MAGTF Officers And Air Campaigning CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: MAGTF Officers and Air Campaigning Author: Major Lawrence D. Knosp, USMC Thesis: To mount an effective air campaign, the Marine Corps needs to train and educate its officers in the complex philosophy and theory associated with air warfare at the operational level of war, thus providing Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders and war fighting CinCs with officers capable of planning and condutcing air campaigns. Background: Man has made great leaps in the technology associated with air warfare, but continues to struggle with the philosophies and theories for the best application of airpower. A thorough understanding of the three major combat missions normally assigned air arms is essential. Of more importance is how the three missions inter-relate with each other and with the theater campaign plan. History has given us many examples where man has employed air power by fully integrating the air arm into the theater commanders plan and been extremely successful. However, there still exists an attitude that airpower is best utilized at the tactical level of war. Planning an air campaign to fully integrate with the theater commanders' plan must be the goal of all air campaign planners. This can only be accomplished if the planners and their commanders thoroughly understand air warfare at the operational level of war. Recommendation: All MAGTF officers must be thoroughly trained and educated in air warfare at the operational level of war. This is not to say that the Marine Corps must start an Air University, but it must increase the level of training and education of air warfare to that given ground and combat service support at the Marine Corps University. MAGTF Officers and Air Campaigning OUTLINE Thesis: To mount an effective air campaign, the Marine Corps needs to train and educate its officers in the complex philosophy and theory associated with air warfare at the operational level of war, thus providing Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders and war fighting CinCs with officers capable of planning and conducting air campaigns. I. Philosophy of air warfare. A. Nature of early 1900 warfare B. The airplane becomes a weapon II. Theory of air warfare. A. Douhet's theory B. Douhet's two conditions III. Air Superiority. A. Modern adaptation of Douhet B. Historical examples IV. Air Interdiction. A. Defining interdiction B. Considerations for planning and conducting air interdiction V. Close Air Support. A. Warden's definition of CAS B. Historical examples VI. Planning the air campaign. A. Relationship of the air campaign to the theater campaign B. Balance of apportionment C. Command and control MAGTF OFFICERS AND AIR CAMPAIGNING Aeronautics opened up to men a new field of action, the field of the air. In so doing it of necessity created a new battlefield; for wherever two men meet, conflict is inevitable. (6:3) Ever since man looked at the first airplane he has endeavored to utilize it in a military capacity. In the beginning it was used for reconnaissance, for artillery spotting, and soon for attacking the enemy on and behind his lines. As a result antiaircraft guns and pursuit planes came into being. Man has developed new and more efficient means of death from the air as well as counters to them at an astonishing pace. Despite man's technical progress he has struggled with how to best use this new form of warfare. Arguments ranged from subordinating the air arm to the army or navy, in effect making it air artillery, to creating a separate and preeminent air arm. The United States Marine Corps developed the concept of creating an air ground team, coequal, and subordinate to an overall commander. The elements of this team are designed to complement each other and to be easily integrated into a larger joint force, as well as to be able to integrate other forces into it. The Marine Corps' joint professional military education institutions are providing an excellent education on ground combat and combat service support at the operational level of war, but are not yet embracing air warfare at the operational level of war. To mount an effective air campaign, the Marine Corps needs to train and educate its officers in the complex philosophy and theory associated with air warfare at the operational level of war, thus providing Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders and war fighting CinCs with officers capable of planning and conducting air campaigns. The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with a tool to understand the philosophical and theoretical framework for conceptualizing, planning, and executing an air campaign within the framework of a theater campaign. To the extent that it assists planners in arranging their thoughts or fosters more study on air warfare, it will have served its purpose. Philosophy. The philosophy of air warfare begins with Giulio Douhet in the early l92Os. Douhet quickly grasped the importance of the air as a battlefield and the airplane as a weapon system that could change the face of war irrevocably. No longer could great armies and navies protect their homelands by establishing great defensive lines or blockades on the earth's surface. The development of weapons systems in the early 1900s favored the defensive. Automatic weapons and barbed wire were significant improvements that gave the defense both absolute and relative advantages over the offense. To say that the increased power of new weapons favored the defensive is not to question the indisputable principle that wars can only be won by offensive action.