Fire And Air Support Center; A New Direction For The Corps CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Fire and Air Support Center; A new direction for the Corps Author: Major F.W. Chesney, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The current structure and relationship of the Fire Support Coordination Center and the Direct Air Support Center are inadequate to meet the needs of future for the Marine Corps. Background: The senior Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) and the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) are collocated in order that they might best integrate fire and air support assets and procedures. Their collocation does not serve this purpose adequately. The two agencies share a mutual goal yet operate in completely different manners with respect to emphasis on real- time operations. The efforts of the Air Officer of the FSCC and the DASC are in many ways duplicative. Under the maneuver warfare doctrine, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force commander is a warfighter, not a coordinator. He requires an agency capable of providing responsive fire and air support, using assets provided by a joint force. The FSCC does not possess the capability, in its aviation section, to simultaneously conduct current operations and future planning. Most of the current operations capability resides in the DASC. A merger of the two agencies, backed by automation, can provide the most responsive and integrated fire and air support. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should merge the FSCC and DASC into a single agency, the fire and air support center (FASC). The merger should include a smaller staff and new facility that can incorporate computer automation to use automated data transfer systems to enhance decision-making and fire support responsiveness. OUTLINE Thesis: Conducting fire support coordination through two separate agencies, The DASC and FSCC, is not the most effective method. The MAGTF of the future will be shaped by force reductions, automation, and maneuver warfare doctrine. Joint force fire support assets may form a larger portion of the MAGTF. The Corps must meet these challenges with new ideas and methods to be successful. Merging the DASC and FSCC into a single agency is a logical starting point. I. Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) A. Mission B. Organization and key personnel 1. Structure of the FSCC 2. Key crewmembers and their roles 3. Communications connectivity C. Tasks and functions 1. Fire support coordination procedures 2. Tasks performed by key individuals II. Direct Air Support Center (DASC) A. Mission B. Organization and key personnel 1. Structure of the DASC 2. Key crewmembers and their roles 3. Communications connectivity C. Tasks and functions 1. Air control procedures 2. Tasks performed by key individuals 3. Use of the Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) III. Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS) A. Initial Requirement Operational Capabilities (ROC) B. System problems 1. Hardware 2. Requirements C. Operational Analysis 1. Results 2. Program decision D. Result of MIFASS program 1. Concept 2. Equipment IV. Marine Corps initiatives after MIFASS A. Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) B. High Mobility Downsized (HMD) DASC V. Other services' procedures for coordinating fire support with air support VI. Fire and Air Support Center (FASC) defined A. Organization and key personnel B. Tasks and functions C. Advantages of consolidated agency The Marine Corps is going through some dramatic changes. The combination of the New World Order and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 is shifting the focus of the Marine Corps towards employment as part of a joint or combined force rather than a single service. The Marine Corps of the future will be smaller and lighter. It may depend more heavily on the Army for tank and artillery support, and the Air Force and Navy for a greater share of its air support. The use of joint force fire support assets will create pressure to integrate their use while maintaining the same level of responsiveness expected from an all-Marine force. The very survival of Marine forces may depend on how well the Marine Corps can perform the fire support integration process. Fire support integration today is performed by two agencies; the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) and the Direct Air Support Center (DASC). Both agencies are voice communications intensive and rely on manually operated situation display boards. The Marine Corps of the 21st century will rely heavily on automation to offset its shrinking size. Maneuver warfare doctrine is driving the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander to be a warfighter and not merely a coordinator. Coordination between the FSCC and DASC will not meet all of the needs of the MAGTF commander on the battlefield of the future. The requirements for joint force operations, downsizing, automation, and maneuver warfare can best be met by combining the FSCC and DASC into a single automated warfighting facility, a fire and air support center (FASC). The FSCC is a command and control agency resident in the Marine Division. FSCC's are the agencies commanders use to integrate fire support into their plans. Each echelon of command in the ground combat element (GCE), down to maneuver battalion, has an FSCC which includes supporting arms representatives. Primary tasks include the planning for and execution of fire support. (7:4-20) Two of the key FSCC members are the Fire Support Coordinator (FSC) and the Air Officer (AO). The FSC's primary role is to advise the commander on all issues pertaining to fire support. The AO is a qualified naval aviator or naval flight officer who functions as a special staff officer at the Marine Division. The AO is part of the Operations (S-3) Section at the regimental and battalion levels. His primary role is to advise the commander on all issues pertaining to air support.