Friendly Radar + Friendly Missiles = Fratricide CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Friendly Radar + Friendly Missiles = Fratricide Author: Major Richard Danchak, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Marine Q-36 weapon locating radars emit energy in the same frequency range as enemy radar associated with surface-to- air missiles, and are potential targets for our own high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) unless we find a solution. Since the Marine Corps has no technical solution, nontechnical solutions must be implemented immediately to prevent further fratricide. Background: The Marine Q-36 radar uses the same frequencies as enemy radar. Therefore, Marine radar can attract our own friendly HARMs designed to destroy enemy radar. Unless we can somehow ensure the HARM can distinguish between friendly and enemy radar, fratricide is possible. During Operation Desert Storm, a HARM "locked on" to a friendly radar position and killed a Marine. During that short war, there were six other incidents where HARMs struck in locations other than those targeted. Until a sure technical solution is introduced, which may be years away, the Marine Corps must implement nontechnical solutions to decrease the likelihood of future fratricide cases of this nature. Our Marines deserve this attention. Nontechnical solutions that can be implemented immediately are as follows: doctrinal changes, frequency deconfliction, geographic separation, pilot and radar operator awareness, radar survivability measures, and training. These procedures require no money and the personnel structure has been committed to make it happen. These procedures are not perfect, but until the fielding of a technical identification-of-friend-or-foe system, they will surely serve to protect our Marines manning the radar more than in the past. This added degree of protection is worthwhile when considering the process may be enough to prevent another Marine from needlessly dying. Recommendation: That the Marine Corps adopt these nontechnical solutions immediately, while concurrently researching, developing, and acquiring technical solutions to the problem. By doing so, we can better safeguard Marines and radars while employing the HARM to destroy enemy targets. FRIENDLY RADAR + FRIENDLY MISSILES = FRATRICIDE OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Marine Q-36 weapon locating radars emit energy in the same frequency range as enemy radar associated with surface-to-air missiles, and are potential targets for our own high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) unless we find a solution. Since the Marine Corps has no technical solution, nontechnical solutions must be implemented immediately to prevent further fratricide. I. HARM historical development and operating principles II. Historical problem with the Q-36 radar and HARM III. Specific example of fratricide from Desert Storm IV. Technical solutions being researched A. Q-36 B. HARM V. Nontechnical solutions for the present A. Doctrine changes via frequency deconfliction and training 1. Solution discussion 2. Solution shortcoming B. Geographic separation and pilot situational awareness 1. Solution discussion 2. Solution shortcoming C. Radar operator awareness D. Q-36 survivability measures l. Contained in FM 6-121 a. Reduced radiating time b. Narrowed search sector c. Selection of optimum site 2. Not contained in FM 6-121 a. Antenna remoting b. Displacement of nonessential personnel FRIENDLY RADAR + FRIENDLY MISSILES = FRATRICIDE In the 1970s, our military adversaries developed a sophisticated air defense system to counter U.S. air power. These enemy defense systems consisted of radar and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). To offset this enemy threat against our air power, the U.S. developed anti-radiation air-to-surface missiles. Anti-radiation missiles home in on and attack enemy ground radars associated with antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and SAMs. Our current state-of-the-art missile is the AGM-88 high-speed anti- radiation missile (HARM). The Marine EA-6B Prowler and F/A-l8 Hornet both carry the HARM. (15:786) Although HARMs operate in different attack modes and methods of launch from the aircraft, they operate on the same principle. Passive systems in the aircraft, and the sensitive seekers in the missiles detect when electronic energy has "painted" them. The aircraft systems and an Electronic Countermeasures Officer (ECMO) determine the locale the energy came from, and analyze the frequency of the energy to decide if the emission came from an enemy air-defense-associated surface-to-air system or radar. If the analysis reveals that the frequency came from an enemy platform, the pilot launches the HARM when the aircraft is within appropriate range. After release, the missile receiver continuously senses the radar energy of the radiation and guides the missile to the signal. The HARM then impacts at the site, killing people and destroying equipment. For instance, Russian and Iraqi radar use the same frequencies as do the Marine AN/TPQ-36 weapon locating radar. When a friendly aircraft or HARM senses that it is being painted by an energy that uses the same frequency as our Q-36 radar, that energy cannot be positively identified as friendly or enemy. The Q-36 radar activates