Military

Re-Clawing The Bear, Russia's New Military Doctrine

 

AUTHOR Major Mark E. Kipphut, USAF

 

CSC 1993

 

SUBJECT AREA - National Security

 

 

 

                                    OUTLINE 

 

Thesis:  The Russian government is developing a new military doctrine designed to

lead it into the next century. While it rejects Gorbachev's 1987 defensive doctrine,

it is rediscovering its traditional Russian nationalist roots. While not a precursor of

a return to the Cold War, it will present specific challenges for the West once

Russia's political and economic situation improves.

 

      I. General Russian Security Strategy Concepts

            A.  Foundations of Policy

            B.  Foundations of the Russian Armed Forces

            C.  Declared Russian Vital National Interests

    

     II. Development of Military Doctrine

            A.  Military's Role in National Security

            B.  Soviet versus Neo-Russian Concepts

            C.  Interrelationship of Interests and Doctrine

            D.  Perceptions of Future Wars

 

     III. Past, Present, and Future Doctrinal Views

            A.  "Reasonable Sufficiency" and Defensive Doctrines

            B.  Preeminence of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1970

            C.  Strengthening Conventional Doctrine, 1970s

            D.  Rise of the Orgarkov Doctrine, 1980s

            E.  Gorbachev Defensive Sufficiency Doctrine, 1987

            F.  New Russian Doctrine, 1992

 

     IV.  Current Major Russian Defensive Principals

            A.  Repulsion and Defeat of Any Aggressor

            B.  Flexible Forces

            C.  Acceptable limits on Nuclear Warfare

            D.  Strategic Offensive Operations

 

      V.  Status of Russian Armed Forces

            A.  Role in CIS and Independent Operations

            B.  Reform Timetables

            C.  Future Priorities

 

      IV. Summary

            A.  Doctrinal Developments

            B.  Components of Armed Forces

            C.  Short- and Long-term Challenges

 

                     RE-CLAWING THE BEAR,

                RUSSIA'S NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE

 

                     by Major Mark E. Kipphut, United States Air Force

 

      Since the collapse of the Soviet Union many strategists have argued that the

 

strategic threat posed by it no longer exists and therefore the United States should redirect

 

its national defense efforts away from the former Soviet Union and focus more on the

 

Third World. In my opinion this would be in folly because while the direct East-West

 

challenges posed by the Cold War no longer exist, we are challenged by the chaos existing

 

throughout the former Soviet Union combined with and by the enormous military might its

 

successor republics inherited. Also, the fall of the communist government in Moscow has

 

unleashed long-standing ethnic, territorial, and economic disputes both among its former

 

republics and throughout many of its former neighbors. In greater numbers these republics

 

are resorting to violence to settle their disputes and if conflicts go unchecked, or if

 

confrontations were to involve the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, a regional

 

conflict could quickly develop a global character.

 

      The breakup of the USSR created 15 politically independent republics. While most

 

attempted to maintain some unity through the rapidly created Commonwealth of

 

Independent States (CIS), many have demonstrated they are not interested in maintaining

 

either close economic or military ties. Instead they are trying to lay claim to the few

 

"riches" the Soviet Union had acquired, including its massive military structure. This has

 

created a situation of great uncertainty for the West because the CIS, primarily the Russian

 

Federation, remains a nuclear superpower that has been in the midst of a political and

 

economic revolution since 1991 -- a situation unparalleled in history.

 

      Of the 15 republics that comprise the territory of the former Soviet Union, the

 

Russian Federation is clearly the most significant and has become the de facto replacement

 

for the Soviet Union in the international arena. It is the largest former Soviet republic,

 

consisting of 76 percent of its territory, 51 percent of its population, and 62 percent of its

 

industrial output. (19:26) However, unlike the past 75 years, the role of its armed forces,

 

still the largest in Europe, is not clearly defined.

 

      Created by presidential decree on 7 May 1992, the Russian military has been beset

 

by a multitude of transitional problems which are compounded by political instability and

 

the deteriorating economic situation in the Russian Federation and CIS.  Within these

 

conditions, the military is attempting to articulate a new doctrine and force structure

 

designed to lead the Russian Federation into the next century. Given the uncertainty of the

 

political situation within Russia, it is critical we understand the capabilities of the military

 

and what it views as its primary doctrine.

