CH-46E Replacement: America's Best Alternative AUTHOR Major Daniel W. Kidd, USMC CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation OUTLINE Thesis: "From the Sea" compels both increased importance and urgency be afforded DON's efforts to replace the CH-46E. The MV- 22A Osprey is America's best alternative in terms of military effectiveness, life-cycle costs, and the global exploitation of American originated tilt-rotor technology. I. The Marine Corps and Assault (A/S) A. Roles, missions, and functions B. Evolution of A/S II. CH-46E and A/S A. Genesis and historical H-46 performance B. Present-day status and capability C. The dilemma III. Alternatives A. Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) variants B. MV-22A Osprey IV. The "cost" of not selecting the Osprey A. The state of international aerospace B. The Europeans as competitors C. The Japanese as competitors D. Exploiting tilt-rotor technology CH-46E REPLACEMENT: AMERICA'S BEST ALTERNATIVE by Major Daniel W. Kidd, United States Marine Corps In the post-cold war U. S. military, the amphibious assault has taken on added strategic importance. New national strategies and service doctrine will ensure the amphibious assault is not relegated to the list of obsolete military tactics. Accordingly, navy and Marine Corps practitioners of war "from the sea" must redouble their efforts in the acquisition of a capable, survivable, and sustainable airframe to perform the "lion's share" of the critical ship-to-shore movement of men and material. The venerable CH-46E (affectionately known as the "Frog"), while performing this mission magnificently for nearly 30 years, is ill-prepared to support a major amphibious assault against even a moderately trained and equipped defender. "From the Sea" compels both increased importance and urgency be afforded DON's efforts to replace the CH-46E. The MV-22A is America's best alternatives in terms of military effectiveness, life-cycle costs, and the global explitation of American originated tilt-rotor technology. The Marine Corps has an enduring operational requirement, established by Title 10, U. S. Code, and Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.1, to provide the capability to conduct assault support operations in support of the national military strategy. Classified as one of the six missions of Marine aviation, assault support is defined as "the air transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment into or within the battle area." Additionally, the Marine Corps' medium lift, assault support platform must be capable of performing secondary missions, such as, non-combatant evacuations and maritime special operations, combat aeromedical evacuation, search and rescue, and, finally, the multi-mission flexibility required to adapt to diverse taskings as Marine aviation "necks down" to fewer Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) aircraft. Finally, this wide spectrum of required capability is further complicated by the need to initiate the mission while standing off "over-the- horizon" (OTH). (7:44) Serving as Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation (DCS AIR), Lt General Duane Wills may have said it best in his 1991 annual address to Congress: Our medium assault helicopters are the very heart of Marine air-ground task forces. In maneuver warfare, they provide the vast majority of our Marines with the tactical mobility they require on the modern battlefield, while also functioning as the primary movers of equipment and logistics support. This is Marine aviation's most important program. Similarly, in the wake of Operation Desert Storm, the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCCLLS) underscores the critical nature of assault support by reporting a need for "...a faster, more survivable, more flexible, more reliable, and increased range/endurance assault aircraft in order to be capable of exploiting the warfighting doctrine of maneuver warfare, and the associated concept of OTH." The Marine Corps' assault support mission has belonged primarily to the CH-46 since 1964. Boeing Helicopter's "Sea Knight" was originally designed to meet the following requirements: (1) shipboard compatible, (2) self-starting, and, (3) cargo-ramp equipped. While the task no doubt proved daunting at the time, the modern battlefield requires assault aircraft to possess features unimagined in 1964. Moreover, there is increasing evidence supporting the notion that dynamic components of the H-46 rotor drive system are demonstrating unsafe levels of metal fatigue. These relatively recent problems threaten the operational viability of the aircraft. The problem centers around dynamic component (rotor head, vertical shaft, synchronization shaft, transmissions, etc.) service life restrictions. Specifically, Dynamic Component Bulletins (DCB), issued against both forward and aft rotor head assemblies, are creating a maintenance nightmare, eroding operator confidence, and highlighting the need to replace "tired iron." Simply stated, there is credible evidence that there have been instances of rotor head "cracking". Even more troublesome is the fact that the cracks have not been limited to one specific area of the rotor head, but have been discovered from the blade attach fitting, along hinge pin housings of the pitch- varying arms, up to, and including the rotor hub itself. To help correct this condition, there is the recently initiated Dynamic Component Upgrade (DCU) program ongoing which is designed to replace worn components. However, a fleet retrofit of any consequence is years away, and while it would go a long way to keep the Frog flying safely for many years to come, it would nothing in the way of improving the aircraft's capability or survivability on the modern battlefield. Additional planned improvements, such as larger stubwings for extended range, upgraded avionics