(12:3-7) Communications connectivity between FSCC's is primarily by single channel radio. The primary voice circuits are the conduct of fire net, fire support coordination net, and tactical air request net. The primary circuit between the senior FSCC and the collocated DASC is the DASC-FSCC hotline, a wire link. The FSC's direct responsibilities include organizing, training, and supervising personnel of the FSCC, preparing the fire support plan, recommending fire support coordination measures, and disseminating target information. The FSC acts as the final arbiter for resolving fire support conflicts.(8:2-3) The AO's direct responsibilities include coordinating requests for air support from subordinate units, passing the commander's air support requirements to the appropriate air support control agency, supervising/coordinating the activities of the tactical air control parties (TACP's), and monitoring the tactical air request (TAR) net in the FSCC for information, or clearance if required, on requests for immediate air support.(8:2-7) The DASC is not part of the Marine Division but belongs to the Marine Air Wing.(3:4-3) It is an air command and control agency designed to provide the GCE access to his supporting aviation structure. The DASC provides the means to process immediate air support requests, coordinate aircraft employment with other supporting arms, and control assigned aircraft and itinerant aircraft within its assigned area of responsibility. (6:4-1) The DASC is task organized in equipment and personnel to provide connectivity between the FSCC, direct air support aircraft, and the agencies of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). DASC crew size will vary with the size of the MAGTF and scope of the mission but the functions that the DASC performs remain essentially the same. The Senior Air Director (SAD) is the supervisor for the entire DASC crew and serves as the focal point of all activity within the DASC. The SAD provides direction which guides the constant information flow between the FSCC, direct air support aircraft, and MACCS agencies. The SAD is the primary point of contact in the DASC for the AO in the FSCC. The interaction between the SAD and the AO is critical to providing adequate and timely air support to the ground commander. As an agency, the DASC is responsible for a myriad of tasks essential to integrating air support with other supporting arms. The DASC receives, processes, and coordinates requests for immediate air support; adjusts preplanned schedules and diverts airborne assets in accordance with the priorities of the ground commander; and coordinates the execution of direct air support missions with other supporting arms. The DASC provides procedural control of aircraft operating within its assigned airspace; maintains friendly and enemy ground situation displays as necessary to coordinate direct air support operations; and provides aircraft and other control agencies with advisory information to assist in the safe conduct of flight.(6:4-2) The DASC accomplishes these tasks through the use of voice communications and manually operated situation display boards. There are no radars or other automated information processing devices in the DASC. The underlying purpose in collocating the DASC with the senior FSCC is to provide the ground commander with real-time access to aircraft in order to provide the most responsive means to fill requests for immediate air support. The DASC and FSCC are designed to complement each other in providing all necessary personnel and equipment required to integrate air support with other supporting arms and maneuver elements. The FSCC is supposed to provide the DASC with information on the location of friendly and enemy forces and fire support systems, including air defense artillery. The DASC uses this information to provide direct air support at the most critical time and place on the battlefield. A crucial aspect of this support for the DASC is the prevention of fratricide. Maintaining situational awareness using voice communications and manual situation display boards is extremely difficult, as recent events during Operation Desert Storm proved. Maintaining continuous voice communications from a ground based agency like the DASC can prove equally challenging. In order to ensure adequate communications and aircraft control are maintained, the DASC may employ an airborne command and control platform known as a Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) or TAC(A). The TAC(A) is by definition an airborne extension of the DASC. The TAC(A)'s primary function is to exercise control of aircraft in its assigned airspace as directed by the DASC. The TAC(A) also provides necessary communications connectivity between the DASC, terminal air control agencies, direct air support aircraft, and the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC).(3:3- 3) The DASC-FSCC relationship is unique and in some aspects problematic. The FSCC is primarily responsible for fire support planning and execution. At the higher GCE echelons, the emphasis is on the planning and targeting functions, while at the lower echelons the focus is on coordination in execution.(7:4-2O) Thus a dichotomy exists; the senior FSCC is more focused on planning and targeting for future operations than on directing current operations, while the collocated DASC is primarily focused on responding to requests for iminediate air support and supervising the execution of the current air tasking order (ATO). As the size of the MAGTF and its area of responsibility grow, the senior FSCC devotes more time to the planning and allocation functions of fire support, and less time to supervising execution of current operations. Because of this focus, the senior FSCC is less able to provide the DASC with current friendly position and activity information. The DASC emphasis on real-time operations is relatively constant regardless of the size of the MAGTF. The DASC's requirement for friendly situation information does not diminish as the MAGTF increases in size; however the FSCC's ability to provide such information certainly does. Additionally, as the MAGTF grows in size it becomes further removed from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). While this may not adversely affect the FSCC, the increased distance from the FEBA makes it more difficult for the DASC to maintain direct communications with the forward air control (FAC) parties that generate requests for immediate air support. One of the pillars of the Marine fire support system is the air request network. The TAR net links all cognizant parties, including the FAC, FSCC's, DASC, and TAC(A). The FAC sends a request for immediate air support which is monitored by the FSCC at each echelon. Silence on the net indicates consent for the DASC to process the request and fill it using aircraft instead of some other supporting arm.