ASPJ: Victim Of Friendly Fire CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Electronic Warfare EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: ASPJ: Victim of Friendly Fire Author: LCDR David Baranek, United States Navy Thesis: The Airborne Self-Protection Jammer is a capable electronic warfare system which faltered because of poorly- defined goals and faulty evaluation procedures. Background: Electronic warfare has become an important component of modern combat. Advances in electronics and computer software in the mid-I97Os promised small, effective jammers that could cope with an intense surface-to-air threat, and the Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) was to use these advances to provide state-of-the-art protection for American combat aircraft. While it demonstrated jamming effectiveness, ASPJ experienced problems with reliability and other real-world concerns. Congressional interest, stimulated by Sen. David Pryor (D-AR), highlighted further problems based on poorly-defined performance goals and test procedures. ASPJ did not meet the goals set for it, but is superior to the alternatives and provides acceptable performance. Recommendations: I. ASPJ development and limited production should have been continued or reviewed rather than canceled. 2. The ASPJ experience should be analyzed by service planners as an example of the importance of well- founded performance specifications. OUTLINE Thesis: Development of the Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) required substantial investments in time and money, then the program was canceled rather than put into production. The effort was appropriate for this complex and capable system, whose failure was precipitated by poorly-defined performance goals and uncertain evaluation procedures. I. Origin of self-protection jamming A. First used in bombers B. Later applied to fighters II. Promise of ASPJ A. Multi-service use B. Application of newest technology C. Ambitious performance goals III. Early challenges for ASPJ A. Space limitations B. Integration into different aircraft C. Program delays IV. Flight testing and continued problems A. Generally good jamming performance B. Problems with other specifications C. Erratic support by Navy, Air Force D. Performance goals poorly defined V. Program cancellation A. Senator Pryor's involvement B. Further evaluations added C. Failure caused by flawed specification VI. Uncertain future for ASPJ In the mid-197Os, U.S. Navy planners conceived of a fully-automatic system that would completely protect combat aircraft from enemy radars and missiles. Soon the Air Force was a partner to the enterprise, and by 1977 six U.S. electronics companies were conducting research on the project. The services intended to put this system into thousands of tactical aircraft starting in 1985; the program was estimated to be worth $3 billion. This program was called simply the "airborne self- protection jammer," and was soon known as ASPJ. On 10 December 1992, the Navy announced cancellation of ASPJ after nearly sixteen years of work. One publication estimated that the Pentagon had spent $1.5 billion on the program, and about 100 pre-production systems had been delivered. Should ASPJ have been canceled, or should it have been put into production while improvements continued? U.S. aircraft have used electronic countermeasures (ECM) almost as long as radar has been associated with war: World War II B-17s first employed jammers in 1943 to confuse German air-defense radars.(2:71) After the war, jammers were standard equipment on U.S. bombers, to counter radar- intensive Soviet defenses should the Cold War turn hot.(11:325) Somehow, fighter and attack aircraft were neglected when it came to jammers. Then, in June 1965, the first Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) brought down a U.S. fighter over North Vietnam.(24:15) This event shocked the military, which began a priority program to fit existing ECM equipment into fighter aircraft, to give them a self-protection jamming capability similar to that of bombers. Since the mid-1960s, ECM has been a consideration for combat air- craft of all sizes and missions, worldwide. One response to U.S. use of jammers in Vietnam was modification of the radars used by Soviet SAMs, changing their transmitting frequency.(11:326) This would negate our jammers effectiveness. The U.S. then revised the hammers and developed new systems, and "electronic warfare" (EW) became an important component of modern combat. Besides self-protection jammers, other components of electronic warfare are summarized in the figure. Properly integrated, these components can substantially degrade enemy radars, as demonstrated in the successful U.S. air strikes In Libya in 1986, and more impressively in Operation DESERT STORM. While the Navy was sorting out its Vietnam experiences, Congress was calling for greater commonality of EW systems among the armed forces.(27:56) This had a profound influence on ASPJ, for in January 1977 the Air Force announced it would also use the new jammer.