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MAGTF Officers And Air Campaigning
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
                    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: MAGTF Officers and Air Campaigning
Author: Major Lawrence D. Knosp, USMC
Thesis: To mount an effective air campaign, the Marine
Corps needs to train and educate its officers in the
complex philosophy and theory associated with air warfare
at the operational level of war, thus providing Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders and war fighting
CinCs with officers capable of planning and condutcing air
campaigns.
Background:  Man has made great leaps in the technology
associated with air warfare, but continues to struggle
with the philosophies and theories for the best
application of airpower.
    A thorough understanding of the three major combat
missions normally assigned air arms is essential.  Of more
importance is how the three missions inter-relate with
each other and with the theater campaign plan.  History
has given us many examples where man has employed air power
by fully integrating the air arm into the theater
commanders plan and been extremely successful.  However,
there still exists an attitude that airpower is best
utilized at the tactical level of war.
    Planning an air campaign to fully integrate with the
theater commanders' plan must be the goal of all air
campaign planners.  This can only be accomplished if the
planners and their commanders thoroughly understand air
warfare at the operational level of war.
Recommendation:   All MAGTF officers must be thoroughly
trained and educated in air warfare at the operational
level of war.  This is not to say that the Marine Corps
must start an Air University, but it must increase the
level of training and education of air warfare to that
given ground and combat service support at the Marine
Corps University.
          MAGTF Officers and Air Campaigning
                       OUTLINE
Thesis: To mount an effective air campaign, the Marine
Corps needs to train and educate its officers in the
complex philosophy and theory associated with air warfare
at the operational level of war, thus providing Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders and war fighting
CinCs with officers capable of planning and conducting air
campaigns.
        I.   Philosophy of air warfare.
             A.   Nature of early 1900 warfare
             B.   The airplane becomes a weapon
        II.  Theory of air warfare.
             A.   Douhet's theory
             B.   Douhet's two conditions
        III. Air Superiority.
             A.   Modern adaptation of Douhet
             B.   Historical examples
        IV.  Air Interdiction.
             A.   Defining interdiction
             B.   Considerations for planning and
                  conducting air interdiction
        V.   Close Air Support.
             A.   Warden's definition of CAS
             B.   Historical examples
        VI.  Planning the air campaign.
             A.   Relationship of the air campaign to the
                  theater campaign
             B.   Balance of apportionment
             C.   Command and control
          MAGTF OFFICERS AND AIR CAMPAIGNING
    Aeronautics opened up to men a new field of action,
the field of the air.  In so doing it of necessity
created a new battlefield; for wherever two men meet,
conflict is inevitable. (6:3) Ever since man looked at
the first airplane he has endeavored to utilize it in a
military capacity.  In the beginning it was used for
reconnaissance, for artillery spotting, and soon for
attacking the enemy on and behind his lines.  As a
result antiaircraft guns and pursuit planes came into
being.
    Man has developed new and more efficient means of
death from the air as well as counters to them at an
astonishing pace.  Despite man's technical progress he
has struggled with how to best use this new form of
warfare.  Arguments ranged from subordinating the air
arm to the army or navy, in effect making it air
artillery, to creating a separate and preeminent air
arm.  The United States Marine Corps developed the
concept of creating an air ground team, coequal, and
subordinate to an overall commander.  The elements of
this team are designed to complement each other and to
be easily integrated into a larger joint force, as well
as to be able to integrate other forces into it.  The
Marine Corps' joint professional military education
institutions are providing an excellent education on
ground combat and combat service support at the
operational level of war, but are not yet embracing air
warfare at the operational level of war.  To mount an
effective air campaign, the Marine Corps needs to train
and educate its officers in the complex philosophy and
theory associated with air warfare at the operational
level of war, thus providing Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) commanders and war fighting CinCs with
officers capable of planning and conducting air
campaigns.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader
with a tool to understand the philosophical and
theoretical framework for conceptualizing, planning,
and executing an air campaign within the framework of a
theater campaign.  To the extent that it assists
planners in arranging their thoughts or fosters
more study on air warfare, it will have served its
purpose.
