Marine Fixed-Wing Air, Required or Retired? CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Marine Fixed-Wing Air, Required or Retired? Author: Major Terrance A. Gould, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The USMC must be proactive in redefining its fixed-wing aviation role; it must look for and exploit gaps in sister services capabilities. Background: On February 12, 1993 General Colin Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, released the latest? "Roles and Missions" document for the Armed Forces. This document, along with the previous two drafts, has drawn severe criticism from several vocal members of Congress as being too easy on the military in not cutting out redundant missions. Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee have said they will rewrite the roles and missions statement if the military is unwilling to do so. In light of the intense scrutiny that this document is receiving, the USMC must be prepared to defend the requirement for its fixed-wing aviation assets, and articulate the need for those assets into the next century. Before articulating the need for fixed-wing aviation, the USMC must critically examine the history, doctrine, and equipment of the United States Air Force and United States Navy. In examining the current doctrines of the USAF and USN, the USMC must look at the strengths and weaknesses of each, and look for possible gaps in their capabilities. The USMC must be ready and willing to use its fixed-wing assets to fill those doctrinal gaps. Recommendation: The Marine Corps needs to prepare to defend the requirement for fixed-wing aviation, by continuing to provide an expeditionary air arm, and by filling gaps in the doctrine and capabilities of the sister services. Marine Fixed-Wing Air, Required or Retired? OUTLINE Thesis: The USMC must be proactive in redefining its fixed-wing aviation role; it must look for and exploit gaps in sister services capabilities. I. U.S. Air Force Doctrine A. Historical View B. Current Doctrine 1. Strengths 2. Weaknesses II. U.S. Navy Doctrine A. Historical View B. Current Doctrine 1. Strengths 2. Weaknesses III. U.S. Marine Corps (aviation) Doctrine A. Historical View B. Current Doctrine 1. Strengths 2. Weaknesses IV. U.S. Marine Corps (aviation) Doctrinal Changes A. Within Sister Services B. Within the MAGTF MARINE FIXED-WING AIR, REQUIRED OR RETIRED? In 1948, all four services met in Key West to delineate the roles and missions for each of the Armed Forces. This delineation of roles allowed each service to plan, budget, and procure individual systems and develop service support organizations for the smooth operation of that service. Each service jockeyed for more roles and missions, because it resulted in larger annual budgets. As each service increased their respective missions, redundancies appeared in service capabilities, weapon systems, and support organizations. The Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwaters/Nichols Act), attempted to streamline the Department of Defense (DOD) by forcing more integration and interoperability between the services, thereby reducing interservice redundancies. It required the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to examine the roles and missions and submit a triennial report with changes to the roles and missions. In 1989, Admiral William J. Crowe submitted his "Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces," the first report since the 1948 Key West Agreement. In his report, Adm. Crowe called for several changes including "A sweeping reorganization of the intelligence organizations that support our forces." (5:16) This was just a start, and now it was time for General Colin Powell to submit his triennial report. On 12 February 1993, General Powell released his report on roles and missions. The initial response from Congress suggests that Gen. Powell's report is not tough enough on the military and does not cut out much of the perceived redundancies. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Les Aspin is currently reviewing the report and will be sending his recommendations to Congress. Rep. Ronald V. Dellums, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, calls General Powell's recommendations as "Tinkering at the margins." (7:34) Rep. Dellums went on to say: For the first time in 45 years we are in a window of opportunity where we do not face a major military threat from abroad. It seems to me we ought to be able to use this time to root out our organizational bad habits, the dysfunctional gaps and expensive overlaps in military roles and missions . . . . (7:34) The roles and missions debate took on an added dimension when SecDef Aspin called for even larger cuts in the DOD budget and manning. SecDef Aspin has submitted a plan for the force structure, and would like to see a shift in the roles for the U.S. military. This shift in roles would be based on the fact that the US is now lacking a superpower enemy. In making his force structure, SecDef Aspin cites a list of lessons learned from the Gulf War: the use of high-tech weapons capable of enormous and accurate destructive firepower, computers, and highly trained soldiers. SecDef Aspin bases his vision for the future military on equivalents of Desert Storm, Just Cause, and Provide Comfort. With the introduction of the new administration, and the DOD budget cutbacks, maybe it is time for DOD to take a hard internal look at the roles and missions statement, and develop a force structure to meet the future requirements. If DOD does not initiate a more comprehensive roles and mission review, it may be forced on DOD by Congress. The