Joint Warfighting And The MAGTF CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Joint Warfighting and the MAGTF Author: Major Stephen M. Douma, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps must change its attitude toward the MAGTF and our warfighting doctrine, if it wants to conduct effective future operations with the other services. Background: Future wars will probably be fought in a joint environment. The joint commander will usually divide assigned forces into functional, or military service, components. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) proven effective in independent operations, has difficulty merging into the joint environment. Despite evidence to the contrary, Marine leaders insist the MAGTF can operate as a unique combined-arms force within the joint setting. Doctrine and organizational structure do not allow individual combat elements to operate separately from the rest of the MAGTF. The joint commander must decide how to integrate the combined-arms MAGTF into the combined-arms joint force. His decision must maximize combat power without hampering unity of effort. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should objectively examine the Marine Corps' warfighting methods. The MAGTF organization, and its doctrine, can fight in situations where it is most effective. When joint commanders do not need an integrated combined-arms force, Marines should provide units tailored to the mission that needs to be accomplished. OUTLINE Thesis. The Marine Corps must change its attitude toward the MAGTF and our warfighting doctrine, if it wants to conduct effective future operations with the other services. I. Background. A. Beginnings of combined-arms thinking. B. Mission change to expeditionary role. C. Development of MAGTF concept. D. Modern MAGTF organization and doctrine. II. Methods of employing combat forces. A. CINC's alternatives for exercising COCOM. B. Joint force organizational structures. 1. Functional component organization. 2. Service component organization. 3. Commonality between component structures. III. Employing the MAGTF. A. The MAGTF in an independent role. B. The MAGTF in a joint environment. 1. Functional component environment. 2. Service component environment. C. Joint commander's alternatives to employ the MAGTF. 1. Independent operations. 2. Joint operations. IV. Recommendations for the future. A. Independent operations. B. Joint operations. 1. Functional component assignment. 2. Service component assignment. C. Necessity to adapt Marine Corps organization and doctrine. Joint warfighting is the topic of the 1990s. Many have commented on the US military's ability to conduct joint warfare. Some say our armed forces are adapting to this new environment with little difficulty. Others argue that our services will never agree on joint doctrine, and that joint warfighting will always be an interservice contest for "territorial rights." The Marine Corps' current mission was born in the twentieth century -- provide expeditionary forces for the establishment and/or protection of advanced naval bases. This mission, combined with World War II experience, produced the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) organizational structure and doctrine. However, the Marine Corps has not always operated in its expeditionary role. It has also often fought alongside its sister services in major land battles. The New World Order is forming a different pattern for the future. The Marine Corps is an integral part of this evolution and it recognizes the need to adjust to its new environment. Future warfighting will embrace jointness. Though the MAGTF has proved to be a success for many years, it may not fit into the joint mold. Despite evidence to the contrary, officials contend that the MAGTF is a "joint warfighting force," and that Marine doctrine blends well with joint doctrine. We should objectively examine the MAGTF to find out if it truly does integrate with joint forces. If not, the Marine Corps should adapt to reflect modern warfighting procedures. The Marine Corps must change its attitude toward the MAGTF and our warfighting doctrine, if it wants to conduct effective future operations with the other services. Background The evolution to the Marine Corps' current role was a gradual one. As naval technology shifted from sail power to steam, the US identified the need for advanced naval coaling bases. As the Navy's "infantry arm," the Marine Corps began to look at the advanced basing problem in 1901. Field exercises and studies followed, and a permanent Advanced Base Force was established in 1914. Numbering approximately 1750 men, this combined-arms force was reinforced with a Marine Corps aviation detachment in 1914.1 Renamed the Expeditionary Force in 1921, the Quantico, Virginia-based unit was joined by a smaller, sister organization, based in San Diego, California. The Marine Corps began experimenting with rudimentary landing craft, as exercises continued. However, the scope of these tests was limited and participation was modest. In 1927, The Joint Board issued a directive requiring the Marine Corps to provide and maintain forces ... for land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.2 The National Security Act of 1947, with its several amendments, codified the Marine Corps' role in the national defense. In part, it specifies that the Marine Corps shall be organized to ... provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign....3 The Marine Corps developed the MAGTF in the 1960s. The Marine Corps saw that it could exploit the Cold War strategy of "Flexible Response," and define its future role in a full range of missions. It formed a force that could fight in conflicts from general