(7:12) It simply means that, by virtue of increased fire power, offensive operations demanded a much larger force proportionately than defensive ones. The airplane, because of its speed and radius of action, offered a new offensive weapon. A simple example illustrates the unique power of air forces. A plane based at point A, for example, is a potential threat to all surface points within a circle having A for its center and a radius of hundreds of miles. Planes based anywhere on the surface of this same circle can simultaneously converge in mass on point A. Therefore, an aerial force is a threat to all points within its radius of action, its units operating from their separate bases and converging in mass for the attack on the designated target faster than any other means so far known. For this reason air power is a weapon superlatively adapted to offensive operations, because it strikes suddenly and gives the enemy no time to parry the blow by calling up reinforcements.(8:13) The striking power of the airplane is, in fact, so great that it results in a paradox: for its own protection it needs a greater striking force for defense against air attack than for attack. For example, if an enemy air force has an offensive capacity of X, the enemy can concentrate its action, gradually or however it sees fit, on any number of objectives within its radius of action. Let us say there are twenty possible objectives. In order to protect ourselves from what enemy force X can do to us, we must station a defensive force near each of these twenty objectives that corresponds to force X. To accept no risk we would have to have a force twenty times as large as force X; this becomes at once absurd.(9:16-17) The airplane is most adaptable to the offense as it is not as effective in the defense, no matter how sophisticated the warning system and defenses are. Theory. Giulio Douhet is recognized as one of the first theorists of airpower. In Douhet's thinking, aircraft altered the fundamental character of warfare. He argued the case at a level of abstraction and generalization that elevated argument to principle and the body of thought as a whole to theory. In that theory, airpower became the use of space off the surface of the earth to decide war on the surface. Bernard Brodie, one of the greatest American military strategists of the post-war era, said that "Douhet's thoughts are actually more valid today than they were during his lifetime." Comparing him to Billy Mitchell, Brodie concluded that Mitchell's "thinking was tactical rather than strategic, and events have so fully confirmed and vindicated him that his writing is today completely dated in a way that Douhet's work is not."(2:64, 126) Douhet's most enduring theory is clearly the one he is most often quoted as well as misquoted on, namely his theory of "command of the air." In an effort to get it right I have chosen Douhet's own iteration from a 1926 addition to his original work The Command of the Air. By the expression "command of the air" I do not mean supremacy in the air nor a preponderance of aerial means, but that state of affairs in which we find ourselves able to fly in the face of an enemy who is unable to do likewise. Given these definitions, the following affirmation is axio- matic: the command of the air provides whoever possesses it with the advantage of protecting all his own land and sea territory from the enemy aerial offensives and at the same time of subject- ing the enemy's territory to his own offensives. (10:95-96) Douhet believed that to be successful an air force must meet two conditions: (1) the essential condition --namely, to possess strength enough to conquer the command of the air; (2) the integral condition--namely, to keep up that strength after command of the air has been won and exploit it in such a way as to crush the material and moral resistance of the enemy.(11:103) After achieving "command of the air" Douhet insists that all action must necessarily be directed against the surface, that is supporting ground or naval forces. Douhet believed that these second stage actions would play a large, possibly a decisive, part in deciding the issue of the war. But the air campaign to achieve command of the air had to be the first priority. (12:105) Douhet gave us a time-tested theory that has evolved into the doctrine that nearly all air forces have adopted. First, one must gain air superiority; second, one must conduct strategic and operational interdiction; and third, if necessary one must provide close air support. All three phases of air warfare are relavent to the MAGTF. We will discuss each phase in detail. Air Superiority. To gain air superiority means having sufficient control of the air to be able to make air attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and, on the other hand, to be free from the danger of serious enemy aerial incursions.