Amphibious Assault Or Amphibious Raid: You Decide! CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Amphibious Assault or Amphibious Raid: You Decide! Author: Major Willie C. Jones, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Given the realities of America's deficit and its impact on the military community, an amphibious raid rather than an amphibious assault will likely be a Unified Commander in Chief's trump card. Background: The U.S. Marine Corps has not conducted an amphibious assault since the Korean War. The forward presence of the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC)), as part of an Amphibious Ready Group, has allowed the Navy-Marine team to respond to numerous crises throughout the world in past years. During the Gulf War, the Marine Corps most unique capability, an amphibious assault, was not employed due to beach obstacles, mines, and heavy enemy opposition. However, amphibious raids were conducted on Um Al Maradim and Durrah Islands to lend credit to the Gulf War deception plan. No service in the world can match the Marine Air Ground Task Force combined arms capability. America's deficit is severely handicapping the Navy-Marine team's amphibious lift capability. The development of "Littoral Warfare" or "Maneuevr From the Sea" validates the Marine Corps vision of maneuver warfare as defined in FMFM-1, Warfighting. Recommendation: The Marine Corps must retain its amphibious assault doctrine but realize that an amphibious raid is most probable in today's world because of budgetary constraints, force lift shortfalls, and insufficient mine countermeasures. The forward deployed MEU (SOC) is the nation's most available tool to deter aggression in remote corners of the globe. OUTLINE Thesis: Given the realities of America's deficit and its impact on the military community, an amphibious raid rather an amphibious assault will likely be a Unified Commander-in-Chief's trump card. I. History of Amphibious Assault and Amphibious Raid II. Amphibious Assault A. Characteristics B. Amphibious Lift C. Small Craft D. Dangers III. "From the Sea" A. Maneuver B. Expeditionary Force C. Recent Operations D. Joint Warfare IV. Amphibious Raid A. Characteristics B. Marine Corps Raid Unit C. Secretary of Defense Directive D. Testing Unit V. Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable A. Missions Assigned B. Deficiencies VI. Issues Concerning the Marine Corps A. Cutbacks B. Reassess Amphibious Doctrine C. Amphibious Assault Shortfalls AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OR AMPHIBIOUS RAID: YOU DECIDE! By Major Willie C. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps History is replete with naval expeditionary missions to wrest the will to fight from opposing forces. One of the oldest recorded is the Battle of Marathon, where Persian forces conducted an amphibious raid to draw forces from the city of Athens in 490 B.C. The most studied amphibious operation, Gallipoli, was the British debacle in the Dardenelles on 25 April 1915. The origin of the Marine Corps interest in amphibious warfare was taken directly from the lessons learned at Gallipoli. Major Earl H. Ellis dedicated his life learning about amphibious operations. He studied Pacific Islands occupied by Japanese forces in the late 1920s and concluded that: To effect such a landing under the sea and shore conditions obtaining and in the face of enemy resistance requires careful training, preparation to say the least; and this along Marine Corps line. It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantry- men and jungle men but military men of high morale; they must be skilled water men and jungle men who know it can be done.(5:23) Thus, the birth of amphibious warfare began in the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is the only modern day force in the world capable of conducting an amphibious assault. However, America's deficit is affecting the resources (personnel and material) needed to sustain this type of operation. Current economic indicators predict a down-spiraling economy. America's trade imbalance with foreign nations, the deficit, military personnel, drawdowns and defense cutbacks point to a smaller military. Given these realities, coupled with amphibious lift reductions, the Marne Corps should reassess its forcible entry capability, an amphibious assault. An amphibious raid is a reasonable option to support future operations. Naval Warfare Publication 3 (NWP) characterizes an amphibious assault as an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing and establishing of force on a hostile shore. Amphibious assaults have been noticeably absent from conflicts since the end of WW II and the Korean War. One primary reason for this is the lack of naval vessels committed to support this type of operation. Colonel James B. Soper shared this observation: The Navy may well deny that it is their intention to further degrade an already inadequate amphibious assault force. However, the gross disproportionate manner in which reductions have been applied to amphibious ships in the recent past appear foreboding. In short force level, and alternate supporting elements, is to state it charitably, grim.