war to what is now known as low intensity conflict. The Corps improved its strategic and tactical mobility in the 1970s and 1980s, and created the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and Marine Expeditionary Force organizational structure. The innovative feature was the doctrinal integration of ground, air, and combat service support forces into one unit -- the MAGTF. The latest development affecting the MAGTF was the 1986 Omnibus Agreement. This agreement virtually guaranteed that Marine aviation will fly in support of Marine ground forces. Marine ground commanders can now have the full range of aviation capability dedicated to their sole support. Today's MAGTF is a task-organized force. It can range from a company- sized Special Purpose MAGTF, to a Marine Expeditionary Corps, which includes most of the combat forces in the Fleet Marine Force. Whatever its size or task, the typical MAGTF always has a Command Element, a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). The MAGTF fights as a combined-arms team. Marine doctrine emphasizes total integration of ground combat, air and ground combat support, and combat service support units into one cohesive, warfighting force. MAGTFs are unique, in that all combat elements are doctrinally interwoven. The tightly linked units form a fighting force whose total combat power is greater than the sum of its parts. Methods of Employing US Combat Forces The theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) has several methods for exercising operational command: (1) Through Service component commanders. (2) Through functional component commanders, if established for a particular operational purpose. (3) Through a subordinate unified command, which the CINC may establish when so authorized through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (4) Through a single-Service force reporting directly to the CINC. Normally, missions requiring operations of a single-Service force will be assigned to the applicable Service component commander. Under exceptional circumstances, a CINC may establish a separate single-Service force. (5) Through the commander of a joint task force who reports directly to the CINC. (6) By attaching elements of one force to another force. (7) Directly to specific operational forces that, due to the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the commander.5 In four of the seven methods listed above, the CINC employs combat forces in a joint setting. Joint forces are composed of units from two or more military departments. They are formed at the theater level or as part of smaller Joint Task Forces. There are two basic ways to arrange a joint force, depending on situational requirements. Commanders can organize the joint components by function or by military service. The joint force commander may assign forces to functional components, forming ground component (GCC), air component (ACC), and naval component (NCC) commands. Units report to the component based on their warfighting function, and not by service affiliation. The GCC commands all ground forces, the ACC controls air assets, and the NCC is in charge of all naval units. The joint commander enhances unity of ef fort and control because like forces are subordinate to each functional component commander. The joint force commander can also organize components by service, one each for the Army, Air Force. Navy, and Marine Corps. Combat unit commanders report to the joint commander via their service components. Command arrangements are streamlined, but control of forces becomes more complicated. Each military service can operate in more than one functional area and control is not exercised on a functional basis. Warfighting becomes a test of coordination skills for the joint and component commanders, and their staffs. Whether components are organized functionally or by service, the joint force (less the Marine Corps) is broadly defined along ground, air, and naval functional lines. The Army provides the ground forces; the Air Force furnishes the aviation units; and the Navy rounds out the force with seapower. Though all of the services have air assets. each service primarily contributes to only one of the three dimensions of warfighting -- ground, air, or sea. There is a common thread in both component arrangements. Command may be established by function or by service, but the joint commander still generally controls the force by function. Employing the MAGTF The combined-arms MAGTF adds a fourth dimension to the joint force. Uniting air and ground combat capabilities into one entity, the MAGTF provides a unique force to the CINC. The MAGTF, influenced heavily by amphibious and expeditionary doctrine, is usually focused toward conducting independent operations, usually with naval forces. Marines have fought well in these types of operations, because of the MAGTF's combined-arms task organization. The MAGTF's self-contained structure of ground, air and service support units brings the entire spectrum of warfighting capability to the battlefield. The MAGTF is successful in the independent role because it uses fixed- and rotary- wing aviation in close doctrinal integration with ground forces. The Navy- Marine team can fight independently, with little or no assistance from other forces. Or, it can act as an enabling force, while waiting for reinforcements from other services to arrive in the operating area. Although there are occasions when the MAGTF will be employed in an independent role, most future conflicts will probably be joint ventures. On the modern battlefield, "Joint Warfare is essential to victory."6 Success depends on unity of effort and, usually, unity of command. Marine forces can add a great deal of flexible