LX: Key To The Future For The Amphibious Navy CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: LX: Key To The Future For The Amphibious Navy Author: Major John R. Webb, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Although not the only program involved in the Navy's fleet moderni- zation effort, LX carries the most promise in leading the amphibious fleet out of block obsolescence as it has made the greatest advances in the tortuous ship procurement process. Background: The United States Navy has virtually ignored the condition of its amphibious fleet for many years, focusing modernization efforts on building surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft to wage naval war with the Soviet Union. Fortunately, a confrontation with the Warsaw Pact never occurred. But maintaining this anti-Soviet focus for nearly 50 years has repeatedly drawn Navy planning and acquisition programs away from efforts to improve the "gators", leading today's amphibious fleet down the road to block obsolescence. Ironically, the shaping of the "New World Order" will cause an increase in the use of amphibious forces as they "show the flag" or respond to crises in Third World nations. Fortunately, the Navy has finally realized the importance of this vital capability and has initiated development of LX, a new class of amphibious ship that will be capable of performing the missions of the many classes of retiring vessels. Although presently in the design stages, LX has already been the victim of lower military budgets, which will certainly result in reduced capabilities for the ship. Still, LX represents a huge step in carrying the amphibious Navy into the 21st century. Recommendation: Now is the time for the Navy and Marine Corps to increase involvement in the LX program, ensuring that the vessel is indeed capable of supporting future MAGTF operations. LX: KEY TO THE FUTURE FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS NAVY OUTLINE Although not the only program involved in the Navy's fleet modernization effort, LX carries the most promise in leading the amphibious fleet out of block obsolescence as it has made the greatest advances in the tortuous ship procurement process. I. Aspects of Amphibious Operations A. For ward Presence Strategy B. Block Obsolescence of Today's Fleet C. Amphibious Operations versus MPF D. Increase in Amphibious Force Usage II. Development of LX A. New Ship versus SLEP B. Fingerprint of Amphibious Lift C. Amphibious Lift Considerations 1. MEU, MEB, and MEF 2. Multi-mission Roles III. LX Today A. Design Characteristics 1. Capabilities 2. Deficiencies LX: KEY TO THE FUTURE FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS NAVY The history of warfare shows that the basic strategic asset of sea-based peoples is amphibious flexibility. In tackling land- based opponents, they can produce a distraction to the enemy's power of concentration that is advantageously disproportionate to the scale of force they employ and the resources they possess. B. H. Liddell Hart In August of 1990, President George Bush announced four elements as foundations for the national security strategy of the United States: 1. Strategic deterrence 2. Forward presence in key areas 3. World wide crisis response 4. Force reconstitution1 In projected support of this strategy, the Navy-Marine Corps team may be called upon to perform missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to counterinsurgency and crisis-response operations. In these missions, amphibious shipping will play an essential role in projecting sustainable combat power ashore. Unfortunately, amphibious operations have become more and more difficult as the Navy has largely ignored the "gator" fleet, concentrating instead on updating surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft to wage naval war with the Soviet Union. Slight improvements to the amphibious fleet have reluctantly been made, but only when the Marine Corps has pressed the issue. The result is an amphibious fleet that is rapidly reaching the end of its service life. Continuing Department of Defense budget cuts have only worsened the problem, prolonging an already sluggish effort to revive the aging amphibious armada. The scheduled retirement of 28 amphibious ships between the years 2002 and 2007 demonstrates the seriousness of the problem. More dramatically, 20 LSTs, five LSDs, five LKAs, six LPHs, and 11 LPDs will reach the end of their service lives within the next 20 years.(5:56) With this decommissioning plan, the entire complement of six ship classes will vanish. The result is a tailspin of ship retirements that is leading the U.S. amphibious fleet down the road to block obsolescence. In the past, officials within the government have not viewed the maintenance of a modern amphibious fleet as vital to national security. This notion began in the late 1940s when senior military officials questioned if the world would ever witness another amphibious operation as large as the World War II landings. In 1950, General Douglas MacArthur silenced these critics when he orchestrated his brilliant amphibious landing at Inchon during the Korean War, once again demonstrating the value of possessing the ability to project combat power from the sea. However Cold War events like the Cuban Missile Crisis soon drew the attention of the Navy back to building large combatant vessels to thwart the Warsaw Pact, allowing U. S. amphibious forces to once again slip into the subordinate position they currently maintain. Today, the recent successes of programs like Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) shipping only cloud the issue of maintaining modern combatant amphibious forces. It is true that during the Gulf War, MPF shipping proved the value of employing prepositioned armored vehicles, trucks, and other items of heavy equipment as a strategic deployment option for combat. The mobility and timely response of these forces proved instrumental in the rapid build-up of combat power ashore. Although highly