(5:245) Multi-service use meant that ASPJ would equip up to seven different types of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft,(6:120) and production could reach 4,000 systems. Besides being a large program, ASPJ development would be a technical challenge, so the six interested Click here to view image firms formed three teams--an unusual step among companies that were normally competitors. (26:68) The program, however, was expected to be worth $3 billion, so there would be enough profit to share. And considering the complexities anticipated in developing ASPJ by 1985, even the heavyweights in the electronics field wanted partners (6:120-121) In practice, a jammer must degrade the performance of some element of a surface-to-air weapon system to improve the survivability of a friendly aircraft. Elements of a surface-to- air weapon system include search radar, tracking radar, and missile guidance equipment. A typical jammer in use In the late 1970s was capable of countering one or a few systems at a time, which it did by transmitting complex signal patterns, each tailored to disrupt a specific weapon system. Limitations included memory space to store the signal patterns, and transmitter power to jam multiple threats. ASPJ was intended to counter dozens of threats simultaneously. To deal with basic enemy efforts such as using different frequencies, ASPJ would be effective over a broad frequency range. Rather than storing and using a specific signal for each threat, ASPJ would analyze enemy radars, generate effective responses, and transmit the jamming. ASPJ would be software-intensive, which is the most efficient way to achieve these performance goals plus retain a growth potential.(26:68) Specifications set for the new jammer included: - occupy no more than 2.3 ft3 of space, - operate an average of 200 hours between failures, and - cost $350,000 per system.(26:68) The size requirement would allow ASPJ to use the space where some Navy aircraft carried the ALQ-126, a much less-capable jammer. The other two specifications can be evaluated against the Air Force ALQ-131 jammer, also less capable than ASPJ: after years of refinement, ALQ-131 averaged about 50 hours between failures; and in 1986, ALQ-131s were sold for $1.9 million apiece.(1:182) All concerned knew that ASPJ was an ambitious project, so plans called for "a continuing technology insertion program" to ensure that improvements could be included in an orderly fashion.(26:68) Against this background, it is of interest to consider the thoughts of a leader in the field around this time. Dr. Malcolm Currie, director of Defense Research and Engineering, in 1976 commented that a balance of countermeasures was needed, including stand-off jammers, anti-radiation missiles, and other systems. Unfortunately, he said, each new system was "being designed to cope with the whole sophisticated threat, almost as if no other (ECM) system were in existence." Dr. Currie predicted, before ASPJ was defined, that the armed forces would require greater commonality among their EW efforts and that they would have more modest performance objectives. (4:14) Unfortunately, his observations were correct and his predictions were not. After more than four years of groundwork, a winning team was selected from those seeking the ASPJ contract: ITT Defense Inc. and Westinghouse Electronic Systems Group, announced in September 1981.(9:20) About the same time, the date production was expected to begin was slid one year to 1986, (27:56) although this was announced with less fanfare. The Industrial teaming arrangement was considered "novel" at the time. Benefits, however, Included the increased research and development experience brought by two companies, as well as two production sources. (12:55) As the program became beleaguered, all sources agreed that the ITT-Westinghouse "joint venture. . worked exceedingly well,"(13:60) and was not a source of problems. One cause of the one-year delay in expected production was the volume requirement: that ASPJ occupy no more than 2.3 ft3. Although ASPJ would have much greater capability than the ALQ-126 jammer that already occupied this space, advances in miniaturization and software seemed to promise success. By 1986, however, an ITT program official commenting on ASPJ characterized the volume constraint as "the most challenging."(27:56) Another challenge to the designers was the plan to integrate ASPJ into the complex electronic systems of seven different aircraft. The aircraft were designed over a twenty-year period during which there were tremendous changes in electronic systems. The number was later reduced to five types (USAF F-16, and USN/USMC FA-18, F-14, A-6, and AV-8),(22:91) but still represented a diverse group. A fundamental difference in philosophy further complicated the matter of integration: the Air Force preferred jammers that were mounted in pods carried under the wings of its aircraft, while the Navy favored internally-mounted jammers.(5:245) Each service had valid reasons for its preference, and there is still no consensus on which way is better. ITT-Westinghouse accepted this as simply another challenge. A one-year delay in a complex program was not unusual. The Air Force's EF-111 stand-off jammer aircraft had been delayed over a year, and the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) survived a three-year delay of initial operational capability. (4:14) Both, incidentally, were developed in the 1970s and became vital components of the balanced, integrated approach to electronic warfare. In addition to delayed introduction, ASPJ shared another characteristic with complex systems: increased projected cost. ASPJ had been projected to cost $350,000 per set, but by 1983 this was up to $800,000.(7:102) Flight testing of ASPJ finally began in September 1985, on an Air Force F-16. The Navy flew the jammer in an FA-18 in February 1987.