combat capability to the joint force. However, because it does not perform a distinct, separate warfighting function, the MAGTF does not fit well into the joint structure. One could argue that it does not fit into the joint structure, at all. The combined-arms nature of the MAGTF, so very important to independent operations, may limit the CINC's flexibility. The MAGTF organizational structure cannot always integrate smoothly into the joint force. Doctrinally interdependent, Marine air and ground elements find it difficult to operate effectively, without relying on the remaining elements. Again, the integration of aviation and ground units is the important feature. In independent operations, aviation is a potent combat multiplier, because the ACE works in close coordination with the ground forces. In joint operations, the harmony between the Marine air and ground forces becomes a significant liability when merging the MAGTF into the joint organization. When the joint force is functionally organized, Army units go to the GCC, Air Force units to the ACC, and naval forces to the NCC. If the joint commander divides the MAGTF by function, the GCE reports to the GCC and the ACE reports to the ACC. The CSSE has to be split into two detachments, one each to support the GCE and ACE. This appears to be a simple procedure, but it is virtually impossible to achieve. The MAGTF employs ground, air, and service support elements as one combat unit. MAGTF doctrine and training become ineffective if combat elements separate and then individually merge into each of the CINC's joint components. In a functionally organized joint force, the MAGTF combat elements would be subordinate to the component commanders. There is little, if any, need for the MAGTF commander, and his command element, if the individual combat elements are under the command of each joint component. One could argue that there would be no reason for the Marine Corps to provide a MAGTF to the joint force, in the first place. The Marine Corps could assign separate ground and aviation forces directly to the functional component commanders. The MAGTF would not be used as a distinct combat force. Unity of command is enhanced for the joint commander, but he loses the synergy enjoyed when the MAGTF is employed as an integrated air-ground force. If the joint force is organized along service component lines, command relationships are simplified. The four service components can fight according to their own individual, and familiar, doctrine. The Marine service component controls the MAGTF, eliminating the need to adapt its doctrine to the requirements of another service. However, the joint commander must now coordinate two separate air-ground forces. The first consists of the GCC and ACC components, making up most of the land-based theater forces. They, along with the Navy, can project the full range of combat power brought to the theater. The second air-ground force is the smaller MAGTF. It also works closely with the Navy, but it has limited ground-based fire support. To offset its light fire support capability, the MAGTF uses its aviation assets to fly in support of its ground forces. Unity of effort becomes a concern to the joint force commander, since he now controls two separate air-ground forces in his theater. In either case, the joint force commander must decide how to employ the MAGTF. One solution is to have the Marines operate as a separate, independent force. Working with naval forces, the MAGTF can operate as part of an enabling force, a strategic or operational reserve, or in independent operations that support the joint force. However, the joint commander may not be able to employ the MAGTF in continuous combat operations. The MAGTF's combat power may not be used to its full potential, when assigned to this specialized role. Unused combat capability in the operating theater drains logistics resources and provides little service to the joint commander. Another solution is to integrate the MAGTF into the joint force and allow it to operate in its own area of operations. Coordination between the Marine service component and other components is critical to executing the joint commander's campaign plan. History has proven that such coordination is possible, but it requires the proper blend of command and staff personalities, to be truly effective. This warfighting arrangement is most often used today. The joint commander can take full advantage of all of his assigned forces. However, only the strong personalities of the individuals involved have ensured its success. Recommendation for the Future In the future, the Marine Corps will fight much as it has in the past. First, it will operate independently, most likely with support from naval forces. These will probably be in limited conflicts or irregular operations, such as non-combatant evacuation, forward presence, or humanitarian assistance duties. Marine forces may only have contact with Army or Air Force units for support operations. The MAGTF's current organization and unique doctrine make it the best force for these types of operations. It can give the CINC a capability matched to the need of the situation, without the need to form a joint force. The Marine Corps must also be ready to participate in medium- or high- intensity land warfare, such as the Gulf War, the Vietnam War, and the Korean War. In these large-scale conflicts, Marines may not be able to fight as a MAGTF. Joint forces may not need independent air-ground Marine forces. The most efficient use of combat power may be to place the GCE and ACE under the command of the GCC and ACC. If not directly assigned, Marine units may be attached to, or in support of, the joint components, with a Marine in command