challenge is to build a force structure based on capability and not threat. If the USMC hopes to retain its truly expeditionary Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) capabilities, it must articulate its roles and missions into the 21st century. Included in the roles and missions is the use of, and requirement for, USMC fixed-wing aircraft, (one of the "four air forces"). The USMC must be proactive in redefining its fixed-wing aviation role; it must look for and exploit gaps in sister services capabilities. To be proactive and look for gaps in fixed-wing aviation capability requires a careful and critical look at where the services have been, and where their equipment and doctrine are taking them. Doctrine and equipment are complimentary, take years to evolve, and dictate what the services will be capable of for the future. Current aircraft procurement from identifying the requirement to operational introduction can be eight to ten years. Lessons learned are also used in developing doctrine, and all the services incorporated the lessons of the Gulf War: lessons such as interoperability, capabilities, and limitations. Let's look at the USAF, USN, and USMC doctrine and equipment to determine if it is possible for the USMC to justify the existence of its fixed-wing aviation. USAF DOCTRINE The USAF was created in 1946, but its doctrine can be traced back to the U.S. Army's Air Corps Tactical School started in 1920, and the teaching of Guilio Douhet and Billy Mitchell. Douhet developed a theory of air war that broke down to five key points, most notable for this discussion were two: first, "A nation must be prepared at the outset to launch massive bombing attacks against the enemy centers of population, government, and industry-hit first and hit hard to shatter (the) enemy," second, ". . . An independent air force armed with long-range bombardment aircraft, maintained in a constant state of readiness, is the primary requirement." (9:630) Mitchell was not so concerned with the strategic aspect, "But rather the centralized coordination of all air assets under the control of an autonomous air force command, freed from its dependency on the army." (9:631) Douhet's and Mitchell's teachings can be seen in the application of air power during World War II, and the daytime, high-altitude, precision bombardment of strategic targets against the Axis powers. Subsequent events would reveal shortcomings in t heir theories which included "A gross over- estimate of the self-defending capacity of bomber aircraft against a daring and dedicated defending air force." (9:635) The almost devastating losses suffered by the Allies in the daylight bombing raids prompted the development of a long-range, fighter-escort capable of protecting the bomber force for the duration of the mission. During the latter stages of WW II, the Army Air Corps operated with air superiority, and near the end, total air supremacy. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the USAF continued to operate with air superiority. But, during the Vietnam War the USAF had to contend with an elaborate, coordinated, and integrated air defense network over North Vietnam. In having to deal with the North Vietnamese air defense, the USAF further developed its doctrine by integrating a total strike package using bombers, escorts, and special mission aircraft (jammers and electronic surveillance). To outfit such a strike package required the use of many different types of aircraft, all designed for a specific mission or threat, and each type aircraft coming from a different unit. To solve the coordination problem, the USAF put all the aircraft under one commander for centralized control. The Gulf War was a culmination of all the previous lessons learned, and showed the devastating power of the USAF, its equipment, and doctrine against the fourth largest military force in the world. Desert Shield demonstrated the USAF capability to airlift massive amounts of supplies and personnel. During Desert Storm, General Horner conducted a strategic air campaign using a classic combination of the previous lessons learned, evolving doctrine, and specially designed, state of the art equipment. The USAF gained and maintained air superiority using F-15 fighters, and crippled the Iraqi Command and Control network using special mission aircraft and precision bombing. Then, he conducted a strategic bombing campaign designed to destroy the will and capability of the Iraqi government to wage war. The success of the air war in the Gulf led to the current USAF doctrine of "Global Reach-Global Power," described in Air Force Manual 1-1 (AFM 1-1), Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (March 1992). AFM 1-1 outlines the doctrine and priorities for employment of aerospace power in future conflicts and will carry the USAF into the next century. The basic tenet of AFM 1-1 is that "Controlling the aerospace environment is a prerequisite to accomplishing other aerospace roles and missions." Another critical point is "The most effective and efficient scheme is control of all aerospace assets by a single joint force air component commander (JFACC), responsible for integrating employment of all aerospace forces within a theater of operations." AFM 1-1 also outlines doctrine for deciding targets. First-priority targets should be those whose destruction can have the greatest effect on the war as a whole-in short, the enemy's (strategic) centers of gravity. Second-priority targets should be those which effect the outcome of an entire campaign within a theater of operations. The last priority should be those targets affecting only the outcome of individual