with a full internal fuel load and external fuel tanks. Retain the capability to upload 2 AIM-9X missiles and 750 rounds of 20/25 millimeter ammunition when in the ferry configuration. Complete the 2100 NM flight in not greater than 10 hours. (9) Have an inflight refueling capability. (10) Expanded ordnance payload capability ( multiple universal weapons stations which facilitate and aircraft configuration of not less than 12 precision guided weapons, 38 rockets, 2 AIM-9Xs, or an equivalent load. The VMAO will be configured with an internal/ turreted gun capable of employing 1500 rounds of 20/25 millimeter ammunition. (11) Ballistic tolerant ( at least 14.5 millimeter)/ crashworthy cockpit and critical components. (12) NBC protection up to MOPP IV level. (13) Economical incorporation of low observable radar, IR, and acoustic signatures. (14) Onboard, state-of-the-art mission planning system/data loader (paperless cockpit concept). (15) Fully integrated observation (enhanced optics day/night with multi-powered zoom lens capability), detection, navigation, communication, and targeting systems, combining active and passive means to acquire, designate, and engage targets at ranges in excess of 10 kilometers. (16) Heads-Up/ Heads-Out cockpit design. A computer driven holographic HUD capability, or existing state-of-the-art visor display systems, which facilitate mission accomplishment and the projection of FLIR/TV imagery in a heads-up/ heads-out manner. (17) Hands on Collective and Cyclic (HOCAC) cockpit design. (18) Fully integrated defensive electronic countermeasures system capable of identifying, displaying, prioritizing and jamming/ decoying anti-air warfare systems to include ground and airborne delivered Anti-Tank Guided Missiles. (19) Long range (OTH) precision navigation capability. (20) an offensive air-to-air capability superior to anticipated threat helicopter/ tiltrotor and low performance fixed wing aircraft. A self-defense capability against high performance fixed wing aircraft. (21) Capability to transmit and receive digital data burst information from/ to ground and airborne platforms. Capability for real time data link of FLIR/Optical imagery to/ from ground or airborne receivers. (22) Capable of sloped landings and take offs up to a maximum displacement angle of greater-than or equal-to 15 degrees. (23) Incorporation of zero/ zero ejection seats. (24) Long range (OTH), low altitude, secure and jam resistant communications capability. (5:10) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. AH-1W Supercobra 4-Bladed Rotor System. Pamphlet published by Bell Helicopter Textron, 1992. 2. AH-1W Supercobra: The Smart Choice for the l99Os and Beyond. News release by Bell Helicopter Textron,1992. 3. Creech, Colonel Jim. "An Enigma: Armed Escort for the Osprey." Amphibious Warfare Review Winter 87-88: 36-42. 4. Darling, Colonel Buck. "Warfighting the V-22." Amphibious Warfare Review Spring 89: 26-31. 5 Draft Mission Need Statement for an Advanced VTOL Attack/ Observation Aircraft (VMAO). Headquarters Marine Corp Department of Aviation. 5 May 92. 6. Gibson, Major Mark J. and Major Barry M. Ford. "Do Grunts Deserve the AH-1W Super Cobra?" Marine Corps Gazette September 90: 71-76. 7. Gisold, Major Gary. "The V-22 and the Future Threat." Amphibious Warfare Review Spring 90: 18-21. 8. Magee, John P. "Tactical Tilt Rotor." American Helicopter National Technical Specialists' Meeting on Tactical V/ STOL Aircraft. New Bern, North Carolina. 19-21 September 89. 9. Operational Requirement Document for the Medium Lift Replacement Aircraft (No. AAS 34.4) Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 4 May 92. 10. Scheure, Doctor W.J. "Escorting the Osprey." Amphibious Warfare Review Exposition Issue 86: 107-112.
