Maritime Prepositioning Force: A Historical Analysis CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Maritime Prepositioning Force: A Historical Analysis Author: Major Bernard T. Burchell, Jr., United States Marine Corps Thesis: The evolution of Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) operations from concept to proven capability in the past fifteen years is one of this country's greatest success stories. This single innovation has dramatically strengthened our national military strategy. Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM not only validated this unique deployment and employment option, but also identified valuable lessons learned which will further refine future MPF operations - The current period of fiscal austerity within the defense establishment--expected to continue for the foreseeable future--demands judicious use of scarce resource. This factor, together with the uncertain tnreats to our national interests , makes MPF operations a Wise investment - particularly in its application as a crisis response to a variety of regional scenarios. Background: MPF operations represent a strategic deployment option for a supported combatant commander (Commander-in-Chief [CINC]) - Developed in the late 197Os to provide enhanced mobility for the Marine Corps , MPF operations are a complementary capability to the standard amphibious assault. MPF operatIons are both naval and joint in character and require the cooperation of many headquarters to ensure success - Although a benign arrival and assembly environment is its primary constraint, MPF operations provides a CINC a rapidly deployable force, capable of sustained combat ashore, and requiring comparativeIy minimal strategic mobiIity resources. Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM proved the value of this program; however, of eual importance might be the valuable lessons Iearned which will guide its refinement in the near future. An important post -Southwest Asia change has been the reconstitution of all three MPF squadrons into the four crisis action modules/deterrent force modules (CAMs/DFMs). This change further enhances MPF's force deployment flexibility by using specific ships to support specific contingencies. As a result of recent Marine Corps organizational changes, MPF training must be emphasized in order to retain the degree of expertise required to execute these unique operations. MPF, once described as an "ounce of prevention," is perhaps worth "a pound" in today's uncertain world of regional turbulence and fiscal constraints. Recommendation: The Marine Corps must continue to refine MPF operations by applying the Southwest Asia lessons learned and aggressIvely exercising the recent addition of CAMs/DFMs. OUTLINE Thesis; The evolution of Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) operations from concept to proven capability in the past fifteen years is one of this country's greatest success stories. This single innovation has dramatically strengthened our national military strategy. Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM not only validated this unique deployment and employment option, but also identified valuable lessons learned which will further refine future MPF operations. The current period of fiscal austerity within the defense establishment--expected to continue for the foreseeable future--demands judicious use of scarce resources. This factor, together with the uncertain threats to our national interests, makes MPF operations a wise investment-- particularly in its application as a crisis response to a variety of regional scenarios. I. What is MPF? A. Strategic deployment option 1. Combination of airlift, sealift, and afloat prepositioning 2. Complementary capability 3. Goal of MPF B. MPF components 1 . Marine Air-Ground Task Force 2. Maritime Prepositioning Force squadron and capabilities 3. Naval Support Element 4. Air Mobility Command 5. Blount Island Command C. MPF roles D. MPF limitations, considerations, and variables 1. Limitations 2. Considerations and variables E. MPF phases and organizations 1. Planning 2. Marshalling 3. Movement 4. Arrival and assembly II. Why MPF? A. Changing Marine Corps emphasis 1. Previously: amphibious assault only 2. Then: need to expand B. Historical influences 1. October l973 Arab-Israeli War 2. Mid-1970s debate on non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization requirements 3. Emerging concern for Southwest Asia region C. MPF's predecessors 1. 1979: Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 2. 1980: Near Term Prepositioning Ships (NTPS) program 3. 1981: Enhanced NTPS program III. Impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM A. Successes 1. MPF works. 2. Speed into area of responsibility 3. First truly capable force B. Lessons learned 1. Sail MPS earlier toward crisis area 2. Timely arrival of offload preparation party 3. Flow logisticians into MPF area earlier 4. Improve logitics automated information systems 5. Exercise aviation logistics support ships frequently 6. Develop doctrine explaining compositing MPF unit into a larger Marine Corps unit IV. MPF since Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and the future (?) A. The rule or the exception? B. Crisis action and force deterrence modules C. Disestablishment of Marine Expeditionary Brigades D. Prepositioning command? E. MPF squadron landing teams? F. Combine with amphibious operations? MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS The evolution of Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) operations from concept to proven capability over the past 15 years is one of this country's greatest success stories. This single innovation has dramatically strengthened our national military strategy. Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM not only validated this unique deployment and employment option, but also identified valuable lessons learned which will further refine future MPF operations. The current period of fiscal austerity within the defense establishment--expected to continue for the foreseeable future--demands judicious use of scarce resources. This factor, together with the uncertain threats to our national interests, makes MPF operations a wise investment--particularly in its application as a crisis response to a variety of regional scenarios. This essay reviews the development of MPF, looks at the impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and considers the changes to this vital military program since this landmark event. What is MPF? MPF operations are a strategic deployment option with three main components: the equipment and supplies for a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) prepositioned aboard forward deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), a Navy Support Element (NSE) for off-load and ship-to-shore movement, and a MAGTF that is flown into an arrival and assembly area to conduct subsequent operations ashore. (37:1-1/1-3) This basic definition portrays the important interrelationship between MPF operations and the remaining two military mobility elements--airlift and sealift. Airlift has the ability to respond very quickly, is particularly effective in personnel transportation, and maintains an "air bridge" for emergency supplies. Sealift has the ability to transport large quantities of equipment and supplies and is best suited for sustainment of military operations. Therefore, MPF operations represents a complementary capability created out of two distinct and interdependent elements. (18:17-18; 33:33-34) The goal of MPF operations is to deploy up to three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) with 30 days of sustainment to areas of conflict quickly. While doctrine identifies this time frame as 10 days from the commencement of squadron off-load, the deployed MAGTF is considered ready to operate when adequate equipment and supplies have been off-loaded and issued to the arriving units, command, control, and communications have been established ashore, and the MAGTF commander reports that his force is ready to operate. (35:63-1/1100-1; 37:1-4/1-5) The MAGTF assigned to MPF operations varies depending on the force employment requirement. Originally designed for a MEB consisting of approximately 16,500 personnel, today's size may range from a reduced Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to a forward element of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). (20:197) Regardless of the MAGTF chosen, that organization will retain its traditional command, ground combat, aviation combat (ACE), and combat service support elements. These elements, less the portion of the ACE responsible for the aircraft flight ferry to the arrival and assembly area, comprise the fly-in echelon (FIE) transported by the United States Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) Air Mobility Command (AMC). (24:110) The MPS was deployed during 1985 and 1986 and is configured into three squadrons totalling 13 ships. Located in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, this factor significantly enhances their flexibility and employment speed. In addition to these ships, two aviation logistics ships (T-AVB) and two hospital ships are available to augment MPF operations on each coast. These squadrons are commanded by a naval officer and under the operational control of the respective fleet commander. (24:112-113; 35:1565-6; 38:125) Civilian owned and operated under long-term charter through the USTRANSCOM's Military Sealift Command (MSC), MPS includes both constructed and converted ships. Its ability to conduct self-sustained instream discharge (to include use of the stern ramp), provide bulk liquid from two miles offshore, and conduct pierside discharge are the most prominent capabilities. (24:111; 35:1565-4/6/10) Additional MPS capabilities include a limited selective off-load capability, a helicopter landing deck, billeting for approximately 90 troops, the ability to handle containerized assets, and a roll-on/roll-off discharge facility. All of these ships have very large cargo capacities (between 120,000 and 150,000 square feet) and are equipped with stern ramps to enhance their off-load capability. It is this combination of capacity (water, fuel, ammunition, and equipment--in a RO/RO or containerized method) and instream/pierside capability that truly depicts MPF operations. (24:111; 35:1565-4/6/10) The mission of the NSE is to conduct the off-load of the MPS squadron. The NSE is the vital link between the equipment and supplies prepositioned aboard the ships and the MAGTF forces flown into the area. Accordingly, the NSE operates the ships' systems (such as cranes), all lighterage, and organizes and controls the beach (beachmaster functions) and/or port to ensure effective ship-to-shore movement. (35:1565-16; 37:D-1) AMC, while not an official component of MPF operations, provides two essential services. They provide the aircraft sorties for the MAGTF and NSE FIE forces (using both strategic