(4:4-1) As far back as 1976, the Marine Corps recognized a need for integrating the DASC and FSCC. In that year, a Marine systems acquisition research council convened and formally raised the issue of combining the DASC and senior FSCC into a consolidated fire and air support center (FASC).(2:6) The Marine Corps acquisition program to develop a FASC was known as the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS). The initial requirement document, a required operational capability (ROC), was drafted in 1976. The initial ROC described the FASC in terms of integrating the tasks and functions of the DASC, FSCC, and fire direction center (FDC). In 1979, Headquarters Marine Corps modified the ROC to incorporate the tasks and functions into a single consolidated agency.(2:6) The intent of the 1979 revised ROC was to create an agency with the requisite staff organization and operating procedures that could perform the functions of the DASC, FSCC, and FDC from a single agency using a real-time display/information processing system (MIFASS).(9:2) The MIFASS program was historic in its attempt to incorporate air and ground fire support planning and execution into a single agency. Up until MIFASS, the ground and air sides of the Marine Corps had pursued independent research and development projects for the command and control of their respective communities. Participation in MIFASS was mandated by Headquarters Marine Corps, but not universally enthusiastic. Proponents were supportive of MIFASS as a replacement for the DASC and a better merger of the functions of the DASC and the AO of the FSCC. Critics saw MIFASS as too large and complex an agency. Many favored an alternative Army program known as the Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). AFATDS was touted as a smaller, lighter, more effective and affordable modernization program that would provide the automation necessary for better fire support integration, without merging the DASC, FSCC, and FDC. The MIFASS program ran into significant problems early on. MIFASS lacked a program manager and the Marine Corps kept changing the program requirements. The shelters that housed the system were too large and cumbersome and proved inadequate for a tactical environment. The microprocessor that ran MIFASS was too small to accomplish all of the tasks that MIFASS was designed to perform. The computer hardware was old, inflexible, and had limited growth capability. The real show stoppers for MIFASS were poor program management and inadequate automation hardware. After seven years and more than $127 million, MIFASS was terminated. Some subsystems, notably the communications control panel (CCP), communications van, and the battery computer system (BCS) worked well, but MIFASS failed its operational analysis in early 1987 and was cancelled without an operational test and evaluation cycle. The demise of the MIFASS program produced different results for the concept and equipment associated with MIFASS. The FASC concept was never validated and has laid dormant ever since. Some of the equipment was used in spin off programs. The communications suite and CCP workstation became the foundation for the Improved DASC (IDASC); a replacement DASC program initiated when MIFASS failed. The BCS was extracted from MIFASS and purchased as a stand alone item to automate Marine artillery FDC's. The Digital Communications Terminal (DCT), which was not a component of MIFASS but was closely allied with the system, has seen use by FAC and artillery forward observer (FO) teams, and the Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battalion. After MIFASS, the Marine Corps tracked the development of the Army AFATDS program and adopted the Army ROC for AFATDS in February of 1991. The AFATDS program can support a variety of fire support functions including fire mission processing, fire planning, and fire support operations. AFATDS is comprised of several different nodes. FAC and FO teams will use a hand-held digital communications device similar to the DCT. FSCC's, FDC's, DASC, and the TACC will receive a laptop sized Lightweight Computer Unit (LCU). The LCU will assemble information and provide the user with options for fire support including artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, or air. While choosing an option, the user can simultaneously direct the efforts of his AN/TPQ-36 battlefield surveillance radars in their counter battery role. Information on the user's LCU is automatically transmitted to all other AFATDS terminals, providing real-time radio relay. AFATDS computers are flexible, easy to use, and can accommodate system growth. AFATDS LCU's will replace the BCS in the FDC.(1:33) In addition to its other information capabilities, AFATDS will provide real-time friendly position location and activity information in order to assist in fratricide prevention. AFATDS offers the capability for automated information dissemination and provides user prompts to aid in decision-making. AFATDS can be a tool to provide the DASC with real-time information feed and a communications link to the FAC through its built-in relay capability. AFATDS is not a portion of the IDASC program. Another post-MIFASS initiative was the IDASC program. The IDASC was a replacement for the 1960's vintage DASC equipment. IDASC uses the communications suite and CCP operator consoles from MIFASS. IDASC is not configured for AFATDS, but does contain a DCT interface, and the capability to incorporate a Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) or Global Positioning Capability (GPS) capability. IDASC will be capable of some automation linkage with the Advanced Tactical Air Command Central (ATACC).