(1:161) Starting production in 1986 was obviously no longer expected. Early flight tests were relatively simple, and revealed only small problems that were corrected relatively easily. By this time, the new jammer had been designated "ALQ-165" in conformance with standard nomenclature for ECM equipment, but the term ASPJ remained more prevalent. While engineers and pilots flogged ASPJ in the air, challenges also developed on the ground. In March 1986, Secretary of the Navy Lehman and his staff announced that they were reconsidering the cost effectiveness of self-protection jamming in general, ASPJ in particular. This led to postponement of firm decisions on ASPJ development, a reexamination of electronic warfare by the military, and speculation by the media. Many insisted that self-protection jamming was still required, forming one more layer of protection from surface-to-air weapon systems.(20:46-49) Air Force support also remained strong. USAF Director of Electronic Combat Maj. Gen. Corder, in a February 1987 interview, supported the system and said "ASPJ has never been in a stronger position... "(3:50) The program survived. Two years after the Navy had second thoughts, it was the Air Force's turn. Inspired partly by extensive problems with the EW equipment of the B-1B strategic bomber, the Air Force initiated an "independent technical assessment" of ASPJ; It could not afford another embarrassing, expensive, and very public problem with a new system. Composed of military and industry experts, the review team reported in September 1988 that it found no "high-risk" issues with ASPJ development, and only a few "medium- risk" issues for which corrective measures were being introduced. (10:55-59) After clearing these hurdles placed by its sponsors, ASPJ faced another set of challenges. In the more than ten years since the requirement was announced, the electronics and defense industries had made significant progress. Developments that threatened ASPJ included: - "stealth" technology, which reduces the requirement for all ECM equipment; - more capable expendable countermeasures, ejected from aircraft to decoy enemy weapons; and - new technology, especially monopulse radars and missile seekers specifically intended to defeat jammers. (23:44) These developments were not confined to Soviet and other potential threat systems; stealth and monopulse, for example, had become integral to American weapons. Some reduced the need for ASPJ (stealth and expendables), others challenged its effectiveness (monopulse). In general, time was eroding the promise of what had once seemed just around the corner. The persistence of ASPJ through these challenges can be explained to some extent by the legitimate need for such a jammer, but also by its impressive performance. Early flight tests of the prototypes were successful enough to prove the concept.(3:50) Soon more demanding runs were held, in which ASPJ-equipped aircraft flew over test ranges sprinkled with radars designed to emulate enemy surface-to-air defenses. Most of the tests remain classified, but some results have been unofficially released. In a published interview, a person with access to the information summarized ASPJ flight testing by saying that at Navy and Air Force ranges, ASPJ detected 98% of the threat emitters it faced--a total of nearly 300. For each of the those detected, ASPJ correctly analyzed the signal and transmitted the intended jamming. (17:27) These are most impressive accomplishments, registered under very demanding conditions. But full acceptance of ASPJ would require other demonstrations of performance, such as reliability and self-diagnosis of faults. Early flight tests were, in fact, halted for reliability problems, but ITT-Westinghouse refined "manufacturing process control" and improved the power supply, and testing resumed. Tests were generally satisfactory, for in November 1986 the Joint Resources Management Board authorized the next phase of development, Production Verification.(22:91) To date, tests had involved hand-assembled prototypes; the next phase would use production-standard designs. Despite this progress, the senior Navy official working on ASPJ, Capt. Small, admitted in a 1989 interview that some test results were "not as good as expected." He attributed this to techniques used to assess jammer performance.(21:91) This is difficult to imagine in view of a 98% correct response rate, but the following scenario, paraphrased from the authoritative publication Aviation Week and Space Technology illustrates the point: On the EW test range, an aircraft without a jammer flies a combat-type mission. The number of simulated SAN launches is counted, and the estimated number of hits is calculated. From these numbers, enemy effectiveness is calculated. The aircraft then flies the same mission with a jammer and missile effectiveness is again calculated. If, on the first mission, there were 20 chances for missile launch and five were estimated to be hits, the enemy is given a 25% effectiveness. On the second mission--with jamming--if there were only eight launch opportunities, and jamming degraded the missiles so that only two would have hit, the enemy is again scored as 25% effective. Thus, despite a significant reduction in threat to the friendly aircraft, the jammer could be judged as having no effect.