 

      During late May 1992, the new Russian Defense Ministry held a four-day

 

conference in Moscow at the General Staff Academy to define the underlying threats to the

 

Russian state, its political-military doctrine, and how the force structure should be

 

comprised. (11:1) Leading theorists were assembled and the conference was chaired by

 

General of the Army P. Grachev, the newly installed Russian Federation Minister of

 

Defense.  Results from this conference were made public in July 1992 when the

 

presentations given were published in Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), the monthly

 

journal of the CIS Armed Forces. (8:56) The principles agreed to at this conference will

 

set the course for the Russian military until after the turn of the century, including its

 

structure, general types of weaponry, doctrine, strategy, operational art, and tactics. (11:1)

 

      The key tenets of Russia's new military policy discussed at this conference ranged

 

from continued acceptance of Mikhail Gorbachev's dovish philosophy of only using the

 

military to prevent wars to older, more aggressive philosophies previously used by pre-

 

Gorbachev governments.  Today's Russian military leadership, like virtually all former

 

communists, believe the main mission of the armed forces consists of maintaining the

 

sovereignty, integrity, and independence of the Russian Federation; ensuring the stability

 

of state institutions; and protecting the rights of Russia citizens in former non-Russian

 

Soviet republics. (10:3)

 

      The political fundamentals of Russia's new military doctrine finds its genesis in the

 

policies of the last regime; it has formally rejected the first use of military force to resolve

 

political disputes and has announced it "will not impose its ideology on anyone and

 

recognizes the preservation of peace as a priority goal." (20:3) At the same time, it sets a

 

more aggressive tone on the role and use of conventional and nuclear forces in regional

 

conflicts.

 

      In many ways the new doctrine combines the enduring principles maintained by the

 

previous communist state with traditional Russian nationalist convictions.  The current

 

Russian military leadership has rediscovered its pre-Gorbachev roots and is again

 

embracing the beliefs developed by such legendary Soviet military strategists as Marshal

 

Nikolai Ogarkov. While not a precursor of a return to the Cold War era, this new doctrine

 

will present specific challenges to the West once Russia's political and economic situation

 

improves given the forecasted size of its military and the potential that our vital interests

 

inevitably will conflict.

 

      To understand the current state of the Russian military and the significant changes

 

taking place, it is necessary to first consider the traditional role and structure of this

 

institution. Throughout the Cold War period, military power was the main basis for the

 

USSR's claim to superpower status. The military's traditionally huge size of over four

 

million men and women, 200-plus maneuver divisions, four fleets, tens of thousands of

 

aircraft, and powerful arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons projected a tangible symbol of

 

strength to the rest of the world, and ensured Moscow would be a player in the major

 

events that unfolded in the international arena. (19:7)  Its presence in Eastern Europe

 

served to maintain Soviet dominance over its wartime conquests and to secure a buffer

 

zone between it and what was perceived as the hostile West. The military also provided a

 

conduit for the spread of influence into the Third World through a network of military arm

 

sales and advisors which projected political influence into non-communist dominated areas.

 

      Domestically, the military also played a significant role as a source of national

 

pride and unity in a country of diverse nationalities and cultures. As a lasting symbol of

 

the defender of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, the armed forces served to

 

maintain a sense of unity and patriotism in a country plagued with austere economic and

 

social conditions. Through universal conscription, the military functioned as a means of

 

assimilating the many diverse ethnic groups into a society dominated by Slavs.

 

      The Soviets placed their highest priority on being prepared to wage and win a war

 

with the West, a war they viewed as the "decisive clash" between two opposing

 

socioeconomic ideologies - communism and capitalism. (11:8)  Their military doctrine

 

was based upon the assumption that a war with the West would be waged on a global scale

 

in which only fundamental political and strategic goals would be pursued. They believed

 

they were encircled by an anti-Soviet coalition and any war would be waged along most of

 

the periphery of the USSR.

