Rethinking Close Air Support CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Rethinking Close Air Support Author: Major J. M. Redman, United States Marine Corps Thesis: For the direct air support of troops in close contact with the enemy, the best asset to accomplish the mission will be, more than not, the attack helicopter. Background: The Marine Corps has long considered close air support to be the main purpose of Marine aviation. The concepts and techniques of close air support have evolved through the years based on the nature of the conflict and the innovation of Marines. Results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War brought about the most significant changes in close air support techniques. These techniques have allowed Marine aviation to continue to provide air support to ground forces despite significant improvements in air defense systems. Although the conduct of close air support with fixed-wing aircraft is still viable, it has become extremely difficult to accomplish on the modern battlefield. The coordination and communication necessary for success is complicated by the use of electronic warfare by the enemy. While the execution of close air support with tactical jets has become more difficult, the fire power capability of the attack helicopter has increased. This increased firepower, coupled with the ability of the helicopter to fly low and slow and remain near front lines, makes the attack helicopter a suitable alternative for close air support. Forward positioning of attack helicopters to support ground units reduces response time and decreases the need for communications. This makes close air support easier to execute. Recommendation: Marine Corps doctrine for the employment of aviation should be changed to reflect a greater reliance on the attack helicopter for close air support and the use of fixed-wing aircraft for missions which utilize their speed, range, and firepower. Additionally, the inventory of attack helicopters in the Marine Corps should be increased. RETHINKING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OUTLINE Thesis: For the direct air support of troops in close contact with the enemy, the best asset to accomplish the mission will be, more than not, the attack helicopter. I. Evolution of close air support A. Pre-1973 B. Post-1973 II. Requirements for close air support A. Responsiveness B. Effectiveness C. Survivability III. Advantages of the attack helicopter A. Forward positioning B. Reduced communications C. Target acquisition/identification D. Reduced weather capable IV. Positive steps taken A. Night attack system B. More aircraft RETHINKING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT The U.S. Marine Corps has always considered the employment of aviation integral to the efforts of its ground forces. This tradition began shortly after World War I when the first Director of Marine Corps Aviation, Major Alfred A. Cunningham, wrote: ". . . the only excuse for aviation in any service is its usefulness in assisting the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their operations." Marine Corps concepts and techniques for conducting close air support(CAS) originated during the "Banana Wars" of the 1920s and 1930s and have continuously been refined through experiences in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.(10:13) During an address to the officers at Quantico in 1988, General A.M. Gray asked them what the purpose of Marine aviation was. The overwhelming response from the audience was to support the Marine on the ground. General Gray firmly corrected the officers stating that the aviation combat element (ACE) is there to support the MAGTF commander in the accomplishment of his mission. Since that address, maneuver warfare has been officially adopted as the basis for Marine Corps doctrine, and discussions over the role of the ACE in maneuver warfare have been ongoing. This dialogue over the role of aviation has resulted in the expression of many ideas about what is required for the ACE to operate most effectively in support of the MAGTF in maneuver warfare. One of these concepts envisions the ACE as another maneuver element of the MAGTF. As such, the ACE would be used not only in support of the ground combat element (GCE) but also operate as an independent element with its own mission. Currently, doctrine still says that the primary mission of MAGTF aviation is the support of the GCE. (5:1-1) There are missions other than direct air support that aviation can do that can have a decisive effect on the MAGTF's mission; however, this does not mean close air support will not be equally important. In examining Marine aviation and its doctrine for employment, we should review all current practices to make sure we are conducting operations in the most effective manner. This includes our doctrine for conducting close air support. In the execution of maneuver warfare we want to task aviation to accomplish something that no other arm can do. A corollary of that would be that we want to select the best asset to do the mission at hand. For