suites, night vision compatible cockpits, and emergency flotation capability have been funded. Fleet operators and maintainers welcome these improvements, but they are also keenly aware that they fall far short of transforming the Frog into a 21st century assault support platform. The CH-46 has served America superbly for nearly 30 years, and will undoubtedly continue to serve into the next century. Nevertheless, 30-year-old helicopters which are demonstrating technical obsolescence, escalating cost of ownership, and increasing performance deficiencies, are not the platforms to transport young Americans to the increasingly lethal battlefield in. America needs a replacement--now! The early 1980's saw Marine Corps leadership recognize the need for replacing the ageing CH-46. Consequently, a Joint- Service Operational Requirement (JSOR) was approved in 1982 by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. The JSOR directed all services to purchase a single, medium-lift aircraft based on the recently validated tilt-rotor technology of the MV-22A developed by the industry "team" of Bell Helicopter Textron Incorporated (BHTI) and Boeing Helicopters. The program progressed well. Money was available, and lessons learned during the acquisition of other aircraft, such as the AV-8B and CH-53E, were applied to avoid repeating mistakes. The V-22 program had a reputation for doing things right. However, a total program cost of 30 billion dollars (55 million per copy) received a good deal of scrutiny when the budget pendulum swung inevitably back to more restrained defense outlays. In April of 1989, the Defense Resource Board (DRB) recommended cancellation of the V-22 program. Then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney moved quickly to cancel the program, and offered his perspective during congressional testimony when he stated, "I think it's probably a good aircraft, but I could not justify spending the amount of money that was proposed on a very narrow mission that I think can be performed in another fashion, specifically, by using helicopters." Mr. Cheney was wrong. The concept of "From the Sea" is not "narrow" in scope or execution. A significant amount of political "posturing" ensued between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress. Widespread Congressional support for the V-22 is easy to understand considering the contracting team of Bell/Boeing spread their sub-vendors across all 48 continental United States. Nevertheless, the official Congressional response was to direct a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) be accomplished to evaluate industry proposals submitted in responbe to five separate Request for Proposals (RFP) to explore any approach that might assist in meeting the medium lift requirement at a lower cost. The primary purpose for the ongoing COEA is to examine industry alternatives to the Osprey. Several aircraft are being examined as the process continues. To date, the "players" have included the CH-46E (with all approved Engineering Change Proposals installed), CH-47 (both basic and "marinized" version), CH-53E (basic "Echo" with -416 engines and 650-gallon external tanks), EH-1O1 (U. K./Italian collaboration of their utility model to include a folding tail pylon), S-92 (Sikorsky Seahawk in a new aluminum fuselage), and the HH-60H (basic H-60 with capability to carry two 120- gallon external tanks). Each aircraft brings attractive qualities to the examination, but only two serious contenders stand out: the Boeing BV-360 Demonstrator and the Bell/Boeing MV-22A. The Marine Corps' single requirement to replace its CH-46 fleet gave birth to both of these aircraft. However, after the V-22 initially "won" the contract, Boeing elected to continue with the BV-360 as a focus for developments in helicopter dynamics and structures. Dubbed "son of Frog" by the industry, the aircraft was privately funded to verify advance technologies useful in Boeing's other rotorcraft programs. The finished product combines twin 4,200 shp engines, low-drag composite fuselage, high-speed airfoils, and integrated cockpit electronics into one of the most advanced rotary wing aircraft ever built. The BV-360 is very impressive. All of the primary and secondary structural elements of the fuselage, and most of the dynamic components, such as rotor blades, hubs, swash plates, shafting, and rotor controls, are made from composite materials. (2) Initial flight tests offer quantum performance improvements, such as a 20% increase in payload, a 30% increase in speed, and a 60% increase in productivity over present rotary wing technology. Unpublished reports from the COEA indicate that the only aircraft consistently approaching the V-22's performance parameters is the BV-360. Additionally, both aircraft are self-deployable beyond 2,000 miles (Osprey has in-flight refueling capability while the 360 must use internal, auxiliary tanks). However, the 360 does not compare as favorably in other categories such as survivability, OTH capability, and potential armament. No conventional helicopter is capable of matching the tilt-rotor technology of the Osprey. The Osprey possesses superior range, speed, endurance, survivability, and communication/navigation. Accordingly, the Osprey offers an unparalleled ability for avoiding surfaces, exploiting gaps, and maximizing the effect of maneuver and surprise at the tactical and operational level. As is the norm in times of decreasing defense budgets, the problem with the Osprey is the price tag. If the Marine Corps were to buy all 500-plus aircraft originally programmed at 55 million dollars per copy, total outlays exceed 30 billion dollars. The Osprey is a major program even by today's standards. It would seem Boeing Helicopter could advertise the BV- 360 as a cheap, viable alternative to the Osprey. However, the 360 was not originally designed as an alternative