Declining Strategic Mobility: A Tread We Must Reverse Now CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Declining Strategic Mobility: A Tread We Must Reverse Now Author: Major Alan K. Baker, United States Air Force Thesis: Recent wars in the Falkland Islands and Persian Gulf very clearly demonstrate that transportation and logistical support are the Foundation of successful military capability today. Unfortunately, the United States is growing dangerously short of airlift and sealift: a worsening strategic mobility problem that must be resolved now to assure effective U.S. military responsiveness. Background: According to the 1981 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study, today's army has far more divisions than the Air Force can rapidly deploy overseas with existing C-5 and C-141 assets. Addressing this airlift shortfall, numerous mobility studies over the past two decades have concluded the C-17 aircraft is the solution for today's airlift crisis. This new airlifter can fly long ranges, carry outsize cargo, and provide the tactical performance and agility to operate into virtually any airfield in the world. Like airlift, sealift is also becoming an increasingly important element in America's national security strategy. Congress' Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense reached the conclusion that the United States possesses insufficient ships and merchant marine manpower to rapidly deploy required forces to a distant theater such as Southwest Asia. The Commission also concluded that, without decisive action, the situation will worsen substantially by the year 2000. Short-term enhancements within the Navy's Ready Reserve Fleet and various other sealift work-arounds cannot replace the capability lost by the U.S. merchant marine over the last 40 years. If the United States is to continue as the world's military and economic leader, the majority of its sealift capability should reside in a strong U.S.-Flag commercial shipping industry. Furthermore, we must possess a merchant marine capable of supporting the nation's considerable peacetime needs and wartime obligations. Conclusion: Although the C-17 acquisition and the Ready Reserve Fleet improvements will provide much needed enhancements to our airlift and sealift fleets, these programs fall far short as long-term remedies for our declining strategic mobility. UnFortunately, the prognosis for any improvement of the magnitude required to overcome our mobility shortfall is not encouraging. If the United States is to maintain its superpower status and continue commanding the leadership role of the Free World, then as a nation we must recognize and accept the responsibility of ensuring that sufficient strategic mobility exists to meet the challenges of an uncertain world. OUTLINE Thesis: Recent wars in the Falkland Islands and Persian Gulf very clearly demonstrate that transportation and logistical support are the Foundation of successful military capability today. Unfortunately, the United States is growing dangerously short of airlift and sealift: a worsening strategic mobility problem that must be resolved now to assure effective U.S. military responsiveness I. Strategic Mobility A. Secretary of Defense Weinberger's definition B. Historical significance C. Relevance today D. Future importance II. The Airlift Perspective A. General Vuono's view B. 1882 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study C. Current shortfall example D. C-17 aircraft as a solution 1. Comparison to other options 2. "Direct delivery", capability 3. Improved design features 4. Mission versatility 5. Cost effectiveness 6. Procurement status III. The Sealift Perspective A. Admiral Crowe's view B. Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense findings C. Declining merchant marine manpower pool D. Diminishing U.S.-flag commercial fleet E. Military Sealift Command's reaction 1. Increasing inventory of Navy's Ready Reserve Force 2. Improving usefulness of Ready Reserve Force 3. Acquiring Fast Sealift Ships F. Recommended sealift solutions 1. Revitalizing commercial maritime industry 2. Restoring merchant marine manpower pool 3. Rejuvenating U.S.-flag commercial fleet 4. Promoting advanced sealift technologies IV. Concluding Observations A. National security greatly dependent on quantitative and qualitative sufficiency of strategic mobility B. Mobility requirements must be balanced with capability C. Only short-term remedies exist for declining capability D. Strategic mobility must become a higher priority national objective to ensure sufficient capability exists to meet challenges of an uncertain world DECLINING STRATEGIC MOBILITY: A TREND WE MUST REVERSE NOW When Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was asked to comment on the mobility of America's fighting forces, he remarked that waging war requires the ability to move, shoot, and communicate. Furthermore, he explained that the order of these three requirements is not accidental. Shooting is what most people focus on since weapons are the most significant items in the defense budget. Communication, which today involves such innovative systems and technologies as satellites and fiber optics, is essential to almost every aspect of defense. But the ability to move forces and equipment--our strategic mobility--is first on the list. (11:12) Recent wars in the Falkland Islands and Persian Gulf very clearly support Secretary Weinberger's view that transportation and logistical support are the foundation of successful military capability today. Unfortunately, the