(7:23) Several guest lecturers at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, during academic year 1992-1993, have remarked that the naval service is improving its amphibious lift capability. Colonel Soper's quote is evidence that this problem has been ongoing in excess of two decades. Further, the recent Gulf War demonstrated the Navy-Marine team's inability to force beaches near Kuwait City. The problems of clearing beach mines and obstacles against a formidable adversary are well documented. Yet little has been done to correct the Navy's minesweeping deficiencies. These obvious shortfalls would suggest that "today amphibious doctrine is influenced by a realistic perception of the inherent dangers of a frontal assault on a heavily defended beach." (4:54) Assaulting opposed beaches in WW II resulted in the untimely death of many Americans. The vulnerability of the American public to accept untold loses in the air, sea, and land is untested. War is a dangerous business and lives will be lost in combat. The American people, via their Congressional representatives, will ultimately decide whether to commit forces to combat. The Unified CINC, in consultation with the National Command Authority (NCA), will approve the form of maneuver for the landing force. Britain did not elect to conduct a direct assault on Port Stanley in the 1982 Falkland War for fear of disastrous results in the face of heavy Argentinean resistance. A similar situation faced American forces off the coast of Kuwait. The focus is "now on the littoral warfare to seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base or coastal air bases to allow entry of heavy Army and Air Force." (3:16) This realization is not a departure from the Marine Corps long-standing tradition of seizing and defending advanced naval bases. Furthermore, the Marine Corps focus has always been on the littorals. This new direction permits the amphibious task force to mass lethal fires against an aggressor, since a threat to maritime transit has considerably lessened. Numerous reasons led to deferring surface and helicopterborne assaults on Kuwait beaches. They were: strength of Iraqi forces, lack of maneuver space, insufficient mine countermeasures, to minimize collateral damage to Kuwait City, and maintaining a reserve force. All of the above are sound reasons to defer an amphibious assault. However, a defended beach, the presence of obstacles and shallow water mines, were foremost in arriving at the decision to take the direct approach into Kuwait. "Maneuver from the Sea," the tactical equivalent of maneuver warfare on land, " provides a potent warfare tool to the Joint Task Force Commander, a tool that is literally the key to success in many likely contingency scenarios."(3:19) This echoes Sun Tzu's thoughts of hitting the enemy where he is weakest. The implication is that the naval expeditionary force will strike the enemy in the rear or on an assailable flank with swift, violent actions. While operations involving an amphibious assault against credible enemy opposition can not be ruled out in the future, the likelihood of it occurring in the current atmosphere is remote. General Al Gray, former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, remarked "that while we are fully prepared for the most challenging conflict, your Marine Corps also stands ready for the most likely conflict in the Third World." Recent events in the underdeveloped countries amply illustrate the need for Marine Corps expedition missions. The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps makes it well suited for combat against forces of similar composition. With the onset of joint warfare, the Corps can also compliment sister services in defeating a robust force in any climate. The naval expeditionary force in Southwest Asia not only tied 8,000 Iraqi forces to the coast, but also supported the Joint Force Air Component Commander(JFACC), conducted maritime interdiction, aviation support, noncombatant evacuation (NEO), and ground combat operations. The preponderance of Marine Corps activities in the recent past will likely be response to conflicts similar to the ones below. The table below is not all inclusive but accurately represents why the Marine Corps is a force-in-readiness. Table 1 Operation Code Name Location Desert Shield/Storm Southwest Asia Eastern Exit Somalia Sharp Edge Liberia Provide Comfort Northern Iraq Sea Angel Bangladesh Restore Hope Somalia The annals of American history sufficiently document the importance of amphibious assaults and other operations since the founding of the Corps. However, the American public is now looking inward and is bent on isolationism. The military services' focus, as mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, is on jointness to accomplish whatever strategic objective(s) the NCA directs. Congress is actively seeking to streamline and consolidate duplicate roles and missions within the Armed Forces. The amphibious raid is evolving as the Marine Corps most unique tool. While an amphibious raid involves inherent risk, it does not include the immediate risk of an amphibious assault. Amphibious raids demonstrated their value during the island hopping campaigns of World War II. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 8-1 characterizes an amphibious raid as a landing on a hostile shore. It involves a swift incursion into, or temporary occupancy of an objective and a planned withdrawal. The Pacific raids were pivotal in forcing a Japanese surrender. Vice Admiral Chormley, Commander, South Pacific Force, vehemently recognized the importance of having raid forces assigned to his command: "The Marine Regiments will not be an entirely suitable combat unit for operations in the South Pacific unless it has, as an integral part of its organization, either a Raider or Parachute Battalion."(8:15) The birth of these units complemented amphibious assaults at Guadalcanal, Tugali, Makin, and Guvatu, to name a few. They spearheaded operations on inaccessible beaches and conducted raids that entailed elements of surprise and high speed. The formation of raider units during WW II amply demonstrate the adaptive nature of the Marine Corps to confront future challenges. Unfortunately, raider units were disbanded prior to the assault on Iwo Jima, and "the demise of these forces closed a colorful chapter in the history of the Marine Corps, but the professionalism of their personnel was diffused throughout the Corps and contributed greatly to the competence and esprit of the First to Fight."(8:78) During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the "Free World" faced increasing threats from Third World countries. these involved hijackings, abductions, and car and airplane bombings. In response to the security interests and risks to the United States and its allies, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive in 1983 advising all services to increase their emphasis on special operations. As previously stated, the Marine Corps discontinued its special operation units during WW II. However, The Corps did possess the capability to conduct limited special operations: raids (helicopterborne), noncombatant evacuations, and recovery operations, etc. Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, was tasked with testing, evaluating, and formulating the concept to meet the strategic concerns of the NCA. The focus of this effort was to develop a time-phased plan for achieving the level of special operations capable of combatting both current and future low intensity conflicts and terrorist threats. The plan was to retain the amphibious nature of the Corps and complement existing missions assigned to other services. As a result of this initiatives, the MEU (SOC) concept became a permanent structure in the Corps. A MEU (SOC) is certified to perform eighteen special missions prior to a six-month deployment cycle. Although the combat power of this force is light, it contains air assets as a formidable combat multiplier. However, an amphibious assault is not included as one of these missions. Colonel Batcheller views on an amphibious raid are: ... at the same time that brute force amphibious operations being relegated to the world of histo- rians, the Marine Corps finding in the tenets of maneuver and technology-dependent over-the-horizon (0TH) operations a new relevance for amphibious operations borrowing more form the raid than the assault. For the past few years, we have been captivated by the raid, even flirt with the "C" word-commando." (1:26) The captivation by an amphibious raid will likely continue unless the threat dictates a new course or direction. The nation has not outfitted the naval service with the required tools to conduct forcible entry, namely amphibious ships, minesweepers, and rotary wing aircraft (V-22 Osprey) and long range, larger caliber naval guns. Since American policy today is reducing the deficit and cutting the military (personnel, equipment and bases), the possibility of receiving enough hardware and funding to conduct an amphibious assault in the near-term is doubtful. The Marine Corps is at the "Crossroads." Yogi Berra said it best, "When you come to the fork in the road, be sure to take one." When General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before Congress concerning future Armed Forces cutbacks during the height of the Gulf War, one could grasp the immense gravity of deciding which fork to take. Current political fallouts in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Bosnia, and