the direct air support of troops in close contact with the enemy, the best asset to accomplish the mission will be, more than not, the attack helicopter. This is not to say that the Marine Corps does not need fixed-wing air support. On the contrary, fixed-wing aircraft are what make the MAGTF unique and enhance its combat power far above the size of its ground forces. However, based on their speed, range, and combat power, they are better utilized in a battlefield air interdiction role. To understand why the attack helicopter should be the primary emphasis for close air support, we should begin by examining the evolution of close air support and the environment in which it developed. This study will lead to a discussion of the capabilities that are most important in successfully fulfilling the CAS mission. From these considerations we can highlight the advantages of the attack helicopter over the use of a tactical jet. The Marine Corps began to develop close air support in the 1920s while conducting operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. These operations were conducted against rebel style forces in jungle type terrain. The technique of dive bombing was developed due to a need to deliver ordnance accurately through the dense jungle. During these actions the only antiaircraft defenses were rifle fire. Pilots were able to fly at an altitude of only 1500 feet without fear of suffering any damage. These relatively low flying aircraft could maintain an awareness of the situation on the ground and had little difficulty identifying the enemy. They communicated with ground forces mostly by Very Pistol, pick-up and drop messages, and panels. (8:73) These early techniques for close air support were carried into World War II and continually improved throughout action in the Pacific. Procedures were required for overcoming the thick jungle conditions where distinguishing friend from enemy was difficult. On Guadalcanal, when air colored panels proved unsuccessful, radio-equipped air forward observers were placed with front-line forces. On Bougainville close cooperation resulted in air strikes that destroyed Japanese forces within 500 yards of Marine lines and sometimes as close as 75 yards. Use of pre-mission briefs by infantry officers on the terrain peculiarities and tactical situation, flights of strike aircraft with ground liaison officers aboard, and assignment of air liaison officers with rifle companies all helped promote the cooperation and coordination needed. The use of colored smoke to mark friendly positions and white smoke to mark the enemy also contributed to the effective employment of aviation to support ground forces. Because of minimal air defenses and lack of an air threat, extensive efforts were made to identify hostile targets, but these didn't always prevent bombing of friendly units. The employment techniques developed in these early battles would carry over through the rest of World War II and be the basis of doctrine for Korea and Vietnam. (8:167) Close air support in Korea and Vietnam was conducted under basically the same conditions as in the Pacific. Aircraft operated in a permissive environment that showed no significant improvement in air defenses or in an air-to-air threat. As in previous wars the enemy was mostly infantry fighting in rugged terrain and thick vegetation. Major changes in execution of CAS included the replacement of propeller driven aircraft with jet aircraft and the use of airborne forward air controllers. The first resulted in greater survivability but also made target acquisition more difficult. The second aided in target acquisition. In Vietnam, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided aircraft to the ground units of the Third Marine Amphibious Force by pushing them to airborne alert positions on a continual basis during all hours of the day and critical times at night. Ground units would then call the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) to have an available aircraft sent to them. Aircraft would fly into the area at medium altitudes and contact the final controller who would talk the pilot onto the target. Throughout this development of close air support, Marine aviation seldom had to be concerned with other types of missions. Except for times in World War II when Marines took part in the air superiority battle or the naval battle, there was not a requirement to conduct typical interdiction missions. Thus the focus was on CAS. During Korea and Vietnam the air superiority and interdiction missions were mainly conducted by the Air Force. Again, the Marines were able to focus their efforts on support of their ground forces with the exception of a few sorties that were provided to assist the Air Force effort. (11:285) Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Marine Corps began to take notice of the changes on the modern battlefield and their effect on air support. With the growing Soviet threat and the likelihood that a war with the Soviets would include Marine Corps participation, the lessons from the Middle East were