(19:13) The concept that air superiority is necessary to achieve victory or to avoid defeat follows from Douhet's theory on how it is fact as well as logically deductible. Theory alone would tell us that ground or naval forces cannot possibly succeed if they are under constant attack by enemy air forces. Ever since the German attack of Poland in 1939 there have been countless historical examples that support this theory. The Luftwaffe destroyed Poland's air force in the first days of the campaign. From then on, the Germans were able to use their air forces to interdict, to attack ground troops, and to soften positions for subsequent movement on the ground.(1:31) Nine months later, the Germans did the same thing in France, when the Luftwaffe won air superiority in two days.( 18:36-37) The tables were turned on the Germans in North Africa during Field Marshal Rommel's last offensive at Alam Halfa. Rommel observed that "anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete control of the air, fights like a savage against a modern European army."(l5:275) Von Rundstedt, the German commander in France during the allied invasion, reported, " The Allied Air Force paralyzed all movement by day, and made it very difficult even by night."(16:275) By the summer of 1944 the Allies had gained "command of the air" in Europe. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) worked out a detailed air campaign plan based on gaining air superiority quickly prior to the Six Day War. If everything went according to plan, the IAF calculated that it could destroy the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) in a matter of hours. In fact, when war came on 5 June 1967, the IAF struck against nine Egyptian airfields beginning at 7:45 a.m., and by 10;50 a.m., had knocked out the EAF fighter aircraft as an operational force. The IAF struck pre-emptively just as Douhet advocated. In a second phase, lasting just over four hours, the IAF destroyed Egypt's entire bomber force. Also, in operations lasting about three hours, the IAF attacked Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi airfields, destroying most of their first line aircraft. This allowed the Israeli ground forces to conduct operations unimpeaded by enemy air.(14:225-228) If air superiority is accepted as the first goal, then clearly all operations must be subordinated--to the extent required--to its attainment. This is not meant to suggest that no other operations may be undertaken until air superiority is won. It does mean that no other operation should be commenced if it is going to jeopardize the primary mission, or is going to use air forces that should be used to attain air superiority for the theater.(20:17) Air Interdiction. Interdiction is one of the oldest forms of warfare. History is full of examples where commanders have maneuvered to place their forces between the enemy and his supplies. There have been periods when a serious interposition has prevented battles from taking place, most notably, the eighteenth century. The history of interdiction is as long, and nearly as important, as the history of battle. The introduction of the airplane only added a new dimension to this form of warfare.(21:83) There are many definitions of interdiction, but for simplicity, we will consider interdiction to be any operation designed to slow or inhibit the flow of men or material from the source to the front, or laterally behind the front.( 22:84) The potential payoffs from air interdiction are multiple, complexly interrelated, situation dependent, and often difficult to assess, particularly in advance. At best, interdiction can destroy forces or supplies, delay a force or supply or buildup, cause diversion of valuable resources from other uses, and disrupt command and control.(4:vi) Theoretically true, but in reality air interdiction payoffs are not only difficult to assess, but are even more difficult to plan for. Typically air interdiction planners are overly optimistic as to the effects of interdiction. There is no book solution for all interdiction campaign plans, but theory tells us that gaining air superiority is mandatory. A 1981 Rand study for the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Program Analysis and Evaluation suggests the following factors, based on experience and common sense, should be considered in planning and conducting an interdiction campaign. 1. Good pre-campaign intelligence is of prime importance for the interdictor, especially as to the physical environment, the most likely locations of assembly areas and supply depots, the detail of route structure, the availability of route repair materiel and temporary bridging, the natural and man made opportunities for cover and concealment, the availability of local labor, and the strength of the enemy's defense. 2. Intra-campaign reconnaissance with good coverage in time and space is required by the interdictor for efficient targeting and quick response to enemy countermeasures, and is especially important to the interdictor is operating at the margin of his ground- attack capability, with no excess sorties available. 3. Enemy sanctuaries and the interdictor's rules of engagement can be critical in assessing the prospects for interdiction success: they may limit the areas that can be attacked, the frequency of attacks, and the types of permissible targets and weapons; and they may increase decision times in responding to enemy countermeasures. 