    Philosophy.  The philosophy of air warfare begins
with Giulio Douhet in the early l92Os.  Douhet quickly
grasped the importance of the air as a battlefield and
the airplane as a weapon system that could change the
face of war irrevocably.  No longer could great armies
and navies protect their homelands by establishing
great defensive lines or blockades on the earth's
surface.
    The development of weapons systems in the early
1900s favored the defensive.  Automatic weapons and
barbed wire were significant improvements that gave the
defense both absolute and relative advantages over the
offense.  To say that the increased power of new
weapons favored the defensive is not to question the
indisputable principle that wars can only be won by
offensive action.(7:12)  It simply means that, by
virtue of increased fire power, offensive operations
demanded a much larger force proportionately than
defensive ones. The airplane, because of its speed and
radius of action, offered a new offensive weapon.  A
simple example illustrates the unique power of air
forces.  A plane based at point A, for example, is a
potential threat to all surface points within a circle
having A for its center and a radius of hundreds of
miles.  Planes based anywhere on the surface of this
same circle can simultaneously converge in mass on
point A.  Therefore, an aerial force is a threat to all
points within its radius of action, its units operating
from their separate bases and converging in mass for
the attack on the designated target faster than any
other means so far known. For this reason air power is
a weapon superlatively adapted to offensive operations,
because it strikes suddenly and gives the enemy no time
to parry the blow by calling up reinforcements.(8:13)
    The striking power of the airplane is, in fact, so
great that it results in a paradox: for its own
protection it needs a greater striking force for
defense against air attack than for attack.  For
example, if an enemy air force has an offensive
capacity of X, the enemy can concentrate its action,
gradually or however it sees fit, on any number of
objectives within its radius of action.  Let us say
there are twenty possible objectives.  In order to
protect ourselves from what enemy force X can do to us,
we must station a defensive force near each of these
twenty objectives that corresponds to force X.  To
accept no risk we would have to have a force twenty
times as large as force X; this becomes at once
absurd.(9:16-17) The airplane is most adaptable to the
offense as it is not as effective in the defense, no
matter how sophisticated the warning system and
defenses are.
    Theory.  Giulio Douhet is recognized as one of the
first theorists of airpower.  In Douhet's thinking,
aircraft altered the fundamental character of warfare.
He argued the case at a level of abstraction and
generalization that elevated argument to principle and
the body of thought as a whole to theory. In that
theory, airpower became the use of space off the
surface of the earth to decide war on the surface.
Bernard Brodie, one of the greatest American military
strategists of the post-war era, said that "Douhet's
thoughts are actually more valid today than they were
during his lifetime." Comparing him to Billy Mitchell,
Brodie concluded that Mitchell's "thinking was tactical
rather than strategic, and events have so fully
confirmed and vindicated him that his writing is today
completely dated in a way that Douhet's work is
not."(2:64, 126)
    Douhet's most enduring theory is clearly the one he
is most often quoted as well as misquoted on, namely
his theory of "command of the air."  In an effort to
get it right I have chosen Douhet's own iteration from
a 1926 addition to his original work The Command of the
Air.
    By the expression "command of the air" I do not
    mean supremacy in the air nor a preponderance of
    aerial means, but that state of affairs in which
    we find ourselves able to fly in the face of an
    enemy who is unable to do likewise.  Given these
    definitions, the following affirmation is axio-
    matic:  the command of the air provides whoever
    possesses it with the advantage of protecting all
    his own land and sea territory from the enemy
    aerial offensives and at the same time of subject-
    ing the enemy's territory to his own offensives.