successful, it should be remembered that the Gulf War MPF operations would not have been possible without a benign port facility such as the one in Al Jubail, Saudi Arabia. In addition to a secure port, the Al Jubail area offered the air facilities and road network required to facilitate the MPF off-load process. But the luxury of such a facility may not exist in our nation's next conflict. If enemy defenses require forcible entry from the sea, tanks, trucks, and supplies will have to be delivered across the beach by amphibious ships and landing craft of the U. S. Navy. It is imperative, then, that the Navy continue to maintain a viable, combat- ready amphibious fleet capable of transporting the supplies and vehicles necessary to support a myriad of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. A recent Brookings Institute study supports this claim, verifying that "amphibious forces were used in 33 percent of the incidents in which the United States was involved between 1945 and 1975." (5:56) This figure increased to nearly 70 percent as recently as 1988. Recent operations in Beirut, Grenada, and Somalia all serve as vivid reminders that "since World War II, U. S. forces have been called on more than 200 times to demonstrate national resolve in response to crises. Most of those responses were naval, and most naval responses were amphibious." (3:64) This increased use of amphibious forces, coupled with the demise of the Cold War, seems to indicate that U. S. maritime strategy is indeed shifting away from Soviet containment, focusing instead on President Bush's stated policy of maintaining global stability through forward deployment and force projection. Fortunately, the Navy recently acknowledged that aggressive efforts were urgently needed if the amphibious fleet intended to keep pace with this new strategy. In 1990, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, headed by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, validated a Mission Need Statement (MNS) for the LX, a ship design that would assume the roles of the 38 retiring vessels of the Austin (LPD 4), Raleigh (LPD 1), Anchorage (LSD 36), and Newport (LST 1179) classes.(6:69) Although not the only program involved in the Navy's fleet modernization effort, LX carries the most promise in leading the amphibious fleet out of block obsolescence as it has made the greatest advances in the tortuous ship procurement process. In determining what form LX would take, several areas were investigated by the Council. It soon became apparent that LX could evolve in one of three ways: 1. Additional models of ships currently in the Navy inventory could be constructed 2. A completely new vessel could be researched, designed, and built 3. Some form of Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) could modernize existing vessels Each of these methods has its own set of benefits and drawbacks. As an illustration, it has been noted that "the SLEP option may be more of a 'Band- Aid' than a real temporary solution. Ship survivability and maintainability becomes subject to question as ships increase in age. The amphibious operation is the most complex in military art; the imperative in amphibious warfare is the continual application of technology. Older ships with older equipment lack the capability for modern warfare. The limited benefits derived, versus the high costs of SLEP, have been the reason for not conducting the SLEP of vessels in the past."(5:56) The next area investigated is known as the amphibious lift "fingerprint", so-named because of the five categories that comprise the amphibious lift goal.2 The current fingerprint for Navy planners requires that amphibious shipping have the capability to lift the equipment and personnel of 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). This represents a figure that has been in a constant state of flux for some time. As recently as 1975, the amphibious lift goal was to maintain the ability to lift the assault echelons (AEs) of 1.33 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) size units. Following a reduction in 1979, the figure was redesignated as one MEF (AE) plus one MEB in 1982. Further budget cuts saw the number reduced to one MEF (AE) plus one MEB (AE) in 1983, with the current figure of 2.5 MEB assault echelons established in 1991. In a related article, Major Thomas C. Linn captured the frustration that Navy planners must have felt in grappling with this problem. He writes: The allocation of resources has not been sufficient to reverse the steady decline in amphibious lift capability that has occurred over the past 40 years. In 1945, the Navy possessed 1,728 amphibious ships, which constituted 40 percent of the fleet and enabled the U. S. to project 13 combat divisions. By 1979, this capability had diminished to its lowest level since the pre-Korean War period. Comprising only 14 percent of the fleet, the 65 amphibious ships in active service could lift the assault echelons of only 1.15 Marine Expeditionary Forces, or approximately 37,000 Marines. (5:54) For now, planners must work with the 2.5 MEB (AE) figure. (4) Unfortunately, the amphibious fleet has historically fallen short in the lift fingerprint areas of vehicle and cargo storage, regardless of lift goals established at the time.