Peacekeeping: The Mission Is Likely To Fail CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Peacekeeping: The Mission is Likely to Fail Author: Major Tim Hunter, USMC Thesis: The United States is neither prepared for, nor willing to assume the role of peacekeeper and peace enforcer for the United Nations. Background: The Cold War is over. A New World Order is beginning to emerge. It is characterized, however, by a lack of order. The United Nations, in light of recent successes, has become the chosen instrument for the maintenance of peace. The United States is being relied upon to support the United Nations in peacekeeping missions throughout the world. These missions are characterized by deep-seated animosities with historical, ethnic, religious, and other hatreds of primarily political concerns that have erupted-into civil violence. Insertion of military forces into this environment for the purpose of establishing or maintaining peace is a complex and poorly understood endeavor that presents a high likelihood of failure. Presently, America's forces are not structured or trained for the types of situations they will face in this role. These missions do not meet the post-Vietnam criteria for force insertion established in the Weinburger Doctrine, and they have not historically experienced success as evidenced in Beirut. The linkage of United States' vital interests to the mission is often remote and sometimes non-existent. The American people will not be willing to tolerate the cost without any perceived gain. Recommendation: Alternative solutions to these highly political situations should be explored and utilized instead of insertion of military forces. PEACEKEEPING: THE MISSION IS LIKELY TO FAIL OUTLINE Thesis: The United States is neither prepared for, nor willing to assume the role of peacekeeper and peace enforcer for the United Nations. I. Emergence of a New World Order A. World in disorder B. United Nations as the instrument for peace C. United States' implied role II. The missions A. Peacekeeping definition B. Peace-enforcement definition III. The environment A. Peace or war B. Peacekeeping situation C. Peace-enforcement situation IV. The context A. Attitudes and conditions B. The pitfalls 1. Peacekeeping problems 2. Peace-enforcement problems C. Chance of success V. Mission challenge A. Maintain neutrality B. Example in criticality C. Force structure VI. Policy and strategy A. Weinburger Doctrine B. Missions don't match the doctrine VII. Cautions A. General Powell's questions B. American mentalities PEACEKEEPING: THE MISSION IS LIKELY TO FAIL The struggle dividing the world for over two generations has ended. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War and brought us into a new era. The New World Order, presented by former President George Bush, "is not a fact; it is an aspiration and opportunity . . . to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us." (9:V) It is, however, an uncharted opportunity presenting the United States with a picture of disorder, and in many regions chaos. The old system was predictable and the lines drawn between the major powers were relatively clear. The New World order is characterized by "the precipitous disintegration of an authoritarian political system and the induced transformation of once isolated economies [that] are new phenomena whose consequences are not fully understood." (8:2) The war in the Gulf ushered in the evolving post-Cold War era with an unprecedented military victory for the United States and its coalition allies. Perhaps more significantly, the United Nations revitalized its role in the international community by orchestrating and sanctioning collective action against aggression. In light of "the systematic transformation of the United Nations into the chosen instrument for the maintenance of peace," (1:212) the Secretary General of the United Nations issued his Agenda for Peace. Within it, the principles of individual and peoples rights are interwoven with our democratic principles that governments must rest their rightful authority on the consent of the governed, and must live in peace with their neighbors. In concert with these concepts, the Agenda for Peace suggests an expanded United Nations role in peacekeeping and peace- enforcement. It is inevitable that the United States will play a major role in these efforts as General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states, "Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are a given." (6:36) As current conditions in Bosnia and in Somalia have demonstrated, the international community has not developed either the principles or the mechanisms for establishing basic civil order in instances where it has collapsed within a sovereign state. (8:1) "Peacekeeping" missions will be complex, intractable, and poorly understood by the American public and by our responsible officials. The United States is neither prepared for, nor willing to assume, the role of peacekeeper and peace enforcer for the United Nations. It is imperative that one understand the nature of war before becoming engaged in one. It is necessary, therefore, that the missions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement be adequately explored. The term peacekeeping can mean different things to different people. For the purpose of this discussion the definitions contained in Joint Pub 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations provide a solid foundation from which to continue. They are: Peacekeeping Operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel at the request of the parties to a dispute to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties. Peace-enforcement Military operations to forcefully restore peace between belligerents, who may be engaged in combat. It is important to understand that the missions of peacekeeping and peace enforcing are fundamentally different, and should not be thought of as similar tasks. An analysis of the two missions can be achieved by examining four categories. The first is environmental and refers to the characteristics "on the ground"; the second is contextual, referring to the situation that would confront the force. The third category, based on the first and second, is the mission challenges