United States is growing dangerously short of airlift and sealift: a worsening strategic mobility problem that must be resolved now to assure effective military responsiveness. It is clearly pointless to have the best-trained, best-equipped military forces in the world if we cannot transport and support them where and when they are needed. The problem requires coordinated action from the Executive branch, the Congress, the Department of Defense, and the private sector. These organizations must act while there is still a chance to achieve the necessary results at a reasonable cost. If they delay, our current capability may disappear, and there may be no alternative but radical action at prohibitively high cost. Strategic mobility is especially critical in today's world, where the interests of all nations extend far beyond their individual borders, and where interdependency among nations has reached such proportions that it is taken for granted. The protection of America's vital national interests and the security of our allies demand an ability to project decisive military power wherever circumstances may dictate. Since the United States has neither the economic resources, nor the political latitude to station forces everywhere they may be needed, we depend upon our capability to rapidly deploy and sustain military forces anywhere in the world. Service departments have ensured our armed forces are equipped with the systems they need to perform their vital defense functions. The world's best fighter aircraft, tanks, and warships, new communications gear, and renewed stocks of spare parts and munitions are now being employed by well- trained, combat-ready American forces. Our defense rebuilding effort has renewed the promise of greater security through stronger and more capable forces. But that will be an empty promise if our forces cannot arrive when and where they are needed; if fuel, parts, and munitions remain stateside or in depots awaiting transport; or if follow-on forces cannot arrive promptly with sufficient firepower to reinforce our rapid deployment forces. General Carl E. Vuono, former Army Chief of Staff, commented that his major concern in the event of conventional war is the army's biggest vulnerability: lack of sufficient strategic lift. (12:66) According to the 1981 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study and subsequent updates, the Army can't get to war on time today, won't be able to in the foreseeable future, and is becoming harder to move, not easier. The Army has worked hard to improve its strategic deployability by creating new light infantry divisions. But since mechanized divisions are 40 percent heavier than in 1980, the Army requires over a third more airlift to move its stateside- based forces into battle than it did just 12 years ago. (12:68) For example, it takes 29,591 C-141 and 4,361 C-5 sorties to move all the Army's stateside-based active and reserve divisions overseas. Today, Air Mobility Command has only 245 C-141s and 114 C-5s. (2:5) Given a hypothetical contingency in which no airlift is required for deployment of tactical air squadrons or Marines; in which the airlift force flies around-the-clock, back-to-back sorties; and in which all the planes are loaded and unloaded instantaneously; it would take 84 days to get the Army to war by C-141 and 26 days to move all its outsize cargo in C-5s. Compounding the situation, Army forces typically account for only about half the initial lift requirement. (12:68) It's apparent from these calculations that the Army has far more assets than the Air Force can rapidly deploy overseas with the existing airlift fleet. Addressing this shortfall, numerous mobility studies over the past two decades have reached a single, consistent conclusion: the C-17 aircraft is the solution for today's airlift crisis. All these studies called for a new U.S. airlifter that can fly long ranges, carry outsize cargo, and provide the tactical performance and agility to operate into virtually any airfield in the world. The most recent of these analyses was conducted at the request of former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. The study looked at a wide array of options in comparison to the C-17 program, including refurbishment of the C-141 force and procurement of other aircraft such as the C-5 or civil transports. Secretary Cheney summarized the results in his annual report to the President and the Congress when he said, "The C-17 offered the most capability at the least cost in every case." (7:102) The C-17 combines current technologies to create a revolutionary capability the Air Force calls "direct delivery." (1:13) Using this new strategy, cargo and personnel can be flown from the United States or elsewhere directly to where they are needed, eliminating the current necessity for transshipment at an intermediate location. In effect, the C-17 integrates the advantages of a strategic airlifter like the C-5--range, speed, aerial refueling, and payload (including outsize cargo)--with those of a tactical airlifter like the C-130--survivability, ability to operate into unimproved airfields, maneuverability in the air and on the ground, and the ability to employ different parachute delivery methods. The C-17's highly flexible design enables it to efficiently meet the nation's airlift needs across the entire range of potential scenarios. This multi-role capability is particularly valuable when considering the increasing uncertainty of future operating environments. The C-17's increased capability is the result