of these forces. In any of these cases, the MAGTF commander may no longer be a warfighter. The Marine Corps may only provide combat forces to the ground, air, and naval components. At the very least, this functional arrangement is unconventional thinking in today's Marine Corps and is not in keeping with our current organization or doctrine. A third alternative is for Marines to be ready to fight as a cohesive MAGTF, assigned to the joint force. This brings the full potential of the MAGTF's combat power to bear, in one place. It may not be the joint commander's most efficient employment of forces. Nonetheless, the commander may feel that he needs the integrated combat power the MAGTF has to offer. The joint commander must choose the method of warfighting organization that is most effective in future conflicts. His method of employing Marine forces may not be in concert with our warfighting structure and thinking. The Marine Corps must be flexible and able to employ our forces in the way the joint commander finds best. The MAGTF has served the Marine Corps well in independent operations. Our unique use of aviation to support ground operations enhances our warfighting ability. However, the Marine Corps continues to extol the virtues of our combined-arms force, even when it detracts from our efficient ability to conduct joint operations. Our attitude toward the MAGTF and its doctrine may not be in keeping with our new warfighting environment. As we look toward the New World Order and future warfighting, the US military must heed the words of Dwight D. Eisenhower: War is taking any problem exactly as you take a problem of your own life, stripping it down to its essentials, determining for yourself what is important and what you can emphasize to the advantage of your side; what you can emphasize that will be to the disadvantage of the other; making a plan accordingly -- and then fighting just as hard as you know how, never letting anything distract you from the prosecution of that conception. If, as Services, we get too critical among ourselves, hunting for exact limiting lines in the shadow land of responsibility as between... [the Services], hunting for and spending our time arguing about it, we will deserve the very fate we will get in war, which is defeat. We have got to be of one family, and it is more important today than it ever has been.7 Marines must also understand that Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting, a philosophy of leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. In short, it establishes the way we practice our profession. In this manner, doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.8 Jointness takes the best from each military service and uses it to the nation's greatest advantage. Marine Corps thinking must be in harmony with this joint philosophy. We must put aside service parochialism, and truly examine the MAGTF organization and doctrine, as it relates to fighting in the modern joint environment. First, we should keep the MAGTF organization and improve its associated doctrine. The CINC can then employ this Marine force when, and where, he considers it appropriate. Second, Marines must also be willing to recognize that the MAGTF is not suitable for every situation. Our procedures need to change to allow for situations where our current warfighting methods no longer serve us. Our absolute requirement for Marine aviation to support ground units should be the focus of this effort. When studying these issues, Marine leaders must remember that doctrine and organizational structure should not drive future changes. Planners should first look at the missions the CINCs may assign to Marine forces, then develop warfighting concepts to fit the missions. Once the methods of warfighting are established, force structure can be developed. Finally, the new concepts and organizational structure should be codified into doctrine and units trained to the new procedures. We must not try to force our warfighting organization and procedures into an environment where they don't fit. Conclusion Our Marine Corps must be ready to conduct both independent and joint operations in the future. The expeditionary nature of the MAGTF, and its method of deployment, makes it the force most likely to be first in the area of conflict. Marine Corps units should also merge rapidly with the joint force structure, when required. This flexible foundation will enable us to train Marines to fight as part of a MAGTF or as augment forces for other components, as the situation dictates. The Marine Corps should change with the times, so that we continue to provide our best warfighting forces to the CINC. Joint warfighting is the way of the future, and the Marine Corps must learn operate as one with the other military services. The changes should not be radical. No major overhaul of MAGTF doctrine is necessary. Joint warfighting is only another step in the evolution of warfare. Our leaders must ensure that the Marine Corps is a part of this evolution. ENDNOTES 1. Frank Hough, Verle E. Ludwig and Henry I. Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, Vol. I, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, (Washington D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps (no date), p. 9. 2. Ibid., p. 11. 3. Marine Air Ground Task Force: A Global Capability, FMFMRP 2-12, p. 11. 4. Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980, pp. 547-548. 5. United Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), JCS Pub 2, p. 3-14, 3-15. 6. Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1, p. iii. 7. Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1. 8. Warfighting, FMFM-1, p. 43. 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