The "Strategic" Conventional Bombers CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The "Strategic" Conventional Bombers Author: Major Jerry L. Dillon, United States Air Force Thesis: The unique capability our heavy bombers possess significantly add to our nation's potential to conduct conventional operations successfully and technological advances must be pursued to insure this much needed capability is preserved. Background: In every major conflict since WWII US heavy "strategic" bombers have flown conventional missions. Ironically, it is the bombers nuclear role most associate with these aircraft. This association has perpetuated myths of the missions these bombers can perform. Some of these myths are: strategic bombers only carry nuclear weapons, strategic equals nuclear and strategic aircraft cannot operate in a tactical environment. Long-range strategic bombers can strike targets in minimum time launching from CONUS bases. This provides any CINC time to hold an enemy at bay until follow-on forces arrive in theater. This global reach also provides the CINC with weapon systems that do not rely on in-theater assets. The cutting of forces and dwindling budget makes protecting our interests abroad more complex. It is imperative old stereotypes do not impede the development of the most capable group of weapon systems in our military arsenal. Our "strategic" bombers possess a capability that will contribute to any CINC's conventional combat power and must be preserved. Recommendation: The Air Force must make a conscious effort to dispel the myths that surround their bomber community. With the lack of a global nuclear threat conventional capabilities must now receive the attention they deserve. Upgrades to our bomber force must concentrate on standoff weapons and smart bombs. The money spent to integrate advanced technological capabilities are small in comparison to the potential payoffs. OUTLINE Thesis: The unique capability our heavy bombers possess significantly add to our nation's potential to conduct conventional operations successfully and technological advances must be pursued to insure this much needed capability is preserved. I. Myths about "strategic" bombers A. Strategic bombers only carry nuclear weapons B. The word "strategic" equals nuclear C. Theater warfare is the domain of smaller tactical aircraft II. History and the "strategic" bomber A. WWII B. The Korean War C. Vietnam D. The Gulf War III. Current conventional capabilities of our "strategic" bombers A. The B-52 B. The B-1 C. The B-2 IV. The future of the "strategic" bomber A. Assuming the conventional role B. Developing a capability to meet war time requirements C. Insuring our capability does not shrink out of proportion to our size THE "STRATEGIC" CONVENTIONAL BOMBERS Over the last several decades, a major part of US national security hinged on keeping the former Soviet Union at bay. During this time, our nations heavy strategic bomber force was charged with the lone- penetrator role. Striking targets with a variety of nuclear weapons. Although this strategic nuclear mission is the mission typically associated with our bomber force, history is witness to the conventional capability of these weapon systems. Now with the end of the Cold War, the importance of a weapon system with the ability to strike the most remote parts of the world has increased. The unique capability our heavy bombers possess significantly add to our nation's potential to conduct conventional operations successfully and technological advances must be pursued to insure this much needed capability is preserved. Several factors emphasize the importance of long-range heavy bombers in the conventional role: The increasing requirement for swift power projection worldwide in response to a crisis. The need for long- range strike capability in response to terrorist attacks. The present constraints on the defense budget increases the demand for multi-mission weapon systems, demanding more capability from fewer systems. These factors emphasize the need for further development of the roles and missions concerning our heavy bomber force. However, such an examination cannot take place without first studying some of the myths about "strategic" bombers. MYTHS ABOUT "STRATEGIC" BOMBERS There are persistent myths that interfere with the understanding of the variety of missions our heavy bombers can perform. These myths are interrelated and hinder the understanding of the versatility of modern strategic aerospace power. The first of these myths is simply; the only missions strategic bombers perform is the delivery of nuclear weapons. This belief is understandable considering this is the reason heavy bombers were initially designed. This myth is also perpetuated by the two nuclear missions flown over Japan towards the end of WWII. Fortunately the use of this capability was not needed to end the Cold War and now the bomber community can explore, even further, its conventional capabilities. "Strategic" bombers were used in conflicts during the Cold War period, ironically, performing the very mission many are unaware exists. The fact is, our nation's bombers have performed gallantly in the conventional role, yet still this myth exists. Another myth the heavy bomber community fights is; "strategic" equals nuclear. Many military members, not only in our sister services, but also in the Air Force, do not understand the word "strategic" does not equal nuclear. Air Force Manual 1-1 defines strategic as, "encompassing key targets, whether vital industrial complexes, infrastructure, population centers, or a specific military center