important. As applies to air support, the most significant change to warfare was the introduction of an integrated air defense system. Surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems forced aircraft to fly below the effective altitude of the radar guided missiles. This placed them in the envelope of radar-guided antiaircraft artillery (AAA) which proved to be extremely more effective than the manually guided systems Marines had faced in previous wars. For protection from these systems close air support tactics were developed using low level flight to mask the aircraft from enemy radars. Low level flight terminates in a pop-up at the target for acquisition and identification. The use of these tactics requires a terminal controller to mark the target by some means such as artillery and to employ assets to suppress local air defense systems. These current techniques for CAS result in a necessity for good coordination and communication. This requirement is encumbered by the use of electronic warfare to jam aircraft communications. This is on top of the difficulty already associated with talking to a low flying aircraft from a position on the ground. Even without enemy activity it is hard to accomplish the mission. With the chaos that will occur in actual battle, the execution of close air support with fast moving aircraft becomes even harder. Another aspect of the modern battlefield is the mobility and firepower. In previous wars Marines faced an enemy that was foot mobile. Actions against the enemy were relatively slow-paced and allowed time to call in close air support. In an armored environment there may not be enough time to wait for an aircraft to come from somewhere else. It must be available immediately. Also, in this environment the enemy is more likely to have weaknesses in his rear area which will require the use of aviation assets to go deep to attack. These changes in the environment in which CAS must be executed have had a noteworthy impact. Prior to 1973 a pilot could orbit above the battlefield out of harms way until he was requested by a ground unit. CAS could be conducted at altitudes where a pilot could see the target area easily and could have a terminal controller talk his eyes onto the target. Communications were not hindered by anything other than the technological limitations. Coordination was relatively simple, and the only major problem that occurred was the weather. Today, to meet the threat of the mid-intensity battlefield with an integrated air defense, we must depend on the ability to communicate in an electronic warfare environment sufficiently to coordinate getting air on station, marking the target, and suppressing the enemy's air defenses. Aircraft can not linger over the battlefield and respond immediately to air requests. They can remain in an airborne alert status out of range of enemy radars, but this is not the most efficient way to use them, because of the amount of fuel burned by modern jet aircraft. In a sustained land campaign, this could be costly in the long run. In determining the capabilities of an aircraft to perform close air support, we can generally break the requirements into three categories: responsiveness, effectiveness, and survivability. No matter what environment, but especially an armored one, the Marine on the ground wants air there immediately. The most rapid response from a jet aircraft will come when it is in an airborne alert status. This concept is easily accomplished, but it also has drawbacks. First, in a situation where assets are scarce, airborne alert is considered an inefficient use of assets and may require the extensive use of airborne tankers. Second, the ground unit must request the asset through the air command and control system which may be overburdened. As a forward air controller in a large exercise, I often found the air request net to be extremely busy when I needed to request air. The other method of rapid response is to place aircraft on ground alert in a rear area. This technique is more efficient than airborne alert; however, it still requires going through the command and control system. Also, the aircraft will have farther to go to get to the target. Forward basing of the AV-8B Harrier is a concept designed to minimize response time which in turn reduces fuel requirements and increases payload. In theory, this is a great concept, but in reality the limitations of the aircraft and the logistical requirements to support forward site operations make it a less than optimum solution. (9:19) The next capability needed of a close air support aircraft is to be effective. To be effective a pilot must be able to communicate with the terminal controller, acquire the target, and deliver, during day, night, or bad weather, sufficient combat power to destroy the target. The Marine Corps has the doctrine to be able to conduct effective CAS during the day, but as previously mentioned it takes a great deal of coordination and requires good communications. To talk to an aircraft on a low level ingress, the terminal controller often times must