the Radar Aircraft Warning (RAW) equipment aboard the aircraft, giving the pilot a warning that he is under attack. Marine Q-36 weapon locating radars emit energy in the same frequency range as enemy radar associated with SAMs, and are potential targets for our own HARM unless we find a solution. Since the Marine Corps has no technical solution, nontechnical solutions must be implemented immediately to prevent further fratricide. Fratricide is a horrible occurrence usually caused by the confusion that exists on the modern battlefield. During war, fratricide will never be eliminated. Most rational people can understand how the chaotic battlefield can lead to friendly casualties; they cannot understand when our own systems attract friendly missiles. Fratricide becomes more deplorable when we take no action to preclude further unnecessary deaths. Since the fielding of the Q-36 radar in the mid-1980s, they have been fired upon several times by anti-radiation missiles. (6:15) In Operation Desert Storm (ODS) alone, there were at least seven instances where HARMs struck in locations other than those targeted. In one of those instances, a HARM "locked on" to a Q-36 radar that resulted in the death of a Marine. (26) On February 23, 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, a Marine EA-6B aircraft from a Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron was flying a mission over Kuwait. The aircraft, armed with HARMs, was painted by an energy in the 9.3 to 9.7 gigahertz range. That is the frequency range used by Iraqi Flap Wheel fire control radar. Concurrently, a Marine Q-36 radar was operating in the same gigahertz range. Whether the EA-6B was initially painted by a friendly or enemy energy is immaterial. Nevertheless, the RAW activated and the system, along with the ECMOs, determined the energy came from an enemy Flap Wheel radar. A Flap Wheel radar provides fire control data for 57mm and 130mm AAA guns. The pilot then decided to launch the HARM using a range-known shot. During a range-known shot, the HARM's seeker activates at about 60 percent of the distance to the target. The seeker then acquires the target and continually adjusts its flight trajectory until it guides itself onto the radar signal. If during its flight the HARM loses its "lock" on the energy source, it will redirect itself. The missile widens its field of view or search area, also known as the "footprint." While doing so it searches for alternate energies programmed into the missile. When the HARM detects an alternate energy, that energy then becomes "home" for the HARM. In this engagement, it seems the HARM was launched at a Flap Wheel radar position north of the Q-36 radar location. The Flap Wheel radar stopped emitting after the missile launched, but before the missile seeker activated. After the missile seeker activated, and while the HARM was still in flight, the Q-36 radar emitted, attracting the HARM. The Q-36 radar, being within the footprint of the HARM, then became the HARM's home. Regardless of exactly how it happened, sometime during the HARM's flight, it locked on to the Marine Q-36 radar. Performing as per design, the HARM tracked the emissions to the Q-36 radar location and the 66-kilogram high explosive pre-fragmented warhead detonated. The aftermath was damage to several vehicles and personal equipment, one destroyed Q-36 radar, one injured Marine, and the charred body of a dead Marine. During the crater analysis, investigative personnel collected fragments and serialized wing sections identified as a HARM. Using missile serialized configuration and operating logs, the HARM was traced back to the specific EA-6B sortie. This incident was undoubtedly fratricide. In another documented example, a HARM destroyed an Army AN/TPS-25 battlefield surveillance radar. (2) Fortunately, there were no casualties. Unless we implement a solution, however, HARMs will continue to be potentially lethal to friendly ground forces operating the Q-36 and other types of radar. In today's technology, an identification-of-friend-or-foe (IFF) solution should be commonplace; it is not. During ODS, friendly fire killed 35 Americans and injured another 72. (32:M-1) Never before have we fought such a short war with such a great percentage of deaths due to friendly fire. (9:34) These fratricide figures run at four times the historic rate! (20:30) Can this problem be eliminated to lessen the fratricide cases in the next war? Post-fratricide investigations reveal that most incidents are avoidable. The fratricide example discussed is no different from most of the investigated cases, in that solutions exist. For example, during ODS, services examined more than 60 proposals representing 41 different technical approaches across five technology categories to resolve the problem of firing on friendly forces. (32: M-5) Solutions can be broadly categorized as technical and nontechnical. Currently, the manufacturers of both the Q-36 radar and the HARM are researching technical solutions to the friendly radar and HARM dilemma. The Q-36 radar program managers (PMs) are examining survivability through the use of decoys. (5) Conceptually, decoys, distantly remoted from the Q-36 radar, would begin emitting upon detection of an incoming HARM and automatically shutdown the Q-36 radar: theory being the HARM would then detonate at the remote decoy site