Peace
Missions In The New World Order
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Peace Missions in the New World Order
Author: Major Jeffrey E. Fondaw, United States
Marine Corps
Thesis: The U.S. currently stands poised on the
brink of the "New World Order" facing
a
series of entanglements, which for lack of a better term can be called
"peace missions."
Without
a clear conceptual basis for addressing these missions, which carefully
examines
their
requirements and the limitations of our capabilities, the U.S. will become
vulnerable
to
"global over-stretch" of our political, economic and military
resources.
Background: Because of ambiguous terminology and the
changing nature of the various
"peace
missions" brought about by the end of the Cold War we do not have an
adequate
understanding
of the requirements and dangers of these missions. The dilemma brought
about
by the "New World Order" is twofold; first, we are now free of Cold
War restraints
on
our use of military power while secondly, the doctrine previously so useful in
governing
the
use of U.S. military power is no longer valid.
Compounding this dilemma, the "New
World
Order" has also seen the emergence of numerous crises as a result of the
end of
super
power conflict. Both domestic and
international pressures seem to compel U.S.
participation
in missions we little understand and for which we have failed to develop an
adequate
doctrine. The resulting situation
leaves the U.S. vulnerable to global economic,
political
and military overstretch.
Recommendations: To reduce our vulnerability the U.S. must
approach each "peace
mission"
as a unique situation, seek to understand the nature of that mission, and
obtain a
clear
focus on the prospective dangers of that mission.
OUTLINE
Thesis: We stand poised on the brink of this
"New World Order" facing an unfamiliar
series
of foreign entanglements, which for lack of a better term can be called
"peace
missions." These "peace missions" are poorly
understood, both for lack of a clear
definition
and because their very nature has changed nature with the end of the Cold War.
Without
a clear conceptual basis for addressing these missions, which carefully
examines
their
requirements and the limitations of our capabilities, the U.S. will become
vulnerable
to
"global over-stretch" of our political, economic, and military
resources.
I. Nature of "Peace Missions"
A. Ambiguous
terminology of the many "Peace Missions"
B. Changes
brought about by the end of the Cold War
l. Reduced constraints on the use of
U.S. military power
2. Emergence of numerous conflicts
II. Obsolescence of our current doctrine
A. National
interests
l. Survival
2. Vital
3. Major
4. Peripheral
B. Weinberger
Doctrine
C. Why
our former doctrine is no longer valid in the "New World
Order"
III. Principles governing the future use
of military forces for "Peace Missions"
A. Why
should the U.S. become involved?
B. Is
there a recognizable political objective?
C. What
are the costs of the commitment of U.S. forces?
D. What
type of force is best suited for "peace missions"?
E. What
instruments of national power should be used?
F. What
is the nature of the conflict?
G. Who
is in charge?
Peace Missions in the New
World Order
by Major Jeffrey E.
Fondaw, USMC
Defense Secretary Les Aspin recently
remarked that "this 'new world order' is a
little
long on the 'new' and a little short on the 'order.' " Although meant as an amusing quip
this
remark offers insight to the dilemma currently facing the U.S. We stand poised on the
brink
of this "New World Order" facing an unfamiliar series of foreign
entanglements,
which
for lack of a better term can be called "peace missions." These "peace missions" are
poorly
understood, both for lack of a clear definition and because their very nature
has
changed
nature with the end of the Cold War.
Without a clear conceptual basis for
addressing
these missions, which carefully examines their requirements and the limitations
of
our capabilities, the U.S. will become vulnerable to "global
over-stretch" of our political,
economic,
and military resources.
The end of the Cold War and beginning of
the "New World Order" has increased
dramatically
the opportunity for U.S. military involvement in the whole range of "peace
missions." These missions, ranging from humanitarian
assistance, peacekeeping, peace
enforcement,
and into the realm of limited war, are seen as imminently more practicable
since
the demise of the Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, the concepts and definitions of these
various
peace missions has not been adequately thought out, either from a military or a
diplomatic
point of view, nor are they well understood by the American public.
Furthermore,
the changing nature of these missions in light of the "New World
Order" and
their
proper correlation to our national interests has not been adequately analyzed.
While political pressure, both at home
and abroad, continually cries out for U.S.
intervention
in various conflicts and crises around the world, there are few existent and
valid
doctrinal guidelines for U.S. participation in these operations. Without a doctrine
governing
U.S. involvement we may be tempted to exercise our propensity for getting into
situations
without satisfactory plans for when (and how) to get out.
Although no statistics are available it
would not be too far-fetched to state that the
American public has an ill-defined understanding
of the requirements of these "peace
missions." There is little wonder why, since the
ambiguous nature and multiplicity of
terminology
associated with these missions adds to this lack of understanding. Take
peacekeeping for example. What is peacekeeping? How is it different from peacemaking,
peace
enforcement, protected zone operations, cease fire supervision, conflict
suppression,
etc.? Does peacekeeping include humanitarian
assistance or protection of the delivery of
that
assistance? Or are these missions
something entirely different? Is our operation in
Somalia
peacekeeping or simply humanitarian assistance?