(1) Although accommodating troops, landing craft, and helicopters has not usually posed a problem, finding the deck space for vehicles and the storage space necessary for transporting a MAGTF's cargo has been a nightmare for Combat Cargo Officers for years. When asked if the amphibious fleet could claim today that it could actually lift the 2.5 MEB (AE) requirement, a high-ranking Navy official responded that it would take just about every vessel the Navy owns.3 That would mean no ships in a "down" status for scheduled or emergency maintenance, no ships in any type of overhaul for system upgrading or modification, and certainly no other vessels participating in operations in another part of the world. This lack of mobility suggested to the planners that a new vessel be developed with more cargo and vehicle storage space than current shipping possesses. Another area requiring attention was the issue of peacetime operational tempo. To support the President's position of forward presence, naval operations were mandated in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and in the western Pacific Ocean operating areas. With that requirement came all the associated problems in supporting time on station, transit time from the United States to the area of operation, scheduled and emergency maintenance procedures, and so on. Taking into account the average age of the current amphibious fleet, the pendulum fell heavily in favor of developing a new ship that would be capable of supporting the strenuous schedule posed by this energetic forward presence strategy. In the planner's view, the capability to keep pace became a key factor as the United States continued to lose overseas bases from which to launch military operations. Today, the preponderance of U. S. overseas bases are within the confines of NATO. However, the possibilities of conducting an operation in South America or in the Pacific theater are growing daily. Appropriately, the reliance on staging a military operation from the sea will grow as well. Planners agreed that the United States must not attempt to rely on mechanically and technologically outdated vessels in an impending era of accelerating operational tempos. Analyzing the question of updating the fleet would not have been complete without also addressing what few improvements did occur within the amphibious community in the era of the capital ship concept.4 At the top of this list was the introduction of the Wasp-class LHD. Incorporating the basic design characteristics of the LHA, the LHD performs the mission of embarking and landing elements of a Marine air-ground task force by helicopter and a variety of surface means. Although the LHD possesses basically the same aviation capability as the Tarawa-class LHA, it can stow up to three air- cushion landing craft (LCAC) in its well deck, compared to only one LCAC in the LHA. This represents a marked increase in the ability to initiate surface assaults at great distances from the beach. Alas, the future of the LHD fleet is in question as funding for the fourth and fifth vessels of the class remains tenuous.(4) Other LCAC carriers, such as the Raleigh-class LPD, have already been retired from the active list.(2) Appropriately, the planners deemed that LX should have the capability to transport at least one LCAC, lending support to the concept of conducting amphibious operations as a form of maneuver warfare from the sea. The realities of a diminished global threat and competing politico- economic interests have forced the American military to come to grips with a reduced defense budget. For the amphibious Navy, this will probably mean that the days of the five-ship Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) are rapidly coming to an end. Historically, previous ARGs have sailed with an LHD, LHA, or LPH serving as the command vessel. Along with this "big deck" would be various combinations of LPDs, LSDs1 LSTs, or LKAs. However, the inevitable down-sizing of the fleet will mean that five-ship ARGs will most likely be two- ship or three-ship ARGs in the future.(4) Consequently, planners determined that LX should be a multi-role ship, allowing it to serve as a mobile sea base for numerous missions; a crucial capability in dealing with regional contingencies that develop as the "New World Order" continues to take form. Other factors were considered during this process, including the composition of future MAGTFs, the mix of future ship-to-shore mobility systems (landing craft, helicopters, and assault vehicles), and perhaps most importantly, expected scenarios for future amphibious operations. As a result, the study concluded that the LX should possess the following minimum capabilities: 1. Living area for 700 troops 2. 25,000 square feet of vehicle storage space 3. 25,000 cubic feet of cargo storage space 4. Four helicopter landing spots 5. One LCAC spot(1) Working within these guidelines, the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) proposed 13 variants of the LX for study. Two of these variants were upgrades of the relatively new LSD 41-class vessel, while the remaining 11 were completely new ships. The list was impressive as vessels varied from just over 600 feet in length to nearly 900 feet, displacing from 17,000 tons to over 45,000 tons.(1) Not surprisingly, the two proposals for modernizing the LSD 41-class vessels received little consideration as the benefits for building a new ship were readily apparent. The question became one of determining which of the new ships would best meet the needs of supporting U.S. amphibious forces in the future. After much deliberation, naval planners recently narrowed the list to two choices. The first option is to develop the LX 901, a 684 foot vessel that displaces 23 tons. The remaining option is to build the LX 88H, a much larger vessel at 765 feet in length, displacing 33 tons.