and not the Q-36 radar site. The HARM PMs are researching a geographic specificity feature that would limit the search area of the missile, as well as software modifications to the HARM that could eliminate the ambiguity of energies detected on the battlefield. (19) Ultimately, the DoD-wide effort hopes to develop a universal IFF or Combat Identification System. For example, the Army recently established a Center for Combat Identification Technology at Fort Meade, Maryland. (4:44, 9:36) The center is studying how equipment could be identified by broadcasting electronic code words. However, I favor the nontechnical solutions as the immediate answer to our problem. Why? First, because nontechnical solutions can be implemented now, and the Marine Corps will not have to wait years for the technocrats and budgeters to fix our problem. Second, because nontechnical solutions are the most feasible, practical, and acceptable. Third, because nontechnical solutions cost little compared to the highly technical IFF systems under development. The focus of my paper will therefore be on nontechnical solutions, not one but a combination of several recommendations. Why a combination of several recommendations? Because, admittedly, none of the solutions are adequate if they stand alone. Taken individually, each of my recommendations would decrease the likelihood of friendly fire or increase the survivability of the Q-36 radar crews. Using the solutions in combination would increase survivability exponentially. The three nontechnical solutions are as follows: doctrine and training, geographic separation and pilot situational awareness, and radar operator awareness and enforcement of Q-36 radar survivability measures. As previously stated, none of these recommendations alone will solve the problem. Therefore, as I end the discussion of each proposal, I will conclude with the shortcomings of some of the solutions for better reader appreciation of the complexity of this problem. The first solution I will discuss is doctrine and training. The doctrinal solutions detailed below will ensure electronic coordination between the ground and air. A review of our existing fire support, target acquisition, and aviation doctrine reveals no mention of required coordination between the ground combat element (GCE) employing the Q-36 radar and the aviation combat element (ACE) employing the HARM. (22, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31) Without electronic coordination, it should come as no surprise that we have a problem. The proposed doctrinal solution to effect this coordination will be called frequency deconfliction. Joint doctrine has established a variation of this modified proposed solution. Joint Publication 3-51, Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operation details joint procedures on how to coordinate frequency jamming to ensure we do not jam our own equipment. (17) For example, through electronic coordination, we can ensure that our EA-6Bs do not jam the specific portion of the frequency spectrum used by our friendly forces at a given time and place. This means specifically that the EA-6Bs do not jam the frequencies used by our Q-36 radar. This electronic coordination procedure can work if it expands not just to coordinate jamming, but also to coordinate the frequency spectrum of the Q-36, EA-6B, and HARM. This expanded electronic coordination will ensure separation between EA-6B and HARM sensitized frequencies, and the frequencies in which the Q-36 operates. The Marine Corps has yet to implement the joint procedures the area unified commanders in chief have directed all services to adopt. An interview with the Electronic Warfare Doctrine action officer reveals that the Marine Corps is presently writing doctrine and implementing joint procedures. These new procedures will eventually be published in FMFM 3-51, Electronic Warfare; FMFM 3-50, Command and Control Warfare; and MCO 3430.2B, Policy for Electronic Warfare. All the documents mentioned are currently either being drafted or staffed. (33) These documents could fix the problem as long as they go beyond simply jamming coordination, and direct electronic coordination between the GCE's Q-36 and the ACE's HARM-carrying aircraft. Thereafter, these new procedures must be included in updates to other applicable fire support, target acquisition, and aviation field manuals (FMs) and Fleet Marine Force manuals (FMFMs). Implementing frequency deconfliction will require change in the Marine Corps. The responsible staff agency for executing this solution must be the Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Coordination Center (S/EWCC). Currently, the G-2, Intelligence Officer, establishes and maintains the S/EWCC. One of the S/EWCC's responsibilities is to coordinate electronic warfare operations. However, to implement this solution, two changes must be made to the S/EWCC. First, the S/EWCC must fall under the purview of the G-3, Operations Officer, and not the G-2. This would ensure the total integration of electronic warfare coordination with ground operations. Second, and most important, the S/EWCC must be a permanently staffed standing organization. Currently, the S/EWCC is formed only when needed, and manned by members with primary duties other than those performed in the S/EWCC. (21:4-12, 23:3-4) For example, in ODS the S/EWCC