The first reason for this confusion is
clear, there seems to be no universally
recognized
definition for the various peace missions.
The U.S. military regards most
"peace
missions" as one of the various forms of low intensity conflict that
military forces
may
be involved. The United States Army and
Air Force publication on low intensity
conflict
(FM 100-20/AFP 3-20) defines a peacekeeping operation as "military
operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict,
to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution."
(3:1) The yet unpublished Joint Pub
3-07.3, titled JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations defines peacekeeping as
"Efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military authorities of
the belligerent parties in a conflict to maintain
a
negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain
peace." (4) The
UN
would define a peacekeeping operation ". . .as an operation involving
military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United
Nations to help maintain or
restore
peace in areas of conflict." (11:3)
These three definitions, while not
worded exactly the same, can be considered
closely
akin. They all portray the essence of "peacekeeping" as requiring the
consent of the
parties
involved, without the least hint of forceful persuasion. Even this seeming
agreement
on a definition can be misleading as noted in the book The Thin Blue Line:
Peacekeeping outside the United Nations
has been made to mean whatever
those applying it have wished it to
mean, from total suppressive action to
the use of minimum force in the control
of violence. The degree of force is
really irrelevant, the operation in
either case is of an enforcement nature in
which the degree of force used
inevitably escalates in direct ratio to the
resistance encountered -- the greater the
force the more determined the
resistance is likely to
become....Whatever their character, these security
actions are inaccurately described as
peacekeeping operations.(8:10)
[emphasis added]
Other "peace missions" are
even less well defined. FM 100-20
describes
"peacemaking"
as "a type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or
restore
peace and order through the use of force" but makes no mention of
"peace
enforcement."
(3:Glossary 6) In contrast Joint Pub 3-07.3
defines peacemaking as the
"diplomatic
process of arranging an end to disputes and solving their underlying
causes." (4)
These
two definitions would seem to have little in common. Joint Pub 3-07.3 continues,
however,
to define "peace enforcement" as "military intervention to
forcefully restore
peace
between belligerents, who may be engaged in combat." (4) The reader may note the
similarities
between this definition of "peace enforcement" and FM-l00's
"peacemaking."
The second reason for the confusion
surrounding the various peace missions is their
changing
nature brought about by the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet
Union. This change has profoundly affected our
perception of these peace missions,
particularly
that of peacekeeping. As previously
defined this mission could be categorized
as
the most benign and least aggressive of the "peace missions". The most unique trait of a
"peacekeeping"
force is that it exists by mutual consent of the parties involved and that it
is
entirely
neutral. To maintain the peacekeeping
role the peacekeeping force cannot take an
aggressive
stance on behalf of either of the parties in conflict. Nor can a peacekeeping
force
remain in an area if either of the parties in conflict demand their
removal. Failure to
abide
by these caveats results in a peacekeeping force no longer acting in a
peacekeeping
role;
the mission has changed to something entirely different.
With the arrival of the "New World
Order" the term "peacekeeping" has become
ambiguous
and no longer bounded by its former narrow boundaries. Its "practitioners
developed
a narrow and precise definition of peacekeeping over time, but today the word
is
misleading
because it is used to describe the whole range of UN-authorized military
activity."
(5:116) To understand why it is
necessary to examine the development of this
mission
within the UN.
Historically, the UN initiated the first
post-World War II peacekeeping mission
when,
in 1956, it sent the United Nations Emergency Force to take over the Suez Canal
area
previously occupied by Anglo-French forces. (7:5) Any attempt to engage in a more
aggressive
mission, such as enforcement, was usually thwarted by Cold War tensions. A
boycott
of the Security Council by the Soviet Union was all that allowed the UN to
participate
in perhaps what was its first and only attempt at peace enforcement with their
intervention
into the Korean peninsula in 1950. In
every situation since then disputes
within
the UN have made attempts at peace enforcement futile. "Peacekeeping, therefore,
was
an expedient of a divided Security Council that lacked the consensus for
collective
action
but could agree to use a less powerful instrument that would not impinge on the
superpower
zero-sum game." (5:114)
Until
1989, peacekeeping by the UN had been characterized by the fact that "a
peace
force could only deploy with the consent of all local parties in conflict, and
particularly
of the host nation in which the force would be stationed." (5:114) With the end
of
the Cold War this situation has changed.