4. The operational situation in the ground war is favorable for interdiction when the enemy has an urgent need for movement for deployment or supply, is highly mechanized and relies mainly on vehicular movement, and is a naturally high consumer with few supplies forward when interdiction begins. 5. The enemy's physical vulnerability to interdiction attacks is enhanced if his vehicles are easy to find on and off the roads, if good anti-vehicle air-to-ground weapons are available, and if the interdictor has the ability to find and attack vehicles at night. The lack of good nighttime capability has been a principal reason for the poor success of many interdiction campaigns. The enemy's vulnerability increases if the routes he uses have segments such as bridges that are easy to find and destroy, difficult to repair or replace, and difficult to bypass. The nature of the road network is important because it interacts with vehicle and route-segment vulnerability in determining the overall physical vulnerability of the enemy's movement system. A network favorable for interdiction is one that is sparse, with low-capacity segments, and choke points located so that a small number of cuts can produce major reductions in throughput, at least temporarily. 6. Ability to identify the enemy's scarcest transpor- tation means favors interdiction success. All the elements of movement capability are not equally scarce, and therefore some means can be attacked without appreciably reducing enemy throughput; this has sometimes been the case with route capacity and at other times with vehicles. An efficient choice of targets requires consideration of both vulnerability and scarcity. 7. With few exceptions, successful interdiction campaigns have been characterized by ample interdiction sortie availability. The availability of precision- guided weapons for bridge destruction will somewhat reduce sortie requirements, but large numbers of sorties are still likely to be required until fighter- bombers can readily acquire moving targets at night and in adverse weather and then achieve multiple kills per sortie. 8. Continuous application of interdiction pressure favors interdiction success, and is probably required for successful supply interdiction. This implies the availability of aircraft with night and adverse-weather capabilities and sufficient sorties so that competing demands for other missions will not cause gaps in the interdiction effort. 9. Enemy ground-based air defenses can be a serious constraint on interdiction effectiveness. In future campaigns enemy possession of highly capably air defense missiles and rolling air defenses appears likely to make this constraint even more serious. As a result, aircraft attrition rates may be somewhat increased, but to judge from past experience the principal consequence is likely to be a reduction in per sortie attack effectiveness: target acquisition degraded before weapon release, weapon accuracy degraded during delivery, and damage assessment degraded after weapon impact. This, together with the probable allocation of sorties for suppression of air defenses, reinforces the conclusion that large numbers of sorties will continue to be needed for interdiction success.(5:viii-x) Close Air Support. Close air Support (CAS) has been a form of air warfare as for back as World War I. Although it has been called many things, such as close cooperation, ground support, and army cooperation, all air forces have tried it in some form or another. CAS can look like interdiction, and vice versa. A ground commander, by his very nature, will find CAS useful in almost every conceivable situation, from pursuit to retreat. If possible he would like to see air precede his every move. No air force has yet been large enough, even when totally subordinated to the army, to provide that level of service. Given that CAS is desired by everyone but cannot be provided to all, how can this finite resource be best used? To help reduce confusion, finding common areas of agreement and disagreement is useful. Proximity and level of coord- ination with ground troops are the normal criteria used to differentiate CAS from interdiction at the tactical level of war. John A. Warden III writes in his influential book The Air Campaign, that at the operational level of war CAS is defined as any air operation that theoretically could and would be done by ground forces on their own, if sufficient troops or artillery were available.(23:102) I subscribe to this definition as it does not change the Joint Pub 1-02 definition, but rather puts CAS in the proper context at the operational level of war. The answer to the question of when should CAS be used is inherent in Warden's definition. He suggested that CAS is a substitute for something that could and would be done with more divisions or artillery if they were available--and they could get to the battle in time. Left hanging is the question of when the extra division or artillery should be employed. This answer lies in the concept of the operational reserve, the theater commander ultimately must decide, and no theory can tell him.(24:104) An operational reserve is normally committed to exploit a great opportunity--either positive or negative. Commitment of the operational reserve is appropriate if doing so will allow a commander to make or extend a breakthrough (a positive opportunity) or will allow him to pre-empt or stop an enemy break- through (a negative opportunity).