formed late in the planning cycle, and was manned by only two officers who tried their best to perform their required duties while learning via on-the-job-training. (25) As a result, little if any electronic coordination occurred. A permanent S/EWCC, staffed with highly trained Marines working for the G-3, can perform frequency deconfliction. A document called the Restricted Frequency List (RFL) can display and be the means to communicate this information. (24:51) The G-2, G-3, and G-6, Communications Officer, provide input into the RFL. The S/EWCC compiles and publishes the RFL every 24 hours. The RFL will coordinate the frequency spectrum by informing electronic emitters and jammers how, when, and where they can emit or jam. Thus, the RFL can deconflict frequencies in three ways. First, the RFL can deconflict frequencies by informing the radar operators which part of their available frequency range is available for use. Second, the RFL can deconflict time by informing the radar not to radiate during specific time periods. Finally, the RFL can deconflict space by informing the radar not to emit into a specific geographic area or zone. In a nonlinear emitter-rich battlespace this is the only viable solution. Frequency deconfliction published via a 24-hour RFL will work only if the RFL is published in a timely manner and received by radar supervisors. Executing this 24-hour cycle brings me to the important subject of executing this new doctrine through training. Consistent training is the only way to attain proficiency when new doctrine emerges. Admittedly, development and promulgation of an RFL every 24 hours is ambitious. Therefore, training is essential. Routinely scheduled training will be the key to mastering this challenging process. I will now discuss the shortcomings of this solution. According to LCDR Roberts, the Navy's PM for the HARM, there may not be enough frequency separation available within the frequency spectrum to assure the HARM would not receive an ambiguous energy source, get "confused", and attack a friendly radar. Stated differently, the available frequency separation may not be wide enough to deconflict radar and missiles. LCDR Roberts was not sure a solution exists, given the Q-36 operating parameters and the HARM capabilities. (19) MAJ Watson, the Marine Corps' Electronic Warfare Doctrine Officer, has his doubts also. As he states, frequency deconfliction is a complex process that takes time. Prior to the start of a conflict, when time is available and the electronic order of battle is neat and orderly, the process should work. But, after days in a fast-paced conflict, the process may be too slow and complex to stay abreast of the pace of battle. (33) Lastly, an account from a regimental artillery operations officer states that frequency deconfliction procedures will result in unnecessary, potentially dangerous, lengthy shut downs of the radar. (26) The Q-36 radar cueing schedule would be so restricted, the radar would be unable to perform its intended mission -- that being enemy target acquisition. The second solution I will discuss is geographic separation and pilot situational awareness. Geographic separation will ensure the HARM's search area does not include areas containing Q-36 radars. The fire support coordination measure to be used for this purpose is the fire support coordination line (FSCL). The FSCL is a line beyond which aircraft can attack targets without prior coordination with the ground force commander provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Attacks short of or on the friendly side of the FSCL must be coordinated with the appropriate ground force commander. FSCLs usually follow well-defined terrain features so they are easily identifiable from the air. (31:H-2) Knowing where this feature is in relation to the friendly forces is the responsibility of the pilot and is an example of situational awareness. A study conducted in May 1991 by the Combat Identification Task Force (CITF) revealed the importance of situational awareness. The CITF was a multilevel and multiservice effort to minimize fratricide. The senior officer review group identified situational awareness as a leading cause of fratricide. (20:31) Before an air mission, pilots become aware of the battlespace through preflight briefs. There is much to be aware of, yet there are only five Q-36 radar positions per division to monitor. Radar operators must accurately report their locations to the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) in a timely manner. The air officer in the FSCC must then ensure all appropriate air agencies receive the current Q-36 radar locations. The receiving air agencies then must provide this information, via timely briefs, to all ACE personnel involved with HARM employment. Situational awareness briefs that are out-of-date are misleading and dangerous. In a fast moving situation, briefs may have to be updated hourly. (2) Accomplishing geographic separation is not easy. For example, the most common scenario finds HARMs employed forward of the FSCL, because that is the normal location for enemy air defense systems. When attacking targets forward of the FSCL then, ECMOs need to ensure that the suspect energy source is well clear of the FSCL. Adhering to this geographic separation procedure should preclude fratricide, because Q-36 positions are