The UN has begun to expand its peacekeeping
role
from its former narrow boundaries and is embarking on a whole host of what
Mackinlay
and Chopra refer to as "second generation multinational
operations." These
missions
include Conventional Observer Missions, Traditional Peacekeeping, Preventative
Peacekeeping,
Supervising a Cease-fire Between Irregular Forces, Assisting in the
Maintenance
of Law and Order, Protecting the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance, The
Guarantee
of Rights of Passage, Sanctions, and Enforcement. (5:117) This change in
attitude
and capability has been dramatically demonstrated by the UN actions during the
confrontation
with Saddam Hussein, the recent decision to introduce military forces into
Somalia
for protection of humanitarian relief deliveries, and the increasingly
offensive
attitude
of the UN toward Serbian aggression in Bosnia.
Thus we are left with increasingly
ambiguous
terminology in which traditional UN peacekeeping has now come to represent a
whole
range of assorted "peace missions".
Unfortunately, the confusing terminology
is the least of the problems to be
addressed
by a new doctrine governing our participation in these "peace missions." Of a
far
more critical nature is an examination of our former doctrine and a thorough
understanding
of why it is no longer valid.
Prior to the end of the Cold War we had
a well defined framework governing the
use
of U.S. military force. The same Cold
War restraints that hamstrung the peacekeeping
efforts
of the UN also constrained unilateral or coalition efforts sponsored by the
United
States. The antagonism between East and West colored
almost every military action in
which
the United States participated. Every
disruption of the peace was viewed directly or
indirectly
as the result of this conflict. Thus,
our peacekeeping, peacemaking, or peace
enforcement
efforts could easily be defined as an attempt to thwart the growth of
Communism. Success or failure could be measured by the
success or failure of our efforts
to
suppress this ideology. With this as
the desired end-state, little thought need be given to
the
actual problems which might have led to the unrest originally. This provided a much
clearer
and neater solution than the situations which seem to confront us today.
The lessons of the Cold War, colored by
our experiences in Korea, Vietnam, and
Lebanon,
formed the conceptual basis for this framework. Two readily recognized
constituents
of this framework are the concept of "national interests" and the
doctrine
developed
by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, known as the Weinberger
Doctrine. These two doctrinal concepts operating
within our foreign policy strategy of
containment
of the Soviet Union, and under the constraints of the Cold War, seemed
sufficient
until 1989.
During the Cold War U.S. military
intervention was determined primarily by our
national
interests, and by what was possible given the bi-polar nature of the world's
political
environment. These national interests were normally
divided into four classes: survival,
vital,
major, and peripheral. Donald
Nuechterlein in his book America Overcommitted
defines
these interests as follows:
(1) Survival Interest -
when there is an imminent, credible threat of
massive destruction to the homeland,
where the very existence of the nation
is inperil. Survival interests require the immediate attention of the
President. (6:9)
(2)
Vital Interest - where probable harm to the security and well-being
of the nation will result if strong
measures are not taken within a short
period of time. Vital interests require urgent planning in
the executive
branch. (6:9)
(3)
Major Interests - where potential serious harm could come to the
nation if no action is taken to counter
unfavorable trends abroad. These
interests require serious study. (6:10)
(4)
Peripheral Interests - where little if any harm to the entire nation
will
result if a wait and see policy is
adopted. Peripheral interests require
only
watchful waiting. (6:10)
The division between interests that are
"major" and those that are "vital" is most
significant. "In the final analysis, a vital
interest is at stake when an issue becomes so
important
to a nation's well-being that its leadership will refuse to compromise beyond
the
point
that it considers to be tolerable."(6:11)
Nuechterlein offers such examples as
President
Truman's decision to defend South Korea in 1950 and President Kennedy's
confrontation
with Khrushchev over missiles in Cuba in 1962.
Thus, with a vital interest at
stake
the use of military force is not only possible, it is probable. In comparison, "a major
interest
is one that a country considers to be important but not crucial to its well-
being."
(6:12) Major interests are those issues
that can be negotiated with an adversary.
Negotiation
and compromise, though painful, is more desirable than confrontation. With a
major
interest at stake military force is not likely to become a possibility. (6:12)
Nuechterlein
further elaborates:
In assessing the national interests of
sovereign states, a crucial factor is
appreciating the difference between a
vital interest and a major interest.
The policy implications of choosing
between them are enormous because a
country must be prepared for an armed
confrontation, if all other measures
fail when its leaders decide that the
issue at stake is vital. (6:17) [emphasis
added]
The "New World Order has blurred
the distinction between these interests,
increasing
the likelihood that U.S. forces will be committed for less than a
"vital" interest.
Such
a situation has already occurred in Somalia. Prior to the end of the Cold War
the
events
in Somalia would probably have been considered only a "peripheral"
interest with
no
possibility of the commitment of U.S. forces.