aircraft and civil contract carriers), as well as the refueling support for both the FIE and the MAGTF's ACE flight ferry. Since the purpose of MPF operations is to combine the speed of airlift with the hauling power of sealift, the approximate 250 sortie limit is an important constraint. This factor-is especially important as one MPF is estimated to save more than 3,000 C-141 aircraft equipment sorties. As the MAGTF personnel and equipment structure changes, the MPF program must be constantly reviewed to ensure this FIE sortie threshold is not exceeded. (4:31-32; 35:1565-5; 37:7-7/7-9) Although the previously discussed organizations all play a vital role in MPF operations, there is probably no organization more important that the Blount Island Command (BIC) located in Jacksonville, Florida. BIC is a subordinate organization to the Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases and although not an official component of MPF operations, it is responsible for the maintenance of MPF equipment and supplies. This effort involves a 60-day cycle whereby a ship is off-loaded and while it undergoes maintenance and Coast Guard recertification, its precious cargo receives the necessary corrective maintenance, preventive maintenance, and modernization prior to reloading. It is this biennial maintenance cycle (BMC) which ensures the combat readiness of the MPF operations. (4:31; 17:48-49; 37:E-3) The varying roles of MPF operations offer a combatant commander (Commander-In-Chief [CINC]) several choices. They serve both as an alternative to other forms of power projection (such as an amphibious assault), as well a reinforcement of an amphibious operation (such as the use of a MEU as the enabling force in an opposed landing). They can effect a rapid and pre-emptive occupation and defense of key points, occupy and reinforce advanced naval bases, and augment fleet defense by supporting air operations from ashore. MPF operations are capable of a wide spectrum of influence from their establishment of a sizeable force ashore in support of a sustained operation to sending political signals in support of an ally or other friendly power. (3:34-35; 38:123) It is important to recognize not only the benefits of MPF operations, but also their key limitations, considerations, and variables. MPF operations require an early employment decision, particularly for the MPS squadron. Although they represent an economy of force measure, they require a benign environment. Specifically, a secure airfield and port/beach is vital. All such terminals must be large enough and have the requisite facilities-- commonly called throughout capacity--to permit timely force closure. There must be an adequate transportation network (roads and/or railroads) to permit a timely and safe merger of airlifted personnel and sealifted equipment. (37:1-3) Another key consideration of MPS operations is in their sequencing of forces ashore; herein, the preponderance of the ground element is usually introduced into the area after significant combat service support elements are ashore to initiate off-load actions. (3:36-37) The security of the MPS squadron, an obvious factor as it transits from its normal operating area into a crisis environment, requires the efforts of many headquarters given their approximate $400 million per ship investment. (26:30) The main variables influencing MPF operations are the size and composition of the MAGTF being employed, the number of MPS and the airlift sorties required, the geography and infrastructure of the arrival and assembly area, and the time required to complete MPF operations. (35:1100-16) There are four distinct phases of an MPF operation: planning, marshalling, movement, and arrival and assembly. (37:1-6) Throughout these phases, there are four organizations which accomplish actions vital to the success of MPF operations: Off-load preparation Party (OPP), Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party (SLRP), advance party, and the off-load, arrival, and assembly party. (4:33; 5:15; 35:1100-17/18/19) Planning, while occurring throughout the entire operation, is particularly evident in the period prior to marshalling. It consists of both contingency and execution planning, with the latter beginning upon receipt of a warning order. This action involves the cooperation of all previously identified MPF components. While MPF operations are essentially naval in character, they take place within a joint force environment and are dependent upon USTRANSCOM support. (37:1-6/3-1) During the marshalling phase, units complete final preparations for movement to aerial ports of embarkation and loading aboard aircraft. The marshalling phase begins upon arrival of the first element at the designated marshalling point and ends upon departure of the last element from a departure airfield. (37:1-6) The movement phase consists of the movement of the forces by air and sea to the arrival and assembly area (AAA). The movement phase begins upon lift-off of the first aircraft from the departure airfield, or when the MPS squadron begins its transit to a designated AAA. The phase ends when both the last FIE aircraft (to include the ACE flight ferry) lands and the last MPS ship has arrived at the AAA. It is during the movement phase that the four previously identified MPF organizations begin their deployment to the AAA. (37:1-6/7-2) The arrival and assembly phase is the most crucial period of MPF operations. This phase begins with the arrival of the first aircraft of the main