normally several kilometers behind the FSCL. This buffer of several kilometers should provide ample space separation needed to protect friendly radar. To simply determine that the energy source is coming from beyond the FSCL is only the first of a two-part process in determining whether to launch a HARM. The second part must determine if the footprint falls short of the FSCL. If a pilot suspects the target is beyond the FSCL, but that the footprint may fall short of the FSCL, the HARM should not be launched unless coordination occurs. Coordination of the footprint area could involve several agencies. Nevertheless, the FSCC should be ultimately responsible for coordinating the effort. The air officer in the FSCC would coordinate the firing of a mission of this type between the Q-36 radar and the appropriate air agency, most likely the Direct Air Support Center. The simplest way to coordinate in this case would be to stop the Q-36 radar from cueing during the HARM time of flight. If the Q-36 does not emit during the time of flight of the HARM, then it cannot become a target for the HARM, even if the footprint included the Q-36 area. In situations where our radars are dangerously close to the enemy, pilots can further protect friendly radar through their launch alignment, i.e., to ensure the Q-36 radar is on line between the aircraft position and the enemy radar position. (II) ECMO calculations can then reasonably ensure that the HARM does not arm itself until it is safely past the Q-36 area and on its way into enemy territory. Coordination short of the FSCL as described above is not normally practiced. Warnings to deconflict are usually not necessary since HARM-carrying aircraft usually employ well forward of the FSCL. Little or no training occurs in this area; training then, as in the first solution, would be an important factor in refining this solution. If all parties involved routinely trained in an environment full of friendly and enemy emitters, we would certainly improve our existing procedures. I will now discuss the shortcomings of this solution. Prior to the start of an armed conflict, separating friendly locations from enemy locations is not difficult. Locations can be pinpointed and coordination measures can be passed to all applicable units. But when the shooting starts and units frequently move and displace long distances, awareness of friendly and enemy locations becomes more confusing. Keeping all concerned parties aware of the friendly positions on the battlefield may be impossible. The faster the pace and movement on the battlefield, the more difficult it becomes to ensure separation between the Q-36 and the HARM-carrying aircraft. Nonlinear battlefields make this separation exponentially harder than in a linear battlefield. Geographic separation between the Q-36 radar and HARMs is even more complicated than it appears because of the HARM footprint. Simplified, the HARM footprint is like a flashlight beam. If the aircraft is low and directly over the target, the beam or footprint will be small. Raise the beam or the aircraft and point it out at an angle, and the maneuver space or footprint gets larger. So the size of the footprint or field of view depends on the aircraft's altitude and distance from the target at the time of the HARM launch. Furthermore, only the locale of the emission can be determined and not the exact location. Obviously, the first check to be made is to ensure the locale is in enemy territory. More important, is to ensure that the footprint does not encompass friendly radar territory. Geographic separation is a complex feat since the HARM is so "smart." This is especially true if the HARM launch is near the forward edge of the battle area. In the fratricide example discussed, the HARM launched at an Iraqi Flap Wheel radar located on the enemy side of the FSCL. However, during the 47-mile 2- minute time of flight of the HARM to the Flap Wheel, the Flap Wheel stopped emitting. The HARM then opened its field of view and began searching for other energies, secondary and tertiary. Sadly the new field of view encompassed an area on the friendly side of the FSCL where a Q-36 radar was emitting. (26) That radar then became home for the HARM. Determining the footprint's location in relation to the FSCL becomes even more difficult when you consider that the HARM arms at different distances from the aircraft depending on the method of launch employed. (12:87) The importance of the footprint's relationship to the FSCL can be seen in this situation. In a nonlinear battlespace without distinct lines there is no friendly or enemy side. Friendly and enemy forces may be so mingled that an FSCL may be impossible to establish. Emitters mingled with each other in a nonlinear battlespace coupled with the chaos of battle make reliance on geographic separation exponentially harder to the point of being impossible. In ODS, where we saw rapid advances on a featureless desert, separation was so difficult that fratricide resulted. The third and final topic I will discuss is radar operator awareness and enforcement of Q-36 radar survivability measures. By definition, these are not solutions. They are steps that Marines can take to protect themselves from HARMs if neither technical nor nontechnical solutions solve the problem. The first step is to increase radar operator awareness of