(1O:16) Under the IDASC umbrella, a new DASC variant known as the High Mobility Downsized DASC ([HMD]DASC) is being produced.(13:1) The (HMD)DASC is designed to use the existing communications assets and operator workstations of the larger IDASC, reconfigured and downsized to be transported by the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The (HMD)DASC will retain all of the operational capabilities of the full IDASC. Operator consoles may be operated from the back of the HMMWV or remoted into any shelter. This capability gives the (HMD)DASC the ability for a variety of configurations and operating facilities. The (HMD)DASC comes equipped with a shelter; a rapid assembly tent.(13:5) The (HMD)DASC will also incoporate selective portions of the software applications package of the ATACC and the Air Force's Contingency Tactical Air Control System Automated Planning System (CTAPS). These two programs will allow the Marine Corps-to provide a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) capability and a means to automate puslishing or receiving a joint ATO. FASC is the senior fire and air support coordination agency of the MAGTF. The facility and its associated equipment belong to the MAGTF command element. Personnel are sourced from the Marine Division and the Marine Air Wing. It is organized to provide personnel for operations sections controlling current and future operations. Key personnel such as the FSC, AO, and SAD retain their present position and responsibilities. The tasks and functions of the FASC include all those functions separately performed by the FSCC and DASC, plus any new tasks required to integrate joint forces fire and air support assets. Combining the DASC and FSCC into one facility offers a number of advantages. The DASC provides the current operations cell for air support. The SAD and AO work as a team, with the AO concentrating on planning and the SAD focusing on execution. Using computer automation and consolidating situation displays and TAR net operations enhances responsiveness and reduces personnel requirements. The DASC portion of the facility can tap into the FSCC communications structure to provide redundant and near real-time communications with the FAC parties through a combination of FSCC communications nets and a device like the AFATDS LCU. MIFASS failed because of its physical size and poor computer hardware. Programs like IDASC and AFATDS give the Marine Corps the tools to automate the DASC and FSCC and merge the facilities. Digital communications provide the means to connect automated data transfer devices. Modular workstations and laptop computers can provide greater productivity from smaller facilities. Real- time information sharing for all echelons of command promotes safety and responsiveness. Using joint fire support programs like AFATDS will make it easier to integrate Army support forces (tanks and artillery) into a MAGTF. When combined with the ATACC and CTAPS programs, the FASC will provide the MAGTF commander with unprecedented real-time access to the TACC, JFACC, and joint force fire and air support systems. FASC can tie together the requester, direct support aircraft, and air command and control agencies, including the TAC(A). FASC can provide the commander with the planning and execution support he needs to perform as a warfighter. As MAGTF's become more austere and operate more frequently in a joint force environment automation will be the key to complete interoperability. The FASC can incorporate the automation systems being developed by the other services to provide seamless operations. ATACC, AFATDS, CTAPS, and the (HMD)DASC are all in the early stages of development. FASC can merge with them under a single architecture that can stretch from the infantry company FAC through the TACC to the JFACC and tie them to direct air support aircraft. Computers provide the key to empower the entire command and control structure with real- time information flow and decision-making aids, alleviate the shortcomings in the DASC-FSCC relationship, and be the conduit for more responsive fire support. It is time to put the failures of MIFASS in the past an reconsider the FASC concept. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Dunn, Kenneth. "The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System.1, Marine Corps Gazette, 76(December 1992), 32-33. 2. Klein, Steven, et al. A Comparative Study of MIFASS and AFATDS, Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 1987. 3. U.S.Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Organization and Function of Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1991. 4. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support, FMFM 5-4A. Quantico, 1988. 5. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical Aviation, OH 5-3. Quantico,1982. 6. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Command and Control of USMC Aviation, OH 5-8. Quantico,1982. 7. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Ground Combat Operations, OH 6-1. Quantico, 1988. 8. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Fire Support Coordinator's Guide, OH 6-2A. Quantico, 1987. 9. U.S Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Revised Marine Corps Required Operational Capability (ROC) for a Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS), 10. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Draft Second Revision To The Require Operational Capability (ROC) For The Direct Air Support Center, Quantico, 992. 11. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Systems Command. System Specification for the dvanced Tactical Air Command Central (ATACC), Quantico, 1992. 12. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Fire Support Coordination, FMFM 7-1. Quantico, 1981. 13. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Systems Command. System Specification for the Improved Direct Air Support Central Product Improvement Program, Quantico, 1992.