    (10:95-96)
    Douhet believed that to be successful an air force
must meet two conditions:  (1) the essential condition
--namely, to possess strength enough to conquer the
command of the air; (2) the integral condition--namely,
to keep up that strength after command of the air has
been won and exploit it in such a way as to crush the
material and moral resistance of the enemy.(11:103)
    After achieving "command of the air" Douhet insists
that all action must necessarily be directed against
the surface, that is supporting ground or naval forces.
Douhet believed that these second stage actions would
play a large, possibly a decisive, part in deciding the
issue of the war.  But the air campaign to achieve
command of the air had to be the first priority.
(12:105)
    Douhet gave us a time-tested theory that has
evolved into the doctrine that nearly all air forces
have adopted.  First, one must gain air superiority;
second, one must conduct strategic and operational
interdiction; and third, if necessary one must provide
close air support. All three phases of air warfare are
relavent to the MAGTF.  We will discuss each phase in
detail.
Air Superiority.  To gain air superiority means having
sufficient control of the air to be able to make air
attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and, on
the other hand, to be free from the danger of serious
enemy aerial incursions.(19:13)  The concept that air
superiority is necessary to achieve victory or to avoid
defeat follows from Douhet's theory on how it is fact
as well as logically deductible.  Theory alone would
tell us that ground or naval forces cannot possibly
succeed if they are under constant attack by enemy air
forces.  Ever since the German attack of Poland in 1939
there have been countless historical examples that
support this theory.  The Luftwaffe destroyed Poland's
air force in the first days of the campaign.  From then
on, the Germans were able to use their air forces to
interdict, to attack ground troops, and to soften
positions for subsequent movement on the ground.(1:31)
Nine months later, the Germans did the same thing in
France, when the Luftwaffe won air superiority in two
days.( 18:36-37)
    The tables were turned on the Germans in North
Africa during Field Marshal Rommel's last offensive at
Alam Halfa.  Rommel observed that "anyone who has to
fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an
enemy in complete control of the air, fights like a
savage against a modern European army."(l5:275)  Von
Rundstedt, the German commander in France during the
allied invasion, reported, " The Allied Air Force
paralyzed all movement by day, and made it very
difficult even by night."(16:275)  By the summer of
1944 the Allies had gained "command of the air" in
Europe.
    The Israeli Air Force (IAF) worked out a detailed
air campaign plan based on gaining air superiority
quickly prior to the Six Day War.  If everything went
according to plan, the IAF calculated that it could
destroy the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) in a matter of
hours.  In fact, when war came on 5 June 1967, the IAF
struck against nine Egyptian airfields beginning at
7:45 a.m., and by 10;50 a.m., had knocked out the EAF
fighter aircraft as an operational force.  The IAF
struck pre-emptively just as Douhet advocated.  In a
second phase, lasting just over four hours, the IAF
destroyed Egypt's entire bomber force. Also, in
operations lasting about three hours, the IAF attacked
Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi airfields, destroying most
of their first line aircraft.  This allowed the Israeli
ground forces to conduct operations unimpeaded by enemy
air.(14:225-228)
    If air superiority is accepted as the first goal,
then clearly all operations must be subordinated--to
the extent required--to its attainment.  This is not
meant to suggest that no other operations may be
undertaken until air superiority is won.  It does mean
that no other operation should be commenced if it is
going to jeopardize the primary mission, or is going to
use air forces that should be used to attain air
superiority for the theater.(20:17)
Air Interdiction. Interdiction is one of the oldest
forms of warfare.  History is full of examples where
commanders have maneuvered to place their forces
between the enemy and his supplies.  There have been
periods when a serious interposition has prevented
battles from taking place, most notably, the
eighteenth century.  The history of interdiction is as
long, and nearly as important, as the history of
battle.  The introduction of the airplane only added a
new dimension to this form of warfare.(21:83)
    There are many definitions of interdiction, but for
simplicity, we will consider interdiction to be any
operation designed to slow or inhibit the flow of men
or material from the source to the front, or laterally
behind the front.( 22:84)
    The potential payoffs from air interdiction are
multiple, complexly interrelated, situation dependent,
and often difficult to assess, particularly in advance.