of gravity, which, if effectively destroyed or damaged, directly affects the enemy's capability or will to resist." (1:152) This definition matches precisely how heavy bombers are typically employed. Defeating an enemy's ability to wage war or his will to fight, is the ideal mission for our heavy bombers. Nowhere in the manuals definition is there any mention of the word nuclear-nor should there be. The final myth I will address that affects our heavy bomber force is, theater warfare is strictly the domain of smaller tactical aircraft. This could not be farther from the truth. Our bombers have played a major role in past wars conducting missions ranging from providing ground troops with close air support to interdiction missions. Many examples from history where "strategic" bombers were used in a conventional role had a direct input on the enemy's defeat. The argument can be made that B-52 missions over North Vietnam played a principle role in bringing that conflict to an end. During the war in the Gulf, the one thing the Marines wanted prior to starting the ground war was B-52 strikes. These two examples provide evidence heavy bombers not only can be used, but are requested, by ground troops in tactical situations. With the versatility of todays modern weapon systems, we must categorize weapon systems by capabilities not by stereotypes. When trying to understand what the future holds for our heavy bombers in a conventional role it is important to look at history. Past wars abundantly illustrate the vital role heavy bombers have played. For illustration I will examine four periods of history: WWII, Korea, Vietnam and South West Asia. Inarguably the heavy bombers contributions while delivering conventional ordinances, often in situations and campaigns not of a "strategic" nature, has changed the world. HISTORY AND THE "STRATEGIC" BOMBER The US first developed a sizable heavy bomber force during WWII. They were used extensively in both the European and Pacific theaters. The Boeing B-29 "Superfortress" was the bomber used most widely in the Pacific because of its range. This massive aircraft had a range of 3,250 miles and could carry 12,000 lbs. of bombs. With the B-29's carrying capacity, the pace of the bombing campaign in the Pacific increased month by month. "in March, LeMay's bombers had released 13,000 tons of bombs on Japan; in July the figure was 42,000, by the end of the summer it was expected to exceed 100,000 tons per month." (4:174) Conventional bombing was not the only mission these versatile aircraft conducted in the Pacific. About 12,000 naval mines were delivered and some 4.5 million leaflets were scattered. The use of a "strategic" bomber in the conventional role was clearly demonstrated during WWII. After WWII not only our strategic bomber forces but the entire military suffered during the period of demobilization. With the tremendous drawdown, many bomber units operated from bases not equipped to support their missions. Bomber aircrews cross-trained, flying in all crew positions, thus not being given the time needed to become proficient in any position. This peacetime mismanagement of the crew force was a product of the belief that nuclear war was not probable. At the same time however, there were high officials in the Air Force who believed the probability of nuclear war was not the issue. They believed their job was to train aircrews. General Leon W. Johnson, then Commander of Fifteenth Air force, was one who thought this way. When asked what he thought his mission in the late 1940s was, he stated, "I never thought of it as atomic warfare only.... All we were trying to do in the late 1940s was to get the crews trained in their specialities, get the crews ready to be marked, as Curt says, (ref. General Curtis E. LeMay) combat ready." (5:76) The Korean War was a difficult war at a difficult time for the then Strategic Air Command (SAC). With most of our bomber training focused on a nuclear war against the former Soviet Union, Korea was not seen by SAC as one for their major concerns. Even with the new B-47 coming on line, SAC chose to again use the B-29 in Korea deploying five bomb groups in theater. The B-47 was saved for what was considered the real threat, Europe. In Korea the B-29's were tasked with performing interdiction and close air support missions. These missions were not what the generals in SAC wanted to see their long-range bombers doing. Nevertheless, this was the B-29's mission for the entire war because of a restriction placed on the bombers from striking strategic targets north of the Yalu. "How not to use the strategic air weapon," (6:86) was the comment of then Commander of SAC, General LeMay, when asked what he learned from Korea. It just goes to show-nobody is right all the time. God bless you General LeMay! In Vietnam the versatility of heavy bombers delivering conventional munitions was again demonstrated. For the first few years of the war, US bombers attacked tactical targets while our fighters struck strategic targets. US heavy bombers also conducted missions against targets such as enemy troop concentrations, supply areas and lines of communication. Their missions were direct support and close air support missions. They could also be called interdiction missions but not what is traditionally referred to as strategic missions. During the intense bombing campaign, code name "Linebacker II," B-52's in joint effort with Naval and Air Force fighter-bombers delivered tremendous firepower to North Vietnam. In just eleven days of bombing military structures, electrical power networks, petroleum storage depots, railroad