the force must face, and the final category is the compatibility of the mission with current policy and strategy. (7:21-22) The environment refers to the conditions that exist at the time a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission is considered. The obvious question is; are the antagonists at peace or at war? The peacekeeping situation demands that peace or at least a cease-fire has been established and that the task before the peacekeepers is to maintain that peace. In contrast, the peace enforcer experiences a state of actual on-going combat with the ominous task of causing that combat to cease. "In a peace-enforcement situation some, possibly both, or all of the combatants prefer the continuation of hostilities to their cessation." (7:22) If this were not the case, then a peacekeeping situation would be in effect, and would only require monitoring. Peacekeepers enter a situation where the perception exists that the absence of hostilities is preferable to the continuation of war. These fundamental differences illustrate the contrast between the problems for the peacekeeper or the peace enforcer. The environment is capable of mercurial changes and the role of the peacekeeper can become one of peace enforcer at any time during the mission. The attitudes and conditions of the country where the force is to be inserted is referred to as the contextual atmosphere of the mission. By the very nature of the missions, the contextual atmosphere will be anything but desirable. "Normally, they will reflect deep-seated animosities with historical, ethnic, religious, and other hatreds that layer upon one another as countries are torn apart and regenerated." (7:17) A graphic illustration of this point is contained within the Long Commission's report on the Lebanon peacekeeping mission: Lebanon, a country approximately the size of Connecticut, contains 3 million people, 17 officially recognized religious sects, 2 foreign armies of occupation, 4 national contingents of a multinational force, 7 national contributors to a United Nations peacekeeping force, and some two dozen extralegal militia. Over 100,000 people have been killed in hostilities over the last eight years, including the 241 U.S. military personnel that died as a result of the terrorist attack on 23 October 1983. It is country beset with virtually every unresolved dispute eliciting the peoples of the Middle East. Lebanon has become a battleground where armed Lebanese factions simultaneously manipulate and are manipulated by foreign forces surrounding them. If Syrians and Iraqis wish to kill one another, they do so in Lebanon. If Israelis and Palestinians wish to fight over the land they both claim, they do so in Lebanon. If terrorists of any political persuasion wish to kill and maim American citizens, it is convenient for them to do so in Lebanon. In a country where criminals involved in indiscriminate killing, armed robbery, extortion, and kidnapping issue political manifestos and hold press conferences, there has been no shortage of indigenous surrogates willing to do the bidding of foreign governments seeking to exploit the opportunities presented by anarchy in Lebanon. (3:IA) Within this contextual setting, the peacekeeping force will be invited to participate in a "universally" accepted cease-fire, and will be welcomed by all concerned. This is a precondition to the peacekeeping mission, and initially, as it was in Lebanon, this may be the case. Frequently, however, the antagonists are not receptive to the peaceful political settlement of their differences and the situation will "creep" to one of peace- enforcement. The peace enforcer is placed in the position of neither being invited, except perhaps by the losing side, nor welcomed in the country. In addition, at least one side has no appetite for peaceful negotiation. In fact, that side prefers to continue to pursue the military solution rather than the diplomatic. The insertion of a military force is a major intrusion and "runs the obvious risk of becoming the organizing focus of resistance and thereby [becoming] self-defeating." (8:4) The situation is analogous to the policeman entering the domestic dispute. It is not clear, for example, that an introduced force to create a cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be greeted with anything but Serbian resistance. If military force is required to bring the antagonists to the bargaining table, it must be understood that it is only a stepping stone to the ultimate political solution. The insertion of the military force cannot create the conditions for lasting peace, which involve the political acceptance of peace as more attractive than war. Due to the nature of these problems, it is entirely possible that the peace-enforcement contingent may be able to establish a cease-fire for the duration of its stay, however, once it is removed from the theater, the combatants resume hostilities. This will create a sense of failure in the mission. The environment and context into which the peacemaker or peace enforcer is introduced will dramatically affect how the mission will be conducted. Strict neutrality is an absolute imperative in peacekeeping, however, maintaining that neutrality can be extremely difficult. Again the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon offers us insight: Lebanon may offer an example of perpetual criticality. Its location at the center of conflict between nations over the centuries, its tortured geography, its bitter ethnic, religious, and clan antagonisms, give little hope for stability and predictability. Working within the classical strategic framework, however, the United States entered the fray in 1982, emplacing Marines to bring balance to the situation and separate opposing forces. As the Marine commander remarked: "We walked a razor's edge." The basic assumption was that the United States could be a neutral, stabilizing force. A system in criticality, however, offers no neutral ground, no hope of permanent stability. Once in it, you are of it, as we learned after the catastrophe in which 241 Marines lost their lives to a terrorist bomb." (5:63) This passage suggests that in some situations it may be impossible to maintain neutrality; even in an invited peacekeeping role. Although the peace enforcer realizes that he is not welcome in the environment, the moralistic tone of the "noble mission" can create a perception of neutrality in the peace enforcer's mind that will not be so perceived by those they have come to "save". The intrusion of the force will necessarily have an undesirable effect on one or more of the parties involved and any sense of neutrality will be lost. Despite the humanitarian effort in Somalia, the resistance to our efforts is increasing daily. The problem stems primarily from the fact that we are outsiders and this is a "domestic" problem. There is a faction that feels that Africans must learn to handle its own affairs responsibly without help from others. (2:19) In addition, those elements making a profit in misery will fight us to the end. Fundamentally, we must ask ourselves if a military force inserted into a highly politicized problem and climate is the proper tool to achieve our purpose. Historically those missions have achieved little success. The force structure needed to accomplish the roles of peacekeepers and peace enforcers are quite different. Peacekeepers have an established model that is already operating in about a dozen countries. They are light, defensive in orientation and require little logistical effort to support. They are relatively cheap. In contrast, peace enforcers will have to be combat troops, prepared and equipped for the rigors of war. They will be larger, offensive in orientation and require more logistical support than peacekeepers. They will be expensive and must be extremely disciplined and politically savvy to ensure that the offensive nature of their mission is taken only to the degree required to separate warring factions. Intelligence, informational assets, negotiating skills, and language proficiency will be critically important because any unnecessary or mistaken action can severely worsen the situation. They will inflict and suffer casualties, escalating the risks and visibility of the mission. There are presently no military units in our forces designed to accomplish this mission, and it is not a mission that we have trained and prepared for. Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement do not match well with historically established criteria for introducing American forces into a theater. In the aftermath of Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinburger developed six criteria to be utilized in committing our forces to war. They are: American vital interests are at stake; we can achieve victory (winning); political and military objectives will be clearly defined; forces will be suitable to accomplish the mission; the will of the American people will be behind the effort; and that force will be used as a last resort. The Weinburger Doctrine implies that the vital interests of our nation be present before we proceed with any effort. Today global television coverage of atrocities can create a public perception of a vital interest, worth fighting over, on humanitarian grounds alone. Given the pressures that seem to emerge, one can call this temptation the "do something syndrome." A more discerning and unemotional look will reveal that sufficiently vital interests will hardly ever be involved to the degree to justify force. This is particularly disconcerting in the peace-enforcement mission where the loss of lives will most assuredly erode public support. In addition, the contextual nature of peace enforcement missions will usually entail insurgency and counterinsurgency operations that are both difficult to win and lengthy. As the sacrifices mount, and the operation cannot be concluded rapidly, these missions will become extremely unpopular. If we are expecting clear cut success in either mission, we are likely to be disappointed. The objectives in both a military and political sense will be elusive and extremely difficult to define. In short, the only principle that can be upheld is to enter this mission as a last resort. General Colin Powell recently raised the following questions when discussing America's use of force: "Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further, and what light be the consequences?" (6:38) These questions are good ones to ask before America launches into the role of peacekeeper and peace enforcer for the United Nations. It will be extremely difficult to justify these missions when American interests are not at stake and the risks in terms of cost, both material and human, can become extremely high. Despite America's heartfelt concern for humanitarian causes, the nation is not prepared for or willing to assume the peacekeeping roles without some assurance of real success. Our failures in Vietnam and Beirut have indelibly etched the painful loss of America's sons and daughters into the nation's conscience. The people of this country will not tolerate similar failures, and our government and military must ensure that we avoid them. In light of this, alternative solutions to military intrusion must be established to deal with the inevitable conflicts that are rising out of the New World Order. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Blodgett, Frank. "The Future of U.N. Peacekeeping." Washington Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1991: 212- 222. 2. Calhoun, Margaret. "Good Motives Aside, The Mission is Likely to Fail." Christian Science Monitor, December 1992: 19. 3. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, December 1983. 4. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations, June 1991. 5. Mann, Steven R. "Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought." Parmeters. Vol. XXII, No. 3, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Autumn 1992: 54- 68. 6. Powell, Colin L. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992/93. 7. Snow, Donald M. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace- Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the World International Order. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1993. 8. Steinbruner, John. "Civil Violence as an International Security Problem," Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute. November 1992. Photocopied. 9. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. August 1991.