Indeed, with the likelihood of a
superpower
confrontation as a worst case and a divided and uncooperative UN as a best
case,
Somalia would most likely have remained a peripheral interest
The second and more recent concept
governing the use of U.S. forces is found in
the
"Weinberger Doctrine." This
doctrine, first espoused by Secretary of Defense
Weinberger
in 1984, lays out six maxims for the use of military force. These can be
condensed
as follows:
(1)
The United States should not commit forces overseas unless the
particular occasion is deemed vital to
our national interest or that of our
allies. (14:8)
(2)
If we decide to put combat troops into a given situation, we should
do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear
intention of winning, (14:9)
(3)
If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should
have clearly defined political and
military objectives. And we should know
precisely how our forces can accomplish
those clearly defined
objectives. (14:10)
(4)
The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have
committed -- their size, composition and
disposition -- must be continually
reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
(14:10)
(5)
Before the United states commits combat forces abroad, there must
be some reasonable assurance we will
have the support of the American
people and their elected representatives
in Congress. (14:10)
(6)
The commitment of United States forces to combat should be a last
resort. (14:10)
By the foregoing argument it is readily
apparent that the first of Weinberger's
maxims
is no longer applicable. It seems we
are now willing to commit U.S. troops for
"peace
missions" which constitute interests of a less than vital nature. The third maxim is
also
at risk due to the very nature of these "peace missions" to which our
forces may now
be
committed. These missions will rarely
have clearly defined political and military
objectives.
The fifth maxim, rather than a
restriction, may well become the driving force
behind
the U.S. commitment of forces in these new and unfamiliar missions. If the case of
Somalia
is applicable, it would seem that the opinion of both the public and our
political
leaders,
spurred on by the evening news, were the decisive issues governing commitment
of
U.S. forces. Finally, Weinberger's
sixth maxim would also seem to be invalidated by the
"New
World Order," for how can commitment of U.S. forces be considered a
"last resort"
if
not in defense of a "vital" interest?
No longer does the specter of global
superpower conflict hamper every movement
of
the UN or of the United States.
"The end of the cold war established new parameters
and
removed many tensions that had limited the scope and application of
peacekeeping."
(5:115) Unfortunately, while the end of
the Cold War has removed many
restraints
and made our involvement, and that of the UN, in "peace missions"
easier, it has
at
the same time made defining our role in those missions more difficult. To understand
how
radically the nature of "peace missions" has changed we need only to
examine the
report
titled Changing Our Ways produced by the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. Peter Rodman in commenting on this report
and its "new principle of international
relations"
states:
that respect for a nations sovereignty
was no longer justified if it was
violating human rights on a large scale,
or in other cases of "humanitarian
crisis." The United States and the international community had not only a
right to intervene, but a duty. Thus, some of the same folks who resisted
the fight against Communist tyranny for
three decades, warning against
intervention in the internal affairs of
other states, now tell us we are morally
defective if we refrain. (9:20)[emphasis
added]
Concurrently, the end of the Cold War
has also removed many of the restraints
which
had obscured or concealed conflicts deeply rooted in cultural, ethnic, and
religious
hatred. With the result that new conflicts seem to
emerge daily. Within the "New World
Order"
it is not easy to determine who the bad guy is; indeed there may not be any
"bad
guy." We are confronted daily with a seemingly
endless variety of situations that may or
may
not require American military involvement and cannot be clothed in our old
comfortable
cloak of anti-communism. We have an
American populace seeking quick
fixes
to problems that appear nightly on their evening news. The evening presentations of
starving
children, old people being bombed, "ethnic cleansing," and hordes of
helpless
refugees
cry out to our American sense of justice and compassion. Somalia, Sudan,
Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Kurdish independence, and unrest in the former Soviet Union, are
only
some of the examples.
Faced with all this change the two
doctrinal theories discussed above, which
formerly
guided our application of military force, are perhaps no longer applicable, if
not
altogether
invalid in the "New World Order."
This dilemma will not be solved by some
restrictive
assortment of maxims which are all encompassing. It would be foolish to hope
for
some simple set of rules to govern the use of military force by the world's
only
remaining
military superpower. In the first place
only in a very stable political
environment,
such as that which existed for over forty years after the Second World War,
would
such a set of rules be relevant. In today's uncertain world, where the U.S. is
often
envisioned
as the sole actor able to exert influence in regional conflicts, no such
doctrine is
useful. Foreign and domestic pressures would soon
invalidate such a doctrine. Secondly,
every
potential opportunity for global involvement is unique in its own respect. Attempts
to
apply a universal code to all scenarios would be ineffective and perhaps
dangerous. In
view
of this, the list of questions which follows is meant only to act as a guide in
the
formulation
of future policy. This list is by no
means exhaustive but should give any
politician
something to think about before placing military forces on foreign soil.
1. Why should the U.S. become involved?
What interests, if any, are served by
commitment of U.S. forces? Are there