At best, interdiction can destroy forces or supplies,
delay a force or supply or buildup, cause diversion of
valuable resources from other uses, and disrupt command
and control.(4:vi)  Theoretically true, but in reality
air interdiction payoffs are not only difficult to
assess, but are even more difficult to plan for.
Typically air interdiction planners are overly
optimistic as to the effects of interdiction.  There
is no book solution for all interdiction campaign
plans, but theory tells us that gaining air superiority
is mandatory.  A 1981 Rand study for the Assistant
Secretary of Defense/Program Analysis and Evaluation
suggests the following factors, based on experience and
common sense, should be considered in planning and
conducting an interdiction campaign.
1.  Good pre-campaign intelligence is of prime
importance for the interdictor, especially as to the
physical environment, the most likely locations of
assembly areas and supply depots, the detail of route
structure, the availability of route repair materiel
and temporary bridging, the natural and man made
opportunities for cover and concealment, the
availability of local labor, and the strength of the
enemy's defense.
2.  Intra-campaign reconnaissance with good coverage in
time and space is required by the interdictor for
efficient targeting and quick response to enemy
countermeasures, and is especially important to the
interdictor is operating at the margin of his ground-
attack capability, with no excess sorties available.
3.  Enemy sanctuaries and the interdictor's rules of
engagement can be critical in assessing the prospects
for interdiction success:  they may limit the areas
that can be attacked, the frequency of attacks, and the
types of permissible targets and weapons; and they may
increase decision times in responding to enemy
countermeasures.
4.  The operational situation in the ground war is
favorable for interdiction when the enemy has an urgent
need for movement for deployment or supply, is highly
mechanized and relies mainly on vehicular movement, and
is a naturally high consumer with few supplies forward
when interdiction begins.
5.  The enemy's physical vulnerability to interdiction
attacks is enhanced if his vehicles are easy to find on
and off the roads, if good anti-vehicle air-to-ground
weapons are available, and if the interdictor has the
ability to find and attack vehicles at night.  The lack
of good nighttime capability has been a principal
reason for the poor success of many interdiction
campaigns.  The enemy's vulnerability increases if the
routes he uses have segments such as bridges that are
easy to find and destroy, difficult to repair or
replace, and difficult to bypass.  The nature of the
road network is important because it interacts with
vehicle and route-segment vulnerability in determining
the overall physical vulnerability of the enemy's
movement system.  A network favorable for interdiction
is one that is sparse, with low-capacity segments, and
choke points located so that a small number of cuts can
produce major reductions in throughput, at least
temporarily.
6.  Ability to identify the enemy's scarcest transpor-
tation means favors interdiction success. All the
elements of movement capability are not equally scarce,
and therefore some means can be attacked without
appreciably reducing enemy throughput; this has
sometimes been the case with route capacity and at
other times with vehicles. An efficient choice of
targets requires consideration of both vulnerability
and scarcity.
7.  With few exceptions, successful interdiction
campaigns have been characterized by ample interdiction
sortie availability.  The availability of precision-
guided weapons for bridge destruction will somewhat
reduce sortie requirements, but large numbers of
sorties are still likely to be required until fighter-
bombers can readily acquire moving targets at night and
in adverse weather and then achieve multiple kills per
sortie.
8.  Continuous application of interdiction pressure
favors interdiction success, and is probably required
for successful supply interdiction.  This implies the
availability of aircraft with night and adverse-weather
capabilities and sufficient sorties so that competing
demands for other missions will not cause gaps in the
interdiction effort.