the problem. An article by MAJ Curry recommended that the Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, send an official warning advisory to all artillery units informing radar crews that they are sitting on a "HARM magnet." (6:17) The rationale being that the warning would provide motivation for the crew to practice extensive survivability measures. The Marine Corps Systems Command Liaison Officer at Fort Sill, in a counter-article, responded that an official advisory would not be sent since they feel the problem is common knowledge, thereby rendering a warning unnecessary. (8:11) Further, an examination of both the Q-36 radar operator's technical manual (TM) and the basic field artillery target acquisition FM, reveal no warnings at all to operators that they may be sitting on a HARM magnet. (13, 14) Obviously, the Artillery School assumes this is a well-known fact among the artillerymen who operate the Q-36 radar; it is not. I have been an artillery officer for 14 years with typical artillery Fleet Marine Force experience. Until the fratricide example described above occurred, I was unaware that Q-36s could attract HARMs. I can only guess as to some of the reasons for the omission in the manuals, though, none of those can justify the life of a Marine. Therefore, we should make no assumptions and place prominent warnings in the TM and FM, send official advisories to all artillery units worldwide, and emphasize this fact in all formal Q-36 radar course instruction. This warning to operators would provide specific motivation for implementing the second part of this final topic, Q-36 radar survivability measures. The FM dealing with target acquisition discusses most of these passive protection measures, nonetheless they need to be emphasized in training and thoroughly practiced to provide the protection our Marines deserve. We cannot simply pay lip service to these measures. They must become a routine part of operations instead of occasional training. (3, 18) The FM outlines specific survivability measures requiring emphasis. They are reducing the radiating time, narrowing the sector of search, and selecting the optimum site. (14:4-16) Measures not specifically mentioned in the FM, that should be added, are to remote the antenna to the maximum distance possible, and to displace nonessential personnel from the immediate area. Reducing the radiating time can increase survivability. Any time a radar radiates it is susceptible to detection. The shorter time the radar radiates, the less likely it is to be found by the enemy, and the less likely it is to become home for a HARM. Therefore, the maximum allowable radiating times as depicted in the survivability flowchart in the FM must be strictly adhered to. Narrowing the sector of search can increase survivability. The radar can search a sector 1600 mils wide. However, the beam can and should be narrowed to search only the minimum required area to accomplish the mission. This will reduce the radar's electronic signature and improve survivability. Selecting the optimum site can increase survivability. When positioning the radar, consideration must be given to both mission and protection. Ideally, the radar position not only allows the radar to perform the mission, but also maximizes protection to the crew and radar. The positions providing the most protection use screening crests, and nearby vegetation to absorb side, tip, and back lobes of radiation. Absorbing this "bleed off" radiation is also known as "tunneling." Tunneling can also be accomplished by using sandbags if vegetation is unavailable. Remoting the antenna to the maximum distance possible can increase survivability. Three components comprise the Q-36 radar. A generator to power the system, a shelter where the operators work, and a trailer containing the antenna and all radiating elements. The trailer is the component of the radar that radiates. Remoting the radiating part as far away as the remote cables allow, currently 50 meters, is critical to survival. Even more important would be to remote the shelter to a protective site. If a protective site does not exist, sandbags or armor shielding should be used to protect the Marines. (10:4) Remoting to further distances may be possible in the future. According to the Marine Q-36 PM, the near-term solution to remoting should be solved with the fielding of Version Eight of the Q-36 product improvement program. This program will provide 100 meter-long remoting cables. (16) The Army Radar Division at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, is currently researching a long-term remoting modification. This Bi-Static Program should allow for separation of up to 10km between a transmit and receive antenna. (8:11) Both these programs will further enhance survivability. Finally, displacing nonessential personnel from the immediate area can increase survivability. Catastrophically, the Marine who was killed during the discussed fratricide incident was not one of the operators in the shelter. He was not even on duty. At the time of his death, the Marine was in a nearby High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle brewing hot chocolate. Why was he nearby? Why was he not in a protective area? These questions can go on and on, but the point is that personnel not at work in the shelter should be out of the area and in a protective