(4) Both ships meet or exceed all the minimum capabilities determined by the lift study, while providing attractive benefit versus cost ratios. To go along with these new ships, planners have allowed for several new systems that will help ensure that LX is not obsolete before it hits the water. First is the use of Copernicus, a state- of-the-art satellite communications system that far exceeds the capabilities of systems currently used in the gator fleet. (7) Although impressive, the planners have realized that Copernicus may not be the best system available when the LX enters fleet service. So the Navy is using a "turn key" approach in designing LX's communication system, providing weight and space reservations for incorporating the most modern communication equipment available at launch time. It is also refreshing to note that LX is currently designed to be capable of supporting day and night, helicopter/VSTOL flight operations. Included in this package will be the appropriate aircraft aids to navigation, the latest version of the optical landing system, and a night vision goggle-compatible flight deck lighting system. To support its embarked aviation unit, LX will provide the necessary ground support equipment, maintenance facilities, and aircraft hangaring spaces, as well as specialized handling areas for the build-up and storage of helicopter weapons. Additional refinements include the planned use of a gas-turbine power plant instead of the traditional steam plant so familiar to the gator Navy, offering increased maintenance reliability and performance. For protection, LX engineers are installing the deadly Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), and are planning to install the Stabilized Weapons System Platform, a pedestal-mounted unit that contains Hellfire and Stinger missiles, 2.75 inch rockets, and a 40 millimeter gun.(7) If needed, LX will be capable of supporting numerous casualties with its two operating rooms and over 100 beds. It is indeed regrettable that with all these improvements, LX will be lacking in a number of areas. First, the Navy has still not addressed the inclusion of aircraft radar control equipment as part of the ship's aviation support package. If the ship is to be truly aviation capable, then consideration should be given to including a radar approach facility similar to the ones used on the LPH and LHA-class vessels. This capability would allow increased aviation flexibility in allowing LX to approach all-weather operation, facilitating independent ship employment. Additionally, no provision has been made for bomb build-up areas on LX. It makes no sense at all to make the vessel capable of supporting AV-8 operations if it cannot handle the ordnance associated with the airframe. Another area that the planners have apparently chosen to ignore is the gasoline storage problem. The MAGTF uses many items of special equipment that require gasoline for operation, including outboard motors for rubber boats, motorcycles, and generators for chemical decontamination units. So prevalent is this equipment, a MEB can use up to 51,000 gallons of gasoline in a short 30 day period.(2) The problem lies in the fact that no amphibious ship has a tank certified to carry the fuel, and as of now, the LX will be no exception. With the technology that is available today, why has a suitable gasoline storage tank not been developed? Finally, the most glaring issue of neglect in LX development is the lack of offensive weaponry. When LX was first presented to Navy officials, it incorporated a weapon system very similar to the DD 993-class destroyer, possessing a five-inch gun, a Standard Missile 2 (SM 2) package, and a Mark 41 Tomahawk vertical-launch cruise missile system. But according to the officials, LX would not need these weapons. In their view, the amphibious platforms would be accompanied by carrier battle groups during times of crisis, so LX should be outfitted with defensive weapons only. Unfortunately, there have been several occasions when a carrier force was too far away to assist the ARG if the need had arisen.(6:70) In these times of reduced budgets and shrinking carrier forces, it only makes sense to equip the LX with the weapons needed to conduct offensive warfare. It is unlikely that the naval battles of tomorrow will take place on the high seas. Massive conflicts involving hundreds of U. S. ships are a part of history now; in their place will be gators navigating the "brown water" littorals of nations plagued by instability and tension. To be successful in the persecution of this forward presence strategy, continued modernization of the amphibious fleet must carry on. LX is a significant step in the right direction, if only for the fact that the step is being taken now. As such, leaders of the Navy's amphibious community must be wary of attempts by submarine and aircraft carrier proponents to redirect further funding away from this vital modernization program. Likewise, the Marine Corps must continue to support this program with all means available. To do otherwise will most certainly result in an amphibious fleet that is obsolete by the 21st century. ENDNOTES 1. This policy was first announced by the President in an address delivered on August 2, 1990, however the theme has been echoed repeatedly by senior military and governmental officials. 2. In determining the lift fingerprint, naval planners must investigate five areas. These include troop transport capability, helicopter transport capability, vehicle storage space, cargo storage space, and assault craft transportability (assault amphibious tractors and air-cushion landing craft). 3. This statement was made during a presentation to the 1992 class of the USMC Command and Staff College by a speaker who requested anonymity. 4. The capital ship concept refers to the historical trend in naval construction of emphasizing the development of vessels to support the aircraft carrier. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Barfoot, Dr. C. Bernard. LX Project Director, Center for Naval Analyses. Personal Interview of 3 January 92. 2. Groothoff, Capt. William L. New Ship Construction Officer, Warfighting Requirements Branch, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Personal Interview of 18 March 92. 3. Howe, Cdr. Robert H. "Tomorrow's Gator Navy." Proceedings December 88: 63-67. 4. Jankura, Cdr. Edward S. Navy Amphibious Warfare Liaison Officer, Warfighting Requirements Branch, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Personal Interview of 13 March 92. 5. Linn, Maj. Thomas C. "Amphibious Shipping Shortfall Undermines Maritime Strategy." Armed Forces Journal International April 89: 54-58. 6. McCartney, LCdr. Pat G. "The Amphibious Fleet of Tomorrow." Marine Corps Gazette April 92: 69-70. 7. Nalchajian, Donald. LX Design Integration Manager, Naval Sea Systems Command. Personal Interview of 18 March 92.