(21:91) This scenario was presented in a September 1989 article on ASPJ. In October 1989, it was reported that the Department of Defense was reviewing procedures to measure effectiveness. One result of the review would be the use of computer simulations to evaluate jammer performance. (14:62) Such issues notwithstanding, the Production Verification phase revealed significant progress. ASPJ prototypes, for example, had been built with a technologically risky component called a hybrid microcircuit. This allowed realization of the 2.3 ft3 volume limit, but at a cost in reliability. Components that were later available (monolithic gate array microcircuits) promised better reliability and satisfied the size requirement. (14:62) Such developments allowed units submitted for production verification testing to pass an incredible 222 out of 225 performance tests. Problems with the other three tests were identified, and corrections enacted.(15:109) With such positive results, despite confusion about how to measure effectiveness, the Department of Defense in October 1989 approved a limited production contract for 100 systems.(14:59) The jammer was about four years behind schedule, but appeared on-track. Then Sen. David Pryor (D-AR) seemed to discover ASPJ. Sen. Pryor is chairman of the Governmental affairs Committee's subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service. This appears to have little to do with the military or electronic warfare, but the senator quickly became a vehement critic of ASPJ. In October 1989, in hearings on the jammer before his subcommittee, Sen. Pryor said that ASPJ was "seriously flawed" in terms of capability, reliability, maintainability, and built-in testing. Using the most dramatic language, he asserted that a pilot flying an F-16 using ASPJ would likely be "blown out of the sky." He failed to note two important points: the deficiencies listed were found in early prototypes, and many had already been corrected; and the alternatives for the hypothetical F-16 pilot were the less- capable ALQ-131 or no jammer at all.(14:59-62) Despite these faults, Sen. Pryor's remarks moved his colleagues. The Senate approved an amendment to the FY 1990 Defense Appropriations Bill prohibiting obligation of any funds for ASPJ until new tests demonstrated corrections that Sen. Pryor required. This seems to ignore a standard series of tests still ahead, known as Developmental Testing, Operational Testing, and Follow-on Test and Evaluation.(14:59-62) On top of this new challenge, in December 1989 the Air Force withdrew its interest in ASPJ. Forced to make substantial cuts in future budgets, the Air Force included money for ASPJ among its sacrifices. DoD directed the Navy to investigate alternatives to the system, intending to cancel the entire effort. The Navy replied that it had examined the options and would proceed alone with ASPJ.(19:114) Without the Air Force, with force reductions and other changes, total production was now estimated at about 750 units,(25:62) quite a drop from the earlier prediction of 4,000. In further hearings before Sen. Pryor's subcommittee, In May 1990, the Navy gave ground on ASPJ. Navy agreed not to go beyond the existing contract for 100 units unless ASPJ met eighteen specific "exit criteria" for performance, (16:62) thus adding further to the established evaluation procedures for new systems. The eighteen "exit criteria" must begin the final portion of any report on ASPJ, for in April 1992 the General Accounting Office reported that ASPJ missed one of the new standards: "instantaneous mean time between failures, a measure of reliability. The goal agreed upon was 75 hours. Ironically, the failure came in a series of laboratory tests designed to improve reliability. What's more, the Navy said that the failure was nothing more than an erroneous report; software conducting self-test concluded ASPJ had failed, while it continued to perform properly. The Navy said the jammer at this time was good for 84 hours between failures.(16:62) In fact, during flight tests in 1991, ASPJ had operated 106 hours without failure, and during another test series the figure was over 90 hours.(25:62) These numbers were well below the 200- hour goal reported earlier: as with other specifications, mean time between failures had been revised downward, to 110 hours, but this was still too much.(21:89) Regardless of the actual numbers, the Navy salvaged ASPJ on a technicality. The Military Standard for software failures exempted those that were corrected and verified during reliability testing. Verification was not complete when a board met in June 1991 to consider further production, but several senior officials testified as to circumstances and the board approved a second batch of 36 jammers.(16:63) Sen. Pryor's next round of hearings was more indicative of the future. In April 1992 he charged "waste and management actions that border on fraud," and held more hearings before his subcommittee. These charges were not substantiated,(16:62) but they revealed his flare for dramatic language and the tenacity of his opposition to ASPJ. ASPJ survived these now-familiar trials, but another loomed. The catalyst for cancellation was a 1992 report on measure of effectiveness by the DoD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, The report noted that ASPJ failed to demonstrate the required effectiveness in combat simulation studies, among other less-important shortcomings. According to language in the FY 1993 Defense Authorization Bill, if ASPJ failed operational tests, "none of the funds available to the Department of Defense. . may be used for the procurement of the Airborne Self Protection Jammer. . . ." In view of this stipulation, the Navy on 10 December 1992 canceled its contract for 36 more systems and terminated ASPJ.