of the interrelated technologies and design criteria incorporated in the new aircraft. The aircraft features a wide, high cargo box inside an airframe with roughly the same external dimensions as a C-141. This results in an aircraft that can carry the same types of cargo as a C-5 but in a much more compact vehicle. The C-17's capability to operate into underdeveloped airfields is enhanced by the use of powered lift, enabling the aircraft to approach runways at much lower speeds and steeper glide paths than conventional airlifters. It can thus land within very short distances with very heavy cargo loads--less than 3,000 feet with over 187,000 pounds of cargo. Another of the critical features of the C-17 is that it will be the first operational jet airlifter capable of backing up without the assistance of ground tugs. These features would open up three times as many airfields worldwide to the C-17 as are currently useable by the C-5 and C-141. (1:15-16) The ability of the C-17 to perform a full range of aerial delivery missions also adds to its value. It can airdrop paratroopers, equipment, and supplies; employ the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System; and airdrop and extract outsize equipment. It will be able to airdrop with precision, over long ranges, at night, and in reduced visibility conditions. The C-17's capabilities are unmatched by any other airlifter today. Enhanced survivability and reduced life cycle cost are other important aspects oF the C-17's design. Its reinforced airframe was engineered to easily withstand the rugged military flight environment. The aircraft features separated and redundant systems and self-inerting fuel tanks. The C-17 was also designed from the outset to operate more efficiently and cost-effectively than any airlifter in the force. It will be able to deliver approximately double the cargo of a C-14l for approximately the same operating cost. The cost-effectiveness is largely the result of improved fuel efficiency. It is also the product of advanced design, which enables a crew of three to fly the aircraft, and from significant improvements in reliability and maintainability, which produce a substantial reduction in the number of maintenance man-hours per flight hour. (1:19) The C-17 is also the first aircraft acquisition to include a manufacturer's warranty, which guarantees this investment in airlift capability well into the future. The C-17 procurement program is underway. The aircraft is being built by McDonnell Douglas at its Long Beach facility. The program will replace the aging C-141 fleet with new C-17s to maintain cargo capacity at approximately today's level through the end of the century. The first four aircraft are currently undergoing rigorous validation testing and evaluation. The test phase is ahead of schedule and initial results are very encouraging. The first operational aircraft is scheduled for delivery to Charleston Air Force Base in late 1993. Recent Department of Defense budget reductions have slowed production and reduced the 1993 delivery schedule from eight to six aircraft. Eight additional aircraft are planned for delivery in 1994, with 12 per year after that until a total inventory of 120 aircraft is reached. (7:102) If all we wanted to do was turn around our current airlift shortfall, the C-17 would be the most cost-effective solution. However, the C-17 offers much more. It offers the potential to increase U.S. airlift capability at a greatly reduced life cycle cost. Investment to date in the C-17 has been significant, and future investment requirements will be even more substantial. Still, the return on investment in terms of national security benefit more than justifies the expense. General Duane H. Cassidy, Commander in Chief of the Military Airlift Command, summarized the case for the C-17 during his testimony to Congress when he stated: I am confident the C-17 is the most cost effective solution to meeting this country's airlift require- ments. From cost and manpower savings to military utility, the C-17 is the key to providing our theater commanders the airlift support they need. (5:4) Like airlift, sealift is also becoming an increasingly important element in America's national security strategy. The shortage of strategic sealift is not a new development. Its growing seriousness has been recognized by Congress as well as the nation's defense leaders. Admiral William J. Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked, "...in this country, the capacity of our merchant marine...is dismal. It is a disaster. The maritime industry.. needs an infusion. It needs help. It needs resurrecting. It is a national problem." (4:70) Under the Reagan Administration, more than $7-billion was invested in sealift assets controlled by both the Navy and the Maritime Administration. Despite those efforts, the situation worsened since the increased number of government-controlled ships was insufficient to offset the continuing decline in the oceangoing commercial fleet. From 2,114 ships in 1947, the active merchant marine fleet shrank to 543 in 1980, and to 420 in 1992. Only 168 of those 420 ships are militarily useful cargo vessels, and this total is forecasted to drop to 119 in 1995, and to 35 in 2005. (10:1-1) Congress established a Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense to examine sealift capability. Even using a "best case" analysis with the most favorable assumptions, the Commission reached the conclusion that the United States possessed insufficient ships to execute a major deployment in a