(25:105) Once the concept of CAS is understood as the functional equivalent of the operational ground reserve, one can put the proper value on a scarce and valuable commodity. CAS or the operational reserve should be used quickly and decisively. Both are weapons of shock and are more effective when concentrated in time and space. The speed and mobility of aircraft facilitate concentration and employment. It is possible to redirect large numbers of aircraft from other missions in a matter of hours to CAS if the opportunity for appropriate employment presents itself. (26:105) We now have two ideas for where to use CAS: where an operational-level commander would want to employ his own operational reserve and where bursts of power--as opposed to the long-term power of ground forces--are indicated. Commanders historically have used their operational ground reserve to break through enemy lines, prevent an enemy breakthrough, or cover an exposed flank. CAS has been used to accomplish all of these missions.(27:105) In the 1940 offensive in France, one of the first problems confronting the Germans was how to cross the Meuse River with three divisions opposed by three French divisions dug in on the opposite bank. An attack by Stuka dive bombers offered the key. But the question then arose as to whether one massive attack, as was consistent with Luftwaffe doctrine, or a con- tinuous attack, as requested by General Guderian, would do. Guderian explained that he needed to keep the enemy down while he made his initial crossings. A single attack would not accomplish that end. The air force then agreed to provide him with a stream of Stukas. The attack took place, three divisions crossed the river to overwhelm three French divisions, and a breakthrough was underway.(13:132) The following two examples are quite different, but illustrate how innovative commanders have used their air assets. During the Vietnam war American commanders deliberately enticed North Vietnamese attacks on strong-points that could be supported by close air operations. Khe Sanh provides a dramatic example. More than two divisions of North Vietnamese, consisting of 15,000 to 20,000 men, besieged an emplacement manned by 6,000 Marines. The North Vietnamese, with incredible tenacity and bravery, made attack after attack on the Americans over a period of months. Despite their numerical superiority, however, they were unable to prevail against the 350 fighter and 60 bomber sorties that flew against them every day for three months. They finally were forced to lift the siege in March 1968 and fall back with terrible casualties.(17:307-311) In France in 1944 General Patton gave the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC) the job of protecting his exposed flank along the Loire River as he raced to the east. So successful was the operation that the commander of the German forces south of the Loire requested that the XIX TAC commander be present when he surrendered his command and 20,000 German troops.(3:29) History has shown us that CAS can do a lot for the ground commander, but CAS does have its limitations. The most insurmountable limitation is that it cannot operate in bad weather. A ground commander that counts on CAS for his plan to be successful could be in for a shock when the cloud ceiling drops down below operating limits for aircraft, as visual confirmation is still required. The interrelationship between CAS and interdiction sorties demands that the theater commander decide which one will most benefit his plan. The weight of history, as well as logic, falls on the interdiction side. Material and troops are easier to keep away from the battle than to engage at the front. They are easier to destroy when they are in assembly or configured for movement than when they are deployed to do battle. Carrying the thought to the ultimate, one pictures one bomb on one tank factory potentially causing scores or hundreds of tanks not to be built. Conversely, the best one bomb can do at the front is to knock out one tank that already may have paid for itself in damage done.(28:160) We have discussed the philosophical and theoretical development of the use of aircraft in the three traditional combat missions for air--air superiority, interdiction, and close air support. The focus has been at the operational level of war and has intentionally avoided any reference to tactics or weapons. So we can now turn to planning the air campaign itself. Planning the Air Campaign. One of the first things that must be decided by the theater commander is whether the air campaign is the primary or supporting effort in the theater. In all cases, an air campaign must describe the centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, end state, phasing of operations, and resources required. It must lay out the theater commanders guidance for the apportionment and priority between air superiority, interdiction, and close air support. It should also explain how the ground and naval arms will support or be supported.