the nuclear buildup in North Korea and South Africa do not equate to a "World at Peace." The implications of these events, coupled with uncertainties in the New World, demand a force with global reach. Dick Cheney, former Secretary of Defense, acknowledged that the military must change lanes at the end of the Cold War era: The fact is that defense is the minority partner in the budget--less than one of five federal dollars and, under the Presi- dent's budget continuing to go down. We are reducing force structure as well to get us down to a smaller, more mobile, and flexi- ble. (2:14) As such, the Marine Corps can ill-afford to totally abandon its claim-to-fame, an amphibious assault. The Corps is cognizant of the fact that with dwindling defense resources its capabilities also diminish. The Marine Corps must continue to stress its unique capabilities, not with parochialism but with an adaptive voice to augment other services to meet the needs of the nation. The nation will then rest assured that the Navy-Marine team will be at the forefront of most conflicts. An amphibious assault launched at the right time and place can paralyze an opposing force. Recent precedent indicates that an assault from the sea on an opposed beach is not likely to occur. The Marine Corps future is inextricably tied to the sea as part of a Naval Expeditionary Force. For how long and at what strength will the subject be debated: The Navy Amphibious Fleet will shrink to 52 ships a ten ship reduction from 1988 force level.... By the year 2007 almost 80% of the 1992 amphibious force will have been decommis- sioned. But the Navy expects no significant shortage of amphibious lift during this period (Emphasis added).(6:26) While this is an overstatement of the problem, amphibious concerns have remained unresolved for years. The naval services have appointed a three-star steering committee to address amphibious assault shortfalls. Antiquated ships will continue to be removed from the active force the remainder of this century. The LST, LPH and LPD classes are to be decommissioned. Replacement ships have been identified, LX and LHD, to lift 2.5 MEBs or 12 MEUs. This should be accomplished by year 2007. The dilemma is readily apparent since we cannot predict the place, time, and opponent in the next conflict. Now that we have come to the crossroads, it is up to the Marine Corps to decide which fork in the road to follow: (1)the road to conducting amphibious assaults, or (2) the road toward supporting amphibious raids. To sit on the fence could prove catastrophic. The Marine Corps indispensable leadership as ambassadors in the free world and for the American public cannot be overstated. President George Washington understood the vastness of a maritime force and revealed that "under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which all hope of success must ultimately depend." In short, the Marine Corps is one of America's foremost institutions and will continue to perform such duties as the President directs. In light of uncertainties facing the New World, a raid could be employed as the cornerstone for the continued preservation of liberty in support of joint operations. Amphibious lift to move a credible force to threatened regions of the world is in a state of disarray. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps must continue to stress to Congress the potent strength of a forward deployed force. Inaction has degraded the ability of the naval service to provide its full range of capabilities. Third World countries are acutely aware of our shortcomings to storm a heavily defended beach. "Maneuver from the Sea" should be retitled "Maneuver to the Shore." The problems associated with conducing an amphibious assault are well known. It is now time to decide which amphibious operation to pursue, an amphibious assault, amphibious raid or both. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Batcheller, Col. Gordon D. USMCR. If Not Tarawa, What? Marine Corps Gazette November 1992. 2. Cheney, Dick. Secretary of Defense of the United States. We Need in the Future: America Leadership and Security Requirements. Vital Speeches of the Day. Vol. LIX, No.1 October 1992. 3. "From the Sea," Marine ALMANAC, Special Issues, Vol. 21, No. 12 December 1992. 4. Hoffman, F.C. Major, USMCR. The Amphibious Dilemma. Marine Corps Gazette February 1993. 5. Isely, Jetter A. and Philip A. Crowle. The U.S. Marine Corps and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practices in the Pacific. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press 1951. 6. Truver, Scott C. Tomorrow's Fleet, U. S. Naval Institute's Proceedings, July 1992. 7. Soper, James B. Colonel, USMCR. By Forcible Entry. Marine Corps Gazette, August 1972. 8. Updegragh, Jr., Charles L. U.S. Marine Corps Special Units of World War II. Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet 1972.