relay through some other agency. This in itself complicates the process. Presently, the Marine Corps is limited in its ability to conduct CAS at night or in bad weather. This is being improved with the introduction of the F-18D and the incorporation of the night attack system into the Harrier, but these are still relatively untested in operations close to friendly troops and leave us limited in our all-weather capability. The final qualification that a close air support platform must meet is survivability. In an environment with a heavy integrated air defense system, one key to survival is minimum exposure time. Exposure to air defense systems can be minimized by destruction, suppression, confusion, or evasion. Destruction and/or suppression of air defense systems is the responsibility of the supported ground unit. Confusion is accomplished with electronic countermeasures, infrared flares, and chaff dispensers. Evasion is the result of utilizing appropriate tactics to remain hidden from the threat as long as possible. For the modern battlefield this means flight as close to the earth as possible at high airspeeds. This increases the complexity of conducting CAS and requires skill and a high degree of training. In a permissive environment as experienced in Vietnam and before, or as was attained in the Persian Gulf War, survivability is achieved by gaining air superiority and flying above the threat of AAA. (13:15) The Marine Corps does have the capability to meet close air support requirements with fixed-wing aircraft, but in a manner that has become complex and difficult to coordinate even in peacetime training. In a mid-intensity conflict with a non-permissive air defense environment, fixed-wing close air support may reach a point where it is not feasible. The speed, range, and payload capability of tactical jet aircraft make them more suited to attacking major targets in the enemy's rear area that may have a decisive effect on the enemy's ability to fight. The Marines had never really faced a situation, until the Persian Gulf War, where there was an adequate array of rear area targets to strike. This can explain why close air support has become the primary mission for Marine fixed-wing aircraft. We should keep this in mind as we look at our doctrine for employing the ACE in future conflicts. Realizing that fixed-wing aviation can perform the CAS mission, then we must look at the capability of the attack helicopter to see if it is a better platform to accomplish the mission. The greatest advantage of the helicopter is its responsiveness to ground forces. The ability of these assets to move right along with ground forces or wait in holding areas close by puts them where they need to be immediately. A good example of this occurred in the Persian Gulf War. The commanding general of the 1st Marine Division found himself at one point in front of his leading elements. All of a sudden, he had Iraqi T-62 tanks coming at him. About the time he realized this, a flight of AH-1 Cobras appeared and took the tanks under fire. In this one engagement alone, this flight of Cobras took out nine tanks and five other armored vehicles. (4:49) Not only can attack helicopters locate themselves close to the infantry, but they can, if the situation warrants, sit at ground idle and extend their time on station considerably. If that isn't feasible, a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) can be easily established using a couple of transport helicopters carrying fuel and ordnance. One AH-1 pilot stated that he has been able to remain on station for nearly five hours. (3:38) This is the responsiveness that is required for the close support of troops. This forward stationing capability of the attack helicopters also makes it very effective in the close support role. With the capability to land and receive a face-to-face brief from a ground unit commander, the problems in communication between the terminal controller and the aircraft are mostly alleviated. This is similar to the methods used in World War II at Bougainville; the pilots are briefed on the terrain and the current tactical situation. The nature of the helicopter and its ability to fly low also increase its effectiveness. For fixed-wing aircraft at high speeds target acquisition is their number one obstacle. A low, slow flying helicopters, with two sets of eyeballs and familiarity with the situation, will have an easier time acquiring targets and identifying them. With reduced visibility often being the greatest weather restriction, attack helicopters can operate in conditions far worse than fixed-wing aircraft. Whether the ceilings are only 200 feet or the visibility less than a mile, by flying profiles of 10 feet in altitude and less than 40 knots, the AH-1 can still operate. Although the night capability is very limited at this time, funding for a night attack system has been approved, and the AH-1W night attack capability in the future will equal that of any fixed-wing aircraft. The delivery of sufficient combat power is the last criteria of effectiveness that must