contin- gency operation to a single distant theater such as Southwest Asia. This conclusion was startling because there had been a widespread assumption that, although the United States could not itself meet all the strategic sealift requirements for a global war, it did have the resources needed for a single-theater conventional conflict. The Commission also concluded that, without decisive action, the situation will worsen substantially by the year 2000. (4:71) More worrisome, perhaps, is the declining availability of the manpower needed to activate and operate the ships of our reserve fleets. The presumption has been that manpower would come from the portion of the merchant marine workforce not actively sailing at the time. However, as the size of the commercial fleet shrinks, so does the size of the workforce that it supports. The merchant marine has declined by more than 60 percent since 1970 and, if current trends continue, will have a shortfall in the year 2000 of more than 12,000 personnel from the 22,000 necessary to man all the strategic sealift ships required during war or national emergency. (4:72) The steadily eroding capability of the U.S. merchant marine has not been ignored by the Department of Defense. In response to the diminishing size of the U.S.-flag commercial fleet, the Navy has begun to increase the number and capability of organic sealift assets owned and controlled by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). MSC shipping comes primarily from two sources: the MSC nucleus fleet of government-owned and long-term chartered vessels currently operating in support of peacetime military operations; and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) of ships maintained in reserve for contingencies. Included in the latter category is the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), ships which are maintained in an upgraded material condition permitting them to be activated in a 5, 10, or 20-day period. The most significant upgrade to MSC capability involves increasing lift capacity and improving the readiness status of the RRF. In 1987, this force contained 77 dry cargo ships, 8 tankers, and 1 schoolship that could be used as a troopship. Realizing the need to compensate for the decreasing number of U.S.-flag commercial vessels, the Navy intends to expand the RRF from the current 97 ships to a goal of 104 dry cargo ships, 36 tankers, and 2 troopships by 1987. (6:94) Improvements in MSC capability have not been limited just to increasing numbers of ships. Equally important have been improvements in the types of vessels as well as their associated lift and operating characteristics. Receiving the most recent attention have been the acquisition and subsequent conversion of eight SeaLand SL-7 container vessels into Fast Sealift Ships. These ships, formerly the largest container vessels in the world, were converted to a predominantly roll-on, roll-off configuration, each capable of carrying the equipment of an entire Army mechanized division. With speeds in excess of 30 knots, they are far less susceptible to enemy attack, and can sail from the east coast to Europe in 96 hours. (9:144) Having scrapped or salvaged many older and deteriorated assets, the majority of ships remaining in the RRF represent the more modern and most militarily useful vessels in the American inventory. They include roll-on, roll-off vessels, barge carriers, breakbulk ships, specially modified tankers, and crane ships to unload containerships and facilitate logistics-over-the-shore operations. (8:29) What's the verdict on the trend to expand the Navy's organic sealift capability and rely less heavily on our commercial merchant marine? The answer is both good and bad. In the next Few years, the United States must take measures to insure we have the sealift needed to support our national strategy, and to be able to deliver the required amounts of fighting forces to overseas theaters. In the wake of the precipitous decline in the U.S. merchant marine and the absence of a viable national maritime policy to reverse this situation, the Department of Defense would be remiss not to develop alternate sources for sealift. But, if the decline in the U.S. merchant marine can be reversed and this industry restored to a position of strength, a U.S. commercial fleet would prove a far more cost-effective and reliable sealift source than an attempt to procure, maintain, and upon mobilization, activate organic Navy vessels in support of national defense. Federal maritime policy must establish a prudent balance between the Navy's organic and U.S. commercial sealift. The efforts of the military to reduce the sealift shortfall are laudatory. However, short-term enhancements within MSC's organic fleet and various other sealift work-arounds such as expanded use of foreign-flag carriers, while important to our overall sealift effort, cannot replace the capability lost by the U.S. merchant marine over the last 40 years. Likewise, organic military shipping cannot equal the potential offered by a restored and rejuvenated U.S.-flag fleet. There will always be a requirement for some specialized organic military sealift; however, the Department of Defense and Congress must realize that the majority of our sealift capability should be drawn from U.S.