9.  Enemy ground-based air defenses can be a serious
constraint on interdiction effectiveness.  In future
campaigns enemy possession of highly capably air
defense missiles and rolling air defenses appears
likely to make this constraint even more serious.  As a
result, aircraft attrition rates may be somewhat
increased, but to judge from past experience the
principal consequence is likely to be a reduction in
per sortie attack effectiveness:  target acquisition
degraded before weapon release, weapon accuracy
degraded during delivery, and damage assessment
degraded after weapon impact. This, together with the
probable allocation of sorties for suppression of air
defenses, reinforces the conclusion that large numbers
of sorties will continue to be needed for interdiction
success.(5:viii-x)
Close Air Support.  Close air Support (CAS) has been a
form of air warfare as for back as World War I.
Although it has been called many things, such as close
cooperation, ground support, and army cooperation, all
air forces have tried it in some form or another.  CAS
can look like interdiction, and vice versa.
    A ground commander, by his very nature, will find
CAS useful in almost every conceivable situation, from
pursuit to retreat.  If possible he would like to see
air precede his every move.  No air force has yet been
large enough, even when totally subordinated to the
army, to provide that level of service.  Given that CAS
is desired by everyone but cannot be provided to all,
how can this finite resource be best used?  To help
reduce confusion, finding common areas of agreement and
disagreement is useful.  Proximity and level of coord-
ination with ground troops are the normal criteria used
to differentiate CAS from interdiction at the tactical
level of war.  John A. Warden III writes in his
influential book The Air Campaign, that at the
operational level of war CAS is defined as any air
operation that theoretically could and would be done by
ground forces on their own, if sufficient troops or
artillery were available.(23:102)  I subscribe to this
definition as it does not change the Joint Pub 1-02
definition, but rather puts CAS in the proper context
at the operational level of war.  The answer to the
question of when should CAS be used is inherent in
Warden's definition.  He suggested that CAS is a
substitute for something that could and would be done
with more divisions or artillery if they were
available--and they could get to the battle in time.
Left hanging is the question of when the extra
division or artillery should be employed.  This answer
lies in the concept of the operational reserve, the
theater commander ultimately must decide, and no theory
can tell him.(24:104)
    An operational reserve is normally committed to
exploit a great opportunity--either positive or
negative.  Commitment of the operational reserve is
appropriate if doing so will allow a commander to make
or extend a breakthrough (a positive opportunity) or
will allow him to pre-empt or stop an enemy break-
through (a negative opportunity).(25:105)
    Once the concept of CAS is understood as the
functional equivalent of the operational ground
reserve, one can put the proper value on a scarce and
valuable commodity.  CAS or the operational reserve
should be used quickly and decisively.  Both are
weapons of shock and are more effective when
concentrated in time and space.  The speed and mobility
of aircraft facilitate concentration and employment.
It is possible to redirect large numbers of  aircraft
from other missions in a matter of hours to CAS if the
opportunity for appropriate employment presents itself.
(26:105)
    We now have two ideas for where to use CAS:  where
an operational-level commander would want to employ his
own operational reserve and where bursts of power--as
opposed to the long-term power of ground forces--are
indicated.  Commanders historically have used their
operational ground reserve to break through enemy
lines, prevent an enemy breakthrough, or cover an
exposed flank.  CAS has been used to accomplish all
of these missions.(27:105)
    In the 1940 offensive in France, one of the first
problems confronting the Germans was how to cross the
Meuse River with three divisions opposed by three
French divisions dug in on the opposite bank.  An
attack by Stuka dive bombers offered the key.  But the
question then arose as to whether one massive attack,
as was consistent with Luftwaffe doctrine, or a con-
tinuous attack, as requested by General Guderian, would
do. Guderian explained that he needed to keep the enemy
down while he made his initial crossings.  A single
attack would not accomplish that end.  The air force
then agreed to provide him with a stream of Stukas.
The attack took place, three divisions crossed the
river to overwhelm three French divisions, and a
breakthrough was underway.(13:132)  The following two
examples are quite different, but illustrate how
innovative commanders have used their air assets.
During the Vietnam war American commanders
deliberately enticed North Vietnamese attacks on
strong-points that could be supported by close air
operations.  Khe Sanh provides a dramatic example.