 

      The changes of the political make-up in Russia has forced a reexamination of the

 

military doctrine. The very planning assumptions relied upon for the past 45 years are no

 

longer valid and must be completely revised.  Additionally, along with the collapse of the

 

communist-led government in Moscow, we witnessed the breakup of the Soviet military

 

and the Warsaw Pact defense alliance.  As a result, the vast strength of the military has

 

been divided by the republics of the former Soviet Union and the additional security

 

offered by the East European buffer states has been lost. While Russia retains the largest

 

share of the former Soviet force structure, it by no means is nearly as powerful as the

 

USSR.

 

      The military doctrine of the new Russian leadership, as articulated during the May

 

1992 conference, is attempting to define its requirements based on its perception of existing

 

and future threats to Russian vital national interests.  As would be expected, doctrinal

 

requirements are therefore being defined using the enduring beliefs carried over from

 

previous governments matched against Russia's current perceptions of its interests and its

 

military capabilities.

 

      Since early last year, senior leaders in Moscow have been describing Russia's "vital

 

national security interests." These encompass the continued neutrality of former Warsaw

 

Pact states, the assurance that republics separating from the CIS do not become buffer zone

 

for Asian or Western European alliances, and the continued survival of Russian capabilities

 

to maintain mutually advantageous economic relations with all countries of the Middle

 

East, South Asia, and the Far East.  Implicit is the principle that Russian vessels are

 

guranteed free use the world's oceans for navigation and economic activity. (20:3-4)

 

Moreover, Russian nationalist leaders are attempting to force President Yeltsin to accept a

 

"Monroe Doctrine" concept as a way to permit Moscow to begin to rebuild an empire

 

consisting of most of the former republics. This movement, led by Parliament Speaker

 

Khasbulatov, aims to protect the 26 million ethnic Russians who live in the former non-

 

Russian Soviet Republics. (20:4 and 7:A23)

 

      The General Staff firmly endorses the definition of vital interests used by the

 

current government and believe Russia's military doctrine must clearly identity all potential

 

threats, as well as the probability future wars may erupt due to violations of these or other

 

"global, regional, or national interests of Russia." (12:59)  Russian military leaders,

 

probably with full agreement from their political masters, believe the very expansiveness of

 

the state pre-determines that its vital interests on the Eurasian land mass extend from the

 

Atlantic to Pacific Oceans. (20:3) Overall, they clearly view Russia as both a continental

 

and oceanic power; therefore, they believe that the military doctrine adopted by the state

 

must reflect this theme.

 

 

      "Doctrine" is a term requiring explanation, since it was used differently by Russian

 

and American armed forces. In the Russian sense it represents a formal political-military

 

consensus of the external threats facing the state, the ways by which these threats are

 

countered, and the resources and organization needed by the armed forces to eliminte

 

them. (19:9) It is viewed as a "contract" between the government and the military which

 

defines a state-approved system of views on the essence, goals, and character of a future

 

war; on the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war; and on the means of

 

conducting war. (20:3) Ultimately, it reflects the political goals of the state, as well as,

 

the military, economic, social, and legal means of achieving these goals during a future

 

war.

 

      The new doctrine was first described by its chief architect, Colonel-General I.

 

Rodionov, Chief of the Russian General Staff Military Academy, at the May 1992

 

conference. His views were based on ideas strongly endorsed by the Russian leadership,

 

including General Grachev, and the leaders of the various republics of the CIS. (12:58)

 

This doctrine includes some "new" approaches, but it reflects many points found in Soviet

 

ideology. (21:1146)

 

      Grachev's doctrine identified two primary military threats to Russia's vital interests:

 

the introduction of foreign troops in adjacent states (such as the Baltic states or former

 

Soviet republics not belonging to the CIS) and/or the buildup of military forces near

 

Russian borders (re former states of the Warsaw Pact). Additionally, the Russian

 

leadership views violations of the "rights" of Russian citizens and persons "ethnically and

 

culturally" identified with Russia living in the other republics of the former Soviet Union

 

as "a serious potential source of conflicts, specifically among former Soviet republics."

 

(20:3)

 

      According to General Rodionov, local wars (low-intensity conflicts) are becoming

 

the most probable type of warfare; however, he is equally concerned that large-scale

 

conventional wars could develop should local conflicts escalate or if adjacent nations or

 

alliances use them as a pretext to mobilize and carry out large- scale aggression. (20:4-5)

 

Russian leaders are greatly concerned with the situation in southern and Asian CIS

 

republics, specifically where outside influences can provoke further ethnic tensions.