-flag commercial shipping. Such a policy promotes the economic well-being of the country and avoids duplicating in the military a capability that can be provided by private industry. Furthermore, the United States should fully promote advanced sealift technologies such as that offered by surface effects shipping. This newest form of sealift uses self- generating, air-cushioning techniques to achieve high speeds and low draft conditions. These innovations offer the potential to carry increasing amounts of breakbulk cargoes at speeds approaching 60 knots. When viewed from the perspective of productivity, as measured in numbers of ship sailings and cargo delivered during a set period of time, this high priced technology may well prove cost effective and the best means to expedite sealift shipments, decrease transportation costs, and reduce sealift attrition. (3:116) If the United States is to continue as the world's military and economic leader, we must possess a merchant marine capable oF supporting the nation's considerable peacetime needs and wartime obligations. Yet today, more than 96 percent of U.S. oceanborne trade is carried on foreign vessels, and the execution of our conventional military strategy and associated war plans is heavily dependent on considerable allied support and additional augmentation from unproven and unreliable "flags of convenience" shipping. (14:98) This need not be the case. The U.S. merchant marine can and should be restored to a position of strength. The Department of Defense, Congress, and maritime industry must coordinate their efforts to achieve this end. During this century, the United States assumed the leadership role of the Free World and learned that the ability to project military power in a timely manner is an essential element of our effectiveness in that role. Most recently, Operation Desert Shield/Storm proved that the ability to deploy forces to the far corners of the earth and sustain those forces in combat is the keystone of America's ability to project power and to protect its vital interests. Our national security strategy remains greatly dependent on the quantitative and qualitative sufficiency of our strategic mobility. There must be a balance between available strategic lift capability and the requirements for that lift which are used in planning contingency operations. Ideally, strategic lift should be sized to meet contingency objectives. If that is not possible, then the operation plan should be adjusted accordingly to compensate for the shortfall in lift capability. Currently, there seems to be a growing tendency by defense planners to accept a strategic lift shortfall as a planning risk while continuing to plan for the use of combat forces that simply cannot be deployed in a timely manner or sustained once in place. Such an irrational approach to contingency planning does not reflect prudent risk; it reflects pure folly. As this paper revealed, because of worsening airlift and sealift shortfalls, the United States may no longer be capable of deploying its forces to areas of vital interest in the numbers or in the time frame essential for success. Only recently did decisionmakers recognize this trend and begin making corrections to improve immediate airlift and sealift capabilities. If these undertakings materialize, the next several years will provide much needed enhancements to our airlift and sealift fleets. Yet, if our leaders are at all cognizant of the threats still facing this country, it is apparent that the C-17 acquisition and the Ready Reserve Fleet improvements fall far short as long-term remedies for our inadequate strategic mobility. Shrinking Department of Defense budgets threaten the continuation of these short-term efforts, and programs planned for the next decade at best serve only as a bandaid to our chronic strategic lift ailment. A quote made almost 30 years ago by General David Shoup, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, is still valid as, "Today we actually have more fight than ferry in the armed forces." (13:987) As was highlighted in this paper, there is valid concern that the strategic lift capability of the United States is not sufficient to meet its global commitments. We must either reconsider the requirements or develop the necessary airlift and sealift capability. The former is unlikely in the post-Cold War environment, and the latter promises to be a long and costly task; but if we are going to deploy our forces where they are needed and sustain them once they are in place, we need to make strategic mobility a higher priority national objective than it is now. Unfortunately, the prognosis for any improvement, especially sealift, of the magnitude required to overcome our capabilities-versus-requirements imbalance is not encouraging. Should the nation make the conscious decision not to increase its strategic lift capability, then among the alternatives to consider is one very sobering thought: the United States may, through default, be forced to scale down its global commitments below the threshold of its national interests. There is a cost associated with superpower status and in commanding the leadership role of the Free World. If the United States is to maintain that status and continue in that role, then as a nation, we must recognize and accept the responsibility of ensuring that sufficient strategic mobility exists to meet the challenges of an uncertain world. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Airlift and U.S. National Security: The Case For the C-17. Washington, D.C.: Secretary of the Air Force, 1991. 2. Air Mobility Command: Its Purpose and Mission. Pamphlet published by Air Mobility Command Public Affairs Office, March 1992. 3. Bahnsen, John C., Jr. "Mr President, We Can't Go! 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