yards and anti-aircraft defenses were severely damaged. Over 20,000 tons of bombs were dropped in just over 1,700 sorties. Because of the destruction caused by this fierce conventional bombing effort, the Vietnamese agreed to resume peace talk negotiations. In Vietnam conventional capabilities of the B-52 were demonstrated with convincing success. Even though this air power demonstration was impressive, the most valuable characteristic of todays bomber force, world-wide strike capability from CONUS bases, had not yet been demonstrated. The first evidence of this world-wide conventional capability was witnessed during "Bright Star-1982," a joint exercise involving elements of the US Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The bombers sought to meet a precise target time as part of a schedule that included fighter strikes and then a land assault. The timing problem was particularly complex because the bombers had launched the day prior from bases 7,500 miles away. The first B-52 appeared low on the horizon only moments before the target time, with five more bombers following in trail. Within four seconds of the target time, the lead bomber released a train of twenty-seven 500-pound bombs on the target. Five more times 27 bombs dropped as each aircraft crossed the range at low altitude. Just as rapidly, the bombers were out of sight, continuing on their mission for another 7,500 miles to a landing base in North Dakota. (3:1) The war in the Gulf is probably the biggest success story for conventional capability of the heavy bomber. The first wartime display of heavy bombers (B-52G's) launched from CONUS bases, striking their targets in enemy territory and returning home took place. This capability demonstrates just what advantages our heavy bomber force provides a CINC. The ability to stage from outside the theater of operation not only relieves pressure from in-theater assets but also gives the CINC the element of surprise needed for success. When our bombers were called to perform direct support missions just prior to the ground war, "strategic" bombers concentrated their conventional power on the elite Republican Guard, breaking their will to fight. The success of the ground war is testimony of the outstanding contribution "strategic" bombers can and will play in the future. CURRENT CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE "STRATEGIC" BOMBER Of the three "strategic" bombers in service today, two are about forty years old: the B-52G and the B-52H. These aircraft were developed in the 1940s and early 1950s and have long been our mainstay of the strategic bomber force. Modification of the B-52G early in the 1980s provided the US with the superb conventional platform utilized in the Gulf War. The B-52H has greater range and does not rely on water augmentation for heavy-weight takeoffs. Both aircraft have the capability of delivering a variety of weapons supporting both land and sea missions. Their ability to deliver gravity bombs, short range attack missiles, air launched cruise missiles and sea mines makes both reliable weapon systems and valuable national assets. The Rockwell B-1 is quickly taking over for the B-52G in the conventional penetration role. Modern weapon delivery capabilities and sheer numbers make it the logical replacement. With the nuclear mission finally out of the forefront, the B-1 is quickly gaining experience as a conventional platform. Of the three "strategic" bombers (including the 20 B-2's the Air Force has purchased) that will take us into the 21st century, the B-1 is the fastest and can carry the heaviest payload. The B-1 can presently deliver the MK-82 general purpose gravity bomb. With the planned enhancements and its current capability, the B-1 is the only weapon system that can fill the gap created by the cut in B-2 acquisition numbers. Air Combat Command will take delivery of 20 B-2's late in calendar year 1993. Therefore, current capabilities do not exist, which leaves the discussion of the B-2 for the following section of this paper. THE FUTURE OF THE "STRATEGIC" BOMBER With the end of the Cold War, our heavy bomber force best serves the CINC in the conventional warfighting role. The bomber package of B-52H's, B-1's and B-2's will provide our planners with the versatility, range and payload making them the most capable group of weapon systems in the US arsenal. This is not to say our bomber force will not retain their nuclear capability but that acquisition and training will concentrate on developing their conventional talent. This new conventional role will provide bomber crews an opportunity to train in a more realistic environment. In the past, our crews flew nuclear training missions against radar training sites with bombing accuracy evaluated electronically. Experienced crews can fly these missions with little effort. Conventional training missions put more emphasis on actual weapon drops, adding realism. According to Major Stephen M. Boykin, Director of Training at Dyess AFB, TX., "currently about two-thirds of the B-1 flight hours are directed toward conventional training compared to only about one-third a year ago." (2) An increased number of conventional training missions equates to more weapons drops. This is something the heavy bomber community needed for years. To understand what the future holds for our nation's heavy bomber force we must first look at what the Department of the Air Force views as potential targets for their bombers. "The Bomber Roadmap," a Department of the Air Force document published in June 1992 indicates what planners consider the future targets of