body or the first MPS squadron ship. This phase ends when the goal of MPF operations has been attained--the MAGTF is operationally ready for combat. (37:1-6/7) The OPP, created from the MAGTF and NSE, deploys to the MPS squadron while en route to prepare the ships and prepositioned equipment for debarkation and provide any required internal security. The SLRP, also created from the MAGTF and NSE, deploys to the AAA to conduct the initial reconnaissance, establish liaison with local authorities, determine the extent of host nation support required, and generally prepare for the arrival of the main body of ships and personnel. They also form the nucleus of the command and control organization for the off-load actions. (4:33; 5:15; 35:1100-18; 37:7-1) The advance party, also-created from the MAGTF and NSE, arranges for the reception of the main body and FIE. The off-load, arrival, and assembly operations is marked by the arrival of the main body and the ACE flight ferry, throughput of all or selected prepositioned equipment-and supplies, and MAGTF unit assembly with their initial operating capability. (4:33; 5:15; 35:1100-17/19; 37:7-1/2) Why MPF? MPF operations marked a significant change in Marine Corps philosophy. Previously, the Marine Corps' primary role was an infantry-intensive arm with a heavy dependence on fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft for firepower and mobility. This concept was epitomized in the Marine Corps main function--conventional amphibious assault, or forcible entry--which formed the backbone of the forward deployment foundation of our national military strategy. (38:122; 39:52) The early through mid-1970s marked a time of conflicting trends. The military confronted increasingly poor public support as a result of the Vietnam War, and this mood directly translated into institutional problems marked by reduced budgets and severe personnel problems. During the period after the Vietnam War, a review of this World War II philosophy of amphibious assault demanded a change. There were two primary reasons for this actions. First, the type of military/political crises seen for the foreseeable future called for the existence of rapid intervention forces, both airborne and amphibious. Secondly, the current amphibious assault philosophy required more amphibious lift than was available. Therefore, the Marine Corps needed to combine a rapid intervention force that still maintained substantial organic mobility and firepower. (38:122; 39:52) Additional historical influences were also at work at this time. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War caused the Marine Corps to question the survivability of its amphibious forces in a new "high tech" battlefield using modern weaponry. This war also ended an era which identified the Marine Corps' primary opponent as only lightly armed Third World countries. Now, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the emerging role of the Marine Corps within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)--with the Warsaw Pact's formidable armor-heavy and firepower intensive forces--increased the urgency of this review. (39:52) By the late 1970s, this situation was changing. While the domestic support for the military was improving, the focal point of our national interests now included the economically valuable Southwest Asian region. Given the geography of this region and the potential adversaries, a heavier mechanized force would be needed. This change enhanced the requirement for a power projection capability, yet did not immediately translated into the mobility improvements necessary to deploy and ultimately employ a capable force. (39:52) The result of this deficiency between requirements and capabilities ultimately resulted in today's MPF; however, this process evolved over time. The Navy first developed the idea of maritime prepositioning of military supplies for the Army or Marine Corps during the mid-1960s; however, the Vietnam War delayed its implementation for over a decade. Between February 1977 and February 1979, the Carter administration had determined that a requirement existed for an improved non-NATO military capability. This decision marked the beginning of both the MPF program and the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), a totally distinct program. (3:35; 38:123) Between March and August 1979, the RDF program continued to grow and was subsequently renamed the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)--today's Central Command. As this process continued, the Secretary of the Navy directed that the Navy Department initiate a program of enhanced mobility for Marine Corps forces. Although not specifically titled as such, this decision marked the beginning of MPF. The feasibility studies initially considered various draft designs for a series of warships; however, concurrent tests of this concept by modifying a group of chartered commercial vessels was also conducted. The success of these tests and the advent of hostilities in Iran and Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in the birth of the Near Term Prepositioned Ships (NTPS). (3:35-36; 31:20-21) Deployed in 1980, NTPS initially involved six commercial ships loaded with sufficient equipment to sustain a 11,200 man Marine Corps brigade for 15 days. During the next two years, an expanded effort--Enhanced NTPS (ENTPS)--increased the number of ships to 12, expanded the sustainment for the brigade to 30 days, and also included ships containing Army and Air