(29:153) We have discussed air superiority, interdiction, and CAS in detail, the commander must decide in the campaign plan how these elements will be integrated. The most important of these elements is air superiority. Based on the mission, relative combat power, and time available, the type of air superiority must be decided. The levels of air superiority vary from total air supremacy, command of the air, to local air superiority, possibly lasting only for minutes. The choice should be driven by theater needs, the appropriate level of air superiority must be achieved prior to using air assets for other missions. Of equal importance, once the desired level of air superiority is reached, all air efforts must be against the ground and naval forces of the enemy. The air superiority campaign, whether an end in itself or a means to an end, should not be waged with air assets alone. Naval and ground forces should play a role wherever possible. The more innovative their actions, the more likely they and the campaign are to succeed.(30:156-157) The campaign must set the priority of what will be done once air superiority has been gained. Emphasis on interdiction is the next logical step. This phase is where the probability of conflicting interests between the component commanders will arise. Concentration is one of the most importatnt pricipals of air warfare. The air commander must make every effort to convince the ground component commander, as well as the theater commander, that they should all choose some mission where a concentrated application of air power could succeed. At a minimum, some proportional agreement must be made so as to keep the balance of interdiction and CAS in line with the overall theater campaign plan. (31:161) Operational reserves are of great importance to the air campaign plan. Once the decision to maintain an operational reserve is made the theater commander must establish criteria for its commitment. The Theater commander has two choices. He can reinforce his own success, or reinforce against an enemy success. This impacts on the apportionment of air assets at the operational level of war because if CAS is used as a substitute for troops or artillery then air superiority or interdiction will be neglected.(32:l65-166) Command and control are the glue that holds the plan together, and will be instrumental in the success or failure during the execution phase. Centralized command and decentralized control are the words most often used to describe how we plan to conduct a war. These words mean different things to every service and component. The commander can use a system of explicit top down orders, or he can issue broad mission type orders. Either system can work, as long as three key requirements are met: Officers and men from top to bottom must know what the system is and is not; it must have been practiced extensively in peacetime; and lower echelons must be given at least the minimum information required to carry out their responsibilities.(33:167) We have covered a lot of ground in this discussion of air warfare at the operational level. The subject is so broad and of such importance that this paper could not possibly cover all of the detail required to become knowledgeable on the subject. If the Marine Corps is going to organize and train to fight at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level, either alone or as part of a larger force, then its officers must have the knowledge required to fight the air war at the operational level. I strongly believe that to mount an effective air campaign, the Marine Corps needs to train and educate its officers in the complex philosophy and theory associated with air warfare at the operational level of war, thus providing MAGTF commanders and war fighting CinCs with officers capable of planning and conducting an air campaign. BIBLIOGRAPHY l Bekker, Cajus. The Lufftwaffe War Diaries, transl. and ed. by Frank Ziegler (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969) p.31 2. Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missle Age (Prinston, 1959) p.64, 126 3. Condensed Analysis of the 9th Air Force in the European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: US Army Air Forces, Office of Assistant Chief of Air Force Staff, Office of the Air Force History, 1984; reprinted from 1946 edition) p.29 4. Dews, Edmund and Kozacka, Felix. Air Interdiction: Lessons Learned From Past Campaigns (The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Program Analysis and Evaluation, 1981) p.vi 5. Ibid. pp.vi-x 6. Douhet, Guilio. The Command of the Air (New Imprint by the Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC, 1983) p.3 7. Ibid. p.12 8. Ibid. p.13 9. Ibid. pp.16-17 10. Ibid. pp.95-96 11. Ibid. p.103 12. Ibid. p.105 13. Goutard, A.. The Battle of France 1940, trans. by A.R.P. Burgess (New York: Ives Washburn, 1959) p.132 14. Horowitz, Daniel and Luttwak, Edward N.. The Israeli Army, 1948-1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1983) pp.225-228 15. Lewin, Ronald. Rommel: As Military Commander (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972) p.275 16. Ibid. p.275 17. Momyer, William W.. Air Power in Three Wars (W.W.II, Korea, Vietnam) (Washington, DC: US Air Force, 1978) pp.307-311 18. Murry, Williamson. Strategy for Defeat; The Lufftwaffe 1933-45 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1983) pp.36-37 19. Warden III, John A.. The Air Campaign (National Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 1988) p.13 20. Ibid. p.17 21. Ibid. p.83 22. Ibid p.84 23. Ibid. p.102 24. Ibid. p.104 25. Ibid. p.105 26. Ibid. p.105 27. Ibid. p.105 28. Ibid. p.160 29. Ibid. p.153 30. Ibid. pp.156-157 31. Ibid. p.161 32. Ibid. pp.165-156 33. Ibid. p.167