our bomber force: - Emerging capabilities for the production, support and use of weapons of mass destruction - Massed conventional forces of an adversary threatening or invading friendly states - Key nodes of enemy command and control, and air defenses - Enemy air attack assets and other offensive capabilities - Enemy capacity to wage war (7:3) This probable target list is the basis for Air Force acquisition and training. Systems are being developed and training is being focused to combat targets in these categories. All efforts point in the direction of developing the most capable bomber force to meet our country's needs. In the future, we cannot plan on having almost six months to build up forces for an impending conflict, like in the Gulf. If our potential adversaries have paid attention, and you know they have, we will not have this luxury again. This is an area our heavy bomber's capabilities can be used to their fullest. As a nation, we must be able to respond with as little warning as possible to prohibit our enemy, wherever he may be, from overtaking our strategic vital interests. Even with considering forward deployed aircraft carriers and strategically positioned allies, we cannot count on short-range air assets holding the enemy at bay by themselves. Long-range "strategic" bombers are not a replacement but the ideal complement for our short-range assets. Along with not having months to prepare for a conflict, we also can expect our potential adversaries to better prepare for war than our last opponent did. With the success of the air campaign in South West Asia, it also can be assumed our future enemies will place greater emphasis on defending their high-value targets from air strikes. We can expect targets like command and control centers, and weapons of mass destruction storage areas to be defended even more than they presently are. Enemy air defense measures can also be expected to be improved around these high-value targets. To meet our country's needs, the move is already on to ensure our shrinking defense budget does not mean a less capable "strategic" bomber force. The key to weapons employment in the future will rely on the development of weapons that take advantage of their respective delivery platforms. With the development of B-1 and B-2, the B-52 will convert to the standoff role relying on cruise missile type weapons to defeat enemy targets. Restricted by its large radar cross section and slow speed, the B-52 is well suited for this standoff role. Numerous standoff weapons are under development to complement the B-52's existing capability. This change in mission for the B-52 complements the aircraft's inherent capabilities. Also this mission change will eliminate the added structural stress of the low-level penetration mission, extending the airframes operational life. Realization of the B-1 force enhancement program has the highest priority for our future bomber force. The B-1 is becoming the center- piece of our bomber force replacing the aging B-52. One of the major reasons for this transition is the B-1's performance is more compatible to other aircraft of future strike packages. To accomplish this transition, the B-1 must be able to accomplish both standoff and penetration missions. Destroying time sensitive targets during the initial phases of a conflict will be the B-1's primary role. Upgrading the B-1 provides the CINC with the most capable bomber ever to conduct air interdiction and close air support missions. The first delivery of the B-2 is expected late 1993. Stealth technology will enable the B-2 to accomplish its intended mission; penetration of the most heavily defended target areas. Phasing the B-2 into our bomber operations will provide any CINC with the ability to defeat time-sensitive targets, buying time for follow-on forces to deploy into theater. Also, the B-2 will have the capability to employ guided munitions, adding flexibility to interdiction and close air support missions throughout the conflict. The B-2 will be an excellent addition to our current bomber force. Opportunities overseas are diminishing because of the changing world order and the decreasing defense budget. To protect US vital national interests, we must maintain our capability to fight from a distance. It is critical our "strategic" conventional weapon systems can deliver sufficient combat power anywhere in the world. The Air Force will rely on the technological advantage to provide its bomber force with the ability to deliver this combat power. The complementary characteristics of the B-52H, B-1 and B-2 provide the US with a combat capability unmatched anywhere in the world. The unique inherent capabilities of our long-range bomber force must be preserved by timely technological advances equal to the tasks they must perform. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Air Force Manual 1-1, Vol. II. Headquarters US Air Force, Washington D.C., AF/XOXWD, 1992. 2. Boykin, Stephen M., Major, Director of Training, Dyess Air Force Base, TX., Telephone interview, 1993. 3. Keaney, Thomas A., Strategic Bombers and Conventional Weapons, National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1984. 4. Kennett, Lee, A History of Strategic Bombing, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY., 1982. 5. Kohn, Richard H. and Harahan, Joseph P., Strategic Air Warfare, Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C., 1988. 6. Kohn, Richard H. and Harahan, Joseph P., Strategic Air Warfare, Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C., 1988. 7. The Bomber Roadmap, Department of the Air Force, Washington D.C., 1992.