 

Should a foreign power be identified as instigating or exploiting ethnic divisions within a

 

former Soviet republic for its own benefit, Moscow would probably respond militarily by

 

citing a nationalist-inspired "Monroe Doctrine" as justification for intervention. (20:4 and

 

7:A23)

 

      To deal with these threats, Rodionov described four distinct components of the

 

Russian armed  forces: operational-strategic nuclear forces, a limited number of

 

conventional forces in permanent readiness in the theaters to repel local low-level

 

aggression, rapid-response conventional forces capable of quickly deploying to any region

 

to reinforce permanently stationed forces to repel mid-level aggression, and strategic

 

reserves capable of being rapidly mobilized during a period of international tension to

 

conduct lage-scale theater or global combat operations. (20:5-6)

 

      A comparison of Russia's new doctrinal approaches with previous Soviet doctrines

 

reveals several major changes. Most importantly, the new doctrine restates older concepts

 

adopted by pre-Gorbachev Soviet governments which called for not only repelling

 

aggression, but also decisively defeating any aggressor. (20:5) This is a marked change

 

from the 1987 Gorbachev-inspired doctrine which focused solely on war prevention. Its

 

fundamental tenets included a defensive orientation for its basic concept of operations

 

("defensive defense") combined with a belief that overall force structures should be

 

reduced to the bare minimum to deter aggression ("defensive sufficiency"). (21:1146)

 

Gorbachev's goal was to immediately reduce defense spending and create conditions to

 

further ease the defense burden on the economy by giving the Soviet military a less

 

menacing appearance to the West and China. These five principles were later reaffirmed

 

in 1990 and included (19:10):

 

            * Prevention of war as the primary function of armed forces;

 

            * A pledge not to initiate military actions against any state;

 

            * A strategy only to repel an aggressor outside existing borders;

 

            * A pledge never to be the first to employ nuclear weapons; and

 

            * Rejection of the concept of quantitative force superiority.

 

      Gorbachev's military doctrine contrasted markedly with that adopted by previous

 

Soviet leaders. Beginning in the 1950s and lasting through the late 1970s, the basic tenets

 

of Soviet doctrine remained relatively stable. Essentially, the communist leaders believed

 

the primary threat to the Soviet Union came from the west, specifically what they viewed

 

as an American-dominated NATO alliance. They further believed any war with NATO

 

would be of relatively short duration and would most likely incorporate the use of nuclear

 

weapons. Their doctrine called for the Soviet military to be capable of achieving victory

 

through the survival of the USSR combined with the defeat or neutralization of Western

 

governments. (26:10-11)

 

      By the late-1960s, Soviet statements began to reflect the belief that any NATO-

 

Warsaw Pact conflict would begin with a conventional phase, followed by an extended

 

nuclear exchange. These perceptions resulted in a wide-ranging conventional force

 

modernization lasting from the late-1960s through the mid-1980s. It focused on improving

 

the initial survivability of Warsaw Pact conventional forces and their capability to operate

 

on either a non-nuclear or a nuclear battlefield.

 

      Beginning in the late-1970s, due in large part to acknowledged nuclear parity with

 

the West, the Soviets began contemplating the possibility of an extended conventional war,

 

and even the possibility that a war between the two alliances might not resort to nuclear

 

exchanges. This doctrinal shift was due in part to technological developments in advanced

 

conventional weaponry and the adoption by NATO of a strategy of "flexible response."

 

This greater emphasis on conventional war was reflected in continued force modernization,

 

force training, and development of a strategy designed to extend the conventional phase of

 

a conflict.  Overall, doctrine had matured to the point where neither nuclear nor

 

conventional forces alone were viewed as "decisive," but each only achieved maximum

 

effectiveness when used in concert.

 

      By the early-1980s military writing began to reflect the view that improvements in

 

nuclear weaponry by both sides, specifically in accuracy and command and control

 

systems, virtually eliminated the possibility that nuclear warfare was winnable and fostered

 

the theory that any conflict with NATO could be waged at conventional levels. This was

 

the area where the Soviets believed they had a "decisive" advantage over NATO forces.

 

As a result, they viewed the war's initial phase as the critical period, a theory championed