to anything specific. Only one aircraft was built with private funds to explore the state-of-the-art and support Boeing's other rotorcraft programs. Utilizing the 360 as a replacement for the Frog would require an entire new program proposal, and given the associated time and expense involved with such proposals, could render the 360 too expensive when considering performance trade-offs. Furthermore, studies by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, NASA, and the BDM corporation have compared the mission effectiveness, and life-cycle costs of the Osprey to those of several of the helicopter alternatives to include the BV-360, and the "mixes" of various helicopters. The results of these studies were published in the November 1992 edition of Air Power and concluded that "...the V-22 is the most capable and most cost-effective of all the potential medium lift aircraft alternatives that have been considered. Evidence supporting the MV-22's selection as the Marine Corps' best alternative for assault support into the 21st century is compelling. However, Department of Defense (DOD) or service parochialism aside, the larger issue is which is the best alternative for America? Given the current and projected defense industry outlook, ferocious global competition, and emerging national military strategy, the importance of exploiting the Osprey's tilt-rotor technology is significant and serves to illustrate an industry-wide dilemma, i. e., acquiring the capital to develop and market technologies, in both military and civilian application, faster than international competitors. America needs to demonstrate the viability of tilt-rotor technology in real- world application before the opportunity is lost. The combination of the tough economic environment, brought about by a world-wide recession, and the collapse of the communist threat, which underpinned the western defense industry, has caused a shakedown of the aerospace industry which few could have predicted as recently as three years ago. Major corporations have consolidated and downsized, and famous names have disappeared in a period of unprecedented change. Like the automotive and steel industries of 20 years ago, America's aerospace industry is being challenged on the world market from abroad. The pressure originated in western Europe, but the more dangerous threat to America's last "crown jewel" may well reside in Japan. The Clinton administration's plans to reduce the defense budget exacerbate the situation to a degree which may require DOD to skip an entire generation of new weapon systems and rely on upgraded versions of existing systems. (8:44) The American defense industry will be affected in varying degrees. It is, however, safe to assume that "big ticket" items such as aircraft, missiles, and electronics resident in the aerospace segment will take a major portion of the cuts. The President's professed support notwithstanding, the V-22 has not begun Full Scale Production (FSD), and remains controversial. Industry's problems are many and complicated, but two issues are critical. The first is the nature of the industry's international competitors. The strongest are supported by governments that have made aerospace a national priority. This national support is certainly not unreasonable, given aerospace's strategic importance as a driver of technology and innovation. Conversely, the second is the U. S. government's puzzling attitude toward aerospace exports which stimulate employment, and make the largest contribution to the U. S. balance of payments. Unlike aerospace companies in other countries, U. S. industry leaders must grapple with government policies that impede rather than enhance export sales. (1:9) In defense of U. S. policy makers, there seems to be a new willingness to confront the current crisis in both the national and export markets. International market forces are requiring fast and efficient reaction to a rapidly changing political and economic climate. The present administration seems to support its predecessor's efforts to implement a whole series of policy adjustments aimed at making U. S. aerospace more competitive on the export markets. Competing with the European Community (EC) and Japan for a share of the global market (defense and non-defense) is becoming more and more critical to the U. S. aerospace industry. In the face of shrinking Defense budgets, American companies can no longer rely solely on their government as a customer if they are to survive. Whereas the U. S. defense industry was never really serious about the export market, this has now changed. The U. S. market is about to be too small to allow for the survival of meaningful R&D and production capabilities. Again, tilt-rotor technology is a perfect example of one way to gain entry to the global market. (3:5) It is appropriate to briefly examine the major competitors. While the EC certainly possesses the existing aerospace infrastructure to develop and market tilt-rotor technology, it is unlikely that they will anytime soon. The new European geopolitical and military factors that will influence all funding and operational decisions are extremely complex. When coupled with faltering economies across Europe and falling defense budgets, the chances of EC collaboration on tilt-rotor technology seems remote. Plus, much of the urgency initially felt by American industry at the prospect of unified European competitor has subsided in the wake of a collapsed Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. The concomitant effect of a smaller market with too many suppliers has left the European competitive threat weakened. (9:40) The inevitable fallout of the EC's current problems is an increase in European protectionism which will make it difficult to export tilt-rotor, or any other technology in the near future. However, improvement in the world-wide economy could quickly