More than two divisions of North Vietnamese, consisting
of 15,000 to 20,000 men, besieged an emplacement manned
by 6,000 Marines. The North Vietnamese, with incredible
tenacity and bravery, made attack after attack on the
Americans over a period of months.  Despite their
numerical superiority, however, they were unable to
prevail against the 350 fighter and 60 bomber sorties
that flew against them every day for three months. They
finally were forced to lift the siege in March 1968 and
fall back with terrible casualties.(17:307-311)
    In France in 1944 General Patton gave the XIX
Tactical Air Command (TAC) the job of protecting his
exposed flank along the Loire River as he raced to the
east. So successful was the operation that the
commander of the German forces south of the Loire
requested that the XIX TAC commander be present when he
surrendered his command and 20,000 German
troops.(3:29)
    History has shown us that CAS can do a lot for the
ground commander, but CAS does have its limitations.
The most insurmountable limitation is that it cannot
operate in bad weather.  A ground commander that counts
on CAS for his plan to be successful could be in for a
shock when the cloud ceiling drops down below operating
limits for aircraft, as visual confirmation is still
required.  The interrelationship between CAS and
interdiction sorties demands that the theater commander
decide which one will most benefit his plan.  The
weight of history, as well as logic, falls on the
interdiction side.  Material and troops are easier to
keep away from the battle than to engage at the front.
They are easier to destroy when they are in assembly or
configured for movement than when they are deployed to
do battle.  Carrying the thought to the ultimate, one
pictures one bomb on one tank factory potentially
causing scores or hundreds of tanks not to be built.
Conversely, the best one bomb can do at the front is
to knock out one tank that already may have paid for
itself in damage done.(28:160)
	We have discussed the philosophical and theoretical
development of the use of aircraft in the three
traditional combat missions for air--air superiority,
interdiction, and close air support.  The focus has
been at the operational level of war and has
intentionally avoided any reference to tactics or
weapons.  So we can now turn to planning the air
campaign itself.
  Planning the Air Campaign.  One of the first things
that must be decided by the theater commander is
whether the air campaign is the primary or supporting
effort in the theater.  In all cases, an air campaign
must describe the centers of gravity, critical
vulnerabilities, end state, phasing of operations, and
resources required. It must lay out the theater
commanders guidance for the apportionment and priority
between air superiority, interdiction, and close air
support.  It should also explain how the ground and
naval arms will support or be supported.(29:153)
    We have discussed air superiority, interdiction,
and CAS in detail, the commander must decide in the
campaign plan how these elements will be integrated.
The most important of these elements is air
superiority.  Based on the mission, relative combat
power, and time available, the type of air superiority
must be decided.  The levels of air superiority vary
from total air supremacy, command of the air, to local
air superiority, possibly lasting only for minutes.
The choice should be driven by theater needs, the
appropriate level of air superiority must be achieved
prior to using air assets for other missions.  Of equal
importance, once the desired level of air superiority
is reached, all air efforts must be against the ground
and naval forces of the enemy.  The air superiority
campaign, whether an end in itself or a means to an
end, should not be waged with air assets alone.  Naval
and ground forces should play a role wherever possible.
The more innovative their actions, the more likely they 
and the campaign are to succeed.(30:156-157)
	The campaign must set the priority of what will be 
done once air superiority has been gained.  Emphasis on 
interdiction is the next logical step.  This phase is
where the probability of conflicting interests between
the component commanders will arise.  Concentration is
one of the most importatnt pricipals of air warfare.
The air commander must make every effort to convince 
the ground component commander, as well as the theater
commander, that they should all choose some mission
where a concentrated application of air power could
succeed.  At a minimum, some proportional agreement
must be made so as to keep the balance of interdiction
and CAS in line with the overall theater campaign plan.