(17:27) Reporting the termination, Aviation Week and Space Technology quoted unnamed sources who said the criterion not met was a 30% increase in survivability over a non-ASPJ-equipped aircraft.(17:27) This evaluation used an opposite point of view from the "reduction in threat effectiveness" addressed earlier. The specific test run was a computer simulation, for it had become too expensive to outfit the test ranges with enough threat-type radars to provide an adequate test. In the computer, the non-ASPJ aircraft "flew" at low altitude while other components of an integrated EW effort countered most enemy radars. These are realistic tactics; as before, however, the interpretation of results is the problem. The non-ASPJ aircraft achieved 90% survivability. Navy evaluators concluded that a 30% increase meant 117% survivability--117% of the aircraft launched on a mission would have to return; an impossible condition to meet.(17:27) Incredible as this reasoning may seem, this published account was endorsed as correct by the Navy ASPJ project officer. (18) An internal memorandum from the Navy ASPJ office provides greater insight. It indicates that the recurring "30%" value is one of the earliest specifications associated with ASPJ, and one of the least-rational. Apparently, 30% was arbitrarily selected in the belief that applying such a measure would be years in the future, and the specification could then be revised to an appropriate number. As discussed by Capt. Small in 1989, it first indicated a decrease in enemy missile effectiveness: if an enemy system had an 80% probability of killing a non-ASPJ aircraft, then ASPJ had to reduce this to 50% to meet the specification.(8:1) No one apparently considered the possibility of an enemy system with only 25% effectiveness to begin with, much less how to define "effectiveness" to eliminate ambiguity. As ASPJ progressed, about the time Sen. Pryor developed interest in the program, Naval Research Laboratory realized the flawed logic of this measure and attempted to revise the entire effectiveness criteria. After all, other standards had been revised, and with less reason. Sen. Pryor, however, took note and chided the Navy for trying to change the rules to hide a failure. Rather than correct the flawed measure, the Navy accepted a new interpretation, "30% improvement in aircraft survivability," precipitating the ultimate failure.(8:2) An industry observer speculated that the Navy gave up on ASPJ. He theorized that "top Navy brass decided that the service, whose image had suffered because of the Tailhook scandal and its handling of the A-12 program, needed to placate Pryor" and enhance relations with the new Clinton administration.(17:27) Such a comment can only be speculation. It becomes believable, however, when considering the background of several important decisions. In review, the performance goals set for ASPJ were too ambitious. The system certainly demonstrated impressive capability by some measures, but by others it was deficient when evaluated against specifications--particularly reliability and effectiveness. Lessons from ASPJ include specification definition. Some of the original criteria, such as the volume to be occupied, were technically challenging but well-founded. The same cannot be said of other criteria, including both reliability and effectiveness, which seem to have been arbitrarily chosen and poorly defined. Further, Sen. Pryor's interest complicated the matter. Although ASPJ failed to meet specifications, this should have been acceptable since the system is clearly superior to alternatives, and prospects were good for effective service and future improvement. Precedents include the B-1 bomber and F-111, both of which progressed from inauspicious beginnings. In the case of ASPJ, however, Sen. Pryor's scrutiny made the deficiencies unacceptable. The Navy now owns around 100 ASPJ systems, enough to equip a quarter of its F-14 fleet. This leaves most Navy aircraft with other jammers, or none at all.(9:20) To fill the holes will take years of developing specifications, selecting systems, testing, modification, and production. DoD has spent an estimated $1.5 billion to get to this point in the program,(17:27) paying for years of development and testing. The cost could only be recovered if full-scale production resulted. In any case, the program has had indirect benefits, for components and processes from ASPJ have been incorporated into other systems. One source says the Navy intends to "review the need for an integrated electronic warfare system, "(9:20) which could indicate that the requirement for ASPJ may have expired, in the Navy's view. Meanwhile, Korea, Finland, and Switzerland appear interested in ASPJ for F-16s and FA-I8s operated by their air forces. (17:27) Finally, it is interesting to note another set of remarks made by Maj. Gen. Corder as turbulence built around ASPJ. In October 1990, as the Air Force Tactical Air Warfare Center commander, he said that he believed a new approach to electronic warfare was needed. He felt that airborne jammers had become too vulnerable to counter-countermeasures, too complex, and too costly.(28:42) These are remarkably similar to Dr. Currie's remarks fourteen years earlier. 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