Force supplies. In 1983, NTPS and ENTPS merged and became known as the Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF). The portion of this force remaining after the deployment of the MPS squadrons in 1985 and 1986 became today's afloat prepositioning (another subset of MSC's strategic sealift assets). (3:36; 9:E-15; 17:48; 31:21) Impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Prior to August 1990, MPF operations were still in their infancy. Just beginning to be incorporated into the various CINCs' campaign plans, MPF employment during major exercises was able to test major portions of the entire operation. With this as a background, their use in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM can only be viewed as an unqualified success. This comment is even more noteworthy given the fact that all three MPS squadrons were employed. Validated under real-world pressure, MPF operations provided the first truly capable force in northern Saudi Arabia. The goal to unload ships and marry equipment with arriving units was achieved within the expected 10 days. In fact, the first brigade (7th MEB) occupied its defensive positions within four days of its arrival. The first nine MPS ships, off-loaded by the first week of September 1990, provided the equipment and 30 days sustainment for two-thirds of the Marine Corps forces ashore. The late deployment of Army logistics forces strained Marine Corps logistics capabilities, and the Marine Corps found themselves not only providing support beyond the 60-day sustainment, but also providing selected support to Army combat forces from MPS stores. (9:E-15/ F-11; 14:73) MPF operations proved themselves to be a wise investment of scarce mobility assets. The prepositioned equipment removed from their temperature- and humidity-controlled storage holds was in good shape. This fact is a testament to the BMC and its upkeep of both the shipboard facilities and the equipment itself, as well as the periodic unloading exercises which occurred. The spread loading concept was validated as late arriving ships (due to ongoing BMC actions at the time hostilities commenced) did not result in any critically short items. A particular highlight was the responsiveness and professionalism displayed by the merchant crews. (27:44) The ships, themselves, proved to be the most reliable of all MSC assets. Several MPS ships transferred to common user status and assisted in transporting the Army's heavy European units. Additionally, MPS ships did not suffer as many mechanical problems as the MSC's fast sealift ships because of their superior propulsion plant design and their state of constant readiness. (12:125) As important as the successes, there were also several crucial lessons learned. Although not unique to MPF operations, the lack of a compositing doctrine confused the integration of the 1st and 7th MEBs, as well as the later arriving 2nd MEF, into the senior Marine Corps organization--lst MEF. The lack of an earlier decision to sail the MPS squadrons because of political considerations reduced the CINC's options in the early days of the crisis. The OPP concept, only used once in its intended form because of the uncertain tactical situation in early August 1990, was also validated. The T-AVBs worked well once in theater; however, they require more frequent exercising to ensure rapid response. (9:xi/E-31; 15:18-19; 35:936-13) The reduced accountability for MPF assets off-loaded to 7th MEB was also chiefly driven by the uncertain tactical situation in early August 1990; however, the doctrinal FIE sequencing of combat service support elements is sound. The overall supply operations during the MPF off-load and issue to MAGTF units required improvement, particularly in its logistics automated information systems. Additionally, although the MPS ships have significant container carrying capability, this operation revealed a lack of training focusing on accountability procedures for the contents, as well as insufficient materiel handling equipment (MHE). (9:xi) MPF Since Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and the Future (?) While Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM did validate the MPF concept, two points must be emphasized. First, the Saudi Arabian port facilities were most probably the "best case scenario" the Marine Corps will ever witness. As a contrasting example, the ongoing Somalian peace-making operation, while still successfully employing MPF, confronted a meager infrastructure. The importance of turning the lessons learned into improved doctrine and enhanced capabilities can not be overstated. Second, the impact of this operation to our current readiness posture is highlighted by the estimated $90 million cost to restock and refurbish the three MPS squadrons by 1994. (7:99) Following, Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the Marine Corps made a significant change to MPF operations which will permit increase flexibility and responsiveness to a broader range of regional contingencies. Specifically, the crisis action modules (CAMs) and deterrent force modules (DFMs) were introduced. CAMs/DFMs enhance the force deployment flexibility by using specific MPF ships to support specific contingencies. (29:19-20) They may also be used in "building blocks" of forces to provide the CINC even greater leverage. (25:14) A total of four force modules were developed concurrent with the reconstitution of the three MPS squadrons. The first module provides the ability to support a MEU-sized