(31:161)
	Operational reserves are of great importance to the 
air campaign plan.  Once the decision to maintain an 
operational reserve is made the theater commander must
establish criteria for its commitment.  The Theater
commander has two choices.  He can reinforce his own
success, or reinforce against an enemy success. This
impacts on the apportionment of air assets at the 
operational level of war because if CAS is used as a
substitute for troops or artillery then air superiority
or interdiction will be neglected.(32:l65-166)
    Command and control are the glue that holds the
plan together, and will be instrumental in the success
or failure during the execution phase.  Centralized
command and decentralized control are the words most
often used to describe how we plan to conduct a war.
These words mean different things to every service and
component.  The commander can use a system of explicit
top down orders, or he can issue broad mission type
orders.  Either system can work, as long as three key
requirements are met:  Officers and men from top to
bottom must know what the system is and is not; it must
have been practiced extensively in peacetime; and lower
echelons must be given at least the minimum information
required to carry out their responsibilities.(33:167)
    We have covered a lot of ground in this discussion
of air warfare at the operational level.  The subject
is so broad and of such importance that this paper
could not possibly cover all of the detail required to
become knowledgeable on the subject.  If the Marine
Corps is going to organize and train to fight at the
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level, either alone or
as part of a larger force, then its officers must have
the knowledge required to fight the air war at the
operational level.  I strongly believe that to mount an
effective air campaign, the Marine Corps needs to train
and educate its officers in the complex philosophy and
theory associated with air warfare at the operational
level of war, thus providing MAGTF commanders and war
fighting CinCs with officers capable of planning and
conducting an air campaign.
                       BIBLIOGRAPHY
l   Bekker, Cajus.  The Lufftwaffe War Diaries, transl.
    and ed. by Frank Ziegler (New York:  Ballantine
    Books, 1969) p.31
2.  Brodie, Bernard.  Strategy in the Missle Age
    (Prinston, 1959) p.64, 126
3.  Condensed Analysis of the 9th Air Force in the
    European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC:  US
    Army Air Forces, Office of Assistant Chief of Air
    Force Staff, Office of the Air Force History, 1984;
    reprinted from 1946 edition) p.29
4.  Dews, Edmund and Kozacka, Felix.  Air Interdiction:
    Lessons Learned From Past Campaigns (The Office of
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Program Analysis
    and Evaluation, 1981) p.vi
5.  Ibid. pp.vi-x
6.  Douhet, Guilio.  The Command of the Air (New
    Imprint by the Office of Air Force History,
    Washington, DC, 1983) p.3
7.  Ibid.   p.12
8.  Ibid.   p.13
9.  Ibid.   pp.16-17
10. Ibid.   pp.95-96
11. Ibid.   p.103
12. Ibid.   p.105
13. Goutard, A..  The Battle of France 1940, trans. by
    A.R.P. Burgess (New York: Ives Washburn, 1959)
    p.132
14. Horowitz, Daniel and Luttwak, Edward N..  The
    Israeli Army, 1948-1973 (Cambridge, Mass.:  Abt
    Books, 1983) pp.225-228
15. Lewin, Ronald.  Rommel: As Military Commander (New
    York: Ballantine Books, 1972) p.275
16. Ibid. p.275
17. Momyer, William W..  Air Power in Three Wars
(W.W.II,
    Korea, Vietnam) (Washington,  DC:  US Air Force,
    1978) pp.307-311
18. Murry, Williamson.  Strategy for Defeat; The
    Lufftwaffe 1933-45 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air
    University Press, 1983) pp.36-37
19. Warden III, John A..  The Air Campaign (National
    Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair,
    1988) p.13
20. Ibid.   p.17
21. Ibid.   p.83
22. Ibid    p.84
23. Ibid.   p.102
24. Ibid.   p.104
25. Ibid.   p.105
26. Ibid.   p.105
27. Ibid.   p.105
28. Ibid.   p.160
29. Ibid.   p.153
30. Ibid.   pp.156-157
31. Ibid.   p.161
32. Ibid.   pp.165-156
33. Ibid.   p.167



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