battles. (1:8) These principles along with current weapons systems such as the F-117, B-2, and F-22 will guide the USAF into the next century and dictate how aerospace power will be employed. The "Global Reach-Global Power" doctrine has several shortcoming that must be addressed. First is the time factor. This new doctrine relies heavily on the fact that the conflict cannot be time critical. In Desert Storm, all the forces had sufficient time to buildup combat power before the war started. With a reduction in overseas bases, time becomes even a bigger factor. Second is the reliance on host-nation or neighboring nation support to house the air wings once they arrive in theater. The USAF is not capable of operating from an austere airfield, but must rely improved facilities. As the USAF discovered during "Operation Eldorado Canyon" (1986 bombing raid on Libya), not all friendly nations will allow the use of their facilities or airspace for offensive actions. Third, is the premise that air superiority must be gained before commencing Offensive Air Support (OAS). This relates directly to the time factor, we may not have the luxury of time to gain air superiority before commencing bombing operations in support of ground forces. Fourth is the issue of JFACC, and whether he controls air assets according to the USAF doctrine, or whether he coordinates air assets according to the USN/USMC doctrine. USN DOCTRINE U.S. Navy carrier aviation doctrine can also be traced back to the 1920s, with the first carrier takeoff from the USS Langley by Lieutenant V. Griffin on 17 October 1922. From 1922 to 1929, carrier aviation stagnated under the reigning battleship mentality. During Fleet Problem IX, in January 1929, Captain Joseph M. Reeves demonstrated the power of carrier aviation when he launched a mock strike of seventy aircraft from the USS Saratoga on the Panama Canal. "The planes struck without warning in an attack deemed so effective by the referees that they ruled the locks at the Pacific end of the canal destroyed." (10:35) The USS Saratago's performance changed naval warfare; she had demonstrated that a speedy aircraft carrier could independently attack enemy installations with devastating results. Admiral William V. Pratt, the Black Fleet Commander for this exercise, was so impressed that he moved his flag to the USS Saratoga for the return trip to the U.S. In his postexercise critique he made the following comment, "Gentlemen, you have witnessed the most brilliantly conceived and most effectively executed naval operation in our history." (10:35) In 1930, Admiral Pratt was named Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and it was during his tenure that the carrier became the nucleus of an independent offensive unit in the fleet. World War II was to serve as the proving ground for carrier aviation and power projection. In early 1942, the United States and Japan would engage in the Battle of the Coral Sea, a naval battle in which the opposing fleets would never sight each other. Carrier aviation became the deciding factor in such battles as Midway, the Eastern Solomons, the Santa Cruz Islands, and the Phillipine Sea. Near the end of the war, Admiral Marc Mitscher, Chief of Naval Aviation, issued a press release asserting "Japan is beaten and carrier supremacy defeated her." (10:170) Following WW II, Navy doctrine and equipment shifted several times as the U.S. Navy attempted to grapple with the changing world picture. During the Cold War, naval emphasis was on "blue water operations" and countering the Soviet Fleet. Naval aviation and carrier doctrine centered on over-the- horizon battles employing nuclear weapons. Aircraft were designed for long range strikes or for protection of the fleet from massive Soviet bomber attacks. The U.S. Navy shifted back to conventional power projection ashore during the Vietnam War. Aircraft carriers were continuously deployed to the Gulf of Tonkin from 1965 to 1973 to support U.S. and South Vietnamese ground forces and for long-range strikes into North Vietnam. Following Vietnam, the Navy again went through a period of shifting emphasis back to countering the Soviet threat, but found itself involved in more regional conflicts. Aircraft carriers were used as the quick reaction U.S. presence in such places as Iran (Desert One hostage rescue operation), Lebanon, Libya, Grenada, and Panama. During Desert Storm, the U.S. Navy reverted to the power projection role with one carrier operating from the Red Sea and up to four carriers operating from the Persian Gulf. The Gulf War allowed the U.S. Navy to demonstrate the versatility, flexibility, and capability of carrier aviation. Carrier aviation was used to augment and support General Horner's air campaign. Following the successes of the Gulf War, the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav), Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) developed and implemented a new Navy-Marine Corps strategy on 28 September 1992. The new strategy is titled ". . . From the Sea." "This document marks a sea change in naval strategic thinking. It details a new naval philosophy for today's world." (8:1) The doctrine was developed in response to the current challenges, a shift in focus from global threats to a more regional focus, and concentrates on littoral waters and maneuver from the sea. It must be remembered though that one capability has remained predominant and preeminent, and that is power projected from a carrier to shore. "In Naval Aviation that capability to project power is our core competency. It is that which separates us from the other navies of the world." (8:1) The biggest shortcoming