ameliorate the present forecast. In summary, the European threat of capitalizing on tilt-rotor technology seems remote while European markets are potentially ripe for tilt-rotor exploitation, particularly in civilian application. Japan offers a more serious challenge. Until recently, the Japanese were not significant aerospace competitors. There is increasing evidence that this situation is changing. It can be argued the real winner of the cold war was Japan. Unrestrained by prohibitive military expenditures, their focus of effort was centered on manufacturing consumer goods to satisfy world demand. Accordingly, they establish an engineering and manufacturing prowess of considerable renown. Their previous successes on the world market demand a healthy respect be accorded their aerospace potential. The Japanese approach has always been the same with respect to economic strategies. Once the decision is made to enter a market, a product is selected, usually at the low-cost end of the spectrum, and used to gain experience and initial market share. Once creditability is established, there is a relentless move "up market." In every case, American industries did not recognize the power of Japanese competition until it was, literally, too late. (9:13) How many times do we intend to learn this lesson? What is particularly disturbing with respect to American tilt-rotor technology is the Japanese proven ability to use designs originating from sources outside Japan. The strength of Japanese manufacturing lies in their ability to exploit existing technology by continually refining and improving the "process." It is these same powerful manufacturing skills that have created a competitive Japanese aerospace industry which has grown at 9 percent a year since 1984. (9:15) There are additional characteristics of Japan's competitive strategy. In their quest to dominate certain international markets, Japanese companies, aided by the Ministry of International Trade (MITI), have tended to follow a similar path. First, they build a reputation as an excellent subcontractor and supplier, then they move to become partner with an increasing share of the risk. The value of partnerships is that they enable Japanese companies to rapidly learn the specific technologies and skills they lack which, when combined with their manufacturing expertise, create a powerful competitive capability. (9:14) Paul Kennedy, in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers reports succinctly an example of this particular Japanese strategy: The Japanese Aircraft Development Corporation efforts to join with Boeing in order to produce new generation, fuel-efficient aircraft for the 1990's-- denounced by one American expert as a "Faustian bargain" whereby Japan will provide cheap finance to acquire U. S. technology and expertise--may be even more significant in the future. In the case of tilt-rotor technology, or any other technology waiting only to be marketed, the basic question is whether the increasingly capable Japanese aerospace industry will be a threat, or a partner to American aerospace. Time will tell, but based on previous lessons painfully learned, to underestimate the Japanese competitiveness assumes incredible risk. The Japanese penchant for leaving "pure" science to the Americans, and tapping it only when the commercial relevance becomes clear must stop. (6:464) America must not allow foreign competitors to successfully market American technology. Japan is America's most difficult challenge for the rest of the century. It will prove a much harder and more intense competition than the previous political-military competition with the former Soviet Union. (5:4-5) Times have changed. American policies with respect to international competition must also change. The U. S. holds no monopoly on advanced technology or marketing expertise. Aggressive foreign competitors will battle for larger shares of the global aerospace market. A coherent policy, which unifies government's strategic goals with industry's requirement to successfully compete is crucial. Government, to include DOD, must continue to heed the call of industry, or risk weakening a proud pillar of the American economy. The MV-22 Osprey is the best choice for replacing the Frog. While the tactical advantages made possible by tilt- rotor and composite technology are readily apparent, they take on critical importance in view of the Navy's fundamental shift to the "From the Sea" doctrine. Coupled with the aerospace industry's requirement to develop and market technological advantages, the Osprey is clearly America's best alternative. Aerospace contractors have been downsizing, divesting, teaming, and reorganizing with a fervor of late--just to survive. And in the fury of it all, it's hard to say whether it's shrinking smart--or just shrinking. (4:132) Marketing technology with the military and civilian potential of the Osprey is "shrinking smart." BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 24, 1992 ed. "Heed the Alarm." (9) 2. Boeing Transitions, Fall 1987 ed. Vol. 3, No. "World's Largest All-Composite Helicopter Enters Flight Tests." 3. Bonsignore, Ezio "Whining Doesn't Help." Military Technology, (Vol.XVI, Issue 10, 1992): 5. 4. Costello, Robert B. Letter to the Editor. "Shrinking Our Defenses." Harvard Business Review, (January- February 1993): 132-133. 5. Halberstram, D. "Can We Rise to the Japanese Challenge?" Parade, (October 9, 1983): 4-5. 6. Kennedy, Paul The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987. 7. Linn, Thomas C. "Over-the-Horizon Assault: The Future of the Corps." Marine Corps Gazette, 71 (December 1987): 44-47. 8. Morrocco, John D. "Pentagon to Rely on Weapons Upgrades." Aviation Week and Space Technology, (March 15, 1993): 44-45. 9. Ropelewski, Robert "Europe rates low priority in USA." Interavia Aerospace World, (Vol. 42 December 1992): 40-41.