force throughout its wide range of special operations capable missions. The next two modules involve the forward echelon of a MEF (MEF[Fwd]) configured for a low-intensity conflict scenario. They vary by number of MPS ships assigned, the use of a FIE, and the ability to deploy to two locations simultaneously. The final module reflects the same heavy mechanized MAGTF (the now obsolete term "MEB") noted in the pre-1990 time frame. (29:19-20) While these CAMs/DFMs have their aforementioned strengths, several issues must be resolved to maximize their effectiveness. The FIE must be restructured from its long accustomed form. The same MHE problems noted in Southwest Asia must be resolved, or they will be passed on to the MEU level. Regarding the MEU level, MPF operational knowledge--never before a requirement for this size MAGTF--must now be expeditiously acquired through training and painstaking practice. Finally, the Navy must provide the task organization for the NSEs associated with these CAMs/DFMs. (29:20) This concept of-merging capabilities has been taken to even a farther extreme with the idea of amphibious battle groups. Here, the recommendation involves combining the ships of a carrier battle group (CVBG), an amphibious group (PHIBGRU), in addition to selected MPS ships. The desired goal is a PHIBGRU with the increased combat power provide by the CVBG and the sustainment provided by the MPS. The problem with such an idea is not having enough of a particular (or all) strength to cope with today's uncertain challenges to our national interests. (21:103) While these CAMs/DFMs promote increased flexibility of MPF operations, they are also constrained by the recent dissolution of the MEB headquarters. Caused by the on-going military reductions, the impact of this change will be critical for the short term in the areas of training and planning. It will be awhile before the MEF headquarters can lay claim, as the MEBs once did, to being the bastion of MPF operational expertise. (29:20) As a result of the MEB headquarters dissolution, an idea worthy of consideration is the conversion of BIC into a prepositioning command. Although the MEF headquarters is also being expanded at this time to address their operational tempo, the MPF responsibilities inherited from their respective MEB headquarters are extensive--not to mention the recent advent of CAMs/DFMs. Without dedicated expertise and consistency in planning and training, the impact on MPF operations could be felt where we can least afford it--the ability of a MAGTF to be combat ready in a timely manner. (5:14-15) Remembering the approximate $400 million investment per vessel, MPS ship security remains an issue for debate. While there have been recommendations to "arm" a MPS ship by placing a squadron landing team aboard, their replacement of the current OPP concept would degrade the ship's capability to debark equipment and supplies in the AAA. Additionally, the ability of CAMs/DFMs to link selected MPF ships with a MEU should provide the augmented security locally. Of course, the time-honored policy of CINC security for a MPS squadron as it transits his area of responsibility remains the key for pre-AAA movement. (22:52; 26:30; 28:47) CONCLUSION The utility of MPF operations is their ability to permit a CINC to address the following pillars of our national military strategy: the foundation of crisis response and the principles of strategic agility and power projection. (10:2-4/2-8) This capability is derived from combining the advantages of airlift's speed with sealift's capacity for bulk lift for rapid deployment of expeditionary forces and accompanying supplies to an objective area. (36:2-5) Therefore, rather than a liability, MPF operations represent an important strategic lift multiplier. (9:D-17) The Marine Corps' MPF doctrinal manual says it best: "MPF operations provides a capability that is global in nature, naval in character, and is suitable for employment in a variety of circumstances." (37:ES-1) A wise investment, MPF operations is able to realize a certain economy due to their use of merchant ships instead of combatant ships and aircraft sorties, while generating substantial strategic/operational and tactical leverage through its forward deployment of heavy equipment to potential crisis areas. (16:27; 39:52) It is important to reiterate that while MPF operations offers a CINC increased flexibility, it does not replace the forcible entry or amphibious assault capability. It does, however, provides a rapid pre-emptive response capability by positioning a significant force before a conflict to enhance global response with, if necessary, a force-building alternative. (38:123) The task for the Marine Corps today is to build on the success of MPF operations in Southwest Asia. We must apply the lessons learned--particularly those associated with insufficient doctrine, equipment, and accountability--to refine this valuable strategic asset. We must pursue the opportunities presented by CAMs/DFMs and continue to seek a better way to accomplish the mission. Finally, we must continue to stress training and ensure it remains the backbone of this program. General P.X. Kelley, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, said this about the MPF program in 1988: "The most important and innovative of our critical response enhancements is now a reality. .. I am a firm believer that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure..." 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