in the new Navy doctrine is the equipment that it must use to implement ". . . From the Sea." USN ships have been designed and equipped to defeat the Soviet Navy in blue water operations. Few are designed or prepared to operate in the littorals, ("brown water"). This is evidenced by the lack of minesweepers and mine countermeasures in the USN fleet. Aircraft carriers require large amounts of space to maneuver for air operations and self-protection, and are normally escorted by a host of surface combatants. By switching to the littorals, the Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) must operate closer to shore and risk exposing themselves. This vulnerability was demonstrated as early as 1929, when the USS Saratoga was ruled sunk after she had launched her planes in a mock attack against the Panama Canal, during Fleet Problem IX. The wide spread export of relatively inexpensive, high-tech weapons, such as the Exocet Anti-Ship Missile (ASM) used against the HMS Sheffield and USS Stark, have compounded the danger of operating in the littorals. USMC DOCTRINE Marine Corps aviation began on 1 August 1912, when after two hours and forty minutes of instruction at Marblehead, Massachusetts, First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham soloed in a Curtiss Seaplane, thereby qualifying to become the Marine Corps' first pilot. In its first five years, Marine aviation expanded rapidly as the U.S. geared for entry in World War I. "From the outset (of the war), the Corps was assigned two disparate aviation missions reflecting its close relationship with the Navy, while still emphasizing direct support of Marines--Antisubmarine patrols using seaplanes, and ground support using landplanes." (4:14) First Aeronautic Company (USMC) was the first fully trained and equipped American aviation unit to go overseas in WW I. During the war, Marine aircraft flew fighter and ground support missions in support of Marines and Allied forces. By the end of the war, Marine aviation had expanded to 340 aircraft. Following WW I, Marine aviation saw expeditionary duty in Haiti and later in Nicaragua. During the Second Nicaraguan Intervention in 1927, Marine aviation went to assist Marines and the Nicaraguan government in suppressing guerilla forces. Missions included flying supplies, conducting message drops, evacuating wounded, reconnaissance and observation, and more important, attack missions in close support of Marine ground forces with Marine pilots acting as ground observers. This attempt at close coordination was to be the springboard for building the Marine Corps air/ground team, In 1934, the USMC published the Tentative Landing Manual which defined amphibious warfare and the role of Marine aviation. From 1934-1942, the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico conducted field exercises to refine and improve on the doctrine. The 1936 exercises were probably the must useful in determining the shortcomings of Marine aviation. It was noted that the Marine Corps had no airplanes specially designed for the attack missions, but was using observation and fighter aircraft as makeshift expedients. In 1937, the recommendation was made again that the Marine Corps needed modern attack planes and "That attack aviation should become an integral component of Marine Corps aviation if it was to carry out one of its primary missions. . . ." (2:54) By 1940, most of the problems had been worked out, but one interesting note is the Marine Corps Schools aviation section doctrinal statement concerning close air support (CAS); "When aviation is acting in close support of the ground forces, its striking power should be used against [only] those targets which cannot be reached by the weapons of the ground arm." (2:58) World War II was to be the proving ground for Marine aviation doctrine. While the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps worked together on the Pacific island hopping campaign, one problem surfaced that needed immediate attention, and that was a command and control problem. The USN preferred to exercise close overall control using Navy officers aboard ship out of immediate contact with the ground situation. The USMC opted for a more flexible system that eliminated various links in the chain of command and whereby pilots were coached onto their targets by air liaison personnel at the front lines. The Marine method was finally adopted, and at the end of the war, CAS was officially defined as "Attack by aircraft of hostile ground targets which are at such close range to friendly front lines as to require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of the ground forces in order to insure safety. . . ." (2:59) A more meaningful definition was offered by a soldier on Mindanao: "Close air support means that those bombs are so close that if you don't get in a hole or down, you're likely to get your backside full of arrows." (2:58) Marine aviation doctrine has remained basically unchanged throughout Korea, Vietnam, and Grenada. The command and control problems were solved with the standardization of CAS procedures in the Navy and Marine Corps. During Desert Storm, a new twist was added to the problem and that was how to integrate a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) into the larger theater air operations run by the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)? The only other changes have been to the aircraft and equipment used to conduct the six functions of Marine aviation. As stated earlier, the Commandant has coauthored the current Navy/Marine Corps doctrine entitled ". . . From the Sea." This latest doctrine emphasizes the close bond