position. If he had been, he would probably be alive today. We know that Marine Q-36 weapon locating radars emit energy in the same frequency range as enemy radar. These radars have and will continue to become targets for our own HARMs if we do not implement corrective action. As a military leader you have four choices. One, you can wait for the technocrats and budgeters to find a solution to the IFF problem. Second, you can wait for doctrine and training standards to be developed, staffed, approved, printed, and finally distributed to the Fleet Marine Force. Three, you can wait for T/O changes to form a permanent S/EWCC under the G-3. Or four, you can implement corrective action now. Implement the recommended doctrine and training, ensure geographic separation, improve pilot situational awareness, increase radar operator awareness, and enforce Q-36 radar survivability measures. Put these procedures in your unit standard operating procedures and begin training tomorrow. The procedures above may not be a foolproof solution to the friendly fire problem, nonetheless they are an improvement and do decrease the likelihood of having another fratricide case of this type. Until we find a technological solution, this is the least we can do. The recommended procedures will immediately allow us to better safeguard our friendly emitters and Marines while aircraft employ the HARM. Is there a big difference between an ODS friendly fire count of 34 or 35? Is one death significant? Ask the family of the dead warrior. COL Robert Jenkins, the Air Force's deputy director for general purpose forces, when asked to comment on fratricide said, "Any instance is too many. I can't live with that." (1) Can you? Do you take immediate action now or do you wait? You should take immediate action; to do anything else would be unconscionable! BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bird, Julie. "Air-to-ground error named in 10 friendly- fire incidents." Army Times, 2 September 1991, p. 23. 2. Bird, Julie. "Moral Support - Air liaison officers hold the line of fire to keep fratricide at bay." Army Times, 2 September 1991, p. 22. 3. Brooks, Kevin D., CWO-4, USMC, Assistant Chief of the MET Division. Telephone interview about the Q-36 radar. Fort Sill, OK, January 26, 1993. 4. Campbell, William H., BG, USA. "Electronic Defense on the Modern Battlefield." Journal of Electronic Defense, 14 (October 1991), 42-46. 5. Courson, Michael W., CW4, USA, TA Radar/RDTE Technician. Telephone interviews about the Q-36 radar. 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Communications- Electronics Command. Operator's Manual for Radar Set AN TPQ-36, TM 11-5840-354-10-1. Fort Monmouth 1990. 14. Headquarters, Department of the Army. HQ TRADOC. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition, FM 6-121. Fort Sill. 1990. 15. Jane's Publishing Company Limited. Jane's Weapon Systems 1987-88. London, England, 1988. 16. Matthews, Alan J., CWO-4, USMC, Target Acquisition Officer, Program Manager -- Ground Weapons. Personal interview about the Q-36 radar. Quantico, VA, December 16,1992. 17. Office of the Chairman. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations, Jt Pub 3-51. Washington, D.C., 1991. 18. Pennington, Stephen V., CWO-2, USMC, Radar Instructor, Target Acquisition Division. Telephone interview about the Q-36 radar. Fort Sill, OK, January 26, 1993. 19. Roberts, Jim, LCdr, USN, HARM Fleet Effectiveness and Suitability Officer. Telephone interview about the HARM. China Lake, California, January 21, 1993. 20. Steele, Dennis. "Multipronged Army Approach - Keeping Friendly Fire Friendly." Army, 42(March 1992), 30-34. 21. U.S. Marine Corps. Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic. Introduction to the Organizations, Capabilities and Limitations of Supporting Arms, Student Outline. Little Creek, Norfolk. 1989. 22. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Close Air Support and Close-in Fire Support, FMFM 5-4A. Quantico, 1988. 23. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Electronic Warfare, FMFM 7-12. Quantico, 1991. 24. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Electronic Warfare in Combined Arms, FMFRP 15-5. Quantico, 1991. 25. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Electronic Warfare in Counterfire Operations, Fire Support in SWA, MCLLS No. 00866-75638 (00802). Quantico, 1991. 26. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Fratricide - Investigation of the HARM Attack on an AN/TPQ-36 Radar, MCLLS No. 31746-48322 (02161). Quantico, 1992. 27. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Ground Combat Operations, OH 6-1. Quantico,1988. 28. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. HARM Fratricide, MCLLS No. 60430-46810 (06485). Quantico, 1992. 29. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Offensive Air Support, FMFM 5-40. Quantico, 1992. 30. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, OH 5-4C. Quantico, 1988. 31. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination, FMFM 6-18. Quantico, 1992. 32. U.S. of America. Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War -- Final Report to Congress, April 1992. 33. Watson, Kenneth C., Major, USMC, Electronic Warfare Doctrine Action Officer/EA-6B Pilot. Personal interviews about the HARM/Q-36 problem. Quantico, VA, January 11, 1993; January 14, 1993.