be assessed. No doubt fixed-wing assets carry more punch overall, but the firepower on the AH-1W is nothing to ignore. With the capability to carry up to eight Hellfire and TOW antitank missiles, 2.75 or 5 inch rockets, and 750 rounds of 20mm ammunition, a flight of AH-1Ws could provide adequate close support to an infantry unit. This is particularly true if we use fixed-wing aviation farther out to disrupt large enemy formations. I believe it is safe to say that attack helicopters are very effective. The final measurement to test the capability of the attack helicopter is survivability. This is where many opponents would say that it falls short. Several articles have referred to helicopter losses in Vietnam as an indication that they will not be able to survive on the modern battlefield. Although helicopters are vulnerable to a variety of weapons systems, so is a Marine infantryman. Survival consists of four elements: orientation, susceptibility, defendability, and vulnerability. To survive a pilot must remain oriented to events on the battlefield. He must employ the appropriate tactics to reduce his susceptibility to detection by the enemy. He must have the capability to respond if detected. Finally, if fired on, the aircraft must be able to sustain some damage and return to a secure area. (12:69) Attack helicopters can survive on the modern battlefield by using the terrain to reduce susceptibility and standoff weapons systems when the situation requires it. Where the AH-1W is deficient is in its armor protection; however, as the Gulf War showed, the AV-8B is also very vulnerable when hit. One additional area that should be regarded in this study is the use of air support in the amphibious assault. This is the main reason that Marines have such an extensive air force and very little artillery support. In the traditional amphibious assault the fire power of fixed-wing aircraft would be preferred over the attack helicopter. Today, with the application of maneuver warfare doctrine, this may not be true. We want to make our landing in an area where the enemy is not, so the use of attack helicopters is viable. We still need to employ fixed-wing aircraft for interdiction of the enemy in the amphibious objective area and to shape the battlefield. The attack helicopter, whether the AH-1 or the AH-64, proved in the Persian Gulf War that it is a credible asset on the modern battlefield and can survive. With the reality of a shrinking budget, we must make careful decisions on our force composition. One way to save money is to invest more in less expensive attack helicopters and less in more expensive tactical jet aircraft. The F/A-18 strike/fighter is an immensely capable airframe and, in my opinion, can do everything that the Marine Corps needs in a tactical fixed-wing aircraft. The Marine Corps has recently taken some very positive steps in enhancing the employment of the attack helicopter. One of these, the night attack system, has already been mentioned. The other is the decision to increase the number of AH-1s in the light attack helicopter squadrons from twelve to eighteen. In line with these steps, doctrine should be changed to reflect a greater reliance on the attack helicopter as a CAS platform. This would include deletion of the term close-in fire support. Another step that should be made is to stop deployment of AV-8Bs with our Marine Expeditionary Units and double the number of attack helicopters that deploy. This would, however, require the number of attack helicopter squadrons in the Marine Corps to be increased. That doesn't sound like a bad idea either! BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Anderson, Lt. Col. Joseph T. "AV-8B Night Attack. Marine Corps Gazette May 89: 26. 2. Davis, Capt. Dale R. "Close Air Support Revisited: Doctrine, Tactics, and Technology. Marine Corps Gazette October 90: 34. 3. Dixon Jr., Maj. William H. "Close-In Fire Support: Is It Degraded by Bad Doctrine? Marine Corps Gazette October 90: 37. 4. Ewers, Col. Norman G. "A Conversation With Lt. Gen. Royal N. Moore, Jr." Marine Corps Gazette October 91: 44. 5. FMFM 5-4A Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1988. 6. Garrett, Thomas. "Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go?" Parameters December 90: 29. 7. Gibson, Maj. Mark J. and Maj. Barry M. Ford. "Do Grunts Deserve the AH-1W SuperCobra? Marine Corps Gazette September 90: 71. 8. Hallion, Richard P. Strike from the Sky Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989. 9. McDonald, Capt. Sean P. "Expeditionary Site Operations." Marine Corps Gazette January 90: 18. 10. Mersky, Peter B. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the Present Annapolis, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983. 11. Momyer, Gen. William W. Airpower in Three Wars Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985. 12. Ponnwitz, Lt. Col. Alfred J. "Understanding Survivability." Marine Corps Gazette August 89: 69. 13. Saye, Wing Commander Jeremy G. "Close Air Support in Modern Warfare." Air University Review January-February 80: 2.