between the Navy and Marine Corps as the U.S. shifts from a global threat to a more littoral, regional strategy. It is still predicated on the traditional expeditionary role of the Marine Corps and it stresses the need for joint operations capable of projecting power ashore and then further inland if necessary. More importantly, its emphasis on littoral warfare focuses on flexible Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary capabilities, not on threats. The one weakness on the Marine side of the doctrine is the total reliance on external support to transport Marine aviation to the region. This is an issue that the Marine Corps must overcome if it is to retain the quick reaction that it is known for. Currently, to overcome that weakness, Marine squadrons are deploying aboard carriers, but this alone will not solve the problem. When Marine squadrons deploy to a carrier, those squadrons fall under the "operational control" (OPCON) of the CVBG. The Marine air mission will be dictated by the CVBG as long as the squadrons are assigned to the carrier. If the Marine Corps is to keep its fixed-wing aviation assets, it must sell "Marine Air" to the President, the Congress, and the American public. To sit back and rest on its laurels will only invite disaster as the DOD budget and personnel drawdown continues. Congress has already said that the redundancies must be eliminated, including the need for four air forces. Though all the services have published new doctrines since the victory in Desert Storm, the Marine Corps must be proactive and develop newer doctrine that continues to articulate Marine Corps aviation capabilities into the next century. In so doing, the Marine Corps must ensure that those capabilities are disseminated using the media in a positive manner. The Marine Corps cannot operate in a vacuum when it comes to developing ~ doctrine for its fixed wing aviation. It must develop a long-term strategy using a careful mix of global change, international politics, defense budgeting, high-tech equipment and manpower resources. In developing future doctrine, the Marine Corps must continue to use those tenets of previous doctrines that still hold true. Tenets such as the expeditionary capability of Marine aviation to operate in an austere environment, the carrier capability of Marine aviation to operate in a joint environment with the USN, and the capability to operate as one unit with Marine ground elements as part of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Some additional aspects that the Marine Corps may exploit are to use Marine aviation to support sister services like the Army or Air Force outside of the normal MAGTF structure. Marine aviation must have that flexibility to support a JFACC that is not in support of Marines on the ground. The Marine Corps needs the capability to complement and integrate with the Army and Air Force in conducting OAS missions. If the Marine Corps does not have that capability, then it loses some interoperability. Another use of Marine aviation is to continue the mix of a special use MAGTF aboard aircraft carriers, complete with Marine fixed-wing assets, comparable to the MAGTF thal deployed aboard the USS Roosevelt when it sailed on 11 March 1993. Inside the MAGTF, Marine aviation should be task as a maneuver element, similar to the Army Combat Aviation Brigades, vice a supporting element which is it current role in the MAGTF. By integrating Marine aviation into the ground scheme of maneuver and tasking them as a separate maneuver element, it becomes a force multiplier and allows the MAGTF Commander additional flexibility to accomplish the mission. "Predicting the long-term adversaries of the U.S. is a difficult, if not impossible, proposition. It is a dangerous exercise that may leave us unprepared for the kind of conflict actually encountered." (3:40) The key to developing future Marine roles and missions is deciding "What the U.S. will face rather than whom." (3:48) In formulating the future doctrine, the Marine Corps must realistically forecast personnel strength, in the event that it drops below Base Force. It must budget wisely, to avoid problems like the Medium Lift Requirement (MV-22 Osprey), and it must take into account the volatility of international politics. Change demands new ideas, new assumptions, and new approaches. Lastly, the Marine Corps must be proactive in redefining future roles and missions. To procrastinate will allow external forces, like the Congress, to dictate what the Marine Corps future roles will be. "Democrats and Republicans alike on the Senate Armed Services Committee warned that if the military does not eliminate duplication in the services' role and missions they will." (6:1) What the Marine Corps needs to avoid is a future doctrine/capabilities mismatch. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Washington, D.C. March 1992. 2. Crowl, Philip A. and Jeter A. Isely. The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. 3. Drew, Dennis M. "Recasting the Flawed Downsizing Debate." Parameters 93: 39-48. 4. Heatley III, Charles J. Forged in Steel. Charlottesville: Howell Press Inc. 1987. 5. Matthews, William. "Echoes of 1946: What Now?" Navy Times. January 4 1993: 16. 6. Matthews, William. "Final 'Roles and Missions' Spares Navy." Navy Times. February 22, 1993: 6. 7. Maze, Rick. "Too Gentle, Or Too Harsh?" Navy Times March 8 1993: 34. 8. Mixson, RADM Riley D. "Naval Air: Projecting Power." Naval Aviation News November-December 92: 1. 9. Paret, Peter. ed. